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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two parts. Part I examines three historical attempts at
explaining colour on the basis of Goethe's Farbenlehre. Schopenhauer, Hegel and
Wittgenstein each give successful explanations of some but not all colour phenomena.
As they succeed and fail in the same areas in which more recent subjectivist and
objectivist accounts succeed and fail it must be concluded that the nature of colour does
not allow for reduction to subjective states of mind or to objective physical processes.
Part II examines colour itself: The first three chapters establish internal colour
relations. Colour language and colour blindness re-introduce the human subject whose
importance is most evident in the contemplation of paintings. As paintings cannot only
represent three dimensional objects but can also evoke feelings through mere colour
effects, colour is an important medium for the communication of subjectivity and
ideality.
The conclusion is twofold. First, we have to strictly differentiate between the
ontology and the epistemology of colour: Colour exists objectively and hence
independently of observers, but internal colour relations are nevertheless determined by
human thought. Secondly, colour is irreducible: although science can explain most of
its aspects the nature of colour itself can only be understood through the irreducible
variety of colour effects.
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INTRODUCTION
The physical properties of light and colour, the physiology and psychology of colour
vision and its evolution, and even the structure of colour language have all been studied
in great detail over the last thirty years or so. The result is a large number of theories
most of which are consistent with each other, so that one might be justified in saying
that we, the scientifically educated that is, know everything there is to know about
colour, with the exception perhaps of a few details which will surely be known in the
foreseeable future.
To write a philosophical treatise on colour may therefore seem a superfluous
exercise. Yet I hope to demonstrate that a philosophical exposition can show colour's
true colours in a way scientific theories cannot. As the pun suggests, I believe that the
notion of truth regarding colour is at least partially self-referential. Hence it cannot be
grasped without looking at the colours themselves. It follows that colours are
irreducible to non-visible quantities, be they physical, physiological or chemical.
The aim of this thesis is to show what scientific theories try to explain, when
they explain colours by reducing them to quantitative entities. By looking at colour I
therefore hope to explain the object of investigation that scientific and philosophical
theories have in common. Although colour is an object of investigation in this sense, it
will prove to be a good example for showing that there are no pure objects. I believe
that by definition there can be no object without a subject and no subject without an
object. (In other words, the notion of "object" only makes sense in connection with the
notion of "subject".) Thus the object is defined in two ways:
First, the object must be distinct from the subject (for otherwise it would be the
subject); by being different from the subject as well as from other objects, each object
is placed in space and time (for difference as we know it can only exist in space and
time. Secondly, the object exists only in the sense in which it exists for the subject (for
if it was not known to the subject it would be an object without a subject, which
contradicts its own definition).
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The subject, on the other hand, is extensionless intentional consciousness;
hence subjects cannot exist without objects as they would then not be conscious of
anything, which is contrary to their definition. Accordingly any object is an intentional
object.1
All acts of perception may be considered as fundamental connections between
subject and object (a subject perceiving an object). Some kinds of perception, however,
are said to be "more objective" than others. Thus the automatic taking of images by an
electron microscope seems to be a more objective way of capturing the world than a
hallucination is. "Objective" in this sense means something like "independence of
individual perceivers and their states of mind". Hallucinations are only seen (or
"experienced") by one individual at a time and are hence highly "subjective" in the
sense that they are strongly bound to that perceiving subject and would not exist
without it. Since colour can be experienced in hallucinations but can also be
investigated and analysed in laboratories, I shall argue that subjective as well as
objective aspects are essential to the nature of colour.
This thesis consists of two parts. In the first part I introduce and discuss the ontology of
colour as seen by strong subjectivists, weak subjectivists, and objectivists. As I found a
little of each theory together with many useful examples in Goethe's Farbenlehre, I
begin with a brief overview of this influential work on colour and then devote a chapter
to each of the above theories as developed by Schopenhauer, Hegel and Wittgenstein
respectively, all of whom refer to Goethe in their writings on colour. I also include
more recent versions of these theories at the end of each chapter, and a fifth chapter on
Schopenhauer's and Goethe's understanding of Platonic Ideas of colour.
While this first part of my thesis is mainly historical, the second part tries to
explain various aspects of colour itself. Because I believe that colours need to be
looked at to be understood, this part includes many colour illustrations. It will become
apparent that each of the previously discussed theories is more useful in explaining
some aspects of colour than others. It seems that this is necessarily the case: Because
'
This paragraph must be taken as a general premiss for my thesis. Each of its statements obviously requires
arguments which lead far beyond the scope of this thesis.
-)
'
This applies to any definition of "mind".
5
colour is a natural bridge between subject and object it contains properties of both,
which any purely subjective or purely objective theory will have to deny. Hence a
complete account of colour will have to include both subjective and objective aspects.
Part two is divided into five chapters: In the first chapter (ch.VI) I try to
establish the relationship between light and colour. Linked to the theme of light and
darkness is the understanding of monochrome colours as well as of transparency and
opacity. As it is possible to explain these concepts without reference to scientific
measurements, I take this second chapter (ch.VII) as an opportunity to argue for a
purely phenomenal account of colour as being just as helpful and complete as a
scientific account (albeit for different purposes). In the following chapter (ch.VIII) a
similar technique is applied to explain the notion of "primary colour". More than any
other colour concept, the different definitions of the term "primary colour" show how
much our colour concepts depend on purposes of use. As different purposes require
different concepts, my next chapter (ch.IX) discusses the topic of colour-language. It
will become apparent that the successful use of colour words does not only depend on
the linguistic framework of one's community, but also on the specific visual apparatus
of the individual user of the language. Various kinds of colour deficiencies necessarily
prohibit the learning of certain concepts. A careful investigation of the uses of colour
language thus shows how colour is both an "objective object" of perception enabling
ostensive definitions, and yet qua object invariably bound to a subject.
So far, all of my results can also be explained by one or a combination of several
scientific accounts. These, however, claim to be "more objective" than a "philosophical
exposition" such as mine is, forgetting that they too are consciously chosen by one or
several subjects. Furthermore, any scientific account rests on premisses which
philosophers cannot question unless they are also trained scientists. To support my
belief that an account such as mine (even if it should prove wrong or misleading in
some areas) is more helpful for the understanding of colour phenomena than any
scientific account is, I add one more chapter on the role of colour in painting (ch.X). I
shall argue that the possibility of abstract art provides a strong argument for the
inadequacy of any reductionist account of colour. If there is this one aspect of life
which is irreducible to "purely objective" entities, such as atoms and light-waves,
similar accounts might be extended to other aspects of human existence in order to
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prove that identity theories are insufficient as philosophical explanations. Although I
cannot claim to arrive at a conclusion as strong as this, my thesis can perhaps serve as
an important part in a larger argument.
This raises the question of what such an argument would try to achieve. Given
that most philosophers cannot question scientific results because they are not
scientifically trained, any fruitful discussion between scientists and philosophers has to
based on a common set of concepts. Thus philosophers including myself should avoid
the Goethean fallacy of trying to prove Newtonians wrong. Newton has not been
proven wrong by Goethe, but nor has he been proven wrong by Einstein. What has
happened instead is that the universal applicability of Newton's theories has been put
into question. And just as Einstein showed that Newtonian mechanics only applies
within a limited (idealised) context, Goethe and his followers showed that Newton's
theory of colour only applies in a very limited context ("under laboratory conditions").
If someone asked me, what Goethe, Schopenhauer, Hegel and Wittgenstein had
in common with Newton, I could say that they all wrote about colour. In this thesis I try
to show what it is that they all wrote about. So if someone asked me what my own
research had in common with the research carried out by physicists, physiologists, or
other scientists, I would again say that we all investigated the nature of colour. The
main difference between me and most philosophers and scientists is that I try to find
nothing but general truths about colour while most of the others investigate colour
within a given framework.34 Thus the general tendency of my thesis is first to look and
then to theorise, rather than first to adopt a theory and then to see whether colours can
be explained by this theory. Thus I hope to look at colours with as little prejudice as
possible in order to establish general rules about colour, and only then to ask which of
the current or past theories is most successful at explaining these rules.
One might compare my thesis to a general introduction to taxonomy: It attempts
to classify colours (into primary and secondary colours for instance), to establish basic
colour relations and wherever applicable their hierarchies, to find habitats for certain
colour concepts and to establish what the necessary features of each colour are. Basic
taxonomical systems can be explained with reference to evolution or to anatomy, but
3 It is of course questionable whether it is possible to investigate a topic without any framework
at all. My own enquiry for instance is based on the supposition that I can more or less trust my eyes.
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also with historical references to Western European thinking in the 18th and 19th
century, or even with reference to universal features of human conceptualisation.
Similarly, the truths of the colour relations which are expressed in part II of this thesis
can be justified in many ways. Most of these ways of justification or causal explanation
do not compete with each other, as each has its own method. And just as a physical
explanation cannot replace a linguistic or a physiological one, so too Hegel's sytem
cannot replace or be undermined by Wittgenstein's language games; nor can Goethe
prove Newton wrong or vica versa.
This thesis is a philosophical exposition of colour in that it tries to show as
many facets of colour as is possible in a limited space, but at the same time ordering
these facets in such a way that they make sense to people in various contexts. The order
of colour qualities as represented in colour spaces is, I believe, intrinsic to the nature of
colour and in this sense necessary to our understanding of colour. Whether the nature of
colour and thus the necessary relations which are essential to colour are purely
conceptual or whether the nature of colour is ultimately determined by perceiver-
independent features I am not quite sure about. Perhaps I am not philosophically mature
enough to decide for one philosophical system over another. Although my conclusion
gives Wittgenstein preference over Hegel, this leaves me uneasy and unfulfilled. I
would rather, my thesis was read as an exposition which could be used as the starting
point to fresh debates about the nature of colour, rather than as the closing point to any
such discussion. For most philosophical systems are compatible with my results, even
if many of them would require some modifications or at least shifts of emphasis. I do
not think that this is a weakness of my account of colour. Perhaps our colourful world
can only be grasped in the colourful multitude of differing philosophical theories. The
need for a new philosophy of colour is thus not the need for yet another theory of
colour but the need for philosophers, to abandon "perfect" theories in order to make
room for living phenomena.
4
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"Das Hochste ware zu begreifen, daB alles Faktische schon Theorie ist. Die
Blaue des Himmels offenbart uns das Grundgesetz der Chromatik. Man suche nur
nichts hinter den Phanomenen: sie selbst sind die Lehre."5
5 "It would be the highest [achievement]: to grasp that all fact is already theory. The blueness of the
sky reveals to us the fundamental law of chromatics. One really should not search for anything beyond
the pheneomena: they themselves instruct us." (lit. "they themselves are the Lehre" - see appendix for
the use of "Lehre".) (Goethe, M&R 488, HAD, p.432)
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I
GOETHE'S FARBENLEHRE IN 1997
Goethe was the first person writing about colour who divided colour phenomena into
three groups depending on the degree of subjectivity involved in their perception. His
Farbenlehre1 is arguably the most influential treatise on colour ever written, even if no
important philosopher, scientist or artist completely agrees with it as a whole.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe is not usually considered a philosopher. Even
those critics who regard Goethe's writings as deeply thoughtful, wise and moral, call
him a "Thinker" rather than a "Philosopher". This is due to his lack of philosophical
rigour and argument on the one hand, and to Goethe's own statements about philosophy
on the other. For Goethe distrusted philosophical systems. He frequently mocked
philosophers for first narrowing their ideas into strict lines of thought and then being
forced to follow these lines to untenable extremes. That I still want to explain Goethe's
philosophy sytematically may be against Goethe's wishes. Yet I see no other way of
making his Farbenlehre accessible to philosophers, and that again is in Goethe's interest
who had hoped his work would be continued. Altogether I share Gadamer's view
(1967) that Goethe is philosophically and not merely poetically interesting.2
Altogether Goethe considered himself to be more of a scientist than a
philosopher. This is ironic when one considers the influence he still has on
1
Throughout this thesis I refer to Goethe's thoughts as his Farbenlehre. I use neither quotation marks nor
italics as I do not mean his complete Zur Farbenlehre nor merely its didactic part (most commonly referred to
as "Goethe's Farbenlehre"), but rather Goethe's thoughts on colour as a whole. These are as much expressed in
his poetry and prose as in his scientific writings, and of these scientific writings the thoughts about the
"Urplant" in particular are just as relevant as many paragraphs of Zur Farbenlehre as published in 1810.
(Please see also appendix for an explanation of the meaning of the word "Farbenlehre", and my chapter on
Wittgenstein for the importance of Goethe's method as a "Lehre". - see ch.IV, 3.4).
9
Goethe's philosophical essays are collected in Heymacher (1905). Vorlander (1898) offers a detailed
comparison between Goethe and Kant, but the philosopher mainly associated with Goethe is Spinoza.
Gebhardt (1929) claims that Goethe was "Spinozean" before he even read Spinoza, and Bollacher (1969) too
argues that Goethe came to Spinozean results independently from reading his work; see also Dilthey (1914),
Franz (1932) and of course Goethe himself ("Studie nach Spinoza", HA 13 pp.7-10).
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philosophers compared to his influence on contemporary scientists. Even if Goethe
initiated much research in his own time he will hardly be considered a scientist on the
same level as Newton or even some less famous scientists. For it is not unproblematic
to treat Goethe as a scientist. As Wittgestein shows, Goethe's Farbenlehre might more
fruitfully be understood and used if one clearly separates between his approach as
philosophical and Newton's as scientific (see also pp.98-9). I too believe that Goethe
was wrong in assuming to have proven Newton's theory to be false. What Goethe
offers is an alternative way of looking at colour as such, and as a philosopher I myself
prefer his way of looking at colour. But as I said in my introduction, this does not mean
that I wish to ignore scientific methods or results, but rather that I do not think them to
be useful to philosophers. Those contemporary scientists and philosophers of science
who believe that we will soon look back at Goethe's methodology with renewed
interest do not, I believe, think that they can prove Newton wrong either. Rather, they
hope for a paradigm shift within science to a more human (subject) orientated science
following Goethe's example.
3
The evaluations of Goethe as scientist range from Brewster (1840) ,who thought that the Farbenlehre was
worthless, to Burwick (1987) who claims that the renowned scientists Purkunje (whom Goethe met in Prague),
Hering, Miiller and Land are all Goethean scientists. Wells (1968) defends quantitative science against Goethe
and counters some of Goethe's experiments, and Nisbet (1972) denies the originality of Goethe's work, but
many critics - though sceptical of some parts - find scientifically significant facts in the Farbenlehre (Abraham
(1983), Bohme (1987), Tyndall (1880), Young (1840), Wilhelmi (1988)). Other writers simply do not treat
Goethe as a scientist but as a humanist (Arnold (1989), Wohlbold (1927)), or as a discoverer of the whole of
nature (Bluntschli (1951), Madelung (1951), Walther (1930)). Heisenberg (1941, 1967) and von Weizsacker
(1957) rebuke Goethe's method but praise the moral value of the Farbenlehre; and finally there is a group of
thinkers who regret the narrow boundaries of modern science and see Goethe as a forerunner of a better
science which does not rest on the "false ontological distinctions" between science and the humanities (Hegge,
1987); see also Altner (1987), Barnouw (1987), Benn (1949), Carus (1930), Sepper (1987), Speiser (1951) and
Zajonc (1987).
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1. The Text of the Farbenlehre
As a truly holistic thinker Goethe's philosophy embraces the whole of living nature and
it does so in all his works: in his poetry and his plays, in his fiction and his scientific
writings, in recorded conversations and in letters. Goethe writes about nature and art,
about beauty and ugliness, and in all of life he sees the same forces of polarity pulling
us apart and keeping us alive. The Farbenlehre is one example of Goethe's philosophy.
It explains one aspect of nature (namely colour) within the whole of nature, and in an
exemplary fashion it thus includes the whole of his natural philosophy.
Goethe worked most intensely on his Farbenlehre from 1790 to 1810. But he
had been fascinated by colour phenomena long before and continued serious work on
colour up to his very last days in 18324. The work Zur Farbenlehre was published on
16 May 1810 (some smaller "Contributions to Optics" had already appeared in
1791/92) consisting of three parts, a short supplement, and some forty pages of colour
illustrations and explanations of his experiments. The three main parts are:
1. The "didactic" part which contains all of Goethe's experiments and observations,
divided into physiological, physical, and chemical colours, as well as three shorter
sections which apply the results of the first three parts to morality and aesthetics. I shall
discuss this part in greater detail throughout this thesis.
2. The "polemical" part against Newton which consists of detailed discussions of
Newton's Optics', it includes experiments which - according to Goethe - refute Newton's
theory. This part is more polemical than scholarly and the cause of most of the sharp
criticism of Goethe up to today. Alfred Schone compares the work to a passionate
religious argument5 and I myself shall exclude it from my investigation since its most
important points are repeated in the didactic and historical parts as well as in some of
4
See Eckermann, vol.2, p.278
5
A.Schone, Goethes Farbentheologie, 1987.
See also Wittgenstein who could be referring to Goethe, when he writes: "Wo sich wirklich zwei Prinzipien
treffen, die sich nicht miteinander aussohnen konnen, da erklart jeder den Andern fur einen Narren und
Ketzer." - "Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man
declares the other a fool and heretic." (On Certainty, 611)
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the smaller writings. Also, Goethe himself later regretted having published this work
and recommended it to be left out of future publications.6
3. The "historical" part is a collection of writings on colour from the Pre-Socratics up to
Newton and then Goethe himself, all of which Goethe summarises, translates and
criticises. During the "Ur-time", according to Goethe, people were amazed by colours
and expressed their feelings through poetry. The same feeling of astonishment and
wonder was brought into a more theoretical framework by the Greeks who thus created
the first climax in the history of the Farbenlehre. The Greek theories were passed on
through the centuries but the original amazement was slowly lost while theorization
gained more and more importance. Theorisation, however, can lead to error if theories
are based on false premisses which are generally accepted and therefore no longer
questioned or tested. According to Goethe, Newton was one of those people who
combined genius with an erroneous assumption resulting in highly intelligent but
wrong theories. Goethe saw his own achievement in the return to the colours
themselves, which made him notice that Newton was wrong.
The history of the Farbenlehre has been continued. Goethe's Farbenlehre as
published in 1810 was supported by Hegel, Schelling and Schopenhauer during his
lifetime; it later influenced Wittgenstein, Rudolf Steiner and many artists, like for
instance, Runge, Turner, Klee and Kandinsky, Itten, Albers and most art teaching in
schools and at universities7.
Goethe frequently told the story of how he intuitively but with absolute knowledge saw
that Newton must be wrong while he was repeating one of Newton's experiments. No
doubt his story has added to his critics' judgments that Goethe was a mystic rather than
a scientist (and this was in no way helped by Rudolf Steiner's strong support of
6
Apparently Goethe said to Eckermann (15.05.1831) that future publications might wish to concentrate on
the essential parts of the Farbenlehre and therefore exclude the polemic part, about which he claimed: "I
certainly do not repudiate my perhaps very sharp analysis of Newton's statements - it was necessary at its time
and will remain valuable in the future - but really all polemical acts are against my true nature and I take little
pleasure in them. " - "Ich desavouiere meine etwas scharfe Zergliederung der Newtonischen Satze zwar
keineswegs, sie war zu ihrer Zeit notwendig und wird auch in der Folge ihren Wert behalten, allein im Grande
ist alles polemische Wirken gegen meine Natur und ich habe daran wenig Freude." (Eckermann, vol.n,
p.266).
7
See also Gage, 1980 and 1993.
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Goethe's Farbenlehre). Yet I hope to show that Goethe's approach is important and
leads to genuine insight.
The problem is that notions of amazement, wonder and fear, which motivated
Goethe to do his experiments in the first place, are not merely less important in today's
scientific world, but are in fact frowned upon as "subjective" and hence as something to
o
be excluded from "objective" observations. This leads to an exclusion of motivation
from the experiments themselves, an exclusion frequently regretted by scientists
themselves when it comes to moral issues connected to scientific research. Even apart
from moral issues, however, I shall argue that it is plainly absurd to try to understand
human vision while excluding the human subject. Provided that colour vision itself
includes a subjective element, and that the notion of subjectivity cannot be explained by
or reduced to objective concepts9, it is simply impossible to understand colour vision
purely in objective terms (I shall argue for this point in more detail later on).
g
In Culture and Value Wittgenstein makes a similar point:
"Freilich ist es wahr, daB der Geist, in dem die Naturwissenschaft heute betrieben wird, mit einer solchen
Furcht [vor Naturphanomenen] nicht vereinbar ist." (Verm.Bem (C&V), p.457)
"For the spirit in which the natural sciences are done today can no longer be reconciled with the fear of natural
phenomena." Wittgenstein draws our attention to the fact that it is precicely the fear or wonder we feel when
encountering natural phenomena such as thunder storms which wake us up and make us want to know more.
And if science or philosophy want to make us more curious about the world they too should perhaps arouse
fear and wonder. That this can be achieved by looking through the eyes of philosophers at the world (rather
than merely at books) is one of the things the study of colour can teach.
9
See S.Priest, "Newton and Hegel: Can Science Explain the Scientist?", in M.J.Petry, 1993.
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2. Physiological, Physical, and Chemical Colours
Goethe divides colour into three major categories. This categorisation is a somewhat
arbitrary one and Goethe was well aware of this (Fl.§689). The colours are ordered so
that we may understand their development and their relations to each other, not so that
we should label them. Many colour appearances are mentioned across chapters, and
experiments from different chapters are explicitly combined to give us phenomena
which are common to several categories. Not only is the difference between colour
appearances a difference of degree rather than of kind, but the same Urphenomena
underlie them all.
2.1. "Physiological Colours" & Subjectivism
"We naturally place these colours first, because they belong altogether, or in a great
degree, to the subject - to the eye itself. They are the foundation of the whole
doctrine..."10
"We have called them physiological because they belong to the eye in a healthy state;
because we consider them as the necessary conditions of vision; the lively alternating
action of which, with reference to external objects and a principle within it, is thus
plainly indicated."11
Examples of physiological colours in this sense are coloured shadows, haloes and after¬
images. The role of the observer (the subject) is more obvious in the case of
physiological colour than it is with other colour appearances. Goethe claims that the
"sunlike" eye produces internal (hence subjective) colours which form the
complementaries of the colours produced externally by the "real" sun, ie. the objective
colours of objects in the external world.
10
Unless otherwise stated I quote from Eastlake's translation of the didactic part of Goethe's Farbenlehre
(Goethe's Theory ofColour, M.I.T., 1970)
"Diese Farben, welche wir billig obenan setzen, weil sie dem Subjekt, weil sie dem Auge teils vollig, teils
groBtens angehoren, diese Farben, welche das Fundament der ganzen Lehre machen..." (F1.§1)
11
"Wir haben sie physiologische genannt, weil sie dem gesunden Auge angehoren, weil wir sie als die
notwendigen Bedingungen des Sehens betrachten, auf dessen lebendiges Wechselwirken in sich selbst und
nach auBen sie hindeuten." (Fl.§3)
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Both internal and external colours can be systemised in a colour circle. The
inner physiological (subjective) colour circle is ontologically secondary to the outer
natural (objective) circle and depends on it much like a mirror image depends on its
object; but epistemologically the outer circle cannot be known without the inner circle
just as without mirrors we do not know what we look like. (This also explains why
colour blind people, who create different inner circles, cannot understand the outer
colour circle seen by "normal" sighted people.) The intensity or "energy" of the inner
circle too depends on the outer circle, but again the energy of external light and colours
is known through complementary internal energy production.
Not surprisingly, an emphasis on physiological colours leads to a strong
subjectivist view of colour. Schopenhauer, for instance, adopts Goethe's findings from
this section, and claims that colours are nothing but effects on our eyes and brains.
More recently this theory has been taken up by Hardin who also reduces colour to
physical events within our eyes and brains. I hope to show that these strong subjectivist
accounts are unsatisfactory. Yet one should remember that Goethe was the first person
to draw attention to subjective colour phenomena such as after-images at all, and that
by doing so he initiated much physiological research.
2.2. "Physical Colours" & the Synthesis of Subject and Object
"We give this designation to colours which are produced by certain material mediums:
these mediums, however, have no colour themselves, and may either be transparent,
semi-transparent yet transmitting light, or altogether opaque. The colours in question
are thus produced in the eye through such external given causes, or are merely reflected
to the eye when by whatever means they are produced without us. Although we thus
ascribe to them a certain objective character, their distinctive quality still consists in
their being transient, and not to be arrested."12
Physical colours are thus less perceiver dependent than physiological colours are,
because additionally to light and healthy organs of vision they depend on objects
12
"Physische Farben nennen wir diejenigen, zu deren Hervorbringung gewisse materielle Mittel notig sind,
welche aber selbst keine Farbe haben und teils durchsichtig, teils triib und durchscheinend, teils vollig
undurchsichtig sein konnen. Dergleichen Farben werden also in unserm Auge durch solche auBere bestimmte
Anlasse erzeugt oder, wenn sie schon in irgendeiner Weise auBer uns erzeugt sind, in unser Auge
zuriickgeworfen. Ob wir nun schon hiedurch denselben eine Art von Objektivitat zuschreiben, so bleibt doch
das Voriibergehende, Nichtfestzuhaltende meistens ihr Kennzeichen." (Fl.§136)
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external to us, namely more or less turbid media.13 We can think of any visible object
as a turbid medium. In the case of physical colours the medium itself is not coloured
but is an essential factor for the appearance of colour.14 Depending on the shape and
material of the medium as well as on the direction and strength of the light, we get five
kinds of physical colours: dioptric colours where the light shines through the medium;
katoptric colours which are produced through reflection; paroptic colours where the
light shines along the medium causing half shadows with coloured edges; epoptic
colours which almost belong to the object, such as the colours of heated metal or on
soap bubbles; and as a late addition to the Farbenlehre (added in the
Naturwissenschaftliche Hefte, 1817) entoptic colours which appear within the medium.
It was actually Hegel who together with the scientist Thomas Seebeck drew
Goethe's attention to entoptic colours and is even supposed to have named them thus.
Why Hegel should be more interested in entoptic than in other colour phenomena will
become apparent in my chapter on Hegel. All I want to say now is that Goethe's
physical colours are a synthesis of subjective (viewer) and objective (external world)
aspects. Hegel's synthesis is an ideal and in this sense subjective synthesis, but
Schelling (if I understand him correctly) offers an objective synthesis.15 Colours
defined as a combination of subjective and objective aspects is also the explanation
given by weak subjectivists, both in the Lockean tradition and by philosophers such as
Colin McGinn.
13
"triibe Mittel": Goethe constantly refers to "triibe Mittel", which for want of a better phrase I shall translate
as "turbid media". The adjective "triib" and its noun "die Triibe" have also been translated as "cloudy", but the
concept of cloudiness seems to evoke the image of floating particles or patches in a clearer surrounding, while
Goethe's turbid media are equally turbid throughout. Prime examples are fog and coloured glass (see also
appendix).
14
By a "non-coloured object" Goethe means an object that is either transparent or monochrome in colour
(black, white or grey). I believe that strictly speaking there is no such thing as a non-coloured visible object;
yet I do think that Goethe's distinction between chromatic and monochrome colours makes sense in this
context.
15
Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of Schelling would go beyond the scope of this thesis, so that I shall
only occasionally refer to his philosophy and instead concentrate on Hegel.
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2.3. "Chemical Colours" & Objectivism
"We give this denomination to colours which we can produce, and more or less fix, in
certain bodies; which we can render more intense, which we can again take away and
communicate to other bodies, and to which, therefore, we ascribe a certain permanency:
duration is their prevailing characteristic."16
Colours which truly belong to objects are "chemical colours". They are not
usually referred to as colour appearances but as properties of objects. Some of Goethe's
classifications in the section on physical colours are quite obscure, and Goethe's
account of chemical colours is clearly wrong: he identifies the causes of chemical
colours with the chemical processes and polarities between acids and alkalines. Apart
from the wrong identification of underlying causes, however, Goethe is right in saying
that chemical colours are the most stable and lasting of colours. Indeed, they are
probably the colours which we refer to most. All paints and dyes are chemical colours.
Chemical colours are "objective" in the sense that they belong to the external
world and exist independently of individual observers. They are thus the colours to
which concepts such as colour constancy refer, but they are also the colours we puzzle
about least (compared to rainbows and after-images we take most chemical colours for
granted). As properties of objects colours can be the object of public discussion and it is
these colours and their relations that Wittgenstein is interested in. Hacker and Westphal
follow Wittgenstein in this.
"So nennen wir diejenigen, welche wir an gewissen Korpern erregen, mehr oder weniger fixieren, an ihnen
steigern, von ihnen wieder wegnehmen und anderen Korpem mitteilen konnen, denen wir denn auch deshalb
eine gewisse immanente Eigenschaft zuschreiben. Die Dauer ist meist ihr Kennzeichen." (Fl.§486)
18
2.4. A Different Kind of Objectivism
Independently of these three categories there is also an "objectivism" of colour in the
17
sense more commonly used in moral philosophy. Here objectivism refers to truths or
values rather than to physical objects - values and truths which are objective in the
sense that they are just as independent from people as physical objects are. Goethe's
Urphenomena can be understood in this way, and so can Schopenhauer's Platonic Ideas,
especially if we think of the lasting quality of objective colours as their main
characteristic. I therefore add a short fifth chapter to the first part of the thesis, in which
I discuss these objective ideas of colour. It is quite fitting to open a new chapter for
them, as they are the only kinds of things which cannot be seen as straightforwardly as
physiological, physical and chemical colours can be.
17
David McNaughton's comparison between moral values and secondary qualities suggests such a parallel
(even if I do not think that his argument is conclusive). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics (1992, ch.4).
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3. Polarities and Urphenomena
"Polarity" and "Urphenomenon" are the two central notions in Goethe's natural
philosophy. Living nature, according to Goethe, is alive by virtue of it being acted upon
by polar forces; these are not unlike magnetic forces, which are indeed their prime
example, but also include spatial polarities, polarities of gender, temperature, aesthetics
and so on, so that an infinite number of polarities underlies the whole of nature. These
18
polarities become manifest in appearances ("Erscheinungen") . When we grasp a
phenomenon we grasp the principle (or principles) which underlies the appearance.
Simple examples from our everyday lives can be found in language: behind allophones
and individually written letters we grasp phonemes and graphemes (the phenomena)
which make up meaning.
I shall return to the notion of phenomena throughout the first part of this thesis,
as Goethe is by no means clear about what and how exactly they exist. For now it is
important to remember that when I refer to phenomena I mean Goethean phenomena
which are not contrasted with noumena as in the Kantian tradition. Goethean
phenomena are different from appearances (Kantian "phenomena"), because they are
themselves not timebound and can be forced to repeat themselves in various
experiments. On the other hand, they are unlike Kantian "noumena" because they can
be grasped in appearances.19
The closest understanding of Goethean phenomena may lie in his phrase "the
conditions (Bedingungen) under which colour phenomena appear". These conditions
20
are not to be confused with causes (Ursachen). Rather, conditions are other
phenomena. The appearance of colour as such, for instance, is conditioned by the
phenomena of light and darkness and turbidity, as well as by temperature, textures of
surfaces, and other perceivable aspects. Phenomena are to be explained by other
phenomena so that a complete explanation of one appearance will be like a complete
18
The word "Erscheinung" is best translated as "appearance"; especially for Goethe and Hegel, however,
one should keep in mind that the emphasis is on the appearing ("das Erscheinen") of something, not on the
contrast between appearance and reality often associated with the word "appearance", (see also glossary)
19
"Phenomena, which others may also call facta are naturally certain and determined, yet often indetermined
and weak when they appear." - "Die Phanomene, die wir andern auch wohl Facta nennen, sind gewiB und
bestimmt ihrer Natur nach, hingegen oft unbestimmt und schwankend, insofern sie erscheinen."
("Erfahrung und Wissenschaft", HA13, p.23)
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picture of nature on the level of phenomena, with this one appearance at some arbitrary
point within the picture. Because all phenomena interact, their conditions of appearance
are not a means of classification. Although there are necessary and sufficient conditions
for each individual manifestation of a phenomenon, these are not its essence (Wesen),
as the same phenomenon (i.e. Wesen of the appearance) can appear in a great variety
•21of conditions. In his essay "Erfahrung und Wissenschaft" ("Experience and Science")
Goethe describes phenomena as a "series of steps" ("Stufenfolge") in the following
way:
a) Empirical Phenomena
The lowest level is that of empirical phenomena. Empirical phenomena can be
observed by anyone as they manifest themselves in everyday appearances. Examples of
empirical colour phenomena are rainbows, after-images and coloured shadows.
b) Scientific Phenomena
Empirical phenomena can be raised to the level of scientific phenomena in experiments
which force them to repeat themselves under varying conditions. During the
experiment hypotheses are formed and tested until we discover which relevant features
our appearances have in common. If we can see the same pattern in all experiments we
have found a scientific phenomenon. Examples are the generative patterns from blue to
red and from yellow to red on black and white boundaries (see below).
c) Pure Phenomena: Urphenomena
The more varied the conditions are under which a phenomenon appears the purer it is.
The true colour Urphenomenon governs all colour appearances. Goethe encourages
^0
"Erfahrung und Wissenschaft", HA13, p.25
i\
Published 1789 (hence before the main body of the Farbenlehre)\ HA 13, pp.23-25.
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diversity in experiments to make us see the same in different appearances and to make
us look out for exceptions, which then lead to new experiments since exceptions show
that we have not found the pure phenomenon yet.
The one pure phenomenon underlying all colour phenomena is the polarity
between light and dark which expresses itself in a turbid medium as the colour
opposition of yellow and blue. This Urphenomenon is so strong and lasting that it
could even be sent by post: Goethe sent Hegel a drinking glass which had a yellow
ornament on the outside which turned blue when the glass was filled with something
dark.22 Although the glass might be more correctly described as a lasting opportunity
for watching the Urphenomenon rather than as an Urphenomenon itself, it is still an
amazing example of what Goethe means by his notion. (More famous even than
Goethe's colour Urphenomenon is Goethe's belief that there is such a thing as an "Ur-
plant", which is the manifestation of all "plantness".)
Not only Schiller saw the danger of Goethe confusing phenomena as external
no
objects of perception with ideas:" Wittgenstein too warns of the danger of confusing a
phenomenon ("Urbild") with the object itself. He rightly suggests that someone like
Goethe wishes to keep the phenomena steady at all cost in order to get a closer look at
them ("Das kommt nun daher, daB man den Merkmalen des Urbilds einen Halt in der
Betrachtung geben will.").24 Thus Goethe might have been looking for his Urplant or
the Ur-colour-phenomenon in too literal a way, thereby confusing phenomenon and
object and hence demanding properties of the object which only the phenomenon can
have.
""
Letter from Goethe to Hegel. 13th April, 1821.
23
The famous conversation between Goethe and Schiller on the nature of the Urplant (idea or genuine plant)
took place in July 1794.
24
Vernuschte Bemerkungen (On Culture and Value), 1931, pp.469-70 - For full quotation see footnote in
chapter IV, section 2.6.
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4. Conditions for Colour Vision
a) Colour Vision in General
According to Goethe there are three major conditions to be fulfilled for us to see
colour:
First of all, we can see colours only when there is light - in this sense light
makes colours appear, and in this sense colours are the deeds of light. Light itself, on
the other hand is not coloured and hence not visible; it only becomes visible on
something darker than itself (see also eh.VI). Hence colour appears where light and
darkness meet - most obviously on opaque surfaces.
Secondly, the highest Urphenomenon regarding colour is colour as the "deed
and suffering of light and darkness", which occurs in turbidity; so all colour
appearances must partake of turbidity. That they indeed do so is really quite obvious:
Our visual world is never perfectly transparent, opaque, light or dark (otherwise it
would be invisible). Hence it is, if ever so slightly, turbid (again, see ch.VI).
A third necessary condition for the appearance of colour is a healthy organ of
vision. While the first two conditions may be considered as objective, this third
condition adds a necessary subjective aspect. We thus get two polarities right at the
beginning: that of light and darkness, which can be united in objective colour
phenomena, and that of the eye and external colour, which are united in the process of
seeing colours. As with all polarities such a unification can be closer to one side or the
other. Thus just as some colours are closer to light and some closer to darkness, some
colours depend more and others less on the eye of the perceiver.
b) Seeing Specific Colours
The next level of explanation is that of explaining individual colours rather than just
colour as such. Goethe's next Urphenomenon is therefore that of yellow appearing
nearest to light and blue appearing nearest to darkness. These can be mixed into green
23
(provided that both colours are pure), or can be individually intensified until each of
them reaches red.*" We thus arrive at four further polarities:
1. Yellow versus blue, when both are pure colours.
2. Mixed versus unmixed - two pure colours can be mixed into one secondary colour;
yellow and blue mix to yield green, red and yellow yield orange, and red and blue
purple. From this it follows that each pure colour has one mixed colour as its
complementary (yellow-purple, red-green, blue-orange).
3. Of the three primary colours yellow, red and blue, the polarity between blue and
yellow is basic because only they can be both mixed and intensified.
4. A further polarity is therefore that between intensification and moderation: yellow
and blue are intensified towards red, but moderated or weakened towards green. This
opposition will be of particular importance for the moral and aesthetic effect of colour.
Goethe is not always clear whether it should be blue or purple that is the polar opposite
of yellow. Rather than calling this an inconsistency, however, we can consider it an
advantage: There can be several colour polarities which interact across levels and thus
make Goethe's Farbenlehre closer to nature than a strict hierarchy would do.
Furthermore, this way we can explain how one level of explanation relates to another
without having to take sudden leaps. Because there are two colour circles underlying
Goethe's Farbenlehre, the polarities change depending on the context in which we
consider them (see also chapter VIE). More important than abstract polarities are the
actual26 interactions of light and dark with physical objects. Light and dark, which are
themselves ideal (see ch.VI) can thus physically be represented by white and black
(Fl.§§ 18,249).
A major Goethean rule derived from his Urphenomena is how yellow and blue
behave on a black and white boundaries: Yellow appears where there is dark over light,
and blue where there is light over dark. One typical example of this rule is smoke
appearing yellow in front of a white wall and blue in front of a black background. But
26
Fl.introduction, p.326 (Eastlake, p.lvi); also §160; §§213-217; §319
Schopenhauer writes that this basic phenomenon of light and turbidity yielding red at intensification was
already mentioned in Aristoteles' Meteorologicis 3,4 (S&F, §14, p.285)
26 The German word "wirklich" is more suitable than the English word "actual" as it combines the sense of
"wirken" ("to act upon") with the meaning of reality, (see also appendix)
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the appearance of one colour "over" the other can also be taken quite literally as "over
and above". I am lucky enough to observe this phenomenon every morning: I sleep in a
west-facing room with light white cotton curtains through which I can see the black
shadow of the window frame. So I have two black and white boundaries which are
white above black on the top of the window frame and black above white a few inches
further down. The curtain acts as a turbid medium, so that I can see a strong yellow
fringe underneath the black shadow of the frame and a strong blue fringe above it.
The phenomenon of coloured fringes is related to the one of coloured shadows.
Goethe claims that we only ever come across monochrome shadows when there is a
singular bright light source, which hardly ever happens in natural surroundings because
there are almost always reflections of light or even several lightsources. Thus most
shadows are indeed at least slightly coloured and correctly represented as coloured by




PHYSIOLOGICAL COLOURS & STRONG SUBJECTIVISM
Strong subjectivism claims that "There is no such thing as objective colour". This is,
perhaps surprisingly, about the most frequent remark I get from people when I
mention that I study colour.
"But surely, that's totally subjective!"
"What is?", I then ask.
"Surely, we all see colours differently -1 have a flatmate who..."
and then I get some strange story about a friend who remembers telephone numbers
by colours, and another who feels sick when there is too much pink around her (don't
we all?), another who believes in colour therapy, and yet another who can hear and
smell in colour (whatever that is supposed to mean). It seems that many people who
don't think that colour is best explained by physics go to the other extreme and treat
colour as subjective on a personal level - "Oh, you are interested in psychology then."
From this I conclude that we have some strong intuitions about colour being
essentially subjective. But before I tackle three main arguments in support of this
intuition I shall discuss Schopenhauer's subjectivist account of colour, namely
Schopenhauer's theory of colour as expressed in Uber das Sehn und die Farben.
Schopenhauer bases his theory on experimental evidence from Goethe on the one
hand, and on his own philosophy on the other. In the first section of this chapter I
therefore compare Goethe's and Schopenhauer's general approaches, and in the
second section summarise and criticise Schopenhauer's Uber das Sehn und die
Farben in more detail.
Schopenhauer's claim that colours are nothing but effects on our eyes/brains
is echoed (unknowingly, I believe) by Hardin in his book Color for Philosophers. I
shall treat his arguments together with those of other recent subjectivists in the third
section of this chapter. Altogether, I shall conclude that an exclusively subjectivist
(or "strong subjectivist") account of colour is necessarily insufficient.
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1. Schopenhauer and Goethe
Schopenhauer's mother Johanna Schopenhauer moved to Weimar in 1806 where she
soon opened a literary salon, one of whose frequent guests was Goethe. The poet read
Schopenhauer's On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in 1813
and liked Schopenhauer's emphasis on understanding (Verstand) and intuition
(Anschauung)1 rather than on reason (Vernunft) and concepts (Begriffe). So when
Schopenhauer moved to Weimar in November 1813 and showed interest in Goethe's
Farbenlehre the two met regularly to do colour experiments and to discuss
philosophy. Both opposed Newton's Optics, both laid great emphasis on physiology,
and both agreed that seeing is theorizing. In other words: Both Schopenhauer and
Goethe did not believe in the possibility of purely objective perception of phenomena
as suggested by the experiments of Newton and his followers.
But soon Schopenhauer must have interpreted their common experiments
according to his own philosophical thought, and the differences between the realist
and the idealist led Goethe to write the famous verse:
"Triage noch gerne des Lehrers Burden,
wenn die Schiiler nur nicht gleich Lehrer wiirden"2
When Schopenhauer left Weimar for Dresden in May 1814 he parted from Goethe on
friendly terms - Schopenhauer still admiring Goethe and Goethe still glad to have
found a supporter of his Farbenlehre. Schopenhauer rather quickly wrote his little
work Uber das Sehn und die Farben while he was already thinking about The World
as Will and Representation. When in June 1815 Schopenhauer sent his manuscript to
Goethe asking him to write a preface for it, Goethe was extremely busy and not very
interested. After several exchanges of letters Goethe returned the manuscript without
the requested preface. This is not surprising if one reads their letters in which
Schopenhauer, despite his openly shown admiration for Goethe, insists that it was he
himself who wrote the first theory of colour.
' I use the common translation of "Anschauung" as "intuition", although I belive that in many contexts
"contemplation" might be a more suitable translation than "intuition" for reasons given in the appendix.
2" I would happily carry the teacher's burden, if students didn't immediately turn into teachers."
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1.1. Agreements between Schopenhauer and Goethe
In Uber das Sehn und die Farben Schopenhauer overall judges Goethe's Farbenlehre
extremely positively. Even in the second edition, in which Schopenhauer has added
further criticism of Goethe3, he writes:
"the correctness of Goethe's color theory is to me also still just as evident as it was
forty-one years ago when he showed me his experiments. I can therefore assume that
the spirit of truth...has not forsaken me." 4
In his last section Schopenhauer too praises Goethe's "scientific achievements"
(p.288/76), calls those people who deny them blind or liars (p.290/78), and for the
last time sets Goethe's truths positively against "Newton's tricks" (p.297/84).
Schopenhauer emphasizes two main achievements of Goethe:
"Goethe had opened the way through a twofold service. First, in as much as he broke
the old delusion of Newton's erroneous theory, he restored the freedom of thought on
this subject..."5
This passage suggests that Schopenhauer himself believed in Newton's theory
until he met Goethe. It is thus not surprising that the two men liked each other - the
elder opening the eyes of the younger to what the younger wanted to see anyway.
Goethe's re-opening of the discussion on colour is praised by Schopenhauer again
and again.
"Goethe's second service is that he delivered in full measure what was promised in
the title of this excellent work: data for a theory of color. They are important,
complete, and significant data, rich material for a future theory of color." (pp.4-5).6
3
Among them most of §14, a fraction of which appeared as part of §13 : "Only on two points...in
compendium" (pp.75-76), and "The grave injustive..." (p.83 to the end), as well as the one sentence on page
75 beginning with "Goethe has never forgiven me".
4
"...die Richtigkeit der Goetheschen Farbenlehre ist mir noch ebenso einleuchtend als vor41 Jahren, da
er mir selbst die Experimente vorzeigte. So darf ich denn wohl annehmen, daB der Geist der
Wahrheit...mich nicht verlassen hat.." (S&F, p. 194/2 - double references to page numbers refer first to the
German edition of Uber das Sehn und die Farben (1989) and then to Payne's translation (1994)).
5
"Goethe hat mir den Weg eroffnet durch ein zwiefaches Verdienst. Erstlich, sofern er den alten Wahn
der Newtonischen Irrlehre brach und dadurch die Freiheit uber den Gegenstand wiederherstellte.."
(S&F, Introduction, p. 197/4)
6
"Das zweite Verdienst Goethes ist, daB er in seinem vortrefflichen Werke in vollem MaBe lieferte, was
der Titel verspricht: Data zur Farbenlehre. Es sind wichtige, vollstandige, bedeutsame Data, reiche
Materialien zu einer zukiinftigen Theorie der Farbe." (S&F, p. 198/4-5)
Please note that the original title of Goethe's work is Materialien zur Farbenlehre.
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This material, however, is in itself insufficient to be a theory. In a letter to Goethe
Schopenhauer writes:
"If I compare your Farbenlehre to a pyramid, my theory constitutes its tip, the
indivisible mathematical point from which the whole building extends and which is
so essential that without it it would not be a pyramid, while at the bottom one can cut
off slices without it ceasing to be pyramid."7
Schopenhauer obviously sees his own theory as the perfection, the final shape of
Goethe's work. One could, however, argue that Schopenhauer completely
misunderstands Goethe. Goethe may not have wanted any (or at least any one) final
o
theory at all. But we lose a deep connection between Goethe and Schopenhauer if
we ignore Goethe's statement that all seeing is theorising (preface), which can be read
to mean that all seeing is done with the help of understanding, and that hence there is
no such thing as a pure datum, and that pure data, were they to exist, could not help
us to understand anything:
"For the mere looking at a thing cannot bring us forward. Each look turns into
observation, each observation into pondering, each pondering into connecting, and
thus one can say that we already theorise with each attentive look at the world."9
On the other hand this also means that we cannot be wrong about the data
themselves were we to reach them.10 Hence Goethe: "Illusions do not derive from our
senses but from our judgments."11
7
"Vergleiche ich Ihre Farbenlehre einer Pyramide, so ist meine Theorie die Spitze derselben, der
unteilbare mathematische Punkt, von dem aus das ganze groBe Gebaude sich ausbreitet, und der so
wesentlich ist, daB es ohne ihn keine Pyramide mehr ist, wahrend man von unten immer abschneiden kann,
ohne daB es aufhort Pyramide zu sein." (letter from 11th November, 1815; HA2, p. 173)
g
Wittgenstein certainly supports Goethe's general approach (see also ch.IV, sect.3.4)
9
"Denn das bloBe Anblicken einer Sache kann uns nicht fordern. Jedes Ansehen geht iiber in ein
Betrachten, jedes Betrachten in ein Sinnen, jedes Sinnen in ein Verkniipfen, und so kann man sagen, daB
wir schon bei jedem aufmerksamen Blick in die Welt theoretisieren.", (Fl. preface, p.317, my translation;
corresponding passage in Eastlake, p.xl).
10
The process for reaching the pure data would presumably be some kind of phenomenological
reduction - another interesting link to Goethe which I cannot develop in this thesis. Instead I refer back to
Goethe's use of pure data in my Wittgenstein chapter.
11
"Die Sinne triigen nicht, das Urteil triigt." (M&R 295; HA12,p.406). Safranski interprets this maxim
as one attitude towards the world, which Goethe and Schopenhauer have in common. (Schopenhauer und
die wilden Jahre der Philosophic, p.266)
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Goethe also speaks of seeing "pictures" ("Bilder"). Our physiology allows us
(or forces us) to actively participate in the process of seeing, as if our understanding
(Verstand) was framing the seen into a picture:
1 ^"Most of all we have to remember that we are strolling in the realm of pictures.
When it comes to seeing, the limited seen is always the thing that we primarily
notice, and in the current case [...] of refraction [...] only the limited seen, the picture
is under observation." and "The seen must be limited."13
Goethe's description of an after-image as a "coloured appearance...[which] originates
from a picture which now belongs to the eye"14 might be extended to mean that
everything seen consists of pictures belonging to the eye. This would make Goethe an
Idealist in the literal sense of the word "idea"- idea: "outer appearance" or "looks",
but also "Urbild", "Idea" in the Platonic sense.15
Schopenhauer and Goethe therefore agree within Schopenhauer's world as
representation (Goethe's world of appearances): For both the process of perception
always consists of an object and a subject. The powers of the subject are limited by
the subject's physiology which limits the numbers and kinds of objects which are
perceivable, a fact most obvious in cases like colour blindness. Thus Goethe's
equation of colour with that part of nature which exists for our sense of vision entails
that without this sense of vision it would not exist, which is why blind people cannot
partake of it.16 This is a clearly idealist view of the world leading to the statements
that objects are only Schopenhauerian presentations (Vorstellungen)17 or Goethean
pictures (Bilder), made up of those things that are presented to us. Thus there might
be other things outside our field of vision which we are unaware of (note the parallel
to Plato's cave where the prisoners only see what is presented to them).
12
Eastlake translates this section less poetically with "...we have to do with circumscribed objects".
13
"Vor alien Dingen erinnern wir uns, daB wir im Reiche der Bilder wandeln. Beim Sehen tiberhaupt ist
das begrenzt Gesehene immer das, worauf wir vorzilglich merken, und in dem gegenwartigen Falle (...) der
Refraktion (...) kommt nur das begrenzt Gesehene, kommt nur das Bild in Betrachtung." (Fl.§219)
"Das Gesehene muG begrenzt sein." (Fl.§227)
14
"...farbige Erscheinung... entspringt aus dem Bilde, das nunmehr dem Auge angehort". (Fl.§49)
15
I shall return to Platonic Ideas in Schopenhauer and Goethe in ch.V.
16
Fl.Einleitung, p.324; Eastlake, Introduction, p.liv.
17
See appendix for a detailed account of "Vorstellung".
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1.2. Differences between Goethe and Schopenhauer
We should not forget that Goethe is inconsistent: On the one hand he writes of seeing
as theorising and stresses the active role of the subject in all perceptive acts, but on
the other hand he remains a realist. It is true that for him people play an important
role in forming the world as they see it, yet Goethe would hardly come to the
conclusion that the real world might be substantially different from the way we see it.
Quite on the contrary, Goethe's belief in the possibility of seeing Urphenomena in
nature, shows how close he thought the real world of Urphenomena was to that of
everyday appearances. We find that ultimately the difference between Schopenhauer
and Goethe is that between idealism and realism. This difference is most beautifully
expressed by Schopenhauer himself:
"But that Goethe was so completely realist that it absolutely would not come into his
senses that objects in themselves only exist in so far as they are presented by the
knowing subject. What, he said to me once, looking at me with his Jupitereyes, light
is only to be there in as far as you see it? No, you would not be there if the light did
not see you."18
In my view, the differences between Goethe and Schopenhauer are more important
than the latter says they are. They regard
1. the true polarity of colours which Goethe believes to be in nature and
Schopenhauer places in the eye/brain, and
2. the production of white from other colours - the possibility of which Goethe denies
completely, Schopenhauer however shows to be possible.
The production of white I shall discuss in some detail in chapter VII, where I defend
the view that white cannot be mixed by mixing other, hence darker colours.
Schopenhauer's solution is the following: The colours should not be physically mixed
but rather be united on the retina itself - i.e. by simultaneously seeing these colours
(S&F,§10). The production of white is thus a purely physiological process which
18 " Aber dieser Goethe... war so ganz Realist, daB es ihm durchaus nicht zu Sinne wollte, daB die
Objekte als solche nur da seien, insofern sie vorgestellt werden von dem erkennenden Subjekt. Was, sagte
er einst zu mir, mit seinen Jupiteraugen mich anblickend, das Licht sollte nur da seyn, insofern Sie es
sehen? Nein, Sie waren nicht da, wenn das Licht Sie nicht sahe." (Arthur Schopenhauer. Gesprciche, ed.
by A.Hiibscher (1971) as quoted in Safranski (1990, pp.275-6)
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occurs automatically given the right conditions (i.e. if it has sufficient reason to
occur).19
This problem is linked to the first difference between Schopenhauer qua
idealist and Goethe qua realist. It depends entirely on the ontology of colour whether
we accept Schopenhauer's proof of mixing white out of colours, or not. He has
empirically shown that two colours can be so placed that it appears that they mix to a
white. So within his own theory in which colour is the effect on the eye, he has
indeed proven that white can be produced from other colours. A colour realist,
however, would disagree with this claim since it is not a mixing of the colours
themselves that produces white, as the colours external to the human body continue
to exist unmixed.
2. Uber das Sehn und die Farben
In order to understand how fundamental the difference between Goethe and
Schopenhauer really is let me now summarise Schopenhauer's theory of colour: If
one accepts Schopenhauer's philosophy of the world as representation as described in
Uber die Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde (VWZG) and the
first book of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (WWVI) then his theory of colour
(as given in S&F) follows naturally:
A colour is an effect in the eye. With the help of our understanding
(Verstand) colour sensations are interpreted as effects whose causes are then
identified as things in space and time (usually as coloured objects in the external
world). This process is necessary in the same way in which mechanical processes are
necessary - i.e. the process of seeing coloured objects follows the Principle of
Causality/Becoming (as described in VWZG, ch.4). That this process is independent
of our faculty of reason (Vernunft) can be seen in the case of optical illusions which
we see as illusory objects even when we know (by reason) that they are something
else.
19
Schopenhauer thus explains "additive colour mixture", a notion which I shll return to in the last
section of this chapter (3.3.c); Schopenhauer's account will be described in further detail in ch.VIII, 1.1.
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Schopenhauer's account of colour vision is based on the presupposition that
the retina consists of two halves which complement each other to yield one whole.
Although he makes finer distinctions Schopenhauer derives the essential thought
from Goethe. "The retina can be in two completely opposite states depending on
whether light or darkness act upon it."" This leads to the first of Schopenhauer's
divisions of the retina, the "intensive division". The equation of a white, black or grey
picture on the retina (the effect) with light, dark or half shadow (both S&F,§3), as
well as the spatial organisation and the geometric relation between the size of the
image and the distance and size of the object seen (§1) can also be found in Goethe's
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Farbenlehre." Furthermore, the colour oppositions found in the "qualitative division
of the retina" are based on Goethe's colour circle.22 But Goethe does not explain them
as a mathematical function like Schopenhauer does: In an astonishingly certain
manner Schopenhauer divides the colours into three complementary pairs of primary
colours and gives them mathematical values. These values depend on the intrinsic
lightness of each colour - yellow for instance is the lightest colour, taking 3/4 of the
retina and leaving its complementary purple with 1/4. The other two pairs are blue
and orange (1/3 and 2/3) and red and green, which are equally 1/2 each.23
There are thus three kinds of division of the retina:
1. intensive (§3) : monochromatic
2. extensive (§4) : to create a field of vision
3. qualitative (§5) : chromatic colours
The first and the third division both assume a whole, of which the seen colour is one
half and its complementary colour produced in the eye is the other (as seen in after¬
images). These two kinds of division occur simultaneously and can be combined so
that a bluish-black would yield a whitish-orange after-image. The second division is
a spatial one: it explains why our fields of vision can include several and even a vast
amount of different colours rather than just one undifferentiated colour area.
20
"Die Retina befindct sich, je nachdem Licht oder Finsternis auf sie wirken, in zwei verschiedenen
Zustanden, die einandcr vdllig entgegenstehen." (Fl.§5)
21
Goethe's complete section on physiological colours is relevant, but especially §§ 5-8, 13, 15-18.
22
Fl. parts V - VIII. especially §§ 48-50, 55-56, 58-61.
23
No matter how surprising these a priori proportions may seem to be, they have been taken up in some
major art theories, as for instance those by Albers and Itten. But contrary to Schopenhauer, these theories
use the proportions for the determination of lightness alone, not for the identification of hue. In a sense they
thus extend Schopenhauer's first intensive division of the retina to colour vision.
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According to Schopenhauer, the whole process of colour vision is
mechanical, and mechanical is its further physiological interpretation: we do not in
fact perceive colour patches (as on a painter's palette) but coloured objects (S&F, §1).
So the physiological process of the eye is followed by a physiological process of the
brain, namely the application of the first principle of sufficient reason which places
the colour patches of our sensations into the temporal and spatial external world.
Please note that the use of the term "sensation" does not fall under P.Hacker's
criticism.24 Hacker distinguishes rightly between sensation and perception, and like
Hacker Schopenhauer calls perception of colour the seeing of external coloured
objects, even if perception includes processes of the understanding (Verstand). What
Schopenhauer calls "colour sensation" is more immediate and has nothing to do with
the identification or recognition (Erkennen) of a colour as a particular colour of
something. Thus Schopenhauer writes in his first chapter "On Vision": "The newborn
infant has the sensation of light and color before it intuitively perceives and knows
the luminous or colored objects as such."25 He also clearly says that "the
understanding converts the sensation into intuitive perception".26 Hence one should
read Schopenhauer's term "sensation" as a neurophysiological term to avoid Hacker's
criticism, and the misleading phrase "colour sensations" or "sensations of colour
patches" must be translated as "neurophysiological processes whose cause is placed
in colour by the functioning of our reason".
The reason why Schopenhauer himself does not choose a less misleading
terminology lies, I believe, in his dualist philosophy in which sensations play an
essential role. For we must remember that the account given in Uber das Sehn und
die Farben only covers the explanation of colour in the world as representation - not
its metaphysical aspect in the world as will. (I shall introduce a possible metaphysical
connection between colour and the Will on the one hand, and colour and Platonic
Ideas on the other in chapter V.)
Schopenhauer defines the connection between physiology, knowledge
(Erkenntnis) and representation (Vorstellung) in his later work Uber den Willen in
der Natur and in parts of his main work27 where he clearly states that Erkenntnis is
24
Appearance and Reality (1987).
25
Payne, p.21 - the phrase "intuitively perceives and knows" is an apt but free translation of "erkennt
und anschaut" - literally: "recognises and contemplates" - "Das neugeborene Kind empfindet Licht und
Farbe, ehe es den leuchtenden oder gefarbten Gegenstand als solchen erkennt und anschaut." (S&F, p.218)
26
"Verwandelt der Verstand die Empfindung in Anschauung..." (ibid)
27
Particularly in §18 of the second volume of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.
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Vorstellung which in turn is a physiological process the result of which is a mental
picture. So, for Schopenhauer the knowledge of colours as described in Uber das
Sehn und die Farben is an entirely physiological process, and I shall now give some
internal criticism of this theory.
2.1. Criticism of Schopenhauer's account
There are two main criticisms of Schopenhauer's theory of the qualitative division of
the retina: Schopenhauer neither shows it to be necessarily true (he calls it a "mere
hypothesis" though he later says that he has total confidence in his theory (P&P
§104)), nor does he give sufficient criteria to identify individual colours with it.
If we take Schopenhauer's fractions (§5) and multiply the numerators over the
denominator of 12 we arrive at the following values: yellow 9, orange 8, red and
green 6, blue 4, and purple 3. It seems strange that the gaps between some colours are
bigger than those between others - especially that purple should be so much closer in
28value to blue than to red seems simply wrong.
One solution might be to make the steps between the colours equal. If we
keep yellow the lightest and purple the darkest colour with the values 9 and 3, we get
5 and 7 as in-between values:
yellow - purple 9-3
orange - blue 7-5
red - green 5-7
This, however is obviously wrong since it gives green a greater lightness than red
(and if we reversed them red the same lightness as orange - circle S2).
The easiest way out is to argue that there are four primary colours with yellow
and blue as opposites of light and darkness (say, 3/4 to 1/4) and red and green as the
same (1/2). Orange then gets the in-between value of 15/24 and purple of 9/24, and
their odd fractions well represent their odd status between primary colours (circle
S3).
If we wanted to stick to six primary colours and keep red and green in equal
values and yellow and purple as main lightness opposites, we'd have to give the
values of 9/24 to blue and 15/24 to orange. But then we might wonder whether blue
does not deserve a better value from an a priori judgment (which is what
28
See illustrations end of this section.
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Schopenhauer's assigning of fractions to colours is all about), and whether the
distance between purple and blue compared to purple and red is not too small.
Either way, however, and this is a more serious problem, Schopenhauer
reduces the qualitative aspect of colour to quantities of lightness which are not in
themselves sufficient to identify individual colours. This is most obvious in the case
of red and green which both have the value 1/2. For every colour but yellow or purple
there is another colour with the same value as well as presumably one grey shade
(this is true for the original values of Schopenhauer as well as for my alternative
solutions).
What needs to be added but is only hinted at is a truly qualitative polarity
such as that between warm and cold colours. This could be done numerically if one
wanted to - either by adding plus and minus signs or by changing the values to
something like a clock face with yellow at twelve o'clock. Then however the
complementaries would no longer be arithmetically but only geometrically obvious.
That a geometrical construction of colour space is more helpful to the understanding
of colour than a priori arithmetic relations between colours, I argue for in chapter
VIII.
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Schopenhauer's Qualitative Partition of the Retina (S&F §5)
Yellow 3/4 - purple 1/4
Orange 2/3 - Blue 1/3
Red 1/2 - Green 1/2
37




red : 60 degrees
green : 60 degrees
blue : 40 degrees
purple: 30 degrees
S2: My first alternative
yellow: 90 degrees
orange: 70 degrees
green : 70 degrees
red : 50 degrees
blue : 50 degrees
purple: 30 degrees
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S3: My second alternative
yellow : 135 degrees





3. Strong Subjectivism: The Arguments
Schopenhauer's theory of colour is only subjectivist as long as we remain within his
"world as representation", in which lightness, darkness and colour are nothing but
states or modifications of the eye. Yet similar theories have since been taken to be
complete accounts of colour. C.L.Hardin, for instance, holds a such a view: "We are
to be eliminativists with respect to color as a property of objects, but reductionists
with respect to color experiences."29 Hardin's strong subjectivism makes two claims:
first, that there is no such thing as objective colour, and secondly, that subjective
colour, i.e. colour experience, can be reduced to something else, namely a physical
state within our heads. This second claim does not necessarily follow from the first
claim. Yet subjectivism without reduction of colour experience to physical states
easily leads to solipsism.
Generally speaking, there are six arguments which claim to prove that there is no
such thing as objective colour. I shall divide these arguments into three groups as
follows:
1. Colour vision depends entirely on the perceiver because
a) different people react differently to different colours: they have different favourite
colours, associate different colours with different emotions (or numbers or vowels or
whatever);
b) there are clear cases of abnormality in colour vision which obviously hinder the
seeing of colour and the formation of colour concepts (my colour blind friend often
does not understand me when I talk about colour relations).
2. It is impossible to know whether one person sees the same colour as another.
3. There is no objective scientific account of all colours:
a) we hardly ever encounter pure wavelength colours; instead most colours we see
are metamers (i.e. mixtures of various wavelengths);
b) neither is there a chemical formula which all paints and dyes share;
c) there is altogether no one scientific theory which explains all colour appearances,
i.e. luminous and reflected colours, surface colour and after-images.
"9
Colorfor Philosophers, 1988, p. 112
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I shall tackle these arguments one at a time:
1. Colour vision is entirely perceiver dependent
a) Different people react differently to different colours.
It is true that people have different aesthetic and emotional feelings about colour, but
I believe that it is up to psychologists and sociologists to find out in how far these
feelings are genetic or are socially determined or otherwise explainable. For while
different people react differently to different colours, this problem is not specific to
colour. People also react differently to different chemicals, politicians, coldness,
crowds and all sorts of things, without us wanting to say that these things are
themselves subjective. Thus people prefer the looks or character of one person to
another without us saying that the person is subjective.
b) Abnormalities in colour vision.
As I shall demonstrate in chapter IX, the fact that a significant minority of the
population is colour-blind is not sufficient to argue for a purely subjective account of
colour, as we can only define colour abnormalities with reference to normal colour
vision, which in turn is defined by public agreement about which distinctions of
colour are normal. The decision of who is normal and who is not must therefore be
made with reference to public (objective) colour samples.
c) Conclusion
From the fact that colour vision depends at least somehow on the perceiver's eyes and
mental/brain states it does not follow that colour is identical to that eye or
mental/brain state. There is an important difference between saying that something is
subjective (an ontological claim) and saying that we know it from subjective
experiences (an epistemological claim which I treat under the next heading). Thus
colours may "feel" different to different people, but from this it no more follows that
the colours themselves have no objective existence than it follows from the different
perspectives of my desk that there is no desk of determined shape in my room.
The same people who claim that colour is subjective because of diverging
attitudes towards them often also claim that judging art or morals is subjective. That I
disagree with all of these statements makes it easier for me to discard the claim about
colour. Because this is not the place to defend objective values in general, however,
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all I can say is that merely because people have different attitudes towards something
it does not follow that this something does not objectively exist or that it does not
have objective qualities.
2. It is impossible to know whether one person sees the same colour as another.
Gregory Harding (1991) thought of an experiment of how we could check whether
two people see the same thing in the same way. A few experimental details granted
(like viewing angles adjusted and subjects being perfectly good imitating artists) the
idea is the following: Two subjects are shown the same image and each of them has
to draw what they see. If they draw the same thing then they see the same thing.
Applied to colour this experiment might have to be repeated a few times to
exclude chance "hits" by a colour blind person who got the lightness right but may
have been unsure whether the colour shown was a light orange or a light green for
instance, but altogether I think that Harding's experiment offers (in theory at least)
the possibility of checking whether two people see the same thing.
As it does not follow that they have the same experience, but only that they
represent their experience in the same way, someone might argue that this
experiment therefore leaves out the most essential aspect of colour, namely the
subjective experience itself. However, in order to argue for the subjectivity of colour
by saying that two people do not see the same colour, one has to use the concept of
sameness. And the concept of sameness is applied in a very strange way if one does
not allow for a representational test of sameness. In a courtcase, for instance, where a
witness is shown a photograph and asked "Is this the man you saw?", we do not
expect the witness to answer "This is a different experience". For naturally, looking
at a photograph is a different experience from witnessing a burglary or murder, but
what matters is the object of that visual experience. (In Fregean terms one might say
that it is the reference (Bedeutung) that matters, not its mode of presentation
(Sinn)).30
The experimental task for Harding's subjects is to draw what they see, not
how they see it. In other words, he wants them to draw the object of their perception,
not their experience of it. The experience and its drawn representation are two
30
"Uber Sinn und Bedeutung", 1892, reprinted 1986.
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different kinds of phenomena, but one might argue like Wittgenstein that there is no
other criterion of a visual experience than the representation of what is seen.31
But even if one does not want to go this far (for the experience could involve
emotions, i.e. lead to different modes of presentation of the same thing) Harding's
point is valid: If I was a perfect artist I could paint my colour experiences. The
difference between my actual experience and my painted representation would be one
of what kind of thing they are, not one of sameness as such (just as the difference
between a photograph and a real person is one of kind not of identity).32
The conclusion from this is stronger than Harding may have realised: Even if
his experiment may never be tried out because some of the conditions of being a
perfect artist etc. cannot be fulfilled, its mere possibility makes a strong point: When
the experimenter compares the drawings of his subjects with the image originally
shown there will be an objective verdict, and this verdict will be about objective
similarities or dissimilarities between the painted representations.
So the claim that we cannot know whether other people see the same colours
as we do is either trivially true in the sense that empirically I am not able to see
through your eyes, or is philosophically flawed, because our criterion for seeing the
same thing as someone else must be a public criterion of sameness which can be
decided on by third parties and which becomes meaningless if applied to individuals
only.33
3. There is no satisfactory scientific theory of what a colour objectively is.
a) Colours cannot be identical to wavelengths because we hardly ever (if at all)
encounter pure lightwaves.
It is true that most of the colours we see are mixtures of light waves and therefore the
identification of colour with wavelength is only useful in laboratory conditions and
insufficient or even incorrect in everyday situations. But this is not sufficient to say
31
"What is the criterion of the visual experience? - The criterion? What do you suppose?
The representation of "what is seen"." (P.I., p.l98e):
"Was ist das Kriterium des Seherlebnisses? - Was soil das Kriterium sein?
Die Darstellung dessen, "was gesehen wird"."
(Philosophische Untersuchungen, p.529).
37"
Please note how this also relates to Wittgenstein's question why we do not have two different terms
for transparent colours and opaque colours. Again the material may be different but the colour is not.
33
For to argue that an individual can judge whether two experiences are the same is to ignore the
problems pointed out in Wittgenstein's "private language argument".
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that colour is subjective - there might just be the need for a better physical account
(see c).
b) There is no chemical formula that all lasting ("objective") colours such as paints or
dyes have in common.
This also is true. Historically most paints and dyes were extracted directly from
organic matter (most famously purple from the shell of the purple snail, and indigo
from the indigo plant). The colours were then named after their source.34 Our modern
basic colour terms no longer name the physical source of colours but are abstractions
from something that colours from various sources have in common. But although
colours are unlike natural kinds where we determine by chemical analysis whether
something is or is not a member of a kind, this does not mean that all blue things do
not have something in common which we are justified in calling "blueness", or that
blueness could not be explained some other way (as a family resemblance concept,
for instance). For it is not the case that any one person could come along, look at
colour samples from different materials, and then arbitrarily decide to call half of
them blue and half of them red. For even if people could name the colours thus if it
pleased them they could not communicate what they meant by these colour terms.
Requests such as "the red disk, please" would become useless (and hence
meaningless if one takes a Wittgensteinian view of language).
c) There is no one full physical account of all colour phenomena.
Again I agree, but let me first explain this point: As I said above (a), Newton's
original theory that light is made up of an infinite number of colours, which can then
be defined by their respective wavelengths, can only be used in laboratory conditions.
Most of the time the colours we see are so called metamers, which are mixtures of
colours, which appear exactly the same as colours of pure wavelengths. Two light
sources of differing colours or three lightsources of any even slightly varying colours
are sufficient to create any colour.
If this was the only problem with physical accounts we might be able to
reduce colours to relatively simple mathematical formulae regarding the mixture of
34
This is also why some ancient colour terms are so confusing and have even led to the belief that the
ancient Greeks were colour-blind. There was, for instance, a century long debate about whether the term
"sil" referred to blue or to yellow (or even to violet). The debate was resolved when it was discovered that
"sil" referred to the source of the pigments which could be treated to yield either blue or yellow. (J.Gage,
1993, pp.35-36)
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light. The next difficulty, however, is that colours can mix additively or subtractively.
A subtractive colour mixture takes place when colour pigments or lit areas are mixed.
This mixture is called subtractive because it actually subtracts from the total amount
of light (so called "white light") with each colour that is added. Thus the mixture will
inevitably become darker than the average darkness of each colour added to the
mixture. When a similar amount of all colours is added the mixture will be grey
(Hegel calls this grey "oyster grey" - it is also referred to as "brain grey").
In an additive mixture on the other hand, the light total to the mixture
increases with each colour added. This is the classical case of Newton mixing all
colours of the spectrum back into white. It is also explained subjectively by
Schopenhauer who claims that in the case of additive colour mixture it is our eyes
which add up the amounts of light of each colour.
One might find a formula for each of the two kinds of colour mixture, but
what could not be explained by the same formula is why reflecting, luminous and
matt or shiny surfaces can be of the same colour. If I wanted to use a computer to
identify colours I would have to programme it in different ways depending on
whether the colour it was to identify was emitted from a light bulb, a star or a tv set,
or whether it was reflected from a matt or a shiny surface. Furthermore, a computer
could not identify colours of after-images, dream or hallucinatory colours, and
perhaps even halos, rainbows and other colours that are fleeting though not
complicated everyday colour experiences.
The best physical theory so far is that of Edwin Land who can at least
accommodate colour contrasts and colour constancy (I return to the way in which
surrounding colours influence our colour vision in ch.X). Yet Land too cannot
explain why these colours should have anything in common with colours in our
dreams, hallucinations, after-images or other clearly subjective cases of colour vision.
And last though not least, none of the experiments successfully explains the colour
brown which we do not see as a darkened yellow or orange (which is its physical
explanation), but quite clearly as a separate colour.
I therefore conclude that there is indeed no satisfactory physical account of all
colour phenomena. From this, however it does not follow that colour is purely
subjective (see b).
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Berlin and Kay (1969) include brown in their eleven basic colour terms.
4. Conclusion:
1. A strong subjectivist account has no criterion for seeing the same colour as, and
yet claims that we each see different colours.
2. Strong subjectivism cannot explain why we can be so sure about the colours of
objects around us, and nor can it account for our ability to name (most) colours
without hesitation or difficulty.
3. The only argument that strong subjectivism rests on is that there is no unified
physical account which explains all colour phenomena. Yet this does not entail that
there could not be such a physical account. For "absence of evidence is not evidence
of absence", and as long as there is no complete scientific account of colour the
argument in how far colours are subjective or objective is not decided either way.
What could justify the rejection of strong subjectivism is that it leads to
unacceptable consequences, as its eliminativism of objective colour in favour of
subjective colour experience leads to the strange conclusion that colour is a mere
illusion. If colour is merely illusionary, however, then so is almost all of our visual
perception,36 and our distinction between real objects and genuine illusions (such as
hallucinations) breaks down.
Furthermore, strong subjectivism leads to extreme scepticism and possibly
solipsism as it does not allow for an objective quality which different people can
refer to. One way out of this cul-de-sac is to reduce subjective colour experiences to
objective physical states within our heads, which can be investigated and talked
about by different people. The reduction of something subjective to something
objective is, however, intrinsically incoherent (see introduction).
Thus I conclude that strong subjectivism has neither empirical evidence37 nor
philosophical argument on its side, and as it leads either to solipsism (if thought
through consistently) or to the philosophically inconsistent reduction of subjective to
objective states I cannot support it.
36
For colour boundaries visually determine spatial boundaries, of shape as well as of distance and other
geometrical relations (see also ch.X).
37
To be fair to Hardin I have to admit that he does offer scientific causal explanations for some colour
phenomena such as after-images or complementary colours. The same evidence is, however, brought to
more acceptable conclusions by more moderate "weak subjectivists".
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Ill
HEGEL: AUFHEBUNG OF THE SUBJECT-OBJECT DIVIDE
IN THE DISCOVERY OF ENTOPTIC COLOURS
Unlike Schopenhauer, Hegel does not devote a whole book to the defence of Goethe's
Farbenlehre. The topic of colour occupies only a small fraction of his philosophy of
1 • 2
nature and a few albeit very beautiful passages in the Lectures on Aesthetics.
Nevertheless there are some great insights about the nature of colour and light in
Hegel's philosophy.
I shall begin with a short history of the relationship between Hegel and Goethe.
As I hope to show, the main principles which underlie Goethe's natural philosophy as
expressed in the Farbenlehre can also be found in Hegel's and Schelling's natural
philosophy. While my section on Schelling is brief and general, I shall demonstrate the
more specific use of these principles in a close analysis of Hegel's notion of "entoptic
colours" as a form of "Aufhebung" of the subject-object divide.
I shall conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of weak subjectivism in
general, for even if Hegel and Schelling may be far removed from modem Anglo-
American philosophy their views on colour are nevertheless weak subjectivist in a wide
sense.
1
Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830), §320
2
Vorlesungen iiber Asthetik oder Philosophic der Kunst (1820-1829), especially Part3, third section, first
chapter: "Painting" (henceforth abbreviated as Part3, HI, 1) in the passages about the "sensual material of
painting" (lb and 2b).
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1. Hegel, Goethe and Schelling
1.1. Goethe and Hegel
In his essay "Influences from Newer Philosophy"3 Goethe thanks Kant and Herder, then
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and the brothers Humboldt and Schlegel for their influence on
his thoughts (note the omission of Schopenhauer). Considering that Goethe was not a
friend of complex philosophical systems, especially when these are almost unreadable
to a non-philosopher, it is surprising how close Goethe and Hegel were. Their letters to
each other are hearty and witty, and according to their contemporaries they thought
highly of each other and enjoyed each other's company.
Their work too shows some affinities. While some critics argue that Goethe
only accepted Hegel because the latter supported his Farbenlehre, others speak of
strong influences they had on each other.4 From Eckermann51 have the impression that
Goethe did not like Hegel's writings but admitted that this might be due to his lack of
understanding of Hegel's philosophy; furthermore, that Goethe thought Hegel had a bad
influence on students, in particular with regard to philosophical style; and thirdly, that
Goethe thought it wrong to make religious issues part of philosophy. On the other hand,
Goethe praised Hegel's judgments as a critic and, as I said, liked Hegel himself a lot.6
Goethe and Hegel share three strong beliefs: First, a general belief in progress
and in the active role nature and especially we humans play in it. Secondly, both
thinkers are holistic and try to explain the whole world by a few basic thoughts (in
Hegel's case these turn into well thought out and very complex systems, in Goethe's
they are distributed over essays, poetry, drama and fiction). Most importantly, however,
3
"Einwirkung der Neueren Philosophie", HA13, pp.25-29
4
Falkenburg, Illetterati and Melica (all in Petry, 1993) come to the conclusion that Hegel adapted most of
Goethe's Farbenlehre to his own thought. Honegger (1951) on the other hand, draws attention to the wider
affinities between Goethe and Hegel regarding the relationship between nature and art, and Marotzki (1987)







both Goethe and Hegel base their thoughts on the dynamic nature of polarities and their
syntheses.
Unlike Schopenhauer Hegel does not dismiss Goethe's insights as "merely
poetical" but is impressed by their philosophical importance, and perhaps Hegel
achieves what Schopenhauer only claims to have achieved: He makes Goethe's
Farbenlehre into a part of a philosophical system and thus philosophically vindicates
Goethe's ideas. On 20th July 1817 Hegel writes to Goethe that he owes the correct
understanding of the nature of light and of a great wealth of its appearances ("die
richtige Erkenntnis der Natur des Lichts und eines weiten Reichtums seiner
Erscheinungen") to Goethe, and that he admires the abstraction within the system with
which Goethe held onto the basic truth ("Grundwahrheit" - "dab ich die Abstraction
darin erkenne und bewundere").7
Goethe, of course, was delighted that Hegel took him seriously, especially as
Hegel had become influential in Berlin and his support might at last spread the
acknowledgement of the Farbenlehre. It turned out that Hegel was less successful than
Goethe had hoped. Altogether he only recruited a few followers, one of whom,
however, von Henning, gave a series of lectures on Goethe's Farbenlehre in Berlin
(winter 1821/22), and these were much discussed among friends. After that the
Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin financed a lecture on Goethe's Farbenlehre to
be held at the University of Berlin every summer semester. In turn, Goethe published
the (greater part of) a letter from Hegel about the Urphenomenon and entoptic colours
in his Heftes, and wrote to Boisseree:
"Since now the higher philosophy has vindicated the independence and
indivisibility of light, we others have won the game and in our naivity can quietly work
towards highest contemplations."9
7
Hegel, Briefe, pp.160 and 161
g
Letter from 20.2.1821, in Hefte zur Naturwissenschaft, vol.1,4 (l.Band, 4. Heft).
9
"Da nunmehr die hohere Philosophie dem Lichte seine Selbststandigkeit und Unzerlegbarkeit vindizieret,
so haben wir Andern gewonnenes Spiel und konnen in unserer Naivitat ganz gelassen den hochsten
Betrachtungen vorarbeiten." (1.7.1817)
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1.2. Goethe and Schelling
Already in 1800 (ten years before the publication of the Farbenlehre) Schelling wrote to
Goethe that one could not proceed with nature studies "before this great and general
phenomenon of nature is made clear" ("ehe dieses groBe und gemeine Phanomen der
Natur ins reine gebracht ist").10 In the same letter Schelling wrote that the completed
Farbenlehre could serve as a schema for other natural phenomena, especially sound and
music. What connects the two thinkers most, however, is their interest in magnetism.
Goethe studied magnetism extensively in August and September 1799 and in March
1800. At about the same time, Schelling suggested to him to write a "theory of the
earth" (i.e. prehistoric account) based on the principles of magnetism. Magnetism was
then as much a key theory as the theory of relativity was at the beginning of this century
and chaos theory was in the nineteen-eighties. Apparently this went as far as
interpreting texts according to Schelling's theory of magnetism (an interesting early
case of deconstruction).11
As with Schopenhauer and Hegel, the difference between Goethe and Schelling
is that between realism and idealism. Thus Schiller writes to Goethe:
"It is an interesting phenomenon (Erscheinung) how your contemplative nature
gets on so well with philosophy and is livened and strengthened by it; whether on the
other hand, the speculative nature of our friend [Schelling] will acquire as much of your
contemplative one is doubtful to me, and that is grounded in the nature of the thing
itself. For you only take from his ideas what suits your contemplations and the rest does
not disturb you as for you the object in the end remains a firmer authority than
speculation is, as long as those two don't coincide. For the philosopher, however, any
contemplation which does not fit in, is very inconvenient because it makes absolute
demands on his ideas."1"
10
Briefe an Goethe. HA 1. p.342 (6.1.1800)
'1
Schiller writes to Goethe that in Schiitz' critique of his Jungfrau von Orleans "one can find Schelling's
theory of art applied to the text in a completely new fashion." ("man findet darin ganz frisch die Schellingische
Kunstphilosophie auf das Werk angewendet." - (Letter from 20.1.1802). And Caroline (Schelling's future wife)
writes: "[In Schutz' interpretation] the Jungfrau is constructed according to the principles of natural philosophy,
and it is really a treatise occasioned by the Jungfrau, for there is very little of her in it, but much of potences,
duplicity and identity, and even of magnets." (Darin ist die Jungfrau nach Prinzipien der Naturphilosophie
konstruiert, und es ist cigcntlich eine Abhandlung bei Gelegenheit der Jungfrau, denn es kommt so wenig von
ihr darin vor, aber viel von Potenzen, von Duplizitat und Identitat, vom Magneten sogar." - (Caroline,
22.1.1802; both letter in Briefe an Goethe, HA1, No.255 and commentary)
12
"Es ist eine interessante Erscheinung, wie sich Ihre anschauende Natur mit der Philosophic so gut vertragt
und immer dadurch belebt und gestarkt wird; ob sich, umgekehrt, die spekulative Natur unseres Freundes
[Schelling] ebensoviel von ihrer anschauenden aneignen wird, zweifle ich, und das liegt schon in der Sache.
Denn Sie nehmen sich von seinen Ideen nur das, was Ihren Anschauungen zusagt, und das iibrige beunruhigt
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I do not know what brought the two men together and apart again (Goethe
significantly influenced the authorities in support of Schelling attaining a professorship
in Jena in 1798, but twenty years later (in 1816) he denied Schelling the very same
post). But when Schelling tried to get into contact again in 1827 Goethe answered him
a month later, pleased by Schelling's efforts:
"For since the early beginnings of [our] common development (Bildung) I have
often looked at what you've been doing, from which I always received a friendly and
happy inspiration."13
Philosophically, Goethe had probably more in common with Schelling than
with Hegel. Between 1800 and 1830 at least both of them saw nature as primary in the
ultimate (godly) identity of nature and human spirit. They may also both be attacked or
admired for wishing to combine Platonism with Spinoza's philosophy.14 It is certainly
true with regard to Goethe that his holism (from Spinoza) sits somehow uneasily beside
the eternal realm of Urphenomena. But as Schiller said, this did not bother Goethe at
all, as long as he remained true to the phenomena themselves.
As I know more about Hegel than about Schelling I shall concentrate on the
former throughout this chapter. I will however return to Schelling in my chapter on
painting where I find Schelling's philosophy of Art (so successfully applied to Schiller's
Jungfrau) very useful for the treatment of colour in painting.
Sie nicht, da Ihnen am Ende doch das Objekt als eine festere Autoritat dasteht als die Spekulation, solange
diese mit jenem nicht zutrifft. Den Philosophen aber muB jede Anschauung, die er nicht unterbringen kann,
sehr inkommodieren, weil er an seine Ideen eine absolute Forderung macht..." (Briefe an Goethe, HA1,
no.257, 20.2.1802)
13
"Denn seit den friihen Anfangen einer gemeinsamen Bildung sah ich mich gar oft nach Ihrem Tun und
Treiben urn, woraus ich jederzeit eine freundliche und gliickliche Anregung erfuhr." (Briefe an
Goethe, HA2, no.620 (22.9.1827) and commentary incl. Goethe's letter from 26.10.1827)
14
Jacobi writes to Goethe that Schelling was combining Plato and Spinoza which was intrinsically




"We see on the one side the light, the bright, on the other the darkness, the dark; we
bring turbidity between the two, and out of these opposites, with the help of the thought
mediation, there develop, also in opposition, the colours; and yet they soon point,
through inter-relations, immediately back to something common."15
From the first three sections of Goethe's Farbenlehre (physiological, physical and
chemical colours) I have extracted the following principles:
1. In the beginning was Opposition
1.1. The Polarity in Nature - real
1.2. Phenomena and Appearances
2. Prime(Ur)-Knowledge is Knowledge of Urphenomena
2.1. The Concept of Polarity - ideal
2.2. Ideal Phenomena
3. From Opposition in opposition follows Unity
3.1. Ideality and Reality
4. From Unification follows Separation
4.1. Analysis and Synthesis
5. There follows an infinite Process of Becoming
5.1. Polarity and Intensification
According to Goethe these principles give a complete account of all developments and
movements in nature. Put into a system like this their proximity to Hegel's dialectic is
15
"Wir sehen auf der einen Seite das Licht, das Helle, auf der anderen die Finsternis, das DunkJe; wir
bringen die Triibe zwischen beide, und aus diesen Gegensatzen, mit Hilfe gedachter Vermittlung, entwickeln
sich, gleichfalls in einem Gegensatz, die Farben, deuten aber alsbald, durch einen Wechselbezug, unmittelbar
auf ein Gemeinsames wieder zuriick." (Fl.§ 175)
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apparent. Even more striking is the affinity to Schelling, whose natural philosophy
deduces all formations and movements from magnetism, which is naturally the most
obvious manifestation of polarity in nature. In the following pages I shall give a
detailed analysis of each principle in order to show that these principles are no mere
formulae ("sterile recepticles") but are useful ideas for the understanding of colour and
colour relations.
2. Goethe's and Hegel's Principles in Detail
1 .In the beginning was Opposition
Opposition is the principle which governs everything. It is in the beginning in the sense
of "apxr|", "principium", or "ur". Within oppositions one side may be regarded as
positive and the other side as its negation. Thus light might be conceived as the positive
force and darkness as its negation.16 Goethe has a clearly optimistic view of this initial
opposition leading to a positive end much like Hegel's synthesis improving over thesis
and antithesis. At the same time opposition keeps us alive in the sense that we can
never become lazy if we do not want the negative side (nothing/death) to take over (see
also below: 5). Goethe's dialectic like Hegel's is therefore also a historical thesis.
16
Please note how wonderfully systems like these can be deconstructed by changing the values of the
forces. Thus Mephistopheles takes darkness to be the primary force:
"Ich bin ein Teil des Teils, der anlangs alles war,
Ein Teil der Finstemis. die sich das Licht gebahr,
Das stolze Licht, das nun der Mutter Nacht
Den alten Rang, den Raum ihr streitig macht,
..." (Faust I, lines 1349-52)
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1.1 .Polarity in Nature - real
The principle of opposition exists in nature as real forms of polarity - for the
Farbenlehre these are of course light and darkness. Polarities of time and space (up and
down, here and there, before and after, etc.) determine nature's movements (attraction
and repulsion, appearing and disappearing light, acids and alkalines, acting and
suffering, male and female, etc.) and interact with the polarities of colours and light and
darkness. There are no isolated polarities.
As for Hegel, Goethe and Schelling ideality and reality (God/spirit/mind and
nature) are ultimately one it is not only "natural" but necessary that nature partakes of
opposition and polarity if that is the governing principle. While Schelling and Goethe
take ideal polarity to stem from (or be given by) nature, Hegel on the other hand takes
nature to be the product of spirit. All three agree that polarity exists in nature in the
sense that it can be discovered empirically.
1.2.Phenomena and Appearances17
According to Goethe, each manifestation of one or several polarities is an appearance.
Appearances thus make their underlying principles - the phenomena - perceptible to
sense-organs. The most fundamental phenomenon is the "Urphenomenon". One such
Urphenomenon is the polarity between light and darkness which governs and can thus
be grasped in all colour phenomena.18
The appearance of colour itself is in Hegel a synthesis of light and darkness (as
in Goethe between light and turbidity). As light and darkness/matter for Hegel represent
subjectivity and objectivity, colours are additionally a synthesis of subjectivity and
17
"Appearance" is the best translation for "Erscheinung" in Goethe, but as I said above (footnote 18, p.20)
the emphasis is on the appearing of phenomena, not on the contrast between appearance and reality, as the
appearances alone make reality visible.
18
Polarity itself cannot be the main Urphenomenon because it is too abstract a term: unlike Urphenomena it
cannot be apprehended in appearances but only abstracted from them. Polarity is thus the form which all
Urphenomena have in common.
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objectivty and hence manifestations of the highest principles of all (see ch.VI for
details).
2. Prime Knowledge is Knowledge of Urphenomena
It follows that the most fundamental insight into nature is the recognition of an
Urphenomenon. Once we have grasped "what holds the world together in its innermost
being"19 we can deduce other phenomena. While Schelling might completely agree
with Goethe on this matter, Hegel will give the same thought a different interpretation:
as for Hegel it is absolute spirit which holds the world together and enables us to
understand, we need to deduce from spirit rather than from nature. One could also
argue that Hegel's point repeats Goethe's albeit on a higher level: Goethe's ascending
from empirical phenomena to Urphenomena is reflected in Hegel's advance from
empirical certainty to the knowledge of absolute spirit (as outlined in the
Phenomenology ofSpirit).
What Hegel, Goethe and Schelling have in common is their holism: if truth is
always the whole truth then the grasping of its most obvious expression - be it
magnetism, colour or whatever - will automatically yield insight into all other
processes. Hence the three thinkers agree in the general method for investigation as
aiming to understand the highest principle in order to descend from it to explain lower
principles.
2.1. The Concept of Polarity - ideal
Corresponding to the real polarity in nature we have the concept of polarity in our
minds. Here Goethe, Schelling and Hegel again set different priorities: For Goethe and
Schelling the concept of polarity is given to us by nature (through our being part of
nature (Natur)) while for Hegel our concept of polarity is given by the nature (Wesen)20
19
"was die WeMm Innersten zusammenhalt" (Faust, lines 382-3)
20
See appendix for an explanation of "Wesen" and "Natur".
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of absolute spirit. Logically it makes no difference which of the two stances we adopt
as long as we accept the ultimate unity of nature and spirit which makes the polarities
in nature and in our conceptual understanding deducible from each other.
2.2. Ideal Phenomena
Accordingly we also possess the concept of "phenomenon". This follows from two
facts given so far: First, as any phenomenon encompasses polarity, the grasping of
polarity as demonstrated above is always the grasping of a particular polarity and hence
of a phenomenon. Secondly, our concepts of phenomena are entailed in there being real
phenomena in nature because (due to the original unity of nature and spirit) they each
have their own equivalents in spirit, i.e. potentially I our minds.
How we grasp these ideal phenomena and polarities is another matter, for even
if ideal (spiritual) and real (empirical) phenomena exist in parallel (or unity) it does not
follow that everyone can apprehend them. With regard to Goethe I give a
Schopenhauerian-Platonic account of the process of grasping phenomena (ch.V), but
otherwise I shall leave this question unanswered and merely discuss the ontological
problems involved.
3. From Opposition to opposition follows Unity
The principle of opposition leads to a paradox: the opposite of opposition is unity. As
we shall see in my chapter on painting, one can thus explain why pictures composed of
certain combinations of colour, which are themselves opposite (complementary) to
each other, can yet have harmonious effects on us. The interaction of opposition and
unity is thus an essential part of our understanding of harmony, be it in music, in
painting or in human relations.
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3.1. Ideality and Reality
Important oppositions are thus united: real objective polarity in nature is set against
ideal subjective polarity in the human mind. The recognition of this parallel or unity
alone is one way of uniting the two sides as we make them two corresponding sides of
the one world picture or statement. A less conscious unity is achieved in the process of
colour vision, as our eyes complement the objective colours in nature with subjective
physiological colours.
Hegel and Schelling expand this point further as they make colour the unity of
ideal light and real matter. The process of seeing colour is thus a "double synthesis" of
the two syntheses of colour outside us (light and matter) and colour activity within us
(complementary production of dark and light in our eyes/minds). Once we understand
this we can return to the individual syntheses and deduce why colour as we see it is
"out-of-itself": it is split into two halves each of which contains ideality (light) and
reality (darkness/matter).21
4. From unification follows separation
The second paradox contained in the concept of polarity is that unity not only opposes
polarity but by its very nature strives to become one with it, i.e. to unite with it. Thus
two united sides will strive back towards opposition.
Both, the unity out of opposition and the separation out of unity may seem to be
rather abstract constructions or even empty wordgames, as both points stem from the
fact that opposition includes the possibility of opposition to opposition, which leads to
the same kind of paradox as Russell's classes of classes. Nevertheless these cases occur
in real life, as for instance in political situations when members of the opposition
oppose their own party's politics and thus back the government. Similarly, the constant
striving towards unity includes the possibility of unity with opposing forces, as happens
when someone who tries to be friendly towards everyone (i.e. to unite with everyone) is
torn into different directions.
21
See chapter VI for details on the relation between light and dark, ideality and matter.
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In the case of colour both effects can be seen in colour combinations: while
some rather different colours can look harmonious when seen together, colours which
are closer to each other may repel each other (we say, "they clash"). Both effects are
useful for painting and will be discussed in the relevant chapter (ch.X; but for anyone
curious, the colour examples are in section X,2).
4.1. Synthesis and Analysis
To grasp the interaction of polarities in unity and opposition two techniques are
required: analysis will render differences while synthesis will strive to unite them. As
analysis and synthesis are themselves a form of polarity the process of investigation can
be the same as that of the investigated.
To match the process of investigation to its object is not merely an elegant
method, but in the case of Hegel, Goethe and Schelling becomes a necessary
requirement if their fundamental thesis of the unity of nature and spirit is to hold.22
5. There follows an infinite Process of Becoming
The movement between polarities is infinite. As one side increases or decreases it
changes the balance of polarities thus demanding its opposite side to decrease or
increase respectively. Because all polarities are connected (see 1.1) the effect of a slight
change in one polarity can be vast (much like the famous movement of a butterfly in
China affecting the weather in Scotland). Whatever is part of this process of becoming
is not part of living nature - it is dead. •
Although the thought that living nature is in constant movement between
polarities is especially strong in the more lyrical passages in Goethe and Schelling, I do
not regard it merely as a romantic metaphor. We do live by constantly striving towards
different goals, which we abandon as soon as we have reached them only to return to
2~̂
Please note that their method could further be understood by yet a higher level of synthesis and analysis
comprising method as well as object of their investigation.
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them again later on (as for instance, in the circle from drinking, hangover and drinking
again - a clear case of attraction to and feeling repelled by the same thing). The only
time we ever stop to strive is when we are dead, for even in sleep we wish for rest and
after sufficient rest wish to rise again.23
5.1. Polarity and Intensification
It can now be seen that two principles are needed to explain all phenomena: Polarity
must be supplemented by intensification (Steigerung) to account for movement or
change. Thus intensification is the life force or energy of nature. As either opposition or
unity are intensified the two polar principles form a circle (rather than a line).
We thus arrive not just at a multitude of polarities but also at different degrees
of their intensities. This again is a natural occurrence as at different moments in life
different things appear to be the most important ("the most attractive"). With regard to
colour (disregarding lightness) the two forces of polarity and intensification form the
first basic colour circle. As I shall show in chapter VII this circle can be modified in






Please note that this Faustian striving as essential human nature is a Western European idea. Strongly
fatalistic societies as well as Buddhist, Zen and many other Eastern philosophies will not treat standing still as
death but as either inevitable or as a desirable goal in life.
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3. Hegel's Principles.
The principles which underlie Hegel's philosophy of colour are not as easy to
summarise as Goethe's are. The sections of the Encyclopaedia devoted to light are
almost unintelligible without a basic understanding of the Encyclopedia as a whole.
Hegel's earlier Wissenschaft der Logik (1812-16) contains a key passage on unity and
polarity which is repeated in his later writings on light, reflection and colour,24 but I
shall try to stick to the "Logic" as given in his Encyclopaedia (1830), since here we
may assume consistency with Hegel's philosophy of nature. Amazingly, however, more
than consistency connects Hegel's logic and his philosophy of nature: We can
understand Hegel's theory of light and colour by merely reading his logic and
exchanging some of its terms with terms from the latter (which might explain why
Hegel spends so little time explaining light and colour in his philosophy of nature
section of the Encyclopedia).
3.1. The theory of being - the theory of light
"Pure Being makes the beginning because it is both pure thought and the indetermined,
simple immediate; and the first beginning cannot be something mediated and further
determined."25
Thus the Absolute Being is abstracted from all limitations of reality (Enc.§86) and as
pure abstraction captures even the absolutely-negative. As we shall see in my chapter
on light, light-in-itself (as I call it) is also absolutely pure, indetermined and simple, as
well as absolute identity ("I") and hence beginning. It is thus the entity closest to God.
Everything else is darker and less pure than light - is its true other. As the negative of
light (itself positivity) its other is empty, is nothing within itself (i.e. not identity,
beginning or "I").
24
Logik, "Lehre vom Begriff", Subjectivitat, pp.43-52.
25
"Das reine Sein macht den Anfang, weil es sowohl reiner Gedanke als das unbestimmte, einfache
Unmittelbare ist, der erste Anfang aber nichts Vermitteltes und weiter Bestimmtes sein kann." (Enc.§86). See
chapter VI for a detailed analysis of these predicates regarding light.
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Light and dark are, however, meaningful polarities: dark is not just the negative
of light and vice versa but each is a force in itself. Thus on the one hand light and dark
are determined by each other but on the other they have independent natures (Wesen).
A Wesen is the shining (Erscheinung) of Sein, i.e. appearing essence. And each Wesen
is not just different from any other Wesen but has its own particular other (Enc.§119).
Thus light is not just different from house and you and me, but is particularly opposed
to darkness. This gives it a particular force. In the case of colour, the particular forces of
light and dark meet and become visible in the production of colour. The opposition
between light and dark is therefore not a mere logical contradiction such as blue and
not-blue, but forms affirmed opposites (such as blue and yellow).
3.2. Colours as a Process of Becoming
Just as becoming is the synthesis of being and nothingness, so colour is the
synthesis of light and dark: anything becoming includes being and nothingness as it
comes into being yet thereby loses its former qualities ("has nothing of them");
similarly colours are a process of becoming between light and dark, sometimes closer
to light sometimes closer to dark but always in time as "fleeting appearances". Just as
becoming is not a restful unity of being and nothingness but is restless in its containing
the two polarities and being torn between them, so colour too continually strives
towards the lighter or darker and never appears to be absolutely still.
This lack of stillness refers both to colour permanency and to the restfulness of
colour at any moment in time. While the latter depends on visual context (such as the
96
shimmering and flickering effect of certain patterns), the former is related to the kind
of colour in question. Pillarboxes, for instance, remain red for many years, while
rainbows and after-images disappear within minutes or even seconds. Hegel therefore
adopts Goethe's distinction between physiological, physical and chemical colours.
Colours which are relatively permanent, such as the redness of a pillarbox, are what
Goethe calls "chemical colours". Hegel explains these colours as qualities of physical
26
See also chapter X, sect.2, where I discuss which colours repel each other and hence cause effects of
instability.
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objects (of "something"). The matter of that something determines the "Dasein" (Being
there) of its colour. And indeed colours are determined by the chemistry of the objects
they are colours of, so that the longer lasting the chemical structures in a dye or paint
are the longer lasting is its colour.
According to Hegel, chemical colours are however the exception to the rule and
do not show the true nature (Wesen) of colour. Already in his Logic (1812-16) Hegel
uses colour as an example for the relationship between the general and the specific
idea:
"[It may seem natural and sensible to observe colour] first in the concrete appearance of
the subjective animal sense [physiological colours], then as being a ghostlike floating
appearance external to the subject [physical colours], and lastly as fixed to objects in
external reality [chemical colours]."27
Hegel continues that it is the second form which is the general (and in that sense first)
form of colour, where
"colour sits in balance between subjectivity and objectivity in the form of the familar
spectrum, still without any involvement with subjective or objective circumstances."28
It is thus colour as holding the balance between subject and object and hence as their
bridge (in that sense unity) which catches Hegel's interest. For it is this kind of colour
which reflects most clearly the process of becoming between polarities: both, between
light and darkness (being and nothingness) and between subject and object. Physical
colours thus bridge the conceptual gap between two major polarities in Hegel's
philosophy.
11
"...so konnte es als naturgemaB und sinnreich erscheinen, die Farbe zuerst in der concreten Erscheinung
des animalischen subjectiven Sinnes, alsdenn ausser dem Subject als eine gespenstartige, schwebende
Erscheinung, und endlich in ausserlicher Wirklichkeit an Objecten fixiert zu betrachten." (Logik, vol.n, "Lehre
vom Begriff: Idee", p.217)
28
"...wie die Farbe auf der Schwebe zwischen der Subjectivitat und Objectivitat als das bekannte Spectrum
steht, noch ohne alle Verwicklung mit subjectiven und objectiven Umstanden." (ibid.)
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3.3. Physical Colours: An Undecided Problem
Hegel's general description of colour as a "ghostlike floating appearance external to the
subject" corresponds to Goethe's class of "physical colours". These are colours which
appear through the interaction of light with non-coloured "turbid" media, such as
mirrors, metals, water, crystals, and most famously: prisms. In trying to explain how
colours can appear from non-coloured causes one has two possibilites: one can either
assume that light is not as simple as it looks but already contains colours which are
therefore discovered under certain conditions; or one can hold on to the notion of light
being simple and argue that colours are created under certain conditions. Malus,
Newton and their followers chose the first option, while Goethe, Hegel and Schelling
chose the second one.29
In the early nineteenth century this issue was not yet decided, and Goethe and
his contemporaries were correct in drawing attention to the fact that Newton's
experiments were by no means conclusive.30 The weakness of the theories of Newton
and Malus is that they ignore the angles of reflection or refraction in their account,
although with most angles the colours actually do not appear. So although we now
know that Newton's theory is correct within our scientific framework, it was pure
hypothesis at the time, and, as I hope to show, can be seen as insufficient or even false
in different frameworks.
In order to defend the explanations given by Goethe, Hegel and Schelling one
has to show how their theories explain the appearance of colour from non-coloured
causes better than or at least as well as Newton does in his theory. The explanation of
the creation of colour "out of nothing" is easier than might appear if one accepts these
philosophers' treatment of nature as a whole: As in organic nature living beings (plants
and animals) are created out of the in themselves fairly insignificant pollen/semen and
eggs, there is no reason why the same could not also happen in inorganic nature. Thus
in chemistry the mixing of two or more substances can yield different and far more
29
Schopenhauer too speaks of the creation of colour but in a different, subjective sense.
30
See also the excellent paper by Friedrich Steinle, "Newton's Rejection of the Modification Theory of
Colour", in Petry (1993), pp.547-556.
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powerful substances (such as explosives)," and in optics relatively dull daylight
meeting an ordinary piece of glass can result in the most beautiful of colour.
In the case of physical colours, colour is created by the interaction of light and a
turbid medium. The conditions for the appearance of colour furthermore include the
angles between surfaces of the turbid medium, the light source (or sources) and the
perceiver. While these combinations can be fairly complex in some cases I hope to
show that the explanation as a whole is a good one, if we want to remain within the
realm of visible appearances rather than refer to processes or entities such as lightwaves
which themselves are invisible.
3.4. Entoptic Colours in Particular
In order to understand Hegel's philosophy of colour it is easiest to concentrate on
entoptic colours. The treatment of entoptic colours in Goethe's Farbenlehre was
published eight years later than the main text in Hefte zur Naturwissenschaft (1,3,1820)
which Goethe introduces by thanking Hegel, Seebeck and others for their help in the
discovery of these phenomena. Goethe also suggests to include the resulting 40 odd
pages on entoptic colours in his Farbenlehre after §485, i.e. at the end of the section on
physical colours. Although not structured into short paragraphs these pages consist of
28 short sections and stylistically as well as thematically fit seamlessly into the main
work of the Farbenlehre.
As their name suggests, entoptic colours are colour appearances within a
medium. They were first investigated by Malus and others in 1809 and then more
closely examined by Seebeck in Germany and Brewster in England (who received a
joint science prize for their discoveries). Hegel took part in some of Seebeck's
experiments during his time in Niirnberg. Whether Hegel actually coined the term
"entoptic colours", as seems to be implied in some of the letters between Goethe and
Hegel, is not quite clear.32 In any case Goethe is clearly grateful for Hegel's
31
Goethe's interest in alchemy must have also supported the belief in creation from fairly insignificant parts,
such as the quest for the "Stein der Weisen" showed, which was believed to create gold out of dirt.
32~
On 20.7.1817 Hegel writes to Goethe that he is pleased about Goethe's accepting his term ("ein Name,
den ich mich freue. daB Sie ihn, wie ich ihn dem epoptischen nachgrazisiert habe, gelten lassen."). Also there
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contribution to his understanding of entoptic colours for he writes to Reinhard and
Schultz that Hegel had penetrated ("penetriert", "durchdrungen") the subject of entoptic
colours to such an extent that Goethe now found his own writings more transparent
(durchsichtig) than before.33
Entoptic colours were first discovered in calcites but were later found to be
reproducible (lifted to the status of empirical phenomena) in pieces of glass.34 The
thick, transparent medium is held towards the north light in such a way that its two
sides reflect the light within the medium showing four dark comers ("the white cross";
if the medium is more or less square, in the triangle we obtain three dark comers). With
the help of further mirrors and/or backgrounds colours can be produced. The details are
rather laborious but what is important is that
1. entoptic colours appear through double reflection;
2. entoptic colours appear within an otherwise colourless transparent medium.
In order to understand Hegel's notion of entoptic colours we therefore first have
to understand the relevance of reflection: The nature of simple reflection is to reverse
left and right.35 A mirror, if not perfectly plane or looked at from a right angle will
furthermore emphasise some features over others by changing the quantitative relations
of the object reflected.
Now, light according to Hegel is reflection-in-itself: as absolute identity with
itself it travels in a straight line and is reflected in a straight line. Perfect reflection
would thus reflect the light back to its original source from which it would again travel
to be reflected and so on ad infinitum (see chapter VI for details).
are several references to Hegel's "godfathering" (Gevatternschaft) of the entoptic colours, which Goethe
however excludes from the reprinting of Hegel's letter (24.1.1921) in his Naturwissenschaftliche Hefte. For on
the other hand, Seebeck claims to have named them himself ("..welche ich spater entoptische genannt habe..";
Naturwissenschaftlicltc Hefte 1.1 (1817) p. 11).
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"..dieser wundersam scharf und fein denkende Mann...Bei Gelegenheit des entoptischen Aufsatzes hat er
sich so durchdringend geauBert. daB mir nun meine Arbeit durchsichtiger als vorher vorkommt." (to Reinhard,
5.3.1821)
"Dieser merkwiirdige geistrciche Mann hat, wie meine Chroagenesie iiberhaupt, so auch dieses Kapitel
dergestalt penetriert. daB meine Arbeit mir nun selbst erst recht durchsichtig geworden." (to C.L.F.Schultz,
10.3.1821)
(both reprinted in Hegels Briefe. commentary p.475).
34
Goethe's note on how to prepare the glass no longer applies as most of our 20th century glass is produced
that way anyway.
35
See J.W.Burbridge for an analysis of Hegel's concept of reflection as reversal as used in his logic; in
Beiser (1993), pp.97-8.
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If we however change the angles of the mirror, the light will be reflected to a
place unlike its origin, and a parallel double reflection will more or less continue the
original direction of the light:
v/
In the case of entoptic colours this double reflection takes place within a transparent
medium where the light will partly be transmitted and partly be reflected.36 Ignoring the
transmittance of light, some of the internal reflection will be infinite:
What we therefore see in entoptic colours is an infinite changing of ideal polarities (of
direction) creating colour within real matter. The intensity and specific colour of
entoptic colours depends on the following conditions:
a) purity (ideality) of light: the experiments have to be performed under a clear blue
sky, i.e. without manifestations of darkness as in material clouds;
b) direction of light: the appearance changes from a white cross (Northern light) to a
black cross (Southern light) depending on the direction we are facing; each cross is thus
in a sense a further reversal (mirror image) of light and darkness;
36
As I explain in chapter VII no empirical object is perfectly transparent, so that even the transparent
medium referred to in this secion will reflect some of the light incident upon it - both externally and internally.
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c) addition of mirrors and surfaces within the medium: further reflections, both
internal and external to the medium, intensify the colours seen - from black and white
crosses to colourful ones on backgrounds of their complementaries;
d) impurity of the medium: as impurity contributes more matter it further intensifies the
TO
colour (presumably there is an ideal balance between the degrees of purity of light
and impurity of the medium for each colour appearance).
We can now see why Hegel was so fascinated by entoptic colours: They are the
result of genuine interaction between reality (material medium) and ideality (immaterial
light), which is enhanced through the number of reflections internal and external to the
medium to yield different colours. Entoptic colours are thus a way of capturing the
"ghostlike fleeting appearance" while at the same time (through the complexity of the
spatial relations required) emphasising the fragile balance of this interaction of light
and dark. Unlike chemical colours, which remain more or less the same object under
different circumstances, and unlike physiological colours, which are clearly subjective,
entoptic colours can thus capture the subtle balance between ideality and reality which
Hegel requires for his philosophy. Especially his explanation and evaluation of painting
as expressing ideality (emotion, beauty, and most importantly religion and truth)
although being itself material, can now be made to rest on the nature of colour itself
(see chapter X).
37
Goethe suggests using several layers of plane glass on top of each other rather than one uniform cube to
intensify the colours.
38
Hegel calls this impurity "Sprodigkeit" ("brittleness") and names it as one of the opposites of ideality in




There is no current strand in Anglo-American philosophy that reflects Hegel's or
Schelling's philosophy. However, if we concentrate on their treatment of colour as a
bridge or unity between subject and object and hence neither fully objective nor fully
subjective, we reach weak subjectivism. In this section I shall argue that although most
weak subjectivist accounts fail, they do capture the essential quality of colour being
both subjective and objective in some sense or another.
Weak subjectivism allows for the possibility of determinate physical causes of
colour appearances but treats colour itself as a sensation, more like pain than like shape.
Most weak subjectivists therefore support the Lockean distinction between primary and
secondary qualities, even if many of them slightly modify it. Weak subjectivists are
thus often dispositionalists who argue that there are objective dispositions in objects
and perceivers which cause colour sensations. These sensations tell us nothing about
their physical causes, which are the subject of the natural sciences. I take it to be an
advantage of the weak subjectivist position that it can accommodate any scientific
account and can thus proceed independently of the sciences. The relationship of
primary to secondary qualities can be one of epiphenomenalism (Jackson),
representation by sense-data (Peacocke) or simply of no interest to the enquiry at all.
4.1. Three Arguments for Weak Subjectivism
Weak subjectivists share some arguments with objectivists and some with strong
subjectivists; I shall only repeat three of them here, but express them in terms of the
primary-secondary quality distinction:-
1. Colours do not reveal anything about the primary qualities of an object and therefore
are not physical qualities but are essentially subjective.
This claim is clearly wrong. While colour admittedly only seldom reveals the solidity of
an object (but a green tomato is more solid than a red one), it does reveal all other
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primary qualities, and is possibly the most revealing of all senses: if colour did not
reveal extension, shape, number and motion of an object (to name Locke's primary
qualities) we would see films as mere moving patches of colour, and even these would
have determinate shape, number, size and motion. (I shall argue more extensively for
the epistemic role of colour in my chapter on painting).
2. Colours like all secondary qualities are causally inactive.
This too is false. Colour does, for instance, interact with temperature as dark surfaces
are warmer than light surfaces are. This alone is neither an argument for subjectivism
nor one for objectivism, as we can either argue that this interaction is due to underlying
causes common to both temperature and colour, or that it is specific to colour. Either
way, however, the claim that colour is causally inactive is false.
When philosophers argue that size and weight are causally more active than
colour, they adopt a Newtonian framework in which causality is defined as causing
39motion in particles. In other frameworks this might be less significant. Biologists for
instance might say that colour is causally more active than shape or size are because of
the signalling role it plays in the recognition of food, mates, predators etc. I see no
reason for favouring one framework over the other: while in some situations shapes and
sizes are causally more important (as in carpentry, engineering, cooking, etc.), in others
colours are more important (as in traffic, decoration, etc.). If someone objected that my
examples show that colours usually interact with observers rather than with other
qualities, I have to admit that this is true to a degree though not totally (as the
interaction of colour with heat shows). If we include photosynthesis and other colour-
intensive biological reactions in our framework, the difference in causal activity
between colour and primary qualities diminishes even further. More importantly
perhaps, I do not see why the interaction with shapes and sizes should be of greater
importance than that with living perceivers. It is a mystery to me why so many
philosophers take physics rather than say, biochemistry as their model for causal
interaction, a mystery which I can only explain historically through Newton's influence.
39
See for instance. J.Bennett, "Substance, Reality and Primary Qualities", 1965.
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3. Being coloured depends on looking coloured.
This is by far the most frequently used argument provided by weak subjectivists, and it
deserves closer examination. It is true that the coloured objects around us and
especially the spectrum itself reveal nothing about the structure of colour and can thus
not be a sufficient explanation for our colour concepts. It is hence in some sense true
that the determinate colour of a thing depends on how it looks to us (and not how it
looks to bees or under a microscope). But we cannot make this fact into an ontological
claim, for if we make colours ontologically dependent on how they look to perceivers,
we run into Berkeley's problem of having to explain how all these looks match over
time and space, so that my room, for instance, always looks the same when I return to
it.
Especially if we want to reject the idea that colour requires a non-coloured
physical formula which explains its objectivity40 and yet want to say that pillarboxes
are red whether or not someone is looking at them, we need to find out what it means to
say that being red depends on looking red. We thus need to reconcile the following
statements:
1. Being red depends on looking red (which is possibly the only criterion we have for
something being red).
2. There is a difference beweeen real colours and colour illusions.
3. An object remains the colour it is when no-one is looking at it.
40
Weak subjectivists, especially if basing their theory on Locke, do not deny that there are or could be
objective primary causes such as lightwaves, which determine how an object looks.
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4.2. The disjunctive solution
One of the most common solutions is to combine these statements in a disjunctive
account such as:
"X is red if and only if it looks red to normal observers under normal
conditions."
This disjunction still takes looking red as the criterion for something being red (1), but
specifies conditions to distinguish real or typical colours from exceptions such as
hallucinations (2). These conditions also entail that an object can be red without anyone
looking at it (3), as long as it would look red if someone did look at it.
But there are some strong objections to disjunctive accounts. I shall only give a
short overview over the arguments, even if I have to simplify both sides of the
argument significantly.41
a) Normal Conditions
Normal conditions vary according to the kind of colour: to judge the colour of a light,
for instance, we need dark surroundings which are unsuitable for judgments of most
other kinds of colour. Instead we should therefore speak of ideal conditions for
different types of colour.
b) Ideal Conditions
Ideal conditions, however, are often so contrived that most people never come across
colour in these conditions at all.42 Yet we are perfectly capable of judging colour in
most (non ideal) conditions.
c) Observers
The same objections hold with regard to ideal or normal observers. Ideal observers are
the exception: colour-vision varies significantly from one person to the next and even
within one person at different times. Thus even if we leave aside people with genuinely
41
For more detailed criticism see Hacker (1987), pp. 127-129; Thompson (1995), pp. 118-121; Hardin
(1989), pp.67-82.
42~
Thompson quotes one such experimental setup from Boynton (1978) (Thompson, 1995, p.l 19)
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abnormal or deficient colour vision, ideal observers constitute only about 4% of the
population and all other "normal" observers will vary in their colour judgments. These
statistics are based on judgments about borderline cases. The established ideal
observers are consistent in their colour judgments while the vast majority of
participants call the same colour green at one time and yellow at another. While we
might therefore employ an ideal observer as expert to decide borderline cases (see next
point) the notion is unlikely to explain most colour judgments.
Normal observers, on the other hand, are, perhaps paradoxically, those people
who always agree that pillarboxes are red, but who usually disagree whether a shade of
lime is yellow or green. The dispositionalist therefore needs to say that "X is red if and
only if it looks red under certain conditions; and Y is lime if and only if it looks either
yellow or green to a normal observer under normal conditions."
And here we begin to see that the number of our colour concepts make a
difference to our judgment. If we have the concept "lime" then the lime syrup looks
lime coloured. If we have only one concept for both yellow and green43 then it looks
that "yellow&green" colour. Lastly, if we have concepts for yellow and green but not a
concept for lime then it is either "yellow" or "green" - and this indeed is the situation
we usually find ourselves in when discussing these matters. (If you doubt this point try
to find a group of people to agree what "puce" looks like.)44
If we now return to the subjectivist claim that something is of a certain colour
only if it looks that colour, we find that the same object must have different colours if it
looks different colours at the same time (yellow, green or lime, for instance). This,
however, is not only absurd, but raises the question of how these colour concepts are
learnt in the first place if they ultimately rest not on what colour an object is but on
what it looks to us (why then, for instance, the difficulties colour-blind people have
with colour terminology?)45.
43
See Berlin and Kay (1969): A language with only four colour concepts usually consists of concepts for
black (dark, often including blue and possibly dark green), white (often including yellow), red and then either
green or yellow.
44
Incidentally, "puce" translates into German as "flohbraun" ("fleabrown") which is not very helpful.
45
See chapter IX for details
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d) Expert Solution
One possible solution is to discard objections b and c and to employ some experts
(from the 4% minority) to judge colours under laboratory conditions and thus to fix
colour terms. This may indeed be a practical solution for the definition of specific
colour terms, but it does not solve the problem of what colour is. At best this solution
leads to the statement that "X is red if and only if our experts judge it to be red under
ideal conditions." General colour terms such as red, however, are not fixed by experts
(though more subtle colour terms are). Thus this solution might be a way of
establishing new colour vocabulary but it does not describe or explain what is actually
the case.
4,3. Ultimate Failure of Dependence on Looks
There is a deep conceptual problem which undermines dispositionals accounts: What
does "being red" mean? If it means looking red then we cannot distinguish between
genuine red objects and illusory red objects, for then anything that looks red is red (so
we would have to drop premiss 2). If it means looking red under normal conditions,
however, then we need to ask how these conditions are to be specified without
reference to the object being red. We cannot specify normal conditions without
reference to the object being red, for something appears a certain colour under normal
conditions if and only if it appears as the colour it really is (that is to say, if the
conditions do not change the colour it really is). The colour it really is, however, can
only be seen under normal conditions, and thus this definition is circular.
It is the word "really" that gives the game away: we need to assume a true
(objective!) colour of an object or we cannot specify any conditions with reference to
it.46 The same is true with regard to observers. While we are aware of slight differences
in colour judgments among normal observers the term "normal observer" only makes
sense if such an observer recognises clear cases of colour (such as the red of
pillarboxes). As I shall argue in chapter IX we can only make sense of our colour
46
See also Hacker (1987), p. 127.
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concepts if we take colours to exist independently of us. Thus I shall have to reverse the
statement of the weak subjectivist to saying: "X looks red to normal observers under
normal conditions if and only if X is red.".
4.4. Conclusion
Weak subjectivism points to the importance of the perceiving subject much as Hegel's
philosophy does. While I do not believe most modern weak subjectivist accounts to be
successful47 I do think that they express the correct intuition that colour partakes of
both subjectivity and objectivity. So what I want to keep from weak subjectivism is the
epistemological claim that we know colours from looking at them. Yet this claim is
neither sufficient for knowing what colour something is, nor does it have any
consequences for the ontology of colour.
47
I must admit that I have not read many contemporary accounts of weak subjectivism. But it seems to me
that most of them try to save the phenomenal qualities of colour within essentially quantitative philosophical
frameworks - be they based on logical relations or on scientific truths.
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IV
WITTGENSTEIN: COLOURS AS REAL OBJECTS
Colours as objective properties or entities can be objective in an ideal sense or in a real
sense. I have therefore divided the topic of objective colours into two chapters, the
latter of which deals with ideal colours and colour relations in metaphysical realms.
First, however, I shall discuss real objective colours - "chemical colours" as Goethe
calls them. Assuming that there are colours in the real world which exist independently
from observers, we arrive at some interesting epistemological questions about what we
know about colours and how we come to know it. I believe that Wittgenstein's later
philosophy gives good answers to these questions, and that his answers furthermore
show a close affinity to Goethe's Farbenlehre even though they are clearly distinct from
those aspects of the Farbenlehre which were adapted by the German Idealists as
described in the last two chapters.
Although Wittgenstein's early philosophy by nature belongs to the next chapter,
the failure of it to explain colour makes it a suitable introduction to Wittgenstein's more
successful accounts of colour as given in his Remarks on Colour and other of his later
writings (especially Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty). I shall therefore
begin this chapter with a discussion of the colour exclusion problem. This is followed
by a section on colour samples and Wittgenstein's emphasis on the context in which
colour words are used. As I believe that Wittgenstein's emphasis on use is close to
Goethe's intentions in the Farbenlehre, I shall argue that common aspects between the
two writers are not merely superficial as in their use of numbered paragraphs but extend
to treating their readers as "apprentices", who are to use their works to discover colour
(or whatever the object of investigation) by themselves. I also believe that
Wittgenstein's notion of colour samples is similar to Goethe's notion of phenomena,
although I do not think that this is their only plausible interpretation.
As in the last two chapters I shall conclude this chapter with a brief overview of
recent arguments about objectivism. I shall conclude that although the objectivists'
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arguments are stronger than those of the strong subjectivists they are still insufficient to
capture or explain all colour phenomena.
1. The Colour Exclusion Problem
It is generally assumed (Hacker, 1972, ch.4) that it was the failure of the Tractatus to
deal with the problem of colour exclusion that initiated, if not determined,
Wittgenstein's changes in his philosophy.1 My own account of the colour exclusion
problem rests on passages from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Some Remarks on
Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks.
According to the Tractatus we analyse sentences into elementary propositions
(4.221), and elementary propositions are by definition independent from one another
(4.211, 5.134). Thus we may not infer one elementary proposition from another nor
exclude one by affirming another. So when Wittgenstein adds to 6.3751 "(...The
statement that one2 point of our field of vision has two different colours at the same
time is a contradiction.)", he means that therefore this statement cannot be the product
of two elementary propositions. For "It is clear that the logical product of two
elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction" (ibid).
When looking for a reason, why the statement that one space-point cannot have
two different colours at the same time is a contradiction, one has to remember that
1
See also Austin and Sievert who disagree about the extent to which Wittgenstein's later philosophy
diverges from his earlier philosophy (J.Austin, "Wittgenstein's Solutions to the Colour Exclusion Problem",
1980; and D.Sievert, "Another Look at Wittgenstein on Colour Exclusion", 1989.)
2"
The German expression "ein Punkt" is ambiguous. I prefer to translate it as "one point" rather than as "a
point" (Pears and McGuinness) to emphasise the contradiction.
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colours are not simple objects. Instead "[sjpace, time and colour (being coloured) are
forms of objects."3, where form is "the possibility of structure".4
So, objects are simple and colourless (2.02, 2.0232). Space, time and colour are
forms of objects (2.0251), and form is the possibility of structure (2.033). Wittgenstein
calls time and space "argument-places" for spatial objects, and suggests that something
similar must be true for colour, which makes colour an argument-place for all visible
(spatial) objects:
"A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an argument-
place.)
A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour: it is, so to
speak, surrounded by colour-space..."5
To explain the colour exclusion problem Wittgenstein proposes the ordering of
colours according to their kinetic properties in the line of the spectrum, i.e. spatially.6
So while Wittgenstein holds on to the view that colour concepts are not part of
elementary propositions and hence colours not simple, the question why two colours
cannot occupy the same place is reduced to elementary propositions about spatial
occupation of one point in space-time.
As we divide both time and space into numerical units - be it years or seconds,
yards, metres or miles - the exclusion of other times and spaces from the here and now
(when numerically defined) follows from our linear numerical system. It is a logical
necessity for our understanding of the world around us that nothing can be in two
places at the same time, and this necessity can be justified by simple algebra. That
nothing can have two different colours at the same time is less obvious to us, and the
temptation is great to explain this fact by similar means. In order to explain colour
exclusion as a contradiction it is therefore irrelevant whether one reduces colour to
3
"Raum, Zeit und Farbe (Farbigkeit) sind Formen der Gegenstande." (TLP 2.0251)
4
"Die Form ist die Moglichkeit der Struktur." (TLP 2.033)
5
"Der ramliche Gegenstand muB im unendlichen Raume liegen. (Der Raumpunkt ist eine
Argumentationsstelle.)
Der Fleck im Gesichtsfeld muB zwar nicht rot sein, aber eine Farbe muB er haben: er hat sozusagen
den Farbenraum um sich..." (TLP 2.0131)
6
See also Diaries, 18.08.1916 and 08.01.1917.
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wavelengths, energy flux, sir7 or, as Wittgenstein suggests, to velocity of particles (TLP
6.3751) - as long as one expresses it numerically (i.e. quantitatively).
This, however, raises further questions: First of all, one has to choose between
the different ways of reducing colours to quantities. Wittgestein's suggestion of the
spectral line is probably the least suitable of all, as most of the colours surrounding us
do not occur in a pure spectrum: black, white, grey, and brown, as well as all mixtures
of colours with black or white are not part of the spectrum, nor are luminous synthetic
colours like those of text markers or neon lights. And even if the spectrum did include
all colours there would still be a problem about the degree of precision we wanted to
apply: As most colours which match the spectrum phenomenally are in fact metamers,
i.e. mixtures of light waves, we would have to decide whether a further analysis into
their components was necessary or whether a phenomenal match would be sufficient
(in which case we would have to take the perceiver into account and reach a weak
subjectivist viewpoint).
One could also ask whether the impossibility of two properties occupying the
same space at the same time is a physical or a logical impossibility. As I just
demonstrated, the physical impossibility depends on the degree of precision one wants
to achieve. (The importance of context will become clearer in Wittgenstein's later
philosophy, where we will also find a genuine solution to the colour exclusion problem,
namely that we cannot see the same speck of our visual field as two different colours.)
In Remarks on Logical Form Wittgenstein is still interested in a logical solution but
realises that it cannot be a solution analysable in a truth table. For if colour statements
were truth-functional in the usual sense, they should allow for four possibilities of
statements about two colours being true: An object should be able to be of one colour,
of the other colour, of neither colour, or of both colours. This last case, however, must
be categorically excluded (see also Sievert, p.294).
In order to label "this object is red and green all over at the same time" a
contradiction, the meaning of "red" would have to be "not green, nor blue nor yellow
nor brown nor black..." ad infinitum. In cases of particular shades of red it would even
need to include "...nor crimson nor purple nor any other shade of red but this one"
7
sir = "spectral integrated reflection", a term coined by Edwin Land; see also section 4.1 of this chapter.
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which is plainly absurd. Any attempt to show that red and green logically contradict
each other in the sense of analytical necessity must therefore fail. And as in the
Tractatus logical necessity is analytical necessity, the Tractatus fails to account for
problems such as this one.
For statements of degree Wittgenstein therefore introduces a new notion of
necessity, namely that of necessary exclusion. We introduce the rule, that if something
has one property in a certain category then it cannot have another property in the same
category. Thus nothing can have two sizes or temperatures or speeds at the same time.
The most obvious case of this kind of exclusion is that no object can be of two different
lengths at the same time. At first sight, Wittgenstein's yardstick metaphor is thus useful
to explain colour exclusion: We can imagine someone holding a spectrum chart with
colour names to a coloured object and accordingly judging that its colour is such-and-
such, just as we might imagine someone holding a yardstick to an object to find out its
length. Furthermore, we can also imagine the spectrum being stretched into different
lengths (i.e. different degrees of precision) for different purposes just as we can have
measuring rods of different lengths and detail. Finally, it is the gradations on the
yardstick that make it a yardstick, and we might say that it is only incidental that a
yardstick is physically one yard long - we could have a yardstick that was two yards
long.8 Thus a properly graded yardstick can be used to measure most different lengths
(with the exception of extremely small or large ones). Similarly, the spectrum chart
encompasses all saturated colours and can be used to name any pure colour. And just as
a one yard long stick without gradations is not a yardstick even if it can be used to
measure whether an object is one yard long or not, a spectrum chart with only one
colour is no longer a spectrum but a colour sample. (I shall come back to Wittgenstein's
use of colour samples in section 2.)
The yardstick metaphor rests on the following notion of space: in any space-time there
is by definition in the smallest unit only space for one property of each category
(colour, length, etc.). Thus if a unit has the colour-property red then it cannot have any
other colour-property, just as an object of a certain length cannot be of any other length.
g
though of course not one that was half a yard long. Even if we could use it to measure a yard-long -object,
it would not be a yardstick as it would not have the grade "1yd".
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This spatial reasoning, however, misses the point. For as Wittgenstein realises in the
Philosophical Investigations as well as in his Remarks on Colour (and, judging by his
examples, much earlier), there is an important difference between saying that
something cannot be red and green all over and saying that something cannot be red
and yellow all over. Anyone who is interested in colour, provided he is not colour¬
blind, can see that a certain shade of orange lies somewhere between red and yellow,
and this fact is reflected in our language: Thus our references to a "reddish orange" or a
"more yellowish orange" shows that we do indeed think of colours as being more of
one colour and less of another (much like a mixed drink). No one, however, speaks of a
"reddish green" or says that he can see a colour which lies somewhere between red and
green in this sense.9 Someone once showed me the iridescent lining of his jacket which
looked red or green depending on its spatial relation to the perceiver and the light
source. So in one sense, this fabric was red and green all over, but it was not so in the
same place and at the same time.10 Thus at any time and in any position one could have
divided the surface of the lining into small patches, some of which would have been red
and others green, but none ofwhich would have been both.
As I shall argue in my chapter on primary colours (eh.VIII), the solution to the
colour exclusion does not lie in the yardstick but in the colour circle: Were
Wittgenstein to use a colour circle as measuring device for colours rather than the linear
spectmm, he would be able to see and show that the circle does not allow for one patch
of colour being red and green all over at the same time because red and green are at
opposite sides of the circle and cannot possibly be made to match one place at the same
time. So I do not agree with Austin's judgment that the yardstick metaphor dramatically
improves Wittgenstein's case because it cuts out the looking at phenomena.11
Wittgenstein's use of phenomena in my opinion is much closer to Goethe than Sievert
and Austin make it to be, so that some of their criticism misses the point. Sievert, for
9
See also R.C.I. 9,10.11.14.21,78; m, 42,94,129,138,162,163.
10
Note also that the second definition of "iridescent" is "changing colour with position" (The Concise
Oxford Dictionary , 1991).
1'
Although Austin refers to the Philosophical Remarks when he writes "the yardstick metaphor ... is a
dramatic improvement over the inadequate answer to the colour exclusion problem.." (ibid., p. 148), my
criticism is still valid as it refers to the metaphor itself.
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instance, explains that in Wittgenstein's use of "symbol" a symbol simultaneously
represents the particularity and the type, but he does not apply the same notion to
1 7
Wittgenstein's use of phenomena. Yet this understanding of phenomena leads us to
what Wittgenstein and Goethe have in common: If a colour symbol (and, as we shall
see, Wittgenstein's colour sample) can represent both type and token (in the
Davidsonian sense) then the truth it expresses is at the same time a factual truth and a
logical truth.
In the case of the yardstick we see that the yardstick can both be physically one
yard long and be used to represent the type "one-yard-long". But the physical length of
one yard is not a necessary condition for the representation of one yard (the yardstick
may in fact be longer than one yard). When we apply this insight to the colour-
exclusion problem we see that in a different physical world different sets of colours
might have been mutually exclusive. If it made sense to use our colour concepts in such
a world (which I don't think it does), we might thus say that red and blue rather than red
and green were mutually exclusive. So physically the colour exclusion of red and green
is an empirical fact of our world, not a necessity. Conceptually, however, it is
absolutely necessary that red and green are mutually exclusive (which is why I think
that our colour concepts would not apply in such a physically different world).
I shall argue for the necessities in the structure of our colour concepts in my
chapter on primary colours and novel hues (ch.VIH). For now let me conclude that what
I have learnt from Wittgenstein's early treatment of colour is the following:
1. Statements about colour cannot contradict each other but may exclude each other.
They are hence not analytically true or false.
2. An object such as a yardstick or a colour chart (be it circular or linear) can be a
physical object and a representation of logical relations at the same time.
12"
In a positive evaluation of Hintikka's Investigating Wittgenstein he treats Wittgenstein's early phenomena
as sense-data (Sievert, pp.302-303).
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2. Colour Samples
In Wittgenstein's later philosophy the yardstick is replaced by the sample. Hacker
argues that the use of samples is very much like that of a yardstick (1987, pp. 150,157).
Yet I hope to show that there is an important difference between the two, and that this
difference may well be an important difference in the development of Wittgenstein's
philosophy of colour. What Wittgenstein has added to the yardstick simile is the
example of the standard metre in Paris:
"There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long nor that it
is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris." (PI.50)
While it might seem that there is not much of a difference between a yardstick
and the standard metre in Paris the essential difference is hinted at in the word
"standard metre": In German the standard metre is called "Urmeter", and as I shall
argue in this section it is much closer to Goethe's idea of Urplants and Urphenomena
than to yardsticks.
2.1. Yards and Metres
First, let us see what difference there is between the yardstick and the standard metre.
Although any yardstick should be one yard long to be a yardstick, a production error
might lead to faulty yardsticks, in the context of which it would make sense to say "Ah,
but this yardstick is one yard long." Hacker gives the example of a drenched tape
measure which ceases to function as a sample when it gets measured itself as to
whether it has shrunk (1987, p. 162). The standard metre in Paris, on the other hand, is
at the very origin of measuring things in metres and therefore not the kind of thing that
shrinks and needs being measured. Were the standard metre a different length from
what it is our notion of metre would be a different one. For this reason the standard
metre is like a new invention. If I invented something and called it the "Kerstin-
machine", and if someone visiting me looked at it and asked whether it was a genuine
Kerstin-machine, I should be perplexed. If other people, however, started building
similar machines we could then say that some were Kerstin-machines and others were
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not. Similarly, with newly produced yardsticks and metre rods we can decide which of
them are genuine and which ones are not.
Wittgenstein's colour samples are of the kind of the standard metre rather than
of the yardstick: they are not themselves representations but means of representation,
instruments of our language by which we decide whether something falls under a
certain name or not.(PI.50, also 16)
2.2. Particular Samples
By particular samples I mean those samples which are exactly like what they represent.
A botanist, for instance, may give me a sample of a Scottish primrose and ask me to
locate as many of these primroses as I can find. If I include other kinds of flowers or
even other kinds of primrose in my report I have failed to understand the task.
Philosophical Investigations begins with language games of the primrose type: there
are tables containing shapes and colours according to which someone playing the game
picks out objects (PI.53). These cases may seem simpler than the one of the primrose
but are essentially the same because we imagine there to be nothing but columns and
slabs, or apples and pears, or red and blue objects, from which someone chooses
according to the samples - just as I would only decide within a limited group of flowers
which ones were genuine Scottish primroses, and not among animals or just anything
around me.
The only problem in applying particular samples is the general one of ostensive
definitions: I need to be aware of my task in the first place, and I need to know which
aspect of the sample is relevant. In the case of colour samples, for instance, I must learn
to disregard the shapes and textures of the samples I use. The knowledge of how to use
a sample as such does not cause us problems. Children learn at an early age how to sort
things into different heaps according to different criteria, and I guess that they learn this
by being shown what to do - i.e. by an adult "setting an example". Psychologically
therefore it does not seem to be difficult to learn the use of samples.
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2.3. General samples and their contexts
Any blue sample must have a particular shade of blue. The same rectangular piece of
cardboard painted in a particular shade of blue may however be a sample for this
particular shade of blue, or for dark blue, or for blue in general. So there is nothing in
the sample itself which can help us decide what it is a sample of or that it is indeed a
sample.
What is essential for any sample is therefore the context of use. This context
may be linguistic, as in an instruction manual, or ostensive - "use it like these kinds of
things"; but the extension of a particular sample is also defined by other samples within
the same language game. The importance of the context of other samples becomes clear
when we think of the several hundred colour systems there are. Within each system the
number of colours given will determine the degree of discrimination to be used. Also,
the structure of the system will show what counts as a clear and what as a borderline
case. Some systems may limit their applications to certain kinds of colour (paints,
fabric, lights etc.), others to certain uses of colour (decorative, informational etc.). We
might, for instance, find a catalogue with several samples of phenomenally widely
differing colours which are yet all suitable for the same purpose. A light blue, for
instance, which is phenomenally quite close to a slightly darker blue given in the
section "solicitor's office" might still be better for the children's bedroom than for the
office because in this case the lightness of colour is more relevant than the hue.
So on the level of particularity I need to know relative to what the samples were
chosen as well as out of which variety of things they will have to serve as samples.13
There must be a decision as to what all samples of one category are to have in common
that makes them suitable for the same purpose. The most general sample should not be
relative to anything but represent its own category. As most categories are ordered in
hierarchies (indigo, blue, colour), with exception of the very highest and lowest in the
category each sample is more general than the one below and more particular than the
one above itself. Arguably the primary colours are by definition the most basic colours
13
As I said above, samples for a simple language game containing only red and blue objects need not be
particular about the shade of the colour sample.
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so that we should be able to exemplify each primary colour by one sample only.14
Choosing a colour sample to represent "blue" I should thus avoid marginal blues such
as violet or light blue.
Which particular shade of colour a colour sample should have depends entirely
on the degree of precision required. This in turn is related to the number of colour terms
in the relevant language game. If there only are four colour terms (red, blue, green and
yellow, for instance) then any shade of blue is sufficient to be used as a sample for
"blue". If, however, there is a great variety of colour terms, such as in an artists'
workshop, only particular shades of each colour (such as ultramarine or Prussian blue)
will be useful as they have to exclude not just all reds, greens and yellows but also
other shades of blue.
2.4. The shape of a leaf
"Ask yourself: what shape must the sample of the colour green be? Should it be
rectangular? Or would it then be a sample of a green rectangle? - Should it be
"irregular" in shape? And what is to prevent us then from regarding it - that is, from
using it - only as a sample of irregularity of shape?" 15
If someone showed me a very furry piece of blue carpet, I would be more likely to take
it as a sample of a strange texture than of the colour, and if a blue piece of cardboard
had the shape of Edinburgh Castle I would be more likely to notice the shape than the
colour. This shows that there is nothing intrinsic to the sample itself that makes it a
sample of something specific. Only if I am told or otherwise made aware of how to use
it, will it become a sample of something particular.
With regard to shape samples themselves, Wittgenstein uses the leaf as his
example. This is less surprising than might appear if we refer back to Goethe's
morphology of plants, in which Goethe suggests that the "Urform" of any plant is the
14
That there are several notions of "primary colour" will be explained in chapter Vm.
15
"Frage dich: welche Gestalt muB das Muster der Farbe Griin haben? Soli es viereckig sein? oder wiirde es
dann das Muster fur grtine Vierecke sein? - Soil es also "unregelmaBig" geformt sein? Und was verhindert uns,
es dann als Muster der unregelmiiBigen Form anzusehen - d.h. zu verwenden?" (P.I.73)
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leaf. The shape of a leaf is also much less like a yardstick than a triangle or a circle are.
So, what Wittgenstein is offering here is not only a new and helpful investigation into
the status of Goethe's Urplants and Urphenomena, but also a move away from
examples that can be quantified or easily defined. Both colour and leaf can be samples
for relatively particular or for more general concepts. It is possible that someone who
knows absolutely nothing about plants could think of an image of a leaf without
thinking of a particular plant, but whenever I try to draw a "general leaf it resembles
the leaf of a particular plant or family of plants. Yet I think I could find some five to ten
basic leaf shapes.16
The most obvious difference between leaf and colour samples is that we usually
think of leaves themselves as particular objects, whereas colours, although usually
thought of as properties, can be imagined as abstracted from objects. On the other hand,
my basic leaf shapes are not that different in function from basic "primary" colours, as I
can develop all other leaf shapes from basic leaf shapes just as I can mix or construct all
colours using the primary colours. Someone might argue that circle, square and triangle
are the three simplest shapes form which all other shapes, including those of leaves, can
be derived.17 Yet with regard to leaves it is surely more useful to refer to a few simple
leaf shapes in one's categorisation than to the far more abstract geometrical forms. For
the least any leaf shape contains is its attachment to the stem of the plant, and this
relation alone, which is so easily described as "leaf with a stem", would be hard to
reduce to geometrical forms. Similarly I might say that the simplest identification of a
colour is by reference to white, black, and a few primary colours. Any other
description, though perhaps more easily quantified (such as wavelength or energy flux
for instance) is much more difficult to use.
The point about colour samples is that there is no one standard colour, no one
Ursample of colour, but only several sets of samples. So unlike the standard metre in
Paris, colour and leaf samples form a family of samples which allows for variations.
16
According to my encyclopedia there are twelve leaf shapes and six kinds of leaf edges (dtv-Brockhaus in
20 Banden, 1986, vol2, p. 197.); the twelve leaf shapes listed in my nature guide, however, have only seven of
them in common with this listing, and the list also differs about one leaf edge (Collins Nature Guide to Wild
Flowers, Lippert & Podlech, 1994).
17
And there have been many artists who identified primary colours with simple geometrical forms (see also
chapter VIII).
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These variations are unlike the variations found in different units of measurement. For
a metre can only be meaningfully used in conjunction with centimetres or kilometres,
not with yards, feet, or miles. Furthermore, a metre is a precise fraction of a kilometre
and a multiple of a centimetre. Colour and leaf samples on the other hand, have
genuinely different samples in their families, i.e. samples that are not mere multiples of
each other, but are qualitative variations related to each other by qualitative
resemblance.
2,5. The Use of Colour Samples
"...for it would only be to say that, as a matter of experience if you see the leaf in a
particular way, you use it in such-and-such a way or according to such-and-such. Of
course there is such a thing as seeing it in this way or that, and there are also cases
where whoever sees a sample like this will in general use it in that way and whoever
1 R
sees it otherwise in another way."
Once basic colour samples are established we can use them for several purposes. For
the sake of argument let us assume that we have found six standard samples of the
colours red, yellow, blue, green, black and white: pillarboxes, daffodils, the Scottish
summer sky, grass, coal and snow. These can be used to test the understanding of
colour concepts, as well as to establish new colour concepts in three stages:
The grasping of the sample as particular means that any person who claims to
understand the six colour concepts must be able to sort all objects which are clearly one
of the six main colours into the right category. Thus fire-engines, ladybirds, geraniums,
and strawberries belong in the same category as pillarboxes, but water, grass, and
snowdrops do not.
Secondly, all objects that do not clearly belong into one of the categories must
be described at least by saying between which of the categories they belong. This task
requires the understanding of the general concept within which the samples function.
The person claiming to understand our six basic colour concepts must be able to say
18
"...denn es wiirde nur besagen, daB erfahrungsgemaB der, welcher das Blatt in bestimmter Weise sieht, es
dann so und so, oder den und den Regeln gemaB verwendet. Es gibt natiirlich ein so und anders Sehen; und es
gibt auch Falle, in denen der, der ein Muster so sieht, es im allgemeinen in dieser Weise verwenden wird, und
wer es anders sieht, in andererWeise." (P.I.74)
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that oranges are half way between red and yellow, that bluebells are blue with a tint of
red, that the sea is somewhere between blue and green, and so on19. The person must
also be able to say that a penguin is black and white, that a certain dress is blue with
yellow flowers, etc.
Thirdly, we can now name finer colour distinctions. By naming oranges
"orange", carnations "pink" and wood "brown" we establish new samples. This is
essentially the procedure used in colour systems such as that of the ISCC (International
Society Colour Council) which named 7,500 colours by writing their names onto the
Munsell colour samples, and thus established an international colour lexicon. This
colour lexicon like any other lexicon is a reference tool with which people can find the
"proper names" of any unicoloured colour sample.
What seems so absurd about these 7,500 colours is that most of their names are
never used except by a few experts. And these few experts are not likely to use them at
home either. They will not even be able to distinguish between subtle shades unless
they have their colour samples with them, since one criterion for most modem colour
systems is that each colour must be indistinguishable from the one next to it but
recognisable as different from the one after that.
19
The sea, by the way, is an interesting case for what may count as a sample for the typical colour of a
particular kind of object: the first argument over colour I can remember was one I had with my kindergarten
friend who had been to the sea. He claimed that the sea was green. I, on the other hand, "knew" from books




We can now agree with Wittgenstein's claim that colour samples are neither coloured
nor non-coloured (the SCCA could not have used black and white samples for their
7,500 colour words since in that case they would not have had samples of colour but
only samples of grey shades). Thus the colour sample qua colour sample is coloured
but which colour it is is up to the colour sample to tell us, not the other way round.
We have to beware not to confuse the sample as sample with its actual
20
properties. As mentioned before Wittgenstein warns explicitly of this. This means on
the one hand that any search for an ideal blue sample is misguided: the sample qua
physical object cannot have ideal properties, and no matter which shade of blue it has,
it will never be of such a shade that it may not appear slightly reddish or greenish in
certain contexts. From this it follows that, given a vague context, any blue which is
reddish or greenish will yet serve the same purpose as a purer blue (if, for instance, I
wanted to teach a child the basic colour terms).
20
"This is due to the fact that one tries to fix the properties of the Ur-Image in the investigation. And as one
thus confuses Ur-Image and object, one has to dogmatically attribute to the object what must only be
characteristic of the Ur-Image. On the other hand, one believes that the investigation lacks the generality one
wishes to attribute to it, if it only truly applies to the one case. But the Ur-Image is proposed to be just that; that
it characterises the whole investigation and determines its form. It thus forms its head and is valid because it
determines the form of the investigation, not because everything true of itself can also be said about all the
objects in the investigation."
"Das kommt nun daher, daB man den Merkmalen des Urbilds einen Halt in der Betrachtung geben
will. Da man aber Urbild und Objekt vermischt, dem Objekt dogmatisch beilegen muB, was nur das Urbild
charakterisieren muB. Andererseits glaubt man, die Betrachtung habe nicht die Allgemeinheit, die man ihr
geben will, wenn sie nur fur den einen Fall wirklich stimmt. Aber das Urbild soil ja eben als solches hingestellt
werden; daB es die ganze Betrachtung charakterisiert, ihre Form bestimmt. Es steht also an der Spitze und ist
dadurch giiltig, daB es die Form der Betrachtung bestimmt, nicht dadurch, daB alles, was von ihm gilt, von
alien Objekten der Betrachtung ausgesagt wird." (Verm.Bem., p.469)
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3. Wittgenstein and the Return to Goethe:
Causal Explanation versus Conceptual Analysis
Wittgenstein is reported to have found Goethe's Farbenlehre "partly boring and
repelling, but in some ways also very instructive and philosophically interesting"21.
Like Schopenhauer and Hegel, Wittgenstein chooses a few of Goethe's remarks and
integrates them into his own philosophy. Unlike the others, however, he concentrates
on the status of these remarks.
According to Monk Wittgenstein read not only the Farbenlehre but also
Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants. The famous discussion between Goethe and
Schiller as to whether the Urplant is a genuine plant or just an idea was decided by
German Idealists in favour of the idea. Wittgenstein, however, succeeds in explaining
how the Urplant can be both. Although he does not explicitly refer to Urplants and
Urphenomena in Remarks on Colour, Wittgenstein's treatment of colour samples as
both physical entities and conceptual tools is a good explanation of what Goethe is
trying to say. More important though, is the affinity between Goethe and Wittgenstein
when it comes to their method:
"It is not the same thing to say: the impression of white or grey comes about under such
and such conditions (causally), and: it is an impression in a certain context of colour
and form."22
Even though Goethe seeks and describes conditions under which colour phenomena
appear, he treats these conditions not as causes but as necessary contexts. Furthermore,
Goethe's Morphology ofPlants is usually not read as an early evolutionary theory but as




"Es ist nicht dasselbe, zu sagen: der Eindruck des WeiBen oder Grauen kommt unter solchen
Bedingungen zustande (kausal), und: es ist ein Eindruck in einem bestimmten Zusammenhang von Farben und
Formen." (R.C.I,51)
(The German word "kausal" can be both adjective and adverb - in contrast to McAlister and Schattle
I prefer to translate it adverbally to emphasize the time element in causal explanations.)
23
For a historical reading see A.Schmidt; but Sepper (1987 and 1988), and Burwick (1987), for instance,
read Goethe's theory as non historical.
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aspect of Goethe's scientific writings that Wittgenstein associates with when he
differentiates between his own "logical" or "grammatical" enquiry and that of physicists
and psychologists. In this section I shall give a closer analysis of this difference, which
is most clearly expressed in the following quotation:
"It is not the same thing to say: the impression of white or grey only comes about under
such and such conditions (causally), and to say that it is the impression of a certain
context (definition). (The first is Gestalt psychology, the second logic.)"24
Wittgenstein seeks the context. His addition of the term "definition" in the later
version of this paragraph shows that he does not mean the physical context which
Goethe specifies, but the linguistic context in which the words "white" or "grey" are
used. Goethe's physical conditions and Wittgenstein's linguistic context, however,
overlap. Thus Goethe might specify that a halo appears around a weakly (i.e. non
dazzling) luminous object in certain conditions, and Wittgenstein might use these
conditions as the linguistic context for defining "halo" as "the appearance around a
luminous object under certain conditions". Both would imply that anyone saying "Look
at that beautiful halo" is not blind and knows what the word "halo" means. There is
thus a requirement of a minimum level of expertise not just for seeing the halo but for
calling it a halo, or seeing it as a halo.
"I am not saying here (as the Gestalt psychologists do), that the impression of white
comes about in such-and-such a way. Rather the question is precisely: what is the
meaning of this expression, what is the logic of this concept?"25
24
"Es ist nicht dasselbe zu sagen: der Eindruck des WeiBen kommt nur unter diesen Bedingungen zustande
(kausal), und daB er der Eindruck eines bestimmten Kontextes ist (Definition). (Das erste ist
Gestaltpsychologie, das zweite Logik.)" (R.C.III, 229)
McAlister and Schattle omit the word "nur" in their translation, yet I believe that "only" emphasises
the idea of causal determination which is then juxtaposed to certainty of context. As the Remarks on Colour
were written at about the same time as On Certainty we may assume that Wittgenstein was thinking about the
difference between certainty of physical causes of an event, and the certainty of logical relations.
Note also that the word "bestimmten" could be translated as "determined" or as "specific" - neither of which
has the connotation of subjective certainty about it, which is carried by "certain context".
25
"Ich sage nicht (wie die Gestaltpsychologen), daB der Eindruck des Weifien so und so zustande komme.
Sondern die Frage ist gerade: Was der Eindruck des WeiBen sei. Was die Bedeutung dieses Ausdrucks, die
Logik des Begriffes ist." (R.C.I,39)
In Philosophical Investigations (part n, section 11), where Wittgenstein discusses the notion of
"seeing as" he again stresses that a physiological explanation is not helpful: "Our problem is not a causal but a
conceptual one." (p.203e)
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3.1. Levels of Explanation: Appearance and Reality
There are two related differences between a causal and a logical account: one is that the
causal account links two levels of explanation while the logical account remains on one
level, and the other is that any causal account is by nature endless whereas a logical
account is true within a closed system which contains certain axioms.
" 'Cause' is used in many different ways, e.g.
(1) "What is the cause of unemployment?" "What is the cause of this expression?"
[experiment and statistics]
(2) "What was the cause of you jumping?" "That noise."
[reason]
(3) "What was the cause of the wheel going round?"
[mechanism]"26
There are probably at least half a dozen good ways of differentiating between different
kinds of causes (one of which is Schopenhauer's in his Fourfold Root), but what they
all have in common is that the cause is not as apparent as the effect. Thus the cause of
unemployment may be very complex and have long historical roots, and the cause of an
immediate action is a combination of will - which again is caused by different kinds of
motivation - and a physical movement - which, just like the movement of a
mechanism, again has several physical causes, one immediate and several underlying
ones.
A causal explanation of seeing something blue, as given by a psychologist for
instance, will also involve something non-apparent in the situation, something hidden
from our eyes, because explanations given in psychology share with those in physics
the assumption that there is another reality behind what is immediately apparent.
Goethe warns us about this approach ("Do not look behind the phenomena", "the
phenomena are reality etc.), and arguably the whole of Wittgenstein's later
philosophy is a series of repeated warnings to the same end.
~6
Lectures on Aesthetics 1,12.
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"Psychology, when speaking of appearances ["Schein"] connects appearance with
reality ["Sein" - "Being"]. We, however, can speak of appearances alone, or we connect
appearances with appearances." 7
"We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we
seem in some sense not to understand."28
In the introduction of his Farbenlehre Goethe explains the omission of a theory
of light by saying that the Wesen (nature or essence) of a thing is [the sum of] its acts or
deeds. Thus colours are the essence of light, and the essence of each colour is what it
does: where and when it appears, whether it pleases or displeases, in which contexts it
is most noticeable, and so on. Here we find a close parallel to Wittgenstein's
understanding ofmeaning defined by use and context. Monk writes about Wittgenstein:
"His attitude is summed up by Goethe's line in Faust: "Im Anfang war die Tat." ("In the
9Q
beginning was the deed."), which he quotes with approval" , and which might, with
some justification, be regarded as the motto of On Certainty - and, indeed, of the whole
ofWittgenstein's later philosophy."30
Goethe and Wittgenstein thus seek explanations within the realm of
appearances as experienced by intelligent human beings and avoid explanations which
refer to some other reality: they describe connections within one level of explanation
rather than deducing or reducing from one level to another. By this means they also
avoid the danger of infinite regress. Thus Wittgenstein: "At some point one has to pass
from explanation to mere description."31
The importance of this can easily be seen in the child's endless series of asking
"why?". Children have not yet learnt what to accept as true and what to question
27
"Die Psychologie, wenn sie vom Schein spricht, verbindet Schein mit Sein. Wir aber konnen vom Schein
allein sprechen, oder wir verbinden Schein und Schein." (RC.1II.232), see also:
"Die Psychologie verbindet das Erlebte mit etwas Physischem, wir aber das Erlebte mit Erlebtem" :
"Psychology connects the experienced with something physical, we however the experienced with the
experienced." (RC.01.234).
28
"Wir wollen etwas verstehen, was schon offen vor unsern Augen liegt. Denn das scheinen wir, in






"Einmal muB man von der Erklarung auf die bloBe Beschreibung kommen." (C.189)
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meaningfully,32 while scientific experts know where to ask further questions within the
causal framework. But only philosophers can explain the a priori limit and condition of
all questioning, and Wittgenstein places this limit in mere description. So, while
Goethe and Wittgenstein describe what is true about colour, a causal explanation tries
to explain why these things are true. Any causal explanation is therefore only useful
once we have established a general understanding of its context, i.e. of what it is that
we want to explain, and any investigation which seeks to establish causal relations must
first know what these are meant to explain. The definition of what we are trying to
explain, however, entails what kind of causal explanation we are looking for (motive,
mechanical cause, reasoning, etc.). It is again the philosophers who make method their
object of investigation, while the other sciences already imply certain methods as part
of their research.33
The equating of colours to wavelengths, for instance, is the answer to a specific
question in the field of physics, which besides its own axioms rests on the basic colour
terms already established (hence the two sides of the equation "red is X"). As has been
argued by Hacker and Westphal, any reductionist account takes those terms for granted
which it tries to reduce. According to Goethe and Wittgenstein, the task of the
philosopher as opposed to any other scientist is therefore to understand what it is that
the others are trying to explain. Answers from physicists or physiologists are of no help
for their understanding of colour because scientists only give further explanations of




By this I do not mean that natural scientists and psychologists are not aware of their methods but merely
that they have to accept them as part of their research.
34
I support this understanding of philosophy, also because it is a good way of saving philosophy from being
swallowed by other academic disciplines.
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3.2. Axiomatic Limits to Explanations
The rock bottom of the question what appears, or the a priori limit of all questions, is
the topic of On Certainty. In order to learn anything we must avoid definitions ad
infinitum (the eternal chain of "why?" that children ask) and assume that some things
are certain. To understand colour philosophically is therefore to find out which of the
colour propositions are so fundamentally certain that I would have to change my whole
world view if some of them were not tme. We can, for instance, learn about several
sophisticated and conflicting causal explanations of colour vision and add this
information to what we already know without having to change our verbal or habitual
behaviour. But if someone told us that blue was lighter than white or that yellow was
darker than brown we could not accept these statements without significant changes to
our colour vocabulary as a whole, as well as to our ways of acting (regarding dress, art,
etc.), which in their turn influence the understanding of other concepts.
There are two ways of justifying such basic axioms. The first is to propose
ontologically fundamental or primary essences, so that the philosophical task consists
in finding these essences and constructing theories around them. This approach can
lead to difficulties if these essences are taken to be "more real" than everyday objects,
for we then need to ask ourselves where and in what sense they exist, and how (with
what faculty) we can grasp them. One way of avoiding these difficulties is to deny the
divide between appearance and reality thus eliminating the problems related to it, and
to argue instead that a colour system such as a colour circle is necessarily and a priori
correct, so that
"The question of whether this abstract system records the correct relations among
colour concepts makes no sense; the system itself is what determines the structural
relations between the elements of the system."35
To place the necessity within the system rather than on some other level also
has the advantage of explaining why there can be several systems or language games
(such as exemplified by the various colour circles) each of which can claim a priori
status and necessity. While Wittgenstein does not explicitly argue for this approach in
35
Marie McGinn, 1991, p.443.
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the Remarks on Colour we can easily draw a parallel to Wittgenstein's denial of
essences in meaning. The meaning of colour words just like meaning in general is
determined by their use. The aim of Wittgenstein's philosophy of colour is therefore to
find the contexts in which we use colour words meaningfully, and to differentiate
between several different status of truths about colour (i.e. several uses of colour
-3 fi
propositions). Causal explanations cannot achieve these goals as they are necessarily
endless.
3.3. Experimentum Crucis versus Use and Context
"No phenomenon explains itself by and out of itself; only many, viewed together,
methodologically ordered, at last yield something that could count as a theory."37
Within different contexts one and the same sentence can mean different things. This is
true of all sentences which include ambiguous words, indexicals or ambiguous sentence
structures. As there is hardly a single word in English or German that cannot have at
least two shades of meaning in different contexts no one would ever base a theory of
meaning on one sentence. Yet this is what Newton is doing: His experimentum crucis
is, so to say, one visual statement out of the whole range of visual appearances. And, as
Goethe correctly remarks, this one statement is not even a typical one, but is highly
contrived, using certain viewing angles, two prisms, a circular hole of a certain size in
the shutters, and so on.38 Newton's experiment is therefore less like a statement of the
kind "this book is red", than like "This book looks red if I look at it through a grey tube
in the bathroom at night time when there is no daylight in the room and I have to use
the red lightbulb which happens to be installed there." Nobody would dream of basing a
36
Compare also Goethe: "The phenomena are worthless unless they grant us a deeper richer insight into
nature or can be of (practical) use to us."
"Die Phanomene sind nichts wert, als wenn sie uns eine tiefere reichere Einsicht in die Natur gewahren oder
wenn sie uns zum Nutzen anzuwenden sind." (M&R, 503)
37
"Kein Phanomen erklart sich an und aus sich selbst; nur viele, zusammen iiberschaut, methodisch
geordnet, geben zuletzt etwas, das fur Theorie gelten konnte." (Goethe, M&R, 500)
38
In Maximen und Reflexionen Goethe names eleven conditions (M&R, 683)
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theory of the meaning of red on a sentence such as this, and yet this is, or so
Wittgenstein and Goethe argue (implicitly), what Newton and his followers are doing.
Newton's excuse for basing his theory on one experiment is that he believed in a
deeper underlying truth. If he could illustrate this truth with even one experiment he felt
he could convince other people of it.39 We must not forget that Newton's theory was
quite exceptional within the belief system of his time, and that through the
demonstration of his theory he did indeed change some fundamental building blocks of
optics. It is however not just the nature of this particular experiment which Goethe and
Wittgenstein object to, but the idea of basing a theory on a single statement at all is
inherently misleading (unless we adopt a Platonic ontology and believe that a single
experiment can be the manifestation of a Platonic form).40 As Goethe convincingly
argues,
"One phenomenon, one experiment, cannot prove anything; it is the link of a big
chain which is only valid in its context. If someone concealed a chain of pearls and was
only willing to show us the single most beautiful pearl demanding that we believe of
him that all the other pearls are the same; we should hardly find someone willing to
trade with him." 41
For Goethe and Wittgenstein it does not make sense to base the explanation of colour
relations on a single experiment because the interpretation of any such experiment
depends entirely on its framework of meaning. Only if we get to the basic axioms of the
framework can we understand the experiment as unambiguous. Wittgenstein's
strongest arguments for the importance of a system of meaning can be found in On
Certainty. "What I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions."42
Accordingly any proof or weakening of a proposition must happen within the system
39
Schopenhauer too saw the need to convince people with practical demonstrations even if an argument
was sound; see also ch.VII, sect.4.3 of this thesis where I discuss Schopenhauer's demonstration of the mixing
of white.
40
Goethe is somewhat torn between the two approaches - see next chapter for an interpretation of Goethe's
Urphenomena as Platonic Ideas.
41
"Ein Phanomen, ein Versuch kann nichts beweisen, es ist das Glied einer groBen Kette, das erst im
Zusammenhange gilt. Wer eine Perlenschnur verdecken und nur die schonste einzelne vorzeigen wollte,
verlangend, wir sollten ihm glauben, die ubrigen seien alle so: schwerlich wiirde sich jemand auf den Handel
einlassen." (M&R501)
42~
"Das, woran ich festhalte, ist nicht ein Satz, sondern ein Nest von Satzen." (C.225) - also: "(My) doubts
form a system." (C.126)
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and must affect the whole or at least a substantial part of it (assuming that no one has an
entirely consistent belief system, only parts of it need to be changed when one belief is
changed).43 Whichever system I am part of I cannot doubt everything:
"must I not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not-
doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part of judging." (C.150)
"That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things
are in deed not doubted." (C.342)44
With regard to colour, these undoubtable things are neither as complex as
Newton's experiment nor are they individual entities like elementary propositions or
Platonic Ideas. Instead they are whole structures. For just as a word loses its meaning
without context - think of the odd feeling which overcomes us when we write a single
word over and over again - a colour too loses its effect when there are no colours
surrounding it. Thus if locked into a bare room with walls, ceiling and floor painted in
the same colour one apparently loses the ability of naming ("seeing"!) the colour after a
short time. There is no such thing as a neutral background which shows a colour "as it
really is",45 and both Goethe and Wittgenstein realise that the search for such an
essence of colour is misguided from the start. Both writers also share the aesthetic
aspect of context and use: whether a colour is suitable for a particular occasion or a
word befitting in its context, is important to both of these aesthetically acute men.
43
On Certainty 105, but also 140: "A totality of judgments is made plausible to us.", and 410: "Our
knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it." -
"Ein Ganzes von Urteilen wird uns plausibel gemacht." (140); ""Unser Wissen bildet ein groBes System. Und
nur in diesem System hat das Einzelne den Wert, den wir ihm beilegen." (410).
44
"D,h, es gehort zur Logik unsrer wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen, daB Gewisses in der Tat nicht
angezweifelt wird." (C.342)
Interestingly, Wittgenstein often uses the example of the names of primary colours to say that one of the things
I cannot doubt is, for instance, that "this is blue". (C. 57, 126, 150)
45
See also Arnheim (1978), p.342; W.Schone (1979) argues in a similar vain that there is no such thing as a
neutral background for a painting.
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3.4. Lehre versus Theory
"Goethe's theory of the constitution of the colours of the spectrum has not proved to be
an unsatisfactory theory, rather it really isn't a theory of all. Nothing can be predicted
with it....Nor is there any experimentum crucis which could decide for or against the
theory." 46
That Goethe's Farbenlehre is not a theory is not taken to be a weakness. Rather,
Wittgenstein points out that Goethe's belief in the superiority of his Farbenlehre over
Newton's Opticks is misguided as each is valid in a different framework. While
Newton's theory is useful within the framework of Newtonian physics (which
Wittgestein does not object to in itself), Goethe's framework is more adequate for
philosophical purposes:47 for as philosophers "[w]e do not want to find a theory of
colour...but the logic of colour concepts."48
So, what is it about theory that Goethe and Wittgenstein object to? As I just
explained, one aspect of theories is that (be it through an experimentum crucis or by
other means) they aim to prove the truth of an otherwise hidden reality or greater truth.
While scientists can indeed explain events by reference to extremely small or large
(hence "invisible" or "hidden") objects such as atoms or galaxies, this method does not
apply to philosophy where thinkers such as Goethe and Wittgenstein deny that such a
truth exists in the first place (see p.92).
Besides the search for hidden truths and essences, however, Goethe and
Wittgenstein also criticise the dogmatic nature of theories, which again is a useful or
even necessary precondition for science, but is also the kind of thing to be questioned
46
"Die Goethesche Lehre von der Entstehung der Spektralfarben ist nicht eine Theorie, die sich als
ungeniigend erwiesen hat, sondern eigentlich gar keine Theorie. Es laBt sich mit ihr nichts vorhersagen. ... Es
gibt auch kein experimentum crucis, das fur, oder gegen diese Lehre entscheiden konnte." (R.C.I, 70)
47 Goethe does not seem to believe in this difference between scientific and philosophical context
and he probably would have objected to Wittgenstein's interpretation of his Farbenlehre as purely
philosophical or even conceptual analysis. For the sake of this thesis, however, I shall stress the
similarities between Goethe and Wittgenstein rather than their differences, even if it is obvious that the
similarities between Goethe and Wittgenstein are incompatible with the similarities between Goethe
and Hegel.
48
"Wir wollen keine Theorie der Farben finden..., sondem die Logik der Farbbegriffe.." (RC.I.22).
Compare also: "Do you think I have a theory?" Wittgenstein asks in his Lectures on Aesthetics (1,33), and
insists that he is not saying what something is (in that case "deterioration") but that he merely describes
different things called that thing (deterioration).
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by philosophers.49 Instead of creating a theory of colour Goethe and Wittgenstein
therefore establish a "Lehre", or, even less dogmatic, mere "remarks". I briefly explain
in my glossary what the word "Lehre" means, but in relation to Wittgenstein's
"remarks" there are two aspects of a "Lehre" which are of particular importance:
1. Lehre as apprenticeship.
Goethe and Wittgenstein both treat their readers as intelligent beings who are willing to
work with their writings and not merely consume them passively. The idea is that just
as an apprentice has to do several exercises, repeat and vary these exercises, and will
only achieve the mastering of the subject if all exercises have been done and
understood, so too the reader has to treat their texts as a set of exercises. In Goethe's
case the exercises are colour experiments, in Wittgenstein's case they are language
exercises. (Hence the great number of imperatives used by both writers as active
encouragement of participation.)
2. Lehre as teaching.
Goethe and Wittgenstein do not teach by saying what their students (or apprentices) are
meant to do, but mainly by omitting some connections. Thus readers face many pages
of numbered paragraphs, some of which are obviously connected but many of which
seem to have no connection to each other whatsoever. Yet their authors have taken
years to assemble these paragraphs, and it may be assumed that the order of the
paragraphs, even if it is not the one and only possible order, is intentional.
So, although Goethe and Wittgenstein both give their readers set tasks they do not
explain what the outcome is meant to show. The reader therefore not only needs to do
certain exercises but also to interpret them. It is only when this task is completed that
mastership can be achieved. I therefore fullheartedly agree with Marie McGinn:
"If these remarks50 about Wittgenstein's method are correct, then it seems to me clear
that there can be no substitute for reading the text itself. For only in that way will the
49 As Hacker correctly points out, scientific propositions such as Newton's laws of mechanics are not
empirical themselves but serve as useful frameworks for truly empirical propositions (Insight and
Illusion, pp.8, 119, 146). It is the task of philosophers of science to question and make clearer the
meaning of these propositions, not to take them for granted or teach them as dogma.
50R.C.m, 12, 15, 101, 106.
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reader be led to cross and re-cross the landscape of our ordinary language games, and
only in that way will Wittgenstein's aim of giving us a sense of vision of that landscape,
which outstrips our ability to put into words, be achieved. It is only by reading the text
that one can appreciate Wittgenstein's method of "showing my pupils details of an
immense landscape which they cannot possibly know their way around"."51
4. General Arguments for the Objectivity of Colour
Objectivism claims that red things are red independently of perceivers. There are two
ways of defending this claim: One can either reduce redness to an underlying physical
quality which can be proven to exist independently of observers, or one can simply say
that red things are red and that's all there is to it.
4.1. Colour Reductionism
As I explained in chapter II (sect.3) there is not yet any complete reductionist
account of colour to either chemical or physical entities which exist independently of
observers. Nevertheless it is possible that scientists will find a way of reducing colours
to other properties or entities. My colleague Vincent Hope gives a such a reductionist
account of colour, and as it is more sophisticated than most reductionist accounts52 I
shall discuss it in some detail:
"Colour is whatever range of physical quantities is causally necessary and
sufficient for normal colour vision. Sir is not causally sufficient because retinal
51
Marie McGinn, 1991, p.443. Quotation from On Culture and Value, p.56e.
52
That is to say, more sophisticated than those by Armstrong or Smart, but also and probably more
importantly, more sophisticated than those accounts which (weak and strong) subjectivists continue to attack.
53
Scaled integrated reflectance: the relative reflectance of each colour within coloured surroundings (and
not to be confused with simple spectral reflectance): sir can explain colour constancy in varying illumination
(which spectral reflectance cannot do) as well as contrasting and enhancing effects of surrounding colours. As
a clear definition of each colour ,sir can thus be used as an objective criterion to distinguish between real
colours and colour illusions or misnaming of colours (as by colour blind people).
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chemicals are also needed.54 As these chemicals are external to the nervous system and
do not form part of the body, they can be regarded as external causes of colour vision.
Thus the physical quantities needed for vision are a range of sir which produce specific
chemical effects in the retina which in turn produce specific neural effects. We can
regard colour, therefore, as objective physical qualities named by the colour words."55
Before I come to the philosophical difficulties related to this account let me first
brush aside two scientific objections: First of all, sir does not accommodate all kinds of
colour but only those of reflective surfaces. It can however, be adapted to explain
radiant colour, and for the sake of the argument I shall assume that it can also deal with
the more complex situation of reflective and radiant colours interacting. Secondly,
Land's account rests on assumptions which our visual system does not possess.56 As
Land's theory is essentially a computational model of colour vision, I am sure that these
difficulties will eventually be removed. However, because it is a computational theory
it only improves as it is given further background information (such as whether the
image to be analysed is two- or three-dimensional). But in normal human colour vision
we gain precisely this information from the colours we see - not vice versa. Thus we
judge something to be a red ball because we see something red with rounded shadows
and reflections on it. In contrast, the computer needs to be told that something is a ball
in order to judge it to be of a uniform red colour.
So, what is missing from an account like Hope's is an explanation of the causal
interaction of colour with other properties such as shape and dimensionality. As I shall
explain in part II (ch.VII), the concept of transparency, for instance, only makes sense
in conjunction with shapes or objects seen through something transparent. Not only is it
impossible to explain transparency by Land's theory as it stands, but any extension of
the theory to accommodate transparency will have to make shape and transparency part
of its premisses. To this Hope might reply in the following ways:
54
Among other things retinal chemicals explain after-images, colour-blindness and colour illusions (be they
caused by drugs or internal chemical causes). Retinal chemicals can thus be used to explain Goethe's
"physiological colours" while sir explains "chemical colours" and presumably also "physical colours" though






First, he might say that Land's theory can accommodate transparency without
the concepts of shape and dimensionality. If this was the case, however, we would
require further physiological explanations (as photochemical reactions are not sufficient
to explain transparency) which in turn would make the account no longer purely
objective. Thus something more conceptual than the purely quantitative sir needs to be
added to the account in order to explain the difference between seeing a yellow object
partially through a red shape (thus seeing the colour orange in the shape of the overlap)
and seeing the same orange painted onto a yellow and red background. The second case
is phenomenologically a completely different experience, which is the epistemological
clue to knowing that these are two different objects: in the first case we have a
transparent red object over a (transparent or opaque) yellow object, while in the second
case there is one object painted in different colours.
Secondly, Hope might reply that he does not mean to dispute the usefulness of
concepts such as transparency and redness (a point which he stresses in his criticism of
Peter Hacker's philosophy).57 But as such an account "says nothing about the physical
character of colour" (ibid) it says nothing about the physical character of transparency
either. While I agree with Hope on this point I nevertheless question his concept of
"physical character". While colour reduced to sir and transparency reduced to
transmittance of light might yield some knowledge about their individual physical
characters, this account completely neglects their interaction. As I shall argue in chapter
VII, however, this interaction is an essential part of their physical character. My
understanding of physics as relevant to philosophy is thus a much broader and more
CO
naturalistic notion than Hope's one is.
While I understand the motive of the natural scientist to look for underlying
physical processes in order to explain colour vision, I do not understand why
philosophers should be interested in . them. If physicists discover some small scale
property which all and only red things have in common and which fits more easily into
their scientific discourse than the concept "red" does, they might be able to explain the
57
Handout from 14.01.1997: The first paragraph praises Hacker's discussion of colour in Appearance and
Reality as a correct conceptual analysis of our colour language.
58
I thus use the term "physis" in its wider Greek sense as "nature", also in the sense of the "Wesen" or
essence" of a thing (see also glossary).
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relationship between colour and some other properties within one theory. The same is
not true for philosophy. It may be assumed that every single colour appearance is co¬
extensive with a particular combination of physical states in the external world and
chemical states in our eyes and brains. It is even possible that particular kinds of colour
appearances, red ones for instance, are co-extensive with particular kinds of physical
and chemical combinations. But the co-extensive existence of colours with such
"objective" entities cannot itself decide philosophical issues: While materialists take
them to prove the objective existence of colour, the same entities can also be
understood as a necessarily human and hence ultimately subjective form of
representation, which depends completely on the structures of human thought.59
Reductionism rests on the assumption that co-extension, i.e. quantitative
identity in space and time, is a sufficient criterion for identity as such. It thus rejects as
subjective and irrelevant (if not false) any qualitative differences between the reduced
and the non-reduced. But not only do "objective" physical states also have qualities
(namely those attributed to them in chemical tables and physical laws), but there is no
reason why these qualities should be preferable over other (non-reduced) qualities. For
the reduction of colour to invisible underlying entities explains neither emotional nor
aesthetic colour effects; it finds it difficult to explain the possibility of representation by
colour such as in film or painting, and it takes little notice of our everyday colour
concepts.
I am aware that these paragraphs fall short of any refutation of reductionist
accounts as such - this would lead me too far astray. The main reason why I reject
reductionism is that although I believe in its value for scientists I fear the philosophical
consequences of eliminative materialism. I am aware that not all reductionists' accounts
lead to eliminativism, yet I believe that the attempt of saving "qualia" and similar
dubious entities from reduction is almost futile once one has entered into the
reductionist framework (i.e. agreed to use its concepts). Instead I shall therefore try to
show that alternative accounts are possible and can yield many insights. To put my
59
The periodic table in chemistry as well as all physical laws are constructions of human beings trying to
categorise the world in such a way as to make it more accessible to human understanding. It is, however, just
one way of categorising the world. In chapter X I briefly refer to the difference between Eastern and Western
perspective in painting. Both kinds of perspective are geometrically consistent constructions. Yet they present
different views of the world and its "objective" relations, (see ch.X, sect. 1.2)
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argument in a nutshell: Reduced colour is no longer colourful and hence loses all those
properties, which make it philosophically valuable, namely the properties which can
arouse emotional and aesthetic feelings, and may even lead to the communication of
moral values.
4.2, Non-Reductionist Arguments
Independently of the possibility of their reduction to underlying entities or properties,
the following colour properties speak in favour of the objectivity of colour:
a) Causal Interaction
Colours causally interact with other properties whether or not they are being observed.
Colour thus plays an active role in nature, which properties that entirely depend on
observers (such as pains or dreams) do not do. Peter Hacker60 gives the example of a
black hut warming up more quickly in the sunshine than a white hut of the same
material. This and similar interactions of colour with other properties can be used as a
criterion for deciding between real colours and colour illusions (see below).
Besides temperature, colour has effects on all creatures with a visual apparatus,
no matter how primitive (remember that I make no distinction between monochrome
and chromatic colours). The information encoded in colours is essential for the survival
of all seeing creatures to distinguish between predator and mate, between wholesome
and poisonous food, between dangerous and advantageous environments. While this
could be taken as an argument for subjectivism it is not necessarily so as I can
manufacture and use objective colour samples to signal to other creatures.61
60
Appearance and Reality, pp. 139-144.
61
Evan Thompson stresses the signalling role of colour in nature to argue for a relational account of colour
which takes into account both the objective (external) properties of colours and the physiology (subjective
side) of the creature perceiving it. The difference between his account and that of Vincent Hope is that
Thompson stresses the role of the environment and its evolution for the development of colour vision and
colour concepts. Although his account is more complex (involving physics, chemistry, biology, linguistics and
other cognitive sciences) and does more justice to the varieties within colour than any other scientific account I
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b) Colour visually objectifies shape
Besides causally interacting with other properties, colour is the essential ingredient of
our visual world: without colour we could not see the objects around us. I therefore
believe that colours are signifiers of shape much as written words are signifiers of
meaning: Imagine a purely visual world, in which we could not walk around objects
and feel their textures and their weight so that colour became our one and only means
of identifying objects, a world as we encounter it on television screens and in cinemas.
In these "pictures" we tell an object from its background only by its colour. It is in this
sense that "colour objectifies shape": without colour differences the shapes would not
exist as objects of our perception. It is no good objecting that we do in fact live in a
three dimensional world in which we can walk around objects and feel and lift them.
For we have no difficulties whatsoever in identifying objects represented in films or on
fV.?
photographs. If shape is taken to exist objectively, then so is colour.
Someone might object that the same ball could be red or blue or any other
colour different from its background, and I would still see it as a ball, whereas if it was
a different shape but retained its colour I would see a completely different object. To
this I reply that a red ball is also a different object from a blue ball, just as a red ball is
different from a red tomato. For it surely is the case that if I saw a red ball at one
moment and a blue ball at the next moment I would assume that someone had swapped
the two balls - not that it was the same ball which had suddenly changed colour (see
below: on colour constancy).
As I shall explain in my chapter on painting, there is more to the connection of
colour and shape than a mere distinction between object and background. The fact that
a white circle on a black background appears to be larger than a black circle of the same
size on a white background (see ch.X, sect.2 for illustration) is a first hint at what other
have read, it is still not "philosophical" enough for my liking. What I mean by that will, I hope, become clear
by the end of this thesis.
62
Someone might object that the world of cinema is not the "real" world, and that the fact that viewers
cannot lift up objects shown in films proves exactly this point. The voices we hear in a film, however, cannot
be interacted with either and yet we would not deny that they existed. The film carries colour as much as sound
from a "really existing" world, namely the world of the shooting of the film, into our cinemas and living rooms.
This possibility, however, entirely depends on the objectivity of colour which makes a blue shirt visible to us
as a blue shirt, whether it is in a film or lying right beside us.
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properties we infer from colours. Even if this case is one of illusion, the illusion only
works because we usually judge the size of an object together with its distance from us.
And because objects close to us appear brighter than objects far away from us we
misjudge the white circle on the black ground as a large circle far from us, and the
black circle on the white background as a small circle close to us. Hence this illusion
only works because we are generally correct in our judgments about the objects around
us.
c) Colour Constancy
Most objects remain more or less the same colour over long periods of time and even in
changing lights. Thus the blue of my trousers does not suddenly change to pink or
yellow when I go from natural day light into a neon lit room even if it may look slightly
different under different illumination. Nor does the blue of my trousers change when
there are different people looking at them. The trousers themselves remain exactly the
same.
If colour was perceiver dependent, colour constancy would be something of a
miracle: each time I had a new sense-impression of the same object I would as if by
magic encounter the same colour. And it is not just the colours themselves but also
their interaction with other properties that remain constant. If this was not the case it
would be inexplicable how we could ever learn our colour concepts, or how we could
distinguish between real colours and colour illusions: for real colours are usually
constant.
63
This is due to the adaption of our eyes to the illumination, so that relative to the illumination the blue
remains constant, and as other colours also change with a change in illumination the colour relations between
the particular shade of blue and the other colours also remain constant.
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d) Colour Language
Colours are the objects of argument, discussion and learning. I can take colour samples
into a conference to illustrate my talk, and these colour samples are as real as any
object, and can even be used prescriptively to name new samples. Unlike subjective
sensations such as pain (which we also talk about publicly), colours can be looked at
and analysed as we refer to them - we can discuss their properties. Thus it seems to be a
logical requirement for the way we talk about colour - be it talk among experts or
among laypersons - that colour exists independently from us. This requirement is
backed up by empirical evidence showing that all languages treat colours as external
properties, even if most nations have doubts as to the constancy of colour (many
metaphors of the kind "fleeting colours").
e) Real Colours and Colour Illusions
While it is hard to say whether someone imagines that he is in pain or whether he really
is in pain as it makes no difference to him (as long as it feels painful to him) - the same
is not true about colour. There are clear criteria about whether a car which just passed
us was red or blue, criteria of the kind that can be used as evidence in a court case. Thus
it is either true or false that a certain object (say, the car of the burglar) has a certain
colour, and eye-witnesses are either right or deluded or lying about its colour - and the
possibility of lies, delusions or mistakes itself implies the possibility of truth about a
matter.
Furthermore, there is a clear difference between colours hallucinated and real
colours, a difference which the person hallucinating is often aware of. There is also a
difference between a jumper which only looks black in red light and one that always
looks black. The second jumper is "really" black while the first one is "actually" green
but appears to be black under these unusual conditions.
There are of course cases where it is difficult to establish the real colour - a shirt
may have a strange colour somewhere between purple and brown but never clearly one
or the other (I have seen such a shirt), and there are of course creatures like chameleons
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which do not seem to have any "real" colour. Neither the shirt nor the chameleon,
however, is yellow with black and pink stripes, and our curiosity about these exceptions
furthermore shows that we expect objects to have certain and easily determinable
colour.
4.3. Conclusion
Although redness like any object (qua intentional object of a subject) epistemologically
depends on a subject, ontologically the following is the case:
1. Colours remain more or less constant over time.
2. There is a difference between real colours and colour illusions.
3. Colours causally interact with other properties.
I therefore conclude that colours exist independently from observers, even though they
are nevertheless epistemologically bound to observers. That they are bound to
perceivers not just in the sense that if no-one had ever seen a colour (if we were all
blind) I could not have known that colours existed and could not have investigated the
nature of colour, but also because their internal relations as reflected by our colour
concepts are determined by human thought, will be further argued for in part EL
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V
COLOURS AS IDEAL OBJECTS
There are two ways in which we might refer to a metaphysical realm of colours: We
can either propose a Platonic realm of the colours themselves, or we can suggest that
although there may not be Platonic Ideas of colour, statements about colour can
nevertheless have the status of Fregean Thoughts and hence be objectively true. The
first (Platonic) option is more interesting to me as it is particularly about colour. One
might, for instance, ask whether there are Platonic Ideas of each and every colour or
just of primary colours or even of colour as such.
With regard to Fregean Thoughts on the other hand, I see no reason why there
should not be Fregean Thoughts about colour if there are Fregean Thoughts at all. Thus
Frege's beautiful metaphor can easily be transferred to colour: "The thought, not
sensory itself, clothes itself with the sensory cloak of the sentence and can thus be
grasped (more easily). We say, the sentence expresses the thought."1
Similarly truths about colour may "clothe themselves" in colourful appearances such as
rainbows, coloured shadows and similar appearances seemingly made for our easier
grasping of colour relations. The question whether there are Fregean Thoughts and
what their existence entails, however, has no place in this thesis, and I shall therefore
concentrate on Platonic Ideas of colour.2
Rather than referring to Plato himself, I shall base this enquiry on
Schopenhauer's "Platonic Ideas". Although Schopenhauer does not refer to Platonic
Ideas of colour in his work Uber das Sehn und die Farben, he does so in Die Welt als
Wille und Vorstellung when he writes about art. I shall argue that Schopenhauer's
Platonic Ideas and Goethe's Urphenomena have much in common and can be united
into a useful concept for the understanding of painting.
1
"Der an sich unsinnliche Gedanke kleidet sich in das sinnliche Gewand des Satzes und wird uns damit
fassbarer. Wir sagen, der Satz driicke einen Gedanken aus." ("Der Gedanke", 1986, p.33)
2
As it turns out the most useful concept of Platonic Idea of colour requires a minimum of colour "syntax";
this makes it closer to a Fregean Thought than might be expected.
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Metaphysical colours3 can take two forms: they can either be objects in the
sense used so far, i.e. in principle knowable to a subject, or they can be like Kantian
things in themselves and hence neither knowable nor to be discussed. Schopenhauer
makes use of both: His Platonic Ideas are objects for us subjects. As they are
objectifications ofWill (thing in itself), it may be assumed that like other forms of Will
they can also act on us directly (i.e. not as coloured objects). This notion is quite
obscure as it makes the Will into the subject and us into objects. It does, however,
explain, why colours in this sense evade analysis (provided they exist): analysis is by
nature directed at objects, but direct expressions of the Will, just as the Will itself, are
not part of the world as representation and hence cannot be grasped as objects. Because
of this difficulty, I shall concentrate on Schopenhauer's notion of Platonic Ideas, which
are part of the world as representation. But I do add a short section on colour as
"expression of the Will" at the end.
I use the expression "metaphysical colours" to keep the term open for more specific categorisation into
"metaphysical colour objects", "Platonic Ideas of colour", "Colours in themselves" etc.
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1. Schopenhauer's Platonic Ideas
I do not try to judge whether Schopenhauer's Platonic Ideas are truly Platonic or not4
Schopenhauer himself writes that he follows the Platonic goal but not in Plato's
footsteps.5 The notion of "Platonic Ideas" is especially used in Schopenhauer's third
book of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung: "Second Observation on the World as
Representation: Representation independent of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: The
Platonic Idea: The Object of Art"6.
Schopenhauer's Platonic Ideas must be distinguished from Kantian things in
themselves on the one hand, and from concepts on the other. All three of these exist
outside space and time. The Kantian thing in itself is unknowable, however, while
Platonic Ideas and concepts can be known. Plato himself is not clear about the
distinction between concepts and Ideas, but Schopenhauer claims that it consists in the
following: Concepts are abstractions from the empirically known. They are formed in
our understanding (Vernunft)7. These representations (usually words) are necessarily
poorer than the originally seen, as many details have to be omitted in a concept.
Schopenhauer does not negate the importance of concepts for the sciences and for
philosophy, but he shows that like Kant he thinks that concepts without intuitions
(Anschauungen) are empty. So while concepts and Ideas can both be grasped in visual
(and to a lesser extent also other) perception, concepts are known only through their
limits as expressed in their definitions. These, like borderlines, make them into forms,
i.e. "sterile (i.e. contentless) receptacles".
4




"Der Welt als Vorstellung zweite Betrachtung : Die Vorstellung, unabhiingig vom Satze des Grundes: Die
Platonische Idee: Das Objekt der Kunst" (chapter heading, WWVI, p.243)
7
Schopenhauer is not very explicit about this process. He devotes a whole chapter of the Fourfold Root on
this topic (VWZG,§§26-34) and a good half of the first book of WWV. The form in which concepts are linked
is the second root of the principle of sufficient reason, but how exactly the abstraction process from empirical
perceptions works is not clear.
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1.1. Specification of Schopenhauer's Platonic Ideas
To understand Schopenhauer's view of Platonic Ideas we must remember his view of
nature as a "Stufenfolge" - a hierarchical series of steps from inorganic matter to human
beings. This Stufenfolge, unlike that of Goethe or of Hegel, does not entail progress or
development: Since the Will is not part of the principle of sufficient reason it does not
undergo change, least of all "reasonable" change towards the better. Hence
Schopenhauer's Platonic Forms, as objectivations of the Will, do not change or develop
either:
"[the Will] does not tire, age, or learn, does not perfect itself through practice, is
in the child the same as in the old man: always one and the same, and in character
unchangeable in each of them."8
Each species represents certain aspects of the Will more or less strongly, which we
recognise (erkennen) in the way each of them partakes of some Ideas more than of
others (the Ideas being especially characteristics such as lightness, swiftness, etc., so
that a swallow has more swiftness and lightness than an elephant but both partake of
weight and speed). The following paragraph summarises best what Schopenhauer
means by "Platonic Idea":
"rather, the Idea is the immediate and thus adequate objectivity of the thing in
itself, which itself however is the Will...The Platonic Idea... is necessarily object, a
known, a representation, and only thereby different from the thing in itself. It has only
put aside the subordinated forms of appearance...; but the first and most general form it
has kept, the form of representation as such, of objectivity for a subject...Therefore it
alone is the most adequate objectivity of the Will or the thing in itself, is itself the
whole thing in itself, just under the form of representation." 9
8
"[der Wille] ermiidet nicht, altert nicht, lernt nicht, vervollkommnet sich nicht durch Obung, ist im Kinde
was er im Greise ist: stets einer und derselbe und sein Charakter in jedem unveranderlich." (WN, "Physiologie
und Pathologie", p.350)
9
"vielmehr ist uns die Idee nur die unmittelbare und daher adaquate Objektivitat des Dinges an sich,
welches selbst aber der Wille ist Die Platonische Idee..ist notwendig Objekt, ein Erkanntes, eine Vorstellung,
und ebendadurch, aber auch nur dadurch vom Ding an sich verschieden. Sie hat bloB die untergeordneten
Formen der Erscheinung..abgelegt...;aber die erste und allgemeinste Form hat sie beibehalten, die der
Vorstellung uberhaupt, des Objektseins fur ein Subjekt...
Daher ist auch sie allein die moglichst adaquate Objektivitat des Willens oder Dinges an sich, ist selbst das
ganze Ding an sich, nur unter der Form der Vorstellung." (WWVI, §32, pp.252-253)
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So, Schopenhauer's Platonic Ideas have the following qualities:
1. As object they are necessarily object and
- thus object for a subject
- hence knowable in the form of representation.
2. As representation they are
- the whole thing in itself
- the first and most general form
- the form of representation as such,
i.e. the ideal representation of the world as representation.
3. The subject that knows such an object is
- therefore the purest subject possible
- hence free from Will.
1.2. Goethe's Phenomena as Platonic Ideas
I shall use this list as a checklist to see if Goethe's phenomena fulfil the requirements of
being Platonic Ideas in Schopenhauer's sense:
1. "As object they are necessarily object and thus object for a subject and
knowable in the form of representation".
Goethe's phenomena are necessarily object as they exist for our senses and hence for
human subjects.10 Also, they are knowable in the form of representation: Goethe's
insistence that "we are meandering in the realm of pictures" as well as his constant
emphasis on white and black as representatives of light and dark should be sufficient
evidence of his conviction on this matter. If one wanted to argue for something closer
10
"Colour is a law of nature in relation with the sense of sight."
"..die Farbe sei die gesetzmaBige Natur in bezug aufden Sinn des Auges"
(Fl. Introduction p. 324; Eastlake p.liv; my italics)
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to Schopenhauer's sense of representation ("Vorstellung") one would have to emphasise
the passages in which Goethe speaks of seeing as theorising and perhaps neglect
Goethe's more realist passages, but altogether Goethean phenomena and
Schopenhauer's Platonic Ideas are at least compatible in their status as objects.
2. "As representation they are the whole thing in itself, the first and most
general form, the form of representation as such, i.e. the ideal representation of the
world as representation."
If we neglect the hierarchy of phenomena and concentrate on Urphenomena alone, then
these are certainly the "first and most general form". They are the "form of
representation as such, the ideal representation of the world as representation" in that
once one has reached them one can descend from them and understand all other, lower
phenomena." As to it being "the whole thing in itself', Goethe's holistic
Weltanschauung is built on the belief that the whole of nature shows itself in each
phenomenon. In this sense it is indeed possible that each phenomenon is the whole
thing in itself. It may not seem obvious how even the fullest possible understanding of
colour phenomena can explain how a tree grows or why a dog barks. However, modem
science too relies on such a close knitted and consistent system of physical laws that if
one fully understands one aspect of physics and is able to trace it back to its axioms
then one is indeed able to deduce the whole of physics from that one beginning.12
3. "The subject that knows such an object is therefore the purest subject
possible and hence free fromWill".
I shall discuss the epistemology of grasping Platonic forms on the next few pages, but
for now let it suffice that Goethe would probably disagree with Schopenhauer on this
point. If one translates Schopenhauer's notion of the Will into Goethe's notion of energy
(see below) then in Goethe's pantheist philosophy the grasping of a Platonic Idea or
Urphenomenon would entail the unity with energyAVill rather than the freedom from it.
"
Fl.§ 175; see also Wittgenstein: the "Urbild" determines our investigations not the other way round (C&V
p.469, for full quotation see footnote ch.IV, sect.2.6)
P
Something similar seems to be implied in Wittgestein's remark: "I can imagine a logician who tells us that
he has now succeeded in really being able to think 2x2 = 4."- "Ich kann mir einen Logiker vorstellen, der
erzahlt, er sei jetzt dahin gelangt, "2x2 = 4" wirklich denken zu konnen." (R.C. 1,69,111,109)
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1.3. Grasping Platonic Ideas: An Epistemological Problem
Platonic Ideas have the important role of determining the truths of
classifications. Thus a fish is only a fish if it partakes of the idea fish and a colour is
only a colour if it partakes of the idea colour. Grasping a Platonic Idea is thus grasping
the essence of a thing. If we imagine the essence of redness to exist in some sort of
Platonic realm of Ideas it is, however, difficult to see how we are able to reach this
essence. Plato himself solved this problem by reference to the rebirth of souls and
recollection of Ideas, so that the grasping of Ideas for Plato is a mere re-awakening of
knowledge already within us - a process more plausible than a sudden leap from mere
sensory perception to the grasping of metaphysical essences.
If one does not believe in Platonic myths, however, the problem of how to
bridge the gap between everyday perceptions and Platonic Ideas remains puzzling. One
solution to the problem can be found in von Weizsacker's interpretation of Goethe's
Urphenomena.13 For Weizsacker the Urphenomenon is "the appearing idea" and thus is
itself a connection of subject and object, ideal and real (HA 13, p.552). That an
appearance by nature involves subject and object can be seen when we imagine an
appearance without subject or object: without subject it cannot be an appearance as it
then does not appear to anyone (the famous tree falling in a forest when no one is
watching). Without object, on the other hand, the appearance is an illusion, and this is
precisely the point at issue: given that there are Platonic Ideas of colour an appearance
of colour will only be a genuine appearance of colour if it partakes of a (or the) Platonic
Idea of colour. Otherwise it is an illusion. This means that only if the real appearance
and the ideal phenomenon or Platonic Idea are recognised as united can we (as
subjects) get to know the truth about the appearance (object). Goethe and Schopenhauer
give different accounts of this process, which I shall treat individually in the next two
sections.
13
"Einige Begrifle aus Goethes Naturwissenschaft" (HA13, pp.540-555)
Another solution is to suggest divine intervention: As in Zajonc's interpretation of Goethean Urphenomena one
could argue that a Platonic Idea or Urphenomenon is a divine idea which can manifest itself both as a natural
phenomenon and as a concept. Because I want to exclude religious matters from this thesis, however, I shall
exclude Zajonc's interpretation. Yet I think that it is a valid interpretation of Goethe's texts which is
furthermore supported by A.Schone (1987) and Franz (1932).
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2. Goethe's Epistemology
Goethe is well aware of the "abyss" between experience and idea.14 It seems impossible
to unite what is in time and space with what is timeless, and to try to do so may lead to
madness (ibid.). Thus the opposition between the experienced and the "ideaed"
("Ideiertes") must be resolved if the two are to be united.
As there is a hierarchy of phenomena and as the lowest level of phenomena can
be grasped in daily manifestations, what we need to do is to train our senses. By this
Goethe means that we need to learn to recognise what is relevant in an appearance and
what is not until our senses (both our sensory organs and our minds) are good enough
to recognise an Urphenomenon. We climb the ladder up to the Urphenomena taking
jumps from one level to the next as we follow the basic principles of analysis and
synthesis. Synthesis is the creative method by which we can jump a step while analysis
gives us a solid foundation on each level. Only if both are in balance can we reach the
Urphenomena. While analysis like the chemical analysis of substances is a clear
enough concept, it is the synthesis that requires further explanation.
2.1. Goethe and Kant: Contemplative Power of Judgement
In his essay "Anschauende Urteilskraft" ("Contemplative power of judgement") Goethe
quotes §77 of Kant's Critique of Judgement to propose that besides our discursive
reason (intellectus ectypus), which works inductively from analysis, we might have the
power of intuitive reason (intellectus archetypus), which is synthetic and deductive.
Goethe interprets Kant to take the intuitive intellectus archetypus as God's reason and
proposes human reason to partake in it - just as according to Kant it partakes in
morality through belief in God, virtue and immortality.
14
See "Bedenken und Ergebung" (HA13, p.31).
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Goethe's process of partaking can be taken quite literally as the participation in
an event (remember that for Goethe "In the beginning was the deed"). If Goethe is a
true pantheist so that God is living nature, and if we as human beings are part of living
nature, then we as human beings are part of God.15 And as nature is organised in steps
(Goethe's "Stufenfolge") we ourselves rise a level each time we recognise something on
a higher level because in the process of contemplating something higher we ourselves
partake of a higher level. Although this sounds quite mystical it is consistent.
Furthermore, it complies with Schopenhauer's notion of only a genius being able to
grasp Platonic Ideas, as Platonic Ideas (or Urphenomena) are at the highest level and
thus take the highest level of human being to grasp it (see below).
2.2. Knowledge by analogy16
A second notion used by Goethe to overcome the abyss between real appearances and
ideal phenomena is that of analogy: instead of having to explain something as it is on
its own level we can show by analogy what it means on a level more familiar to us.17
15
I make this point without wanting to say that Goethe was a pantheist in one sense or another. The exact
form of Goethe's religious beliefs is not of any consequence to his Farbenlehre. What is important is that
Goethe believes in something higher than what can be experienced by our sense organs - "Call it bliss! Heart!
Love! God!" - "Nenn's Gliick! Herz! Liebe! Gott!" (Faust I,line 3454).
16
In his excellent paper "Hie Theory of Colour as the Symbolism of Insight" (in Amrine et al, 1987)
Christoph Gogelein proposes an "analogy between the way in which colour appears (ie.the content of the
theory of colour) and the way in which Goethe understands insight (ie. the act of cognition)" (p.247). Defining
analogy as "identity of relationships" (p.248) Gogelein equates the relationships of the following pairs: idea
and light, condition and darkness, Urphenomenon and colour, phenomenon and turbidity, conceptual mode
and eye.
Although Gogelein points out many interesting parallels in these pairs I do not want to use his model. The
reason for proposing my own model instead is that I want to stress the dynamic process more than he does.
Thus I do not set light as the highest principle but rather begin with the polarity between light and darkness.
Nevertheless there are good arguments for Gogelein's interpretation - not least its even closer parallel to Plato.
17
In order to translate from one language into another we first have to analyse the original text (our object
in this world of representation) and then synthesize it into a new text (in a different world of representation).
This translated text is strictly speaking analogous to the first text: it reaches for the same meaning, the Platonic-
Idea of the first text, albeit by a different route, namely through a different language.
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If it is by analogy that we translate appearances into phenomena, the balance of
the roles of analysis and synthesis may change as they do in translations of texts18: At
the level of empirical phenomena we almost exclusively rely on our senses (which are
mostly analytical forces of our understanding (Verstand)), while at the stage of
scientific phenomena synthetic thought is required to create the experiments whose
results we then again perceive by our senses. Finally, at the stage of pure phenomena
our power of synthesis does most of the work and the appearance which triggers our
thoughts is but of little analytical importance. So, the higher we climb the ladder of
phenomena the more synthetic thought is needed because similarities between
appearances are less easily seen.19 (Here we also find another similarity with Plato: the
realm of visible objects, the realm of mathematical (today also physicist) knowledge,
and the realm of pure forms.)
2.3. Criticism of Goethe's Epistemology
There are two main problems regarding Goethe's epistemology: it is very general and it
lacks an account of the recognition of similarity. We cannot learn by analogy nor use
synthetic creativity unless we have the concept of similarity, which is required for the
recognition of common aspects in different appearances. So I shall begin with an
account of Goethe's understanding of similarity.
18
The process of translation is itself more or less analytic or synthetic depending on the kind of text we
translate: a scientific text can easily be analysed into key concepts and then translated into other languages,
while a poem will require synthetic creation by the translator to make it into a new piece of art. Other
analogies, such as paintings or metaphors require an even more synthetic understanding to make them
meaningful in new cultural contexts (worlds of representation).
19
Remember that the Urphenomenon can be grasped in a wide variety of appearances many of which will
have little in common at first sight.
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a) The recognition of similarities
According to Goethe, polarity is the form of all Urphenomena in nature. Polarity
logically demands unity as its opposite.20 Similarity can be defined as a degree of unity
between absolute opposition and identity (thus red is similar to orange but not similar
to green). As human beings we are part of nature and hence partake both of polarity and
unity to varying degrees. Hence we also partake of similarity (as in the case of family
resemblance, for instance).
If this sounds obscure, one has to remember that according to Goethe we are
part of living nature and not parts of machines. As nature goes through certain
processes, we go through the same processes ourselves. This is most striking in
Goethe's account of colour vision: as we see colours in the external world, our eyes
produce complementary colours and thus complete the colour circle (i.e. through
polarity (complementary colours) our eyes achieve unity (the complete colour circle)).
We are not passive receivers of nature's phenomena like scientific instruments are, but
take an active part in the process of colour creation.
Now, our eyes by creating the opposites of the colours that appear in nature
complete the very same colour circle that is created in nature (even if in mirror image).
So unlike most dualist accounts Goethe does not have to explain how outer
appearances reach the inside of our heads, but only how we recognise similarities
within us. It is much more intuitive that we should recognise similar aspects or events
happening within us than outwith us. Indeed, Goethe denies that any living thing can be
grasped by something outside it:
"A living existing thing cannot be measured by anything outside itself, but were this yet
to happen it would have to provide the yardstick for itself; this however, is within the
mind ("hochst geistig" - "mentally/spiritually highest") and cannot be found by the
senses."21
If our minds, rather than our eyes, complete the colour circle then this is indeed
a case where nature has given us an appropriate yardstick for colour within us.
Additionally, we have the outer world to refer to through interaction with other people.
20
See ch.m, sect.2 for details.
21
"Studie nach Spinoza", HA13, pp.7-8.
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To explain in detail how we see that two colours are similar, if we reject explanations
from intuition (our inner yardstick) or recollection, may be a task for psychologists
rather than philosophers,22 but I do think that Goethe's account is philosophically
satisfactory.
b) The problem of generality
There still remains the problem of generality: Goethe's explanation of
everything by reference to polarity (internal and external, ideal and real, subjective and
objective) seems so simple and general a solution that we could prove almost anything
by it. But this is precisely what Goethe is trying to do: As a holistic philosopher he
wants to explain the whole of nature rather than just some little part of it. And as the
principle of polarity can be applied on all levels in increasing detail we may use it to
explain one particular appearance, the whole of the colour circle, or even the interaction
of colour with other phenomena.
The explanatory value of Goethe's Farbenlehre will I hope become more apparent when
I explain individual truths about colour in part H There you will see how the same
process can be meaningfully applied on all levels. If this process really works then there
is no reason to think that its simplicity itself is a weak point.
2°
See also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §377.
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3. Schopenhauer's Epistemology
3.1. The Anticipation of Platonic Ideas
It is essential that for Schopenhauer Platonic Ideas are not known a priori (as H.Hein
(1966) thinks they are). As Chansky (1988) correctly points out (p.70) they would then
be mere forms. But Ideas in Schopenhauer's sense are more like pictures than like
forms: they have a content which can be seen, albeit only by the activity of a genius.
The reason why it takes a genius to grasp these Ideas is that although they are forms of
representation and hence in principle available to our senses, they never appear in their
pure form in the world of representation around us. Instead, Platonic Ideas have
generative powers which can only work on, so to say, the fruitful soil of the mind of a
genius: Platonic Ideas are generative completions of something which empirically is
only half there.
Schopenhauer introduces the notion of "anticipation" for the activity of the
genius who "sees" Platonic Ideas in nature. Unlike concepts we do not grasp Platonic
Ideas after we have seen so and so many things from which we then abstract in order to
form concepts, but instead we anticipate Ideas. The odd thing about the anticipation of
Platonic Ideas is that it cannot be described ("put into concepts") but must be
understood immediately. Perhaps this is the reason why some critics find
Schopenhauer's notion of Platonic Ideas so "eccentric" and "paradoxical" (P.Gardiner,
1963) or in the end "not very important" (H.Hein, 1966). Yet I think that the concept of
"anticipation" makes sense. One might draw a parallel to situations where one is able to
complete the sentence of another person. When this happens one anticipates what the
other was going to say, and one therefore anticipates the other person's idea before one
has the empirical evidence for it.
Platonic Ideas are ideal not just in the sense that they do not appear in their full
form, but also because they each represent only one force of the Will. As they are
therefore not under the influence of other forces of the Will than the one which they
objectify (makes visible to us) - they are pure representation. And this is the second
reason why we need to anticipate Platonic Ideas rather than passively conceive them: in
the contemplation of Platonic Ideas we anticipate what nature would have created were
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she not hindered by opposing forces of theWill - in a crude sense we thus see the world
before it was messed up by the Will.
"For how is the artist to recognise in nature the successful work which is worthy of
representation and find it among the failed ones, unless he anticipates beauty before
experience?'
3.2. The contemplation of Platonic Ideas in Art
Sometimes Goethe seems to say that phenomena are laws of nature "frozen" in lasting
appearances. This may bring us dangerously close to the madness Goethe warned us
about (especially when one tries to visualise how the fleeting phenomenon sails
through the air until it is grasped by some plant or glass). It is perhaps for this reason
that Schopenhauer moves away from Urphenomena in nature and instead places his
Platonic Ideas in art:
According to Schopenhauer, Platonic Ideas are most easily perceived in
aesthetic contemplation because (good) artists are able to depict things more purely
than they naturally appear. There are two sides to aesthetic contemplation: the object as
Platonic Idea and the knowing, pure, will-less subject (WWVI, §38). Art is the one way
of contemplating things independently from the principle of sufficient reason (WWVI,
§36): In art we do not ask for the sufficient reason of a piece of art (the Why and
Whither) but just what it is. So, in artistic creation and contemplation the knowing and
the known are no longer distinct in the sense that there might be a causal chain leading
from the piece of art to the eye of the beholder, but knower and known become pure
subjectivity and objectivity: pure representation as "the other side" of pure Will (§34).
The possibility of pure representation is necessary because ontologically the
Will, or thing in itself, alone is (§35). As the Will manifests itself in nature it does so in
different forms, which struggle to be dominant over each other (so that in each of them
several forces exist, but none of them purely). Because in every living being different
23
"Woran soil aber der Kunstler ihr [der Natur] gelungenes und nachzuahmendes Werk erkennen und es
unter den miBlungenen herausfinden; wenn er nicht vor der Erfahrung das Schone antizipiert?" (WWVI, §4,
P-31)
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forms co-exist and compete with each other (lightness, strength, fluidity etc.) there are
therefore no perfect living beings, and we need art "to see in the things not what nature
has really formed but what she endeavoured to form".24
So when a genius (be he artist or philosopher) seeks to find "what nature
endeavoured to form" he does so
"by finding (knowing) in the individual thing its Idea, and so to say understanding
nature's half-spoken words he expresses purely what she only stammers; he moulds
into the hard marble the beauty of the form which she fails to create in a thousand
efforts, and he places it in front of nature, almost as if calling to her: "This is what you
were trying to say!", and "Yes, that's what it was!" echoes the true connoisseur"
"This anticipation is the Ideal: it is the Idea in so far as it is at least half known
(erkannt) and in so far as it meets the a posteriori given by nature in a complementary
way, which becomes practical for Art. The possibility of such anticipation ...lies in the
fact that artist and connoisseur are the in-itself of nature, are themselves the Will
objectifying itself. For only by something alike, as Empedokles said, can the alike be
known."26
3.3. Schopenhauer and Goethe Reunited
Goethe uses the Empedokles saying as a leading principle for his Farbenlehre;27
furthermore Goethe's search for Urphenomena in his other scientific writings fits
Schopenhauer's description of someone looking for a perfect form - a Platonic Idea - in
nature. In this light we may now agree with Schiller who famously said to Goethe that
what Goethe was looking for in his search for an "Urplant" was not a plant but an idea.
24
"um in den Dingen nicht das zu sehen, was die Natur wirklich gebildet hat, sondem was sie zu bilden sich
bemiihte" ( WWVI §36, p.267).
25
"indem er im einzelnen Dinge dessen Idee erkennt, gleichsam die Natur aufhalbem Worte versteht und
nun rein ausspricht, was sie nur stammelt, daB er die Schonheit der Form, welche ihr in tausend Versuchen
miBlingt, dem harten Mamor aufdriickt, sie der Natur gegeniiberstellt, ihr gleichsam zurufend: "Das war es,
was du sagen wolltest!" und "Ja, das war es!" hallt es aus dem Kenner wider." (WWVI §45, pp.313-4)
26
"Diese Antizipation ist das Ideal: es ist die Idee, sofern sie, wenigstens zur Halfte, a priori erkannt ist und,
indem sie als solche dem a posteriori durch die Natur Gegebenen erganzend entgegenkommt, fur die Kunst
praktisch wird. Die Moglichkeit solcher Antizipation...liegt darin, daB Kiinstler und Kenner das An-sich der
Natur, der sich objektivierende Wille selbst sind. Denn nur vom Gleichen, wie Empedokles sagte, wird das
Gleiche erkannt." (WWVI §45, p.314)
27
"War nicht das Auge sonnengleich..." (Fl.Einleitung, HA13, p.324; Eastlake introduction p.liii)
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The Urphenomenon is indeed a Platonic Idea in the Schopenhauerian sense. Like
Schopenhauer's Ideas, the Urplant can be seen, is thus object to a knowing subject, but
at the same time has to be created, for there is no such pure form in nature herself.
In order to see a Platonic Idea or Urphenomenon in nature we have to disregard
the powers of will on the actual thing and on us. If, for instance, I want to see a pure red
on a rose, I have to disregard shadows and other colour-related characteristics as well as
the smell of the rose which I may like or dislike. So I should not be interested in the
actual rose at all, but only in its ideal features - in what it endeavours to be. The Urplant
should thus be visible in the rose just as much as in a fir tree, and a pure red should be
the same in a rose, a book or in a colour chart. In other words, Urplant and pure redness
are the pure forms independently from their causes of existence in that particular object.
We can now interpret Goethe's Urphenomena to fit them into a more
sophisticated philosophical framework: Goethe, the artist, sees the colour circle both in
nature and in pieces of art. His own diagrams of the colour circle are what
Schopenhauer says Art should be: "Her one origin is the knowledge of the Ideas; her
one aim communication of this knowledge."28 For the world of representation this
means: "If the whole world as representation is only the visibility of the Will, then Art
is the clarification of this visibility."29
OA
In this sense Goethe is an artist - a Kenner und Kiinstler. For Goethe too
writes that "nature speaks to us in various tongues" and "however manifold,
complicated, and unintelligible this language may seem to us, yet its elements remain
ever the same"31 (namely Platonic Ideas). As art shows the what, rather than the why or
how or whither, it lets the thing speak for itself (WWVII, §17). One could therefore say
that when Goethe does not produce a theory of colour in his Farbenlehre he works as
28
"Ihr einziger Ursprung ist die Erkenntnis' der Ideen; ihr einziges Ziel Mitteilung dieser Erkenntnis"
(WWVI §36, p.265)
29
"1st die ganze Welt als Vorstellung nur die Sichtbarkeit des Willens, so ist die Kunst die Verdeutlichung
dieser Sichtbarkeit" (ibid, p.372)
30
Literally a "Kenner" is someone who knows by personal experience, and a "Kiinstler" someone who is
able.
31
"so mannigfaltig, so verwickelt und unverstandlich uns diese Sprache scheinen mag, so bleiben doch ihre
Elemente immer dieselben" (Fl. Vorwort, p.315; Eastlake, preface, p.xxxviii)
124
an artist: he just shows what colours are. (This in itself is a major achievement and one
might even argue that it is the only achievement ever possible.) Schopenhauer,
however, interprets Goethe like a Platonic interpreter interprets an inspired poet: he
shapes Goethe's insights into philosophical concepts and focuses them in his "tip of the
pyramid".
This process is necessary (in Schopenhauer's view) in order to facilitate the
correct interpretation of Goethe's writings. Like any piece of art the Farbenlehre too is
bound to the world of representation by its physical form (as a book). So while Goethe
has made colour phenomena visually accessible to similar minded people and while he
himself found Platonic Ideas of colour, the universalia ante rem, through his ingenious
insights into nature, Schopenhauer sees his own task in defining the universalia post
rem, in order to make Goethe's phenomena philosophically communicable and
valuable. So what Schopenhauer seeks are the suitable philosophical concepts. And
"philosophy [is] nothing other than a complete and correct repetition and expression of
the essence of the world in very general concepts."33
32
See my chapter on Wittgenstein
33
"...die Philosophic nichts anderes ist als eine vollstandige und richtige Wiederholung und Aussprechung
des Wesens der Welt in sehr allgemeinen Begriffen" (WWVI §52, p.368)
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4. Colours as Platonic Ideas
Independently of Goethe and Schopenhauer and assuming that there are at least some
Platonic Ideas (such as Ideas of tables, chairs, goodness and justice), there are three
possibilities regarding the number and kind of Platonic Ideas of colour: Every single
shade of colour could be an exemplification of a particular Platonic Idea; or there might
be no Platonic Ideas of colour at all; or there could be some Platonic Ideas of colour but
not every shade of colour would have its own Platonic Idea.
4.1. There are no Platonic Ideas of colour
In order to investigate this possibility let us assume that there are Platonic Ideas of
tables, beds, goodness, justice and so on, but no Platonic Idea of colour or individual
colours. This would imply that colours belonged exclusively to the world of appearance
and that we could only have opinions about them but no true knowledge of them. This
raises the immediate objection that certain statements about colour, such as about the
mutual exclusion of red and green or about yellow being lighter than blue, seem to be
eternally true and cases of genuine knowledge. And even the obvious fact that
pillarboxes are red seems to imply that they partake of the Platonic Idea of redness. Yet
the view that we might be deluded into thinking that colours truly exist whereas colours
are really just like the shadows in Plato's cave and truths about colour only distract us
from the real truths, is consistent with the Lockean view that colours are mere
secondary qualities and is hence frequently held in modem philosophy.
Provided that there are other Platonic Ideas, however, this view requires further
explanations, which depend on the status granted to Platonic Ideas: If Platonic Ideas are
take to explain our concepts, i.e. to explain what it is that all things called "X" have in
common, it would be inexplicable how we could form colour concepts at all if there
were no corresponding Platonic Ideas. So if we want to deny the existence of Platonic
Ideas of colour we need to deny the stronger claim that Platonic Ideas have some sort of
primary metaphysical existence. Thus we need to assume that it is possible to have
perfect forms of beds and tables without having perfect forms of colour. This is
plausible when one thinks of the difficulty attached to picking the "perfect" shade of
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blue out of a large number of blue samples. But even if colours may not have Platonic
Ideas of their own, they seem to be part of other Platonic Ideas. Thus it is difficult to
believe that there could be perfect forms of daffodils, bluebells or strawberries which
were not yellow, blue or red. One might argue that colours are always properties of
things and hence that while they may be included in the Platonic Ideas of objects they
do not have Platonic Ideas of their own. So unlike goodness or justice, which may be
instantiated in good or just people and actions but also and more importantly each have
their own perfect form independently of these instantiations, colours would exist only
in conjunction with other forms and their instantiations. This leads to difficulties related
to Platonic Ideas being simple or complex and to possible interrelations between
complex Ideas, difficulties which would lead too far astray. So for now I shall assume
that it is at least possible for there being no Platonic Ideas of colour or colours, but that
colours could still play a role in complex Platonic Ideas of objects and natural kinds,
(interestingly this could lead to a Wittgensteinian emphasis on context: Thus the
perfectly red tomato will be of a different shade of red from the perfectly red apple,
strawberry or rose.
4.2. Every single colour has its own Platonic Idea
The opposite solution is to propose Platonic Ideas for each and every single colour.
This would make Platonic Ideas nothing more than universals in the most minimal
sense: what two objects of exactly the same shade of blue have in common is precisely
that shade of blue. But if there was a Platonic Idea for every single colour we ever
encountered and if Platonic Ideas had no further structure, then it would be difficult to
understand how we could ever grasp that two different shades of colour may yet be of
the same colour (dark and light blue, for instance). Platonic Ideas of colour are only
useful if general concepts such as redness or blueness can be understood through them.
This may or may not make the infinite number of Platonic Ideas of single colours (the
minimal universals) redundant, but it requires at least a hierarchy or classification
among these Platonic Ideas.
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I conclude that although some conceptions of Platonic Ideas require every
colour to have its own Platonic Idea, this does not offer a sufficient explanation for our
grasping of colour concepts, and this, after all, is the purpose of Platonic Ideas in the
first place ("what makes knowledge possible").
4.3. There are some Platonic Ideas of Colour
I therefore favour the third option: In order to make use and sense of the notion of
Platonic Ideas of colour we require these Platonic Ideas to be of epistemological value
to us. They must therefore offer insights into the structure of colour itself and/or into
the relation between colours and other things and properties. An obvious solution
would therefore be to propose that only primary colours (and black and white) are
Platonic Ideas, and that all colour appearances are more or less good exemplifications
of these Ideas. As I will show in chapter VII, however, the notion of primary colour is
not as simple as it may seem - there are at least three good and useful notions of
primary colour, each of which would require a different set of Platonic colour Ideas. It
might therefore be more useful to take the complete colour sphere as the one Platonic
Idea of colour: once grasped it yields understanding of most colour relations, and one
could shift the proportions occupied by each colour on the sphere (their quantitative
relations) according to purpose, and still retain the same qualitative colour relations.
If the colour sphere was the one and only Platonic Idea of colour, the grasping
of Goethe's Urphenomena or Schopenhauer's Platonic Ideas would reveal such a
significant part of the sphere that its whole could thus be grasped. In this sense Goethe's
Urphenomena and Schopenhauer's Platonic Ideas would be genuine appearances of
Ideas as they would unite the object (Platonic Idea) with the subject (perceiver). While
Schopenhauer would only allow for one eternally stable Platonic Idea, namely one in
which yellow was placed opposite purple, the proportions on Goethe's sphere could
change depending on context. While Schopenhauer is thus closer to Plato's original
conception of a Platonic Idea, Goethe is closer to understanding the nature of colour
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itself.34 In other words: Goethe remains a realist and Schopenhauer an idealist even
when they appear to refer to similar Platonic entities.
5. Colours as Objectivation of the Will
I shall conclude this chapter about the metaphysical objectivity of colour with a short
section on the metaphysical subjectivity of colour. By "metaphysical subjectivity" I do
not mean those properties of colour which are subjective to us (for I do not think that it
makes sense to speak of such properties as metaphysical when they are so clearly
grounded in the individual subject) - but instead I mean the extreme case when we are
no longer subjects observing colour objects but become the object of colour. This can
only be possible in a dualist system in which there is a realm which is completely
independent of us human beings and cannot be grasped by us (hence cannot become
object to our senses or reasoning powers). Schopenhauer's Will is such a realm. While I
cannot possibly discuss the consistency and feasibility of Schopenhauer's notion of the
Will as a whole, I hope to show nevertheless that colours as powers of the Will are a
strange but not altogether useless or easily discarded concept.
5.1. Will and Energy
Even if all our seeing is the creating of pictures, we still make a clear distinction
between seeing after-images and seeing coloured objects. Our deep knowledge that
there is more to the world than a picture in our eyes is, as Schopenhauer correctly says,
a deep metaphysical understanding: for Schopenhauer it is the will in nature which we
sense other beings to share with us, for Goethe it is energy. Using the notion of energy
Goethe explains how we can have an image after the actual object of perception has
been removed: "We specially have to take the energy into consideration with which the
34
Chapter VIII explains that the proportions on the colour sphere are context dependent.
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light effects the eye. The picture of the sun stays longest."35 Schopenhauer's explanation
is less simple but he might well agree with Goethe's statement that the picture on the
retina "is not the end to its effect. It doesn't just work as a picture, but also as energy
beyond itself."36
This implies that the energy has an effect on us without us representing it any
longer and hence without us treating it as an object, even if it is possible to concentrate
on it and thus make its visible appearance into an object suitable for our understanding.
While Goethe's energy strives towards higher goals Schopenhauer's Will is blind and as
such unalterable. Both, however, are completely independent from us and yet affect us.
Despite Schopenhauer claiming that objective Platonic contemplation is only possible
because colour does not affect the Will (WWVII, §3, p.40), there are several cases in
favour of colours as forces of the Will (and hence affecting our will): the immediate
effect that colour can have on our moods, beginning with the as such inexplicable
difference between warm and cold colours down to "aggressive" or "soothing" colours;
but also personal reactions which are not unlike those experienced when confronted
with music (which in Schopenhauer's philosophy is a direct objectivation of the Will):
Thus a room painted too bright in white and pink might "hurt the eye" similarly to very
high sounds on a flute which "hurt the ear". On the other hand a sonorous bass sound
could be similar to a dark greenish-blue room or perhaps to one of Gotthart Graubner's
"colour-space-bodies". Details of these parallels have also been used in synaesthetic
works of art.37
It is hard to explain the effects colours can have on us without becoming
anthropomorphic about them: i.e. without making them into active subjects and us into
passive objects. By monitoring ourselves we can learn to classify the effects colours
have on us in different situations (in a summer forest, while driving at night, during
migraines etc.), but we cannot get to the core of the colours themselves this way. It is in
35
"Besonders auch kommt die Energie in Betracht, womit eine Lichtwirkung das Auge trifft. Am langsten
bleibt das Bild der Sonne..." (F1.24)
36
"...aber damit ist die Wirkung noch nicht vollendet. Es wirkt nicht allein als Bild, sondern auch als
Energie iiber sich hinaus." (F1.90)
37
Abraham (1983) gives also neurophysiological and semantic evidence for Goethe's synaesthetic polarities
as given in the Farbenlehre §696. See also chapter X.
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this sense that we treat colours like human beings (subjects) dividing them into nasty
and friendly colours, weak and powerful ones, etc. That each colour may have its own
particular behaviour was also believed by Rudolf Steiner, the classrooms of whose
schools are painted in different colours according to the age groups of the children
TO
taught in them. This is done not as a way of representing what the children have in
mind, but so that the individual energies of each colour will meet those children who
are most likely to use these energies rather than be distracted or even disturbed by them.
5.2. Colour. Will and Music
While it is tempting to discard the treatment of colours as active subjects independent
of human beings as esoteric nonsense, this becomes difficult if one believes that there is
some kind of energy or Will or whatever out there which exists independently of
human beings at all. For how else would this something make itself noticeable to us but
through immediate (i.e. non-representational) effects on us? Schopenhauer treats music
as such an effect. That music should be able to convey the whole Will may seem more
likely than that colour should be able to do the same, especially as music exists in time.
But a closer look at the parallels between music and colour may lead to closer
connections than are apparent at first sight (see chapter X, sect.3).
For now let me conclude that painting, and especially abstract painting is easier
to explain if we treat colours as subjects in themselves, some of whose qualities can be
understood (represented) by humans, others however remain a mystery. Whether this is
so because there are Platonic Ideas of colour which I myself have not (yet) grasped, or
whether colours exist in themselves and are as such not graspable at all, is by the nature
of this option impossible for me to decide.
38
A member of the Edinburgh Rudolf Steiner School told me that individual schools differ slightly in their
choice of colours, but they would all, for instance, use peach colour for their most "spiritual" room (usually a
meeting room for special occasions, which hence should be suitable for all age groups).
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I will say, however, that metaphysical colours, be they Platonic Ideas,
expressions of Will, or any other entity, are useful for any dualist system of philosophy
as their existence explains colour harmony and disharmony. They can thus be taken as
good arguments for systems which like Schopenhauer's distinguish between rational
representation and Will; but they may also be useful to someone who believes in a




It obviously depends on one's religious beliefs whether one wants to treat these colour or light




Since colour is both physically and phenomenologically closely related to light it seems
only fair that I should begin my closer investigation into the nature of colour with a
chapter on light. Goethe, as we have seen, calls colours the deeds and sufferings of
light. But he clearly rejects investigations into the nature of light itself:
"For really we are trying in vain to express the nature [Wesen] of a thing. It is its effects
that we perceive, and a complete history of these effects might well enclose the nature
[Wesen] of the thing. In vain do we try to describe the character of a man; but compile
his acts, his deeds, and a picture of his character will appear.
The colours are the deeds of light, deeds and sufferings. In this sense we can expect
them to give us clues about light."1
I believe thatWittgenstein may have held a similar view regarding the nature of
light. In Remarks on Colour he does not mention light except when it is seen as
reflection or sheen on an object. So like Goethe, Wittgenstein remains in the realm of
concrete examples of manifestations of light (what I shall call "light-pictures"). Both
seem to imply that light itself must be an active force but one that is only intelligible
through its effects, namely colours. Schopenhauer explains the nature of colour by the
nature of our colour vision; accordingly the existence and nature of light external to and
independent from us can only be known by speculation, a method he too rejects.2
What these three philosophers are rejecting to is an investigation into what I
shall call "light-in-itself'. They do not think that there is no light, or that the concept of
light is non-sensical, but merely that we cannot go very far in our investigation of the
nature of light itself. Hegel and Schelling on the other hand, use light as a fundamental
1
"Denn eigentlich unternehmen wir umsonst, das Wesen eines Dinges auszudriicken. Wirkungen werden
wir gewahr, und eine vollstandige Geschichte dieser Wirkungen umfasste wohl allenfalls das Wesen jenes
Dinges. Vegebens bemuhen wir uns, den Charakter eines Menschen zu schildern; man stelle dagegen seine
Handlungen, seine Taten zusammen, und ein Bild des Charakters wird uns entgegentreten.
Die Farben sind Taten des Lichts, Taten und Leiden. In diesem Sinne konnen wir von denselben Aufschliisse
iiber das Licht erwarten." (Farbenlehre, Preface, p.315)
2
"Admittedly the nature of light is a secret to us: but it is better to admit this than to stand in the way of
future insights by proposing bad theories." - "Allerdings ist die Natur des Lichtes uns ein Geheimnis: aber es
ist besser, dies einzugestehen, als durch schlechte Theorien der kiinftigen Erkenntnis den Weg zu verrennen."
(Wwvn, §24, p.408)
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concept in their natural philosophy. In this chapter I shall therefore begin with the
notion of light as Hegel understands it before I analyse more concrete occurrences of
light.
I wish to distinguish four kinds of light:
1. Light-in-itself: an absolute, ideal and positive force, itself invisible.
2. Real but itself invisible light:
a) Light source: light as causing visible effects; with the exception of light pictures (see
below) light sources too are invisible, but their activity can be known empirically.
b) Illumination: the passive prerequisite for vision; itself invisible except as light
pictures.
3. Light picture: I shall call all visible light light pictures because of the edge which,
like a picture frame, separates them from darker areas; all light pictures are coloured.
4. Painted light: since the first two kinds of light are invisible they cannot be
reproduced, neither in painting nor in film or photography. Light pictures, however, can
be reproduced, and I shall return to painted light in chapter X.
In this chapter I shall only discuss light-in-itself, light sources, illumination, and
my notion of the light picture.
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1. Light-in-Itself
The concept of light-in-itself is not easy to grasp and one might ask whether it is
meaningful at all. As an ideal and absolute invisible force it is a metaphysical construct
rather than a concept capturing reality, and Goethe's and Wittgenstein's rejection of a
discussion such as the one that follows in this section, has my sympathies. Nevertheless
I want to enter the forbidden zone of metaphysics and make as good a case as I can for
Hegel's notion of light - for that, as the title of this section suggests, is what it is about.
I can see two good reasons for wanting to understand the nature of light-in-
itself. First, we seem to feel that there is more to light than the visible section of some
invisible waves. There is something miraculous and powerful in the way in which one
can use a torch to light up whatever section of a garden or a room one wants; for as the
light beam makes only some parts of our surroundings visible it seems to bring them
into existence. Accordingly, there is also a sense of failure when the light does not
reach far enough into the trees or cannot light up the sky. This power of light is
distinctly different from the physical explanation we read about in an encyclopaedia.
Secondly, and this follows from the first point, light is one of the strongest, if
not the strongest, metaphor in the history of mankind. Most religions use light
metaphors for their gods or even make the sun itself their main god, and in Western
philosophy Plato's analogy of the sun in the Republic together with Christian ideas led
to the light metaphysics of the Middle Ages3. We have the feeling that there must be a
reason for this metaphor, something intrinsic to the nature of light which makes it more
suitable as a metaphor for the highest unknown or "God" than anything else in our
everyday surroundings. As Schopenhauer says:
"Light is the most delightful of all things: it has become the symbol of everything good
and redeeming... All this derives alone from the fact that light is the correlate and
condition of the most perfect contemplation, the only one [kind of contemplation] that
absolutely does not affect the Will."4
3
It therefore seems strange that the Middle Ages are often referred to as the "dark age" when few periods in
European history were ever as fascinated by light as the Middle Ages were. It was the time of colourful
manuscripts and Gothic cathedrals with stained glass windows.
4
"Das Licht ist das Erfreulichste der Dinger es ist das Symbol alles Guten und Heilbringenden geworden....
Dies alles kommt allein daher, daB das Licht das Korrelat und die Bedingung der vollkommensten
anschaulichen Erkenntnisweise ist, der einzigen, die unmittelbar durchaus nicht den Willen affiziert."
(WWWVI, §38, p.284)
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Before we enter the depths of Hegel's writings on light let me just list what we know
about light:
1. its effects: shining surfaces, reflections, illumination, also colour effects such as
rainbows etc.
2. that light is light in the sense of "without weight"5
3. that light seems to be immaterial and pure (hence its metaphorical value) in the sense
that anything in its way darkens it and makes it less pure.
As we shall see Hegel's notion of light as he expounds it in his Encyclopaedia makes
these three intuitions part of the concept of light-in-itself.6 Hegel treats light under two
aspects: In the Encyclopaedia he treats light as a free physical body, while in his
Lectures in Aesthetics he discusses both the possibility of painting light and the magical
effect that this produces. Fortunately the concepts of the two are closely enough
interlinked for me to use both texts interchangeably, though in this section I shall
concentrate on the Encyclopaedia since most of the Aesthetics will be treated in my
section on painting.
Although this may seem tedious, a short overview of the structure of Hegel's
philosophy of nature is necessary to establish Hegel's concept of light: According to
Hegel the "idea as nature" occurs in three determinations (Bestimmungen): as
- externality (Aussereinander),
- individuality (Besonderheit),
- and subjectivity (Subjektivitat).
Externality is studied by mechanics which examines matter and its system, a
system that must be ideal since its parts are as themselves (an sich) and determined
towards infinite particularisation, i.e. they have no inner form or structure so that their
structure has to be ideally imposed onto them.
5
Etymologically the two are not related. The bright light shares its Indoeuropean root "leuk-" with Licht,
leukos, lux, lumen etc.. while the lightweighted "light" together with leicht, leits, latt, levis, levare, etc. comes
from le[n]g h - light in movement and weight, hence German "gelingen" - to succeed.
6
The term light-in-itself is not used by Hegel. Yet I find it useful in order to distinguish Hegel's
understanding of light from other uses of the same word.
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Individuality is studied by physics;7 it is reality set in difference, in a relation of
reflection whose in-itself (in sich) is natural individuality (this will be further
explained).
The study of subjectivity is organics, the study of living nature in which the real
difference between forms through their different individualities is brought back to unity
and finds itself and is for-itself in subjectivity.
The study of light is part of physics which again consists of three parts:
- the study of general individuality - part of which is the study of light;
- individual individuality - the study of weight and its oppositions;
- and at last the "Aufhebung" of the polarity between the first two parts:
total, free individuality - part of which is the study of colour.
General Individuality is again divided into three aspects: free physical bodies,
the elements, and elemental processes (meteorology). Light is the first of the free
physical bodies and the study of light therefore forms the beginning of Hegel's "Physics
of General Individuality" ("Physik der allgemeinen Individualitat"). In order to
understand Hegel's treatment of light in his philosophy of nature I shall quote the whole
of paragraph 275 and then explain it in detail with the help of the paragraphs following
it:
"The primary qualified matter it is as its pure identity with itself, as unity of reflection-
in-itself, thus as primary, still itself abstract manifestation. Existing in nature it is the
relation to itself as independent from the other determinations of totality. This existing
general Self ofmatter is light, - as individuality the star, and the same as a moment of
totality the sun."8
7
Please note that mechanics is not a subject for physics as it is today: For Hegel, mechanics essentially
comprises time, space, matter and movement in abstracto, while physics deals with physical properties of
objects and matter on earth.
g
"Die erste qualifizierte Materie ist sie als ihre reine Identitat mit sich, als Einheit der Relexion-in-sich, somit
die erste, selbst noch abstrakte Manifestation. In der Natur daseiend ist sie die Beziehung auf sich als
selbststandig gegen die andern Bestimmungen der Totalitat. Dies existierende allgemeine Selbst der Materie ist
das Licht, - als Individualitat der Stem, und derselbe als Moment einer Totalitat die Sonne." (Enc.§275)
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1.1. "Light is primary qualified matter"
For Hegel, the whole of natural philosophy deals with ideas in the form of being-other
(Anderssein), so that the idea in nature appears as its own negative and is thus external
to itself. Externality (Ausserlichkeit) is the determination of the idea as nature (§247).
Matter as treated in mechanics is infinite individuality which can be
systematised in categories of time and space (wholly abstract externality), matter and
movement (individual externality) and free movement (matter in the freedom of its in-
itself-existing concept). It is the study of the last of these, absolute mechanics, that
leads to the study of light: In free movement the externality of matter is no longer
external to matter, and matter becomes one with its form: as qualified matter it can
move its own form or, in Hegel's words, in qualified matter the abstract, dumb Being-
in-itself (weight) is "resolved to form" ("zur Form entschlossen", §271). Thus it has
being-for-itself within itself rather than external to itself (as non-qualified matter does,
which is merely shaped through gravity); qualified matter manifests itself and
determines spatiality through the form immanent in itself in opposition to gravity.9
From light as qualified matter we should thus expect the following two
qualities: that it has form immanent to itself, and that it can determine the spatial (form)
out of itself and in opposition to (independently from) gravity. Light fulfils these two
criteria: it fills space independently from gravity10 and as heavenly body has form
immanent to itself.11
9
"Die Materie entreisst auf diese Weise sich der Schwere, manifestiert sich, sich an ihr selbst bestimmend,
und bestimmt durch die ihr immanente Form das Raumliche aus sich der Schwere gegeniiber,.." (Enc.§272)
We must forgive Hegel for not anticipating Einstein's discovery that light is in fact bent by gravity - ideally
the concept of light seems to include (rightly or wrongly) freedom from the forces of gravity, so that in this
sense the concept of light is in opposition to the concept of gravity.
B.Falkenburg interprets this passage to mean that "light is conceived of as a luminous matter [her
emphasis], which on account of this specific quality is not related to any point outside the space it occupies."
(p.338).
Although Falkenburg is correct with regard to the sun that "light is identified with luminous matter" (p.339), I
believe that Hegel does not identify light itself with luminous matter. Not only is there no textual evidence for
this interpetation, but the concept of "luminous matter" cannot possibly be identical to the concept of "light"
since "light" would then consist of matter plus luminosity (ie.light), and this goes against Hegel's notion of
light as identity with itself.
Cp. also Aristotle: "... light is neither fire nor any kind whatsoever of body nor an efflux from any kind of body
(if it were it would again itself be a kind of body) - it is the presence of fire or of something resembling fire in
what is transparent. It is certainly not a body, for two bodies cannot be present in the same place." (De Anima,
ch.7)
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1.2. "Light is matter as its pure identity with itself'
This point is further explained in the following paragraph (§276): light is the "abstract
Self of matter" ("das abstrakte Selbst der Materie") because it is independent from
gravity: it is "the absolutely-light" ("das Absolut-Leichte"). Phrases like "abstract self',
"pure identity" and even "abstract-identical ideality" (§279) are used throughout Hegel's
texts (both the philosophy of nature and the lectures on aesthetics) and justly
emphasised to point out the purity of light. For nothing could be purer than something
that is not influenced or part of anything other than itself.
Hegel's reasons for defending the purity of light are also a sign of support for
Goethe's stance against Newton. For Hegel, like Goethe and mentioning Goethe,
vigorously argues against any splitting up of light into particles, waves, light beams,
bundles of light beams or waves, and other "Newtonian nonsense". Light as ideality
cannot possibly be divided into parts, and as absolutely-light (non-weighted) can even
less be split into parts which may have mass (no matter how little).
Personally, I find the insistence on light as indivisible convincing: When we
think of light itself rather than of light beams (such as search lights), we do conceive of
light as ultimately simple, pure and indivisible. For when we try to divide light, for
instance by putting up a divide perpendicular to the light source, the light itself, though
"halved", does not lose any of its identity but seems to retain all the properties it had
before. Also, notwithstanding Einstein I think that Hegel is right in defining light as
absolutely weightless - we can hardly think of anything lighter than light.
1.3. "Light is matter as unity of the reflection-in-itselF
I believe that this definition is the key to understanding the concept of light as it is in
itself. While the previous points set light in opposition to its empirical counterpoint
gravity, we now set it against its conceptual opposite: darkness. The main argument is
set out in paragraphs 277 and 278. Darkness is the negative of light in the same sense in
which a photo negative is a "negative": light and dark are of equal importance but
diametrically opposed. They are also the two ends on a line of relative lightness.
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Because light relates to other forms of qualified matter primarily as other, that
is, as something external to them, ah other conceptual moments of qualified matter are
its negative, i.e. dark. In as far as darkness also exists independently from light, light
can meet it at its surface but cannot penetrate darkness itself. Hegel calls darkness the
"for now opaque" ("zunachst Undurchsichtigen"), because anything that we only know
the surface of appears to be opaque.
Light thus simultaneously manifests this surface and itself on the surface so that
the two appear through each other. In Hegel's words: "As each appears on the other and
thus only the other on it, this manifestation is through its setting-of-itself-as-external
("AuPersichsetzen") the abstract-infinite reflection-in-itself, through which nothing yet
appears on itself for itself."12
That light is the unity of this reflection-in-itself while darkness remains
unknown can be explained by the spatial relation between the two: When light meets
absolute darkness, as perceivers we are always on the light side and remain "in the
dark" about whatever lies on the dark side. Also, Hegel correctly observes that light
travels in a straight line.13 Its law is therefore one of sameness and unity: the angle at
which light meets a smooth surface will always be the same as the angle reflected. This
means that light has the unity of reflection-in-itself. Goethe too writes: "We can
imagine the shining of the sun or any light as an infinite mirror-reflection of a limited
light picture."14
12
"So jedes an Andem erscheinend, und damit nur Anderes an ihm erscheinend, ist dies Manifestieren durch
sein Aussersichsetzen die abstrakt-unendliche Reflexion-in-sich, durch welche noch nichts an ihm selbst fur
sich zur Erscheinung kommt." (Enc.§277)
13
Goethe too discovered the importance of light travelling in a straight line. Yet unlike Hegel he sees how
light can "bend" around an object if it shines along its edge. Schopenhauer takes the fact that light shines in a
straight line as the reason why our understanding (Verstand) can so easily interpret the effects on our eyes as
causes in the external world (WWV n, §3, p.37).
14
Goethe further derives the generally round shape of lights from this fact, which only makes sense if light is
not reflected in a perfectly straight line but spreads out: "Wir konnen uns vielmehr das Scheinen der Sonne
oder irgendeines Lichtes als eine unendliche Abspiegelung des beschrankten Lichtbildes vorstellen, woraus
sich denn wohl ableiten lasst, wie alle viereckigen Offnungen, durch welche die Sonne scheint, in gewissen
Entfemungen, je nachdem sie grosser oder kleiner sind, ein rundes Bild geben miissen." (F1.402)
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This also means that a perfectly smooth surface does not affect the quality but
only the direction of light. We find this to be true in cases where we mistakenly take a
strong reflection of light to be a light source itself.15
The law of reflection shows that light as truly primary qualified matter is not
affected spatially by its negative. It also means that light-in-itself just as darkness-in-
itself remains unknowable: if we have a strong light shining directly into a mirror so
that the light is reflected back to its source there is no way of telling one from the other.
So we could not identify light-in-itself or probe further than the surface of the mirror -
the meeting point of light and dark.
From what I wrote so far I conclude that
1. Light travels in a straight line. Otherwise, clear mirror images would be impossible
(see also next chapter).
2. The conceptual opposite of light is dark (see also next chapter).
3. Without further information we can say nothing about the nature of darkness except
that it is the other of light; if I want to assume an independent existence for darkness I
should assume it to be opaque for I can only see its surface. We only ever see the
surface of something dark, because while it is dark we cannot judge the spatial
extension of the dark object or space; in complete darkness we cannot, for instance, tell
the difference between a large basement, a small cupboard or a cloth around our eyes
(by vision alone).
4. But this surface is not darkness itself - it only shows that there is something other in
the path of light; and by definition (see point 2) anything other than light is dark. That
this surface is not darkness itself can also be inferred from the fact that we do not see
darkness in the strict sense, but are instead hindered from seeing.
15
"when subjective, pure reflection continues the Lehre of the weak and decreasing lights, and when made
objective [i.e. using sunlight under a free sky] points to something real external to human beings, even in the
slightest of appearances."
"reine Spiegelung, die sich, sofem sie subjektiv ist, an die Lehre von den schwach wirkenden und
abklingenden Lichtern anschliesst und, insofem sie objektiv gemacht werden kann, auf ein ausser dem
Menschen Reales, sogar in den Ieisesten Erscheinungen hindeutet." (F1.370, my translation)
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1.4. "Light is the primary, itself still abstract manifestation"
To make sense of this phrase we must limit it to refer only to visual manifestations, for
I do not think that Hegel could reasonably call light the primary manifestation as such.
We have just seen that light appears only on something other than itself, that it makes
the other manifest, and that it makes any other manifest. That light is indifferent to the
objects it makes manifest is also emphasised in Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics: In his
comment to §276 Hegel writes: "When the idea (Vorstellung) which has been called
realist denies that ideality was existent in nature then among others it should also be
referred to light, this pure manifestation which is nothing but manifestation."16
Light is a true Hegelian synthesis of the real and the ideal: ideally and as being-
in-itself light is invisible, but it becomes visible when it manifests itself on something
other than itself. As the power of manifestation it thus simultaneously manifests the
ideal and the real. It is again in the Aesthetics that this point becomes more clear as
Hegel calls light the "Making-Visible as such" (Sichtbarmachen als solches).
Light is primary manifestation because it does not derive from anything other
than itself, and also because it is nothing other than manifestation: We would not know
light if it did not manifest the visible world, and we do not know anything else about it
other than that it manifests the visible world (and nor should we try to probe further, in
the way Newton and other physicists do, for that is to leave the realm of pure
manifestation and hence the realm of light-in-itself).
16
"Wenn die Vorstellung, welche man realistisch genannt hat, leugnet, dass in der Natur die Idealitat
vorhanden sei, so ist sie unter anderem auch an das Licht, an dieses reine Manifestieren, welches nichts als
Manifestieren ist, zu verweisen." (Enc.§276)
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1.5. "Existing in nature light is the relation to itself as independent from all other
determinations of totality. This existing general Self of matter is light. - as individuality
the star, and the same as a moment of a totality the sun."
I treat the rest of §275 as one because it more or less follows from what I have said so
far. Hegel moves from the abstract reason for light being primary qualified matter to its
empirical manifestation in the form of planets and stars. As is the case for all naturally
occurring forms, light too must externalise itself, i.e. represent itself in some
perceptible way; otherwise it could not be studied by physics but would remain a pure
idea, to be studied by logic rather than by an empirical science. Yet it must keep the
qualities ideally assigned to it.
I have already transferred Hegel's ideal concept to natural occurrences of light,
but let me quickly go through it again: Light in nature must be a relation to itself as
independent from other determinations - this is the independence of light from gravity
and spatial division as well as the quality to shine in a straight path, which makes light
indifferent to everything other than what is in its way (light is thus independent from
gravity, wind, but also from subjectivity as treated in Hegel's chapter on organics).
Somehow more puzzling are the references to the stars and the sun. The
explanatory context can be found in §274: Hegel divides the "Physics of General
Individuality" into three kinds of physical qualities: those that are immediate and
external in an independent way as the physically determined heavenly bodies, and two
others which I shall come back to later. Light occurs in all three qualities but manifests
itself immediately only in "solidified lights": The stars which are relatively small (from
our perspective) and which exist purely as other to the dark night surrounding them
form the first group. They fulfil the criterion of independence in that they seem not to
depend on anything other than themselves for their existence. They are nothing but
lights in the dark,17 and as such they manifest both the night and themselves: we cannot
see the stars unless it is dark and we would not notice the dark if everything was star,
ie. light. Everything as light is, however, the second case: the sun is the totality of
17
Strictly speaking, most stars are of course only seen because they reflect light not because they produce
light themselves. Nevertheless they appear as independent luminous bodies.
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primary qualified matter because it is light without surrounding light (that is why we
cannot see the sun on bright (= totally light) days). Yet the sun too only manifests itself
on other objects (most of them earthly) and as lightsource manifests these earthly
things.
1.6. Resulting Oppositions to Light-in-Itself
a) Rigidity and Neutrality
As we have seen, darkness, as the negative of light, is the opposition to its abstract-
identical ideality - is opposition-in-itself (§279). In material reality this opposition
appears in two forms: as bodily difference, ie. in material being-for-itself or "rigidity";
and as oppositioning as such, which is not held by individuality but merely as
something collapsed into itself: dissolving "neutrality".
As with light existing in the sun and the stars, darkness too exists in the sky: its
rigid body is the moon which does not move around itself like a true individual but
serves the earth. As it is always the same to the earth (we only ever see the same side of
the moon) it is to us rigid.
The neutral body is the comet which has no core but dissolves into an
everchanging fiery tail. The opposition comes back to itself in a third kind of body, the
body of individuality (§280). All planets are bodies of individual totality, including
planet earth. The earth is a body of individual totality, as opposed to the sun which as a
form of general self of totality, and opposed to the stars which are general moments of
individuality. Hegel's classification derives from the earth moving both around the sun




The body of individuality (planet earth) encompasses as subordinated moments on it
the determinations of elemental totality: bodies which exist free-for-themselves, or
"physical elements".18 Each of the elements is different from light in a different aspect,
so that we arrive at several new polarities in addition to the ones already established
(light/dark and light/heavy). Even if the following four paragraphs may seem excentric
or irrelevant, please bear with me (and with Hegel), as they do in the end reveal further
insights into the nature of light.
1. Air (§282)
While light is positive identity with itself or self-manifestation, air is merely negative
generality, is a selfless moment of something other, and hence has mass. Light and air
are both cases of indifferentiated simplicity, but air is passive against the light since
light can travel through it. Air is thus transparent and elastic in a mechanical way.
2. Fire (§283)
Air is, according to Hegel, as itself (an sich) fire, and fire is air set as negative
generality. Fire is also materialised time, is restless, and consumes the other as well as
itself and thus becomes neutrality. Fire like the moon is a beingfor-itself, but unlike the
moon is not indifferently rigid but an unrestfulness for-itself set in individuality.
3. Water (§284)
Water is the truly neutral, the collapsed opposition without any individuality for-itself,
without rigidity or determination in-itself, a general balance which dissolves all
determinations and shapes (takes on any shape).
18
"Der Korper der Individualitat hat die Bestimmungen der elementarischen Totalitat, welche unmittelbar als
frei fur sich bestehende Korper sind, als unterworfene Momente an ihm; so machen sie seine allgemeinen
physikalischen Elemente aus." (§281)
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4. Earthliness19 (§285)
Undetermined earthliness is different from the other elements in that it is an individual
element with developed difference (it can take on shapes) and an individual
determination of this difference. As totality it keeps the other elements together and is
the power which begins their processes and keeps them going. Thus we arrive at the
elemental process - meteorology.20
The reason why I mention all these rather archaic and possibly more anecdotal than
philosophical points is that they are all part of the general individuality of which light is
the primary moment. So, within one group of physical phenomena they all form
polarities with light.
Let me just repeat these polarities:
Light as abstract identical ideality is opposed by
1. dark - the abstract negative of light;
2. weight - which has its identity outside itself;
3. rigidity - being-for-itself defined as mere difference from
(hence serving rather than being individuality);
4. neutrality - opposition as such without own individuality and
hence collapsed into dissolution;
5. earth - individual totality come back to itself;
6. air - negative generality;
7. fire - being for-itself, negativity related to itself;
8. water - neutrality without any determination whatsoever;
9. earthliness - developed difference and its individual determination.
19
Please note that in German the two words "soil" and "earth" are both "Erde". Thus Hegel's element
"Erdigkeit" is being-soil as well as being-earth.
20
Hegel believes that all processes of the earth are continued through the primary relation between its
general self, light, and the particular position of the earth to the sun. No doubt Hegel can thus explain the
seasons but I shall not go into any more details.
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We can group these into active and passive oppositions: Darkness, weight, and rigidity
are active, air and fire as well as the two neutral forms of comets and water are passive.
The earth and earthliness at last are special cases of individuality.
Hegel's classification now makes sense: Darkness, mass and rigid bodies can
indeed actively stand in the way of light: darkness seems to overcome light at night
time, weighted material always disturbs the light somehow (any weighted, i.e. material
medium whatsoever disperses, reflects or swallows light), and rigid bodies do the same,
most notably the moon during an eclipse of the sun. The passive elements on the other
hand, air and fire, water21 and comets not only let light through but may even become
the medium of light.
Hegel's notion of earth is less easy to understand until we realise that for him all
physical processes take place on earth22 and that the earth is therefore the kind of place
that allows these processes to happen. All earthly elements have some relation to
light.23 Colours are the lights of the earth, which result from a special relationship of
earthliness with light (see below).
1.7. Conclusion: Light-in-Itself
Hegel makes a good case for an ideal synthesis of ideal and real in the form of light. I
believe that an understanding of light such as Hegel's is an ideal beginning (in its
double sense) for the understanding of the metaphorical value of light. Like Beauty,
Goodness, Truth and God, light is eternal yet not everywhere, is indifferent to where it
occurs, pervades some aspects of life but is hindered by others, and is pure identity with
itself: While most concepts can be defined with reference to Truth, Goodness, God or
Beauty it will be hard to define any of these in terms of something else. Similarly it is
easier to define colour, visibility, eyesight and various other concepts with reference to
light than the other way round. This does not, of course, mean that I am justified in
21
Hegel seems to be inconsistent when it comes to the nature of water which is of course a weighted
substance. He is probably thinking of ideal water as being perfectly transparent, so that it would be the
impurities in water that make it behave like other forms of matter.
22
Hegel uses the notion "physics" almost in the old Greek sense of "nature", presumably meaning all natural
processes on earth.
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proposing the ontological existence of absolute and ideal beings such as Truth, Beauty,
Goodness, God, or Light-in-Itself. But at least I hope to have shown that Light is one of
these concepts, of which either all exist objectively or none of them does.24
1.8. Postscriptum: Light and Colour
So how are our visible and concrete colours, such as the redness of pillarboxes related
to the abstractum which I call "light-in-itself? According to Hegel, colour is the
synthesis of light and dark/matter. He therefore devotes the chapter after light as
"general individuality" to darkness as "particular individuality" (Enc. §§290-307).
Colour is their synthesis as "total individuality": Individual physical objects ("Korper")
which qua physical objects partake of materiality (i.e. mass and darkness) can be
distinguished from each other by their properties. One of their distinguishing features is
their relation to light. According to Hegel there are three ways in which a material
substance can interact with light: it can completely transmit light (as in ideally
transparent crystals; §317); it can refract light (as in water, causing spatial illusions
(§318), and in other transparent bodies, causing entoptic colours (§319)); and it can
retain light within substance in the form of colour (§320).
This latter case is the for-itself (Fiirsichsein) of form gaining being-there
("Dasein"). In other words, colour is the materialisation of light in physical bodies, i.e.
it shows the light's "being there" (Dasein) in the physical body for itself, i.e.
independently from other causes. Colour is thus the "concrete and individualised unity"
23
which are taken up again in a later section (Enc.§§317ff.)
24
Schelling's notion of light is similar to Hegel's:
"Light is the ideal as it shines into nature, the first breakthrough of idealism. The idea itself is light,
but absolute light. In appearing light [the idea] appears as something ideal, as light; but only as relative light,
relatively-ideal. It [the idea] casts off its covers with which it clothes itself in matter, but in order to appear as
something ideal, it has to appear in opposition to the real."
"Das Licht ist das in die Natur scheinende Ideale, der erste Durchbruch des Idealismus. Die Idee
selbst ist das Licht, aber absolutes Licht. In dem erscheinenden Licht erscheint sie als Ideales, als Licht; aber
nur als relatives Licht, relativ-Ideales. Sie legt die Hiille ab, mit der sie sich in der Materie bekleidet; aber, um
eben als Ideales zu erscheinen, muB sie im Gegensatz gegen das Reale erscheinen." (Philosophie der Kutist,
1/5, 507)
Please note that Stott translates the first sentence as "Light is the element of the ideal that is manifested in
nature" (p. 120), whereas my translation suggests that the ideal as a whole appears in nature, albeit in natural
(i.e. imperfect) form. I doubt that the ideal can consist of "elements", but as I said, I am by no means a
Schelling scholar and Stott's alternative might be a more suitable tranlsation than mine.
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of light and darkness/matter. The resulting qualities of colour as partaking both of ideal
light and solid matter can be analysed by synthesising the properties of light with those
of the individual elements as listed above (1.6.) to yield
1. degrees of lightness (dark);
2. particular external relations (weight);
3. particular internal relations (rigidity);
4. degrees of transparency (neutrality);
5. colour as encompassing all visible processes (earth);
6. colour as based on a minimum of transparent materiality (air);
7. colour as partaking of time (fire);
8. colours as taking on any shapes (water);
9. chemical colours as determined colour differences (earthliness).25
2. Empirically Real, yet Invisible Light
By empirically real light I mean light that can be discovered and measured empirically,
be it by light meters or by simpler means such as seeing that it is light outside, or being
dazzled by light. I shall argue that although we can discover that this light exists we
cannot see it. Light in this sense can be divided into light sources and illumination.
Both can become visible but only as "light pictures", a category which I shall explain
in my next section. The reasons why I think that light sources and illumination are
usually invisible are the following:
a) Light Sources
Strong light sources are usually too bright to be seen. They dazzle us and therefore
cannot be seen in the same sense in which chairs and other straightforward objects of
perception can be seen. For this reason, the word "light source" is useful as it reminds
25
Hegel does not make these connections himself and admittedly some of them seem far-fetched; yet I
believe that Hegel would have been pleased with them. The mere possibility of combining his polar concepts
in such a way as to show the properties of colours, demonstrates how ingeniously interwoven the concepts in
Hegel's Encyclopedia really are.
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us of a somehow hidden source which we only know by its effects. As these effects
make us conclude that there is a light source, however, I call light sources empirically
real even when they cannot be seen themselves.
b) Illumination
Illumination is usually assumed rather than seen. It is a prerequisite for my seeing
things that the space in which these things are is well enough illuminated. I might
notice a particularly bright or dark room and comment on how well or badly it is lit. In
these cases however, the illumination is not so much an object of my perception than a
fact (see next paragraph: I do not see the illumination but I see that something is well or
badly illuminated). Illumination, like light sources, can become visible as light-pictures,
such as spot lights (especially when these are coloured).
c) The connection between light source and illumination
There is an obvious causal connection between light source and illumination. When I
notice that a room is quite dark I conclude that the light source for its illumination is
rather weak. Similarly, when I go out to buy a 100 watts light bulb for my kitchen I
assume that the kitchen will be lit more brightly than it was with a 60 watts light bulb.
Please note that we judge the illumination or "quality of light" not by looking at
the light source or at the illumination itself but by observing the objects illuminated.
Thus we do not see the illumination, but we see that the room is well illuminated.
Depending on our purposes we may want the same table lit brightly on most days but
less brightly for a party. Yet we would be puzzled if someone asked us to check the
illumination by looking at it. Illumination is no straightforward object of perception and
may indeed not be anything at all but an overall effect of more or less well lit surfaces
in a room. The only thing I can perceive regarding illumination is whether something in
particular is more or less well lit (which relates to Hegel's point of light manifesting
itself only on something dark). It follows that I would not be able to judge the
illumination in a void (and indeed we might say that the concept of illumination does
not apply in a void: for reasons still to come I want to argue that there can only be
visibility where there is turbidity).
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It makes more sense to speak of looking at a light source than of looking at the
illumination (but I would be very careful about looking at a light source in case it might
dazzle me). The reason why we feel easier about looking at light sources than at
illumination is that light sources are in most cases contained in some kind of physical
matter which, when not used as a light source, has ah the properties of other physical
objects, including that of visibility. Thus I can look at a match, a candle or a torch
before I light them, and at light bulbs, at spotlights even and very strong flood lights
before they are switched on.
Light sources and illumination are indistinguishable from each other when they
are at their strongest and dazzle us.26 After spending some time in a dark room, for
instance, we cannot tell the difference between a very bright day and a light being
shone into our face. Another example would be a fluorescent gas or liquid which filled
a space with light. A similar effect can be achieved by a great number of light sources
in a white room. Thus some modern art galleries seem to be illuminated from within
rather than from pointed light sources - we say, "the room is bathed in light". In these
cases we judge the illumination to be very strong because we see the objects and walls
in the room as very bright objects and walls, not as relatively normal objects and walls
with bright lights shining at them.
26
"The highest degree of light, such as that of the sun, of phosphorus burning in oxygen, is dazzling and
colourless." - "Das hochstenergische Licht, wie das der Sonne, des Phosphors in Lebensluft verbrennend, ist
blendend und farblos" (Goethe, F1.150)
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3. Light Pictures
I want to argue that even when we think that we see "a light", i.e. when we speak of a
light as the object of our visual perception, what we really see is what I call "light
pictures". I take this term from Goethe who defined light pictures as anything luminous
with an edge.
"For up to now people treated light as a kind of absolute, as a being existing and
effective for-itself and, so to say, conditioning itself, which could produce colours out
of itself for the slightest reason. To divert the friends of nature from this image and to
make them attentive to the fact that in prismatic and other appearances there is no
unlimited conditioning, but only limited conditioned light, a light picture - that there are
pictures as such, dark ones and light ones: this is the task to solve, the aim to reach."27
The edge or limit of the light picture is extremely important and it is useful to
think of the light picture as a framed picture. Regarding the nature of light pictures I
shall argue for two things:
1. that it is only framed light pictures which we refer to when we say that we see a light;
2. that in light pictures too, light source and illumination can merge.
1. a) Light Source seen as light picture
When travellers in the night see "a light" they see a white or yellow glow framed by
blackness. In the twentieth century we see traffic and neon-lights, which also have
clearly marked shapes and hence boundaries. We see the sun only when it rises or sets
and on misty days, and then we see it as a brightly coloured circle with a more or less
clear edge. We see the clearly defined glowing wire in a weak light bulb, but find it
hard to distinguish light source from illumination in a strong light bulb (we usually
consider the glass of the light bulb as the limit of the light source). There are also
natural phenomena where the light source seen is a light picture - good examples are
Northern lights and flashes in a thunder storm.
27
"Denn man hat bisher das Licht als eine Art von Abstraktum, als ein fur sich bestehendes und wirkendes,
gewissermassen sich selbst bedingendes, bei geringen Anlassen aus sich selbst die Farben hervorbringendes
Wesen gesehen. Von dieser Vorstellungsart jedoch die Naturfreunde abzulenken, sie aufmerksam zu machen,
dass bei prismatischen und anderen Erscheinungen nicht von einem unbegrenzten bedingeneden, sondem von
einem begrenzten bedingten Lichte, von einem Lichtbilde, ja von Bildern iiberhaupt, hellen oder dunklen, die
Rede sei: dies ist die Aufgabe, welche zu losen, das Ziel, welches zu erreiche ware." (F1.361)
Other references in the Farbenlehre to light as limited pictures are at 306, 307, 309, 363, 364, 371, 374, 389,
392, 690, 691.
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So, either light dazzles us or it is visible as a light picture in a more or less clear
contrast to the relative darkness surrounding it.
lb) Illumination seen as light picture
The best examples for seen illumination are spot lights. The illumination of public
buildings too is visible, but when the illumination exactly matches the outline of the
building it is impossible to judge whether it is the colour of the building we see or
whether it is coloured illumination on a differently coloured surface. (A white building
lit by a greenish light will appear to be a greenish building unless some part of the
building is not thus lit and so shows its true colour.) Floodlights too show clearly
defined lit up areas, as do streetlamps, car lights, torches and other light sources.
So, either illumination is unnoticable and defined by inference from lit up
surfaces, or it too has clearly defined edges and thus becomes a light picture.
2) Merging of light source and illumination
As can be seen from the above cases it is not always clear where the light
source ends and the illumination begins. The difference between the two seems to lie in
our visual perspective rather than in their nature: I look at the light source when I face
it, but looking with the light source I see the illuminated area - not the light source
itself. A good example of this difference in perspective is the case of a relatively weak
light source such as a torch: I can look at the torch, but when I hold it in front of me to
light up the path, I look at the illuminated area (and do not see the bulb of the torch).
Someone else watching me on the other hand, might be looking at the light beam and
not be able to tell where the light source ends and the illumination begins. Another
example of light source and illumination merging is in film or television. The pictures
shown on screen are simultaneously light source and depiction of a lit up world.
As a general rule, light pictures can be represented by photographs and
paintings whereas illumination and light source themselves cannot be thus represented.
This might make you wonder what the difference is between the empirically real but
invisible light source or illumination and light-in-itself as defined by Hegel. The answer
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is simple: Light sources and illumination are empirically real in that they can be
detected and measured by empirical means whereas light-in-itself is transcendental.
The relation between light-in-itself and light source is similar to that of universal and
particular. The relation between light source and light picture, however, is one of cause
and effect. The light source is the underlying and possibly hidden cause of the colours I
see in the light picture, whereas the light-in-itself is their conceptual, or logical basis.
4. The Dimensions of Light
In order to distinguish further between the four kinds of light I shall now have a quick
look at their dimensions. By "light dimensions" I mean the spatial and temporal
extension of each kind of light.
Light-in-itself is non-dimensional and timeless: We can represent the concepts
of light and dark in themselves as a line of which light and dark are the ideal end
points. In the middle we have perfect transparency or neutrality. All three are invisible
9R
because they all form ideal limits to visibility as such.
Light sources are ideally also non-dimensional but exist as points in time and
space. Perhaps it is easiest to imagine them as the sun, with black holes as its absolute
opposites: While the sun and the black holes have several dimensions as physical
entities the light or darkness they produce is again absolute, but in this case physically
absolute: they are the greatest and lowest amount of light possible.
Illumination on the other hand is always three dimensional and part of time.
Illumination is most easily imagined as lit air which can creep into anything unless it
meets a physical barrier.
Light pictures are two-dimensional: Even if we interpret them as three-
dimensional objects, we see the sun or the moon in the evening sky as circles, not as
spheres. We see spot lights as essentially flat circles which creep over the ground and
onto people, and we see light beams as more or less stretched triangular shapes with a
circular base.
154
I shall return to the notion of light pictures in chapter X. With regard to
empirical light (light sources or illumination) I have one main argument for saying that
light is only visible as light pictures: If we did not see light sources and illumination as
two dimensional light pictures it would be a miracle how they could be reproduced so
successfully in films, photographs and paintings.
The polarity that results from this section is the following: the brightest light source
(the sun) versus the darkest blackness (a black hole) causes the brightest illumination or
no illumination at all. Neither extreme can be object of our perception though we are
able to perceive that they exist. We judge that something is bright or dark only in
relation to the visibility of the objects around us. In my terminology we therefore judge
light source and illumination by the brightness of the colours in light pictures.
28
I explain the notion of neutrality as a limit to visibility in my next chapter.
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VII
FOUR FORMS OF NEUTRALITY
TRANSPARENCY, REFLECTION, OPACITY, AND WHITENESS
"What is capable of taking on colour is what itself is colourless [...]; what itself is
colourless includes a) what is transparent and b) what is invisible or scarcely visible,
i.e. what is "dark". The latter (b) is the same as what is transparent, when it is
potentially, not of course when it is actually transparent; it is the same substance which
is now darkness, now light."1
Besides transparency and darkness (blackness), reflections, grey and white can
also be called things or substances capable of taking on colour. In this sense they are
colour neutral ("monochrome"). This chapter analyses our concepts and the
phenomenal qualities of these colour neutral properties. Perhaps surprisingly, the
chemical and physical substructures which explain physical transparency, opacity,
reflection, white, black and grey are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for us
seeing them thus. While I concentrate on transparency and whiteness, as these are the
two properties most frequently discussed in philosophy, most of my arguments are
directly transferable to the other colour neutral properties.
I have divided this chapter into the following sections:
1. Conceptual Relations
2. Perceptual and Physical Transparency
3. Whiteness and Transparency
4. The Mixing ofWhite
5. Opacity and Reflection, Black and Grey
6. Conclusion: Four Forms ofNeutrality
1
Aristotle, De Anima, ch.7
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1. Conceptual Relations
Please note that the following relations are based on phenomenological rather than
physical evidence. Thus claims like "everything reflective is opaque" do not imply that
all reflective objects are opaque, for that is clearly not true. Altogether this section is
less describing our every day use of the these terms (which is probably less consistent)
than prescriptive for my own use of these terms in the sections that follow.
1.1. Transparency and Reflection
Conceptually as well as phenomenally, transparency and reflection are mutually
exclusive. That nothing can be transparent and reflective at the same time can best be
observed when one looks at a shop window: One can actually only look at those parts
of the window that reflect oneself and the street, and it is only those parts of the
window which do not reflect anything that are transparent. Yet the glass itself is made
up of the same material throughout. Transparency and reflection are therefore mutually
exclusive regarding the object of vision: A subject sees an object through a transparent
medium, but it sees itself as object in a reflection.
1.2. Transparency and Opacity
Transparency and opacity are also contradictory terms. Yet in contrast to the shop
window example we can imagine situations in which we would argue about whether
something was transparent or opaque. This is so because there can be degrees of
transparency and opacity (such as in the case of fog). From this it follows that there are
at least two concepts of transparency: Ideally transparency is the opposite of reflection,
empirically however, there is an additional opposition between transparency and
opacity which is not absolute but is a matter of degree.
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1.3. Reflection and Opacity
Everything reflective is opaque but not everything opaque is reflective. Reflective
surfaces are opaque because they are not transparent (see 1.1). Opaque surfaces on the
other hand can be more or less reflective. One of the most obvious examples of more or
less reflective surfaces is the distinction between matt and glossy photographs, or matt
and glossy paint, both of which are perfectly opaque.
1.4. Reflection and Whiteness
White surfaces can be more or less reflective (matt and glossy whites), and white is the
colour most frequently used to represent reflection in painting (and comic strips). The
reflection of light from a mirror is not only stronger than that of a white surface, but
there is also a qualitative difference between the two: A mirror reflects directionally
and hence leaves reflected colours unchanged, while colours reflected by a white
surface are weakened considerably by diffuse reflection. Thus, just as transparency is
ideal in that it transmits colours unchanged, so a perfectly reflecting surface mirrors all
colours unchanged. A white surface, however, weakens the colours reflected just as
milky glass weakens the colours seen through it.
1.5. Transparency and Whiteness
The famous statement that nothing can be transparent and white is sometimes
empirically challenged by examples ■ such as milky glass, thin fog, etc. Yet these
examples are not examples of perfect whiteness or transparency: wherever I see
something through milky glass or thin fog this part of the supposedly transparent white
medium is neither transparent nor white but appears in the more or less weakened
colour of the object seen through the medium. As I shall argue below the puzzle about
whiteness and transparency can be solved if we treat transparency as a spatial concept,
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whiteness however as a surface concept. This is why only those parts of the milk bottle
appear white which I cannot see through.
However, transparency and whiteness also share two qualities: they can both
take on any colour, and any colour mixed with them becomes lighter and hence makes
them darker (for details see section 3).
1.6. Opacity and Whiteness
Everything white is opaque but not everything opaque is white. That everything white
is opaque follows from there being no transparent white, and that not everything
opaque is white is only obvious because there are so many other colours opaque
surfaces can have.
Regarding transparency, the most important result from these six paragraphs is that we
look through transparent media but at opaque and white surfaces and at ourselves in
reflections. Thus the first rule about transparent objects is that they must have a certain
thickness. Vincent Hope suggested to me that transparent objects could therefore be
defined as objects which may enclose an opaque object so that we can see the enclosed
object from all sides. This definition is useful because it works well with the most
common of transparent media, air and water. Because we usually do not walk around
the transparent medium, however, and in the common case of window panes and
spectacles only ever look through the glass in two directions, I shall give a linear
account of transparency to illustrate the relations given above.
Because we cannot see things that directly touch our eyes there is always
something between us and the object we are looking at. We can draw a straight line
from us to the object we are looking at and call anything that is between us and that
object more or less transparent. This linear account gives a good image of what the
difference between a transparent, a reflective, and an opaque object is: A transparent
object such as a perfectly clear pane of glass lets my looks right through to the object
(or the object right through to me, depending on how you like your story to be told).
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The opaque object hinders any communication between me and the object I want to
see. The reflective object, however, does more than that: it reflects my own image back
to me (and the object's image back to the object), so that now I become the object ofmy
own vision. So, while both the reflective and the opaque medium eclipse the object
from my vision, only the reflective medium returns my vision to myself.
Opacity and reflection unite naturally in the case of reflective substances. All
metals, for instance, are more or less reflective and show their "true" colour only as
long as they are reflective. Unpolished metal may be green or black but never copper,
silver, or gold in colour, for the name of their colour is the same as the name for the
substance in its purest state.
2. Perceptual and Physical Transparency
In the following I shall argue that with exception of metals the properties of
transparency, reflection, opacity and whiteness are independent of the physical
properties of objects. I shall argue my case by first explaining the case of transparency,
and then transferring the arguments to the cases of reflectance, opacity and whiteness.
My argument develops in four stages:-
1. To perceive transparency is to perceive that something is transparent.
2. Empirical transparency is a matter of degree.
3. Physically, transparency is transmittance of light.
4. Physical transparency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the
perception of transparency.
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1. To perceive transparency is to perceive that something is transparent.
What would absolute transparency look like? Presumably it would be invisible
and not look like anything at all. Yet it would be something material. I believe that
Goethe gives a good picture of how to imagine transparency:
"The space, which we imagine to be empty, could well be taken by us to have the
property of transparency. If the space was now filled in such a way that our eyes would
not notice the filling, we would have some matter, a more or less material transparent
medium which could be a gas, liquid or solid."2
If perfect transparency such as this existed it would be invisible. This is also
expressed by Hegel when he calls transparency "homogenous neutrality" (Enc.§320),
for where everything is homogenous and neutral there can be no visibility because there
is nothing to see. In this sense transparency is a limit to our visual perception not unlike
the number zero as a limit to counting.
Goethe's filled space becomes visible when either it or the medium surrounding
it (most probably air) is of greater density or colour than the other. Thus transparency
becomes noticeable either as a gap in something less transparent (a window in a wall,
for instance) or as a neutral surrounding. Strictly speaking, transparency is therefore not
itself visible, but is noticeable only as the absence of something visible and is in this
sense neutral. Perceiving transparency in this sense is not seeing transparency: we
cannot perceive transparency but we can perceive that something is transparent.
2. Empirical Transparency is a matter of degree.
Paradoxically, however, even confirming that something is transparent by looking at it
is only possible if the transparent something is not perfectly transparent. This follows
from the above as, if it is true that the perfectly transparent is by definition invisible
then I do not detect anything by sight alone when I encounter something transparent -1
do not even detect that there is something transparent in front ofme. Were it possible to
i
~
"Der Raum, den wir uns leer denken, hatte durchaus fur uns die Eigenschaft der Durchsichtigkeit. Wenn sich
nun derselbe dergestalt fiillt, daC unser Auge die Ausfullung nicht gewahr wird, so ensteht ein materielles,
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perceive perfect transparency by sight alone, people would not run into glass doors.
When I look out of my own window, on the other hand, I can see the window pane -
not just because it needs to be cleaned but also because the glass is slightly uneven and
distorts some of the objects seen through the glass. Hence in this case I do see
something between me and the objects outside. The best empirical case of a perfectly
clear transparent object is the case of a crystal or of cut glass. Both are visible through
the various reflections and distortions of objects seen in and through the glass, which
make the glass itself visible.
Often when we speak of something transparent we do not mean something
merely clear but something coloured. Thus we speak of transparent colour filters, skin
or flower petals, and transparent, "see through", clothes. Some people distinguish
between transparent and translucent objects, meaning by a translucent object one
through which we can see the outline of another object but not its colour or its details.
Thus some philosophers might even argue that there can be no transparent white but
that there can be translucent white.3 As the difference between transparency and
translucency is one of degree, however, I cannot accept this as a good answer to the
puzzle. As a medium becomes less and less transparent it becomes more and more
opaque, and I find it unnecessary if not confusing to insert a third state of translucency
between the states of transparency and opacity.
I conclude that cases of seeing transparency are those cases in which the
transparent medium is not perfectly transparent but only more or less so.
"The transparent itself, when seen empirically, is already the first grade of turbidity.
The further grades of the turbid up to the non-transparent white are infinite."4
mehr oder weniger korperloses, durchsichtiges Mittel, das luft- und gasartig, fliissig oder auch fest sein kann."
(Fl. 145)
3
See for instance, Westphal, p. 13.
4
"Das Durchsichtige selbst, empirisch betrachtet, ist schon der erste Grad des Triiben. Die femeren Grade
des Triiben bis zum undurchsichtigen WeiBen sind unendlich."
Goethe, Fl.§ 148, also §178. See also Westphal (1987) "no transparent medium is transparent in the strictest
sense that it transmits all the light incident upon it", p. 14.
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2.3. Physically, transparency is transmittance of light.
The physical explanation of transparency is that a transparent object transmits most of
the light incident upon it while an opaque object reflects most of the light. Jonathan
Westphal gives an excellent account of the physical explanation of transparency as an
answer to the question why there can be no transparent white. He treats the question as
simple (pp. 19-20): A white surface scatters back or reflects nearly all the light incident
upon it while a transparent one transmits almost all the incident light. Since no physical
object can both transmit and reflect most of the incident light at the same time, there
can be no object that is at the same time transparent and white. Westphal thus makes a
connection between the physical and the phenomenal property of white objects even
though he admits that this is not a complete conception of whiteness (p. 19) and that it
would not suffice for a reductive account of whiteness (p.34). While I think that he is
right with regard to white objects I do not think that Westphal really answers
Wittgenstein's question, which, after all was not about objects but about white as a
colour.
2.4. Physical transparency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the
perception of transparency.
"It is not the same to say: the impression of white or grey comes into being under such
conditions (causally), and: it is an impression in a certain connection of colours and
shapes."5
That physical transparency is not sufficient for the perception of transparency is fairly
obvious: I do not perceive the transparency of my spectacles when I look through them,
nor do I perceive the transparency of the book foil around my book. To perceive the
transparency of a physically transparent object two conditions must be fulfilled: first, it
must have a visible edge which does not coincide with the edge of the background, and
secondly, there must be an object between the transparent medium and the background,
5
"Es ist nicht dasselbe, zu sagen: der Eindruck des Weissen oder Grauen kommt unter solchen
Bedingungen zustande (kausal), und: er ist ein Eindruck in einem bestimmten Zusammenhang von Farben und
Formen." (Wittgenstein, R.C.I, 51)
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which beyond the edge of the transparent medium is partially hidden or of a different
colour. If, for instance, I found myself in a large room with several windows all of
which showed a blue sky, but some of which were only painted blue, I would not be
able to tell the difference between them until I saw some object passing behind the real
windows. So I need to observe at least three levels of vision - the limited transparent
medium, some background, and another limited object - in order to perceive the
transparency of the medium (see illustrations below). This fact has been recognised by
most of the philosophers which I read. Thus Wittgenstein for instance:
"Transparency and mirror reflection only exist in the (dimension of) depth of the visual
field. The impression of a transparent medium is that something lies behind the
medium. A perfect uni-colourisation of the visual field cannot be transparent." 6
6
"Durchsichtigkeit und Spiegeln gibt es nur in der Tiefendimension eines Gesichtsfeldes. Der
Eindruck des durchsichtigen Mediums ist der, daB etwas hinter dem Medium liegt. Vollkommene
Einfarbigkeit des Gesichtsfeldes kann nicht durchsichtig sein." (RC 1,19; 111,148,172))
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More surprisingly perhaps, physical transparency of the medium is not even a
necessary condition for the perception of transparency. The visual arts show that
something can look transparent although it is painted with opaque colour pigments. But
it does not take an artist's subtle hand to show how this phenomenon works. Simple
illustrations suffice to demonstrate this point (see following pages).
Someone might object that these are cases of apparent transparency, and that
real transparency is still supervenient on or even identical with the transmission of
light. I agree with this distinction, but wish to stress that I am interested in the
conditions under which we perceive that something is transparent. (After all we do not
perceive transparency itself anyway, as that is invisible.) One might compare the
perception of something transparent with perceiving that Hamlet is mad. We use the
same criteria forjudging his madness as we would use for any real person, and the fact
that the actor is not mad is irrelevant (even if in other contexts, i.e. to answer different
questions, the difference between a stage play and real characters and events, is of
course important).
Thus in the case of the colour squares, it is not the physical properties of the
paper but the spatial relations of the colour shapes which determines whether we see
the middle section as a separate colour or as one of the colours seen through the
transparent shape of the other. Which of the two squares we see as transparent and
overlying the other one depends on the relative lightness of the middle section. If this
section is quite light it will be seen as part of the lighter of the two colours, if it is
relatively dark it will be seen as part of the darker one. Depending on the general
lightness of all the colours we furthermore perceive the effect of additive or subtractive
colour mixing (see Arnheim, pp.250-251). Surprisingly enough, this can also be
achieved if we choose black and white squares, so that in one sense at least we do see
transparent white. It is rules like these that Wittgenstein refers to when he writes:
"And this is not an axiom of physics but a rule for the spatial interpretation (Deutung)
of our field of vision. One could also say, it is a rule for a painter."7
7
"Das ist hier nicht ein Satz der Physik, sondern eine Regel der raumlichen Deutung unserer
Gesichtserfahrung. Man konnte auch sagen, es sei eine Regel fur den Maler." (R.C.m, 173)
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To see that physical transparency is not a necessary condition for the perception of
transparency, please compare the figures on these three pages. Here we see three colour
shapes of unequal size beside each other:
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These combinations can be seen either as two large squares with a small square
superimposed in the middle, or as two overlapping large squares one of which is
transparent.
Physical transparency is not necessary for the perception of transparency
Interestingly the same rule applies to black and white examples, so that we take either the
black or the white square to be transparent. This illusion is much like an Escher drawing or
the Muller-Lyer diagram in that we know that the white and the black shape cannot be
transparent but we yet see them this way.
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A simple abstraction shows the importance of shape in seeing transparency.
Unlikely colour combinations, however, override the effect caused by the combination of
shapes.
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2.5. Solving two of Wittgenstein's puzzles
Bearing in mind my explanation of transparency as an essentially spatial concept, let us
now have another look at Wittgenstein's puzzling about "the indeterminacy of colour
concepts": that there are no different names for opaque and transparent colours is one
puzzle, and the other is how we can compare the colour of a green piece of glass to that
of a green piece of cardboard.8
From the fact that transparency can only be perceived if we have three levels of
vision we know that there is indeed no way of distinguishing the colour of green glass
on a white surface from a green surface with a clear piece of glass on it. This is one of
the reasons why we do not need two words for each colour - one for transparent
appearances and one for opaque ones. For this would lead to a constant possibility of
error (mistaking the first case for the second and vice versa). And since we have no
difficulty in naming the colour of the green glass on the white piece of cardboard
"green", a splitting of one useful concept into two is unnecessary.
Furthermore, one could extend the puzzle to other spatial concepts to show how
superfluous the distinction into two concepts can be. Thus one might propose to have
two words for things seen from the front and things seen from the back, or one for birds
sitting or hopping and another for birds in flight. Especially if one also extended this
option to non-spatial concepts (sounds, for instance) one would soon arrive at an
infinite number of ways of splitting up concepts, which one had previously further
qualified and thus avoided confusion. If in doubt, we can simply say "transparent
green" (but if we talk about glasses we may assume their transparency and require no
further qualification), or "the shape of a bird in flight" (which again is unnecessary if
we are all looking up at the sky anyway).
A second reason for not having two separate words for transparent and opaque
colours is that transparency is a matter of degree. Thus it might be difficult to apply the
right word to borderline cases. To answer Wittgenstein's question (R.C.I, 18): Yes, a
transparent green glass can have the same colour as an opaque piece of paper.
8
See RC. I 17,18,19,24,46; m 147,181,182,242.
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Wittgenstein's second question as to what kind of glass has the same colour as a colour
sample on paper (R.C.I,24), is about colours that are blends of colours with white, such
as pink or violet. Would a slightly tinted red piece of glass on a white piece of paper
look the same shade of colour as a strongly painted pink on paper? The answer is no,
(try it out), but a clear piece of glass over a red piece of paper looks the same as a red
piece of glass (of the same shade of red) over a white sheet of paper.
Wittgenstein's question of how opaque pigments can represent a transparent
green glass in a painting (RC.1.18,24; 111,181) can now also be answered: We do not
require two sets of colour terms, one for colours on the palette and one for colours as
represented, because these are two frames of reference: We can quite literally take the
frame of the painting as one limit of reference so that the complex of opaque colour
dots or brush strokes can as easily make a certain shade of green glass appear in the
painting as they can represent a certain person. If, on the other hand, we look at the
painting with a magnifying glass we will find only opaque colour dots and no
transparent green glass. (Note how our language alone explains this puzzle: the subjects
(in the grammatical sense) to which we apply the predicates "transparent" or "opaque"
change when we look through the magnifying glass - we no longer look at the same
things.)
Similarly, the way in which we compare a green piece of glass to a green piece
of paper depends on the context: If we place both on top of a white piece of paper they
may be of the same colour, but if we hold them over a red surface the green
transparency will look almost black (for illustrations see next page). Please note that if
we hold them against a red light source, the green transparency still looks green
(provided the light is reasonably bright), but the piece of paper will look considerably
darker.
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Comparison of transparent and opaque examples of green
1. Although they have a different texture, the two squares below can be said to have the
same colour.
2. The green transparency is however perceived to be transparent once it is held over a
differently coloured surface.
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3. Whiteness and Transparency
Whiteness and transparency are related in several aspects: First of all, both transparency
and whiteness are ideal concepts. Wittgenstein, citing Lichtenberg, states that few
people have ever seen pure whiteness, so that the concept of pure whiteness could
hardly be abstracted from empirical phenomena but must rather be a constructed, ideal
concept. So, just as we hardly ever come across something perfectly transparent we
neither come across something perfectly white, and yet we understand the concepts
"perfect white" and "perfect transparency".9
This means that almost all of the cases which we call white are in fact slightly
or partially coloured. As I said in section one (1.5) transparency and whiteness are
related in that they both take on any other colour, and in that any colour they take on
makes them darker (provided of course that they are in a well lit environment).10 This
process can best be observed when a transparent and a white medium are mixed with
each other: the lightness of the mixture depends on the spatial relations between the
mixture, the light source and the perceiver. Thus a milky white liquid is lighter than a
completely white liquid if the light shines through it (we see the light through it), but it
is darker if we have the light on our side of the medium and see a dark background
through it. Accordingly the same liquid is darker than something purely transparent if
held against a light source, but lighter if held against a dark background. Hence any
mixture makes both transparent and white substances darker if they are viewed under
the circumstances in which they themselves appear lightest.
Finally, transparency is not a property of colour and hence non-transparency not
a property of whiteness.11 Rather, white and transparency are concepts within different
frameworks: Transparency is a concept which requires depth of the visual field and the
9
Wittgenstein, RC.I,3,5; m, 35,36,160.
10
This process of darkening extends as far as their conceptual opposites, opacity and black. In the
case of transparency, something white or yellow can be completely dark if, for instance, the only windows in a
room are painted with them (and they are perfectly opaque). From the outside of the room, however, the
individual window panes are as dark or light as the intrinsic lightness of each colour. Thus the darkening
process of transparency again depends on spatial relations.
11
See also Wittgenstein, RCI,45; 111,147.
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12visual interpretation of something as transparent, ~ whereas whiteness is a substance or
surface colour (causes lack of depth). Whiteness and transparency are thus not
incompatible in the way in which red and green are incompatible, but they refer to
different aspects of the visual world. They are thus comparable to length and volume:
while it makes sense to say that an object of a certain depth, width and length has less
volume than an object of the same depth and width but greater length, it does not make
sense to say that volume is a property of length. Similarly, a colour of a certain hue,
lightness and saturation will be less transparent than one of the same hue and lightness
but greater saturation, yet transparency is not a property of saturation and hence not
contrary to white in the sense in which black is contrary to white.13
White like transparency is thus absence of colour or not darkening light.14 A
purely white room should thus be just as bright as a space in an empty, hence
transparent, aquarium when lit in the same way (I may now speak of "purely white"
meaning "as pure as empirically possible" - just as the aquarium will of course only be
as transparent as empirically possible). That white is not as bright as light itself, can be
seen in falling snow: on the ground the snow, be it in light or shade, is the lightest
colour around us; but seen against even the relatively grey winter sky or against an
orange street-lamp the snowflakes are comparatively dark. While this is due to their
own shadow it yet shows that lights are always brighter than surface colours (and white
is only the brightest colour within the group of surface colours).15 So it seems that
transparency is a potential material basis for the lightest colour in space, just as
whiteness is the lightest colour on a surface.
12
See Wittgenstein, RC 1,19; 111,150
13
Please note that "saturation" is defined as "free from an addmixture of white" (Concise Oxford
Dictionary, 1990).
14
This is hinted at in Wittgenstein (RC,I,30); see also Westphal, pp.21,26,32.
15
See also section 4 on the mixing of white.
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"White as substance colour ... is lighter than any other substance colour... Here
colour is darkening, and if it is withdrawn from the substance there remains whiteness,
and this is why we cannot call it colourlessness."16
The only case of true colourlessness is transparency, because we also have to withdraw
whiteness from transparent material such as glass in order to obtain transparency, and
this is a significant step: together with the whiteness of an otherwise colourless material
we lose all visible substance. For we are left with transparency, which, as I argued
above, could be a gas, liquid or solid - in other words, it could be anything whatsoever
and in this sense is not a substance.
"Ideal whiteness is the theoretical limit of the process which gives substances their
colour. Chromatically coloured objects change both the quantity and the colour of light.
White objects do neither. In this respect they are comparable to transparent objects." 7
Finally, the idea of a perfect white is also aesthetically linked to the perfection
of transparency. For Goethe
"The perfected turbidity is whiteness, the most equal, the lightest, first non-transparent
filling of space."18
"Pure water crystallised as snow appears white, as the transparency of the individual
parts do not create a transparent whole ... One could call the contingently non-
transparent state of the pure transparent "white", just as a crushed glass appears as a
white powder."19
It thus seems that the aesthetic difference between whiteness and transparency
is one of natural order, and that in the evaluation of natural order Goethe judges that
16
"Weiss als Stoffarbe ...ist heller als jede andere Stoffarbe..Hier ist die Farbe eine Verdunkelung,
und ist dem Stoff jede solche entzogen, so bleibt Weiss, und darum kann man es nicht farblos nennen."
(RC,I,52).
See also Schopenhauer (S&F,§2): although white is softer and more luminous than light, white too causes




"Die vollendete Triibe ist das Weisse, die gleichgiiltigste, hellste, erste undurchsichtige Raumerfiillung."
(F1.147 - please ignore for now that I treat white as a surface colour)
19
"Reines Wasser zu Schnee kristallisiert erscheint weiB, indem die Durchsichtigkeit der einzelnen Teile
kein durchsichtiges Ganzes macht....Man konnte den zufallig undurchsichtigen Zustand des rein
Durchsichtigen Weiss nennen, so wie ein zermalmtes Glas als ein weisses Pulver erscheint." (Fl,495)
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"Transparent bodies are on the highest level of inorganic matter. The nearest next level
is pure turbidity, and whiteness can be seen as perfected pure turbidity."20
As ideal concepts transparency and whiteness were treated with reverence by German
idealists. It is not always easy to tell whether they write metaphorically or literally about
these concepts (after all, the crystal was one of the main symbols in Romantic art).
Although not an idealist himself, Goethe can take some of the responsibility for the
more mysterious though often also more beautiful passages in the writings of Hegel and
Schelling. Leaving poetic connotations aside, Hegel understands the phenomenon of
transparency very well. He calls it the "first determinedness" ("erste Bestimmung") of
any physical object in-itself (an sich). The idea is that a physical object, in order to be
an object, must first have something which itself is undetermined but to which the other
properties of the object may belong. Transparency might be considered as something
like the tabula rasa of visibility. To make it visible we need at least a difference in
specific weight, i.e. density between two objects: Differences in density leading to
reflections and refractions are, according to Hegel, properties of the for-itself (fur sich).
So the first determination of an object for-itself is weight, and weight leads to the
particularisation of visibility as it enables us to distinguish between different objects:
"What is essential is that a medium is only transparency as such, and that only
the relation between two media of different specific weight will be the affecting
[power] for a particularisation of visibility, - a determination which at the same time is
merely taken to determine the place, i.e. by purely abstract density. A relation of media
only effectively (=affectingly) takes place, when one is set in the other - namely just as
visible - as visual space. This other medium gets, so to say, infected by the immaterial
density of the one set within it, so that it shows the visual space of the picture within it
as the limitation, which it itself (the medium) suffers and thus limits."21
I interpret this passage to mean the following: When we think of air we usually
think of it as being more or less everywhere. Only when another medium, say water,
20
"Duchsichtige Korper stehen auf der hochsten Stufe unorganischer Materialitat. Zunachst daran fiigt sich
die reine Triibe, und das WeiBe kann als die vollendete reine Triibe angesehen werden." (F1.494, also F1.496).
17 "Worauf es ankommt, ist, daB ein Medium nur schlechthin Durchsichtiges iiberhaupt ist, und erst
das Verhaltnis zweier Medien von verschiedener spezifischer Schwere das Wirksame wird fiir eine
Partikularisation der Sichtbarkeit, - eine Determination, die zugleich nur ortsbestimmend, d.h. durch die ganz
abstrakte Dichtigkeit gesetzt ist. Ein Verhaltnis der Medien als wirksam findet....allein statt, indem das eine in
dem Anderen - namlich hier nur als Sichtbares - als Sehraum gesetzt ist. Dieses andere Medium wird von der
immateriallen Dichtigkeit des darin gesetzten sozusagen infiziert, so dass es in ihm den Sehraum des Bildes
nach der Beschrankung zeigt, die es selbst (das Medium) erleidet und ihn damit beschrankt." (Hegel,
Enc.§318)
Goethe too speaks of inner pressure making glass more turbid than it would otherwise be (F1.452).
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comes into contact with air do we find air to have a boundary. It is this limiting
boundary between air and water, where the density of the water does not allow the air
to enter it, which makes both visible - the least we will see is the boundary itself which
shows us that there are two individual substances. According to Hegel, and in true
Romantic tradition, this process is internalised in the crystal.22 Even the clearest crystal
is always visible because of the boundaries within it. The beauty of crystals did not just
fascinate the German Romantics. Wittgenstein too writes that the highest simplicity of
an a priori order of the world must not be turbid or insecure - "It must rather be of the
purest crystal" (PI.97). He emphasises not just the transparency but also the symmetry
of crystals, which is naturally impressive because of the crystal's transparency which
shows its inner and outer perfection. The crystalline perfection through and through is
therefore a kind of mathematical perfection which is immediately apparent to the
observer: "Remember that one can sometimes be convinced of the truth of an opinion
merely by its simplicity or symmetry..." 23. It is only when one questions the crystalline
perfection philosophically that one introduces turbidity ("philosophische Triibe",
Verm.Bem. (C&V), p.530).24
22
Goethe observed that glasses which are empirically as transparent as possible are still slightly
turbid through their inner pressure. (F1.452).
23
"Bedenke. daB man von der Richtigkeit einer Anschauung manchmal durch ihre Einfachheit oder
Symmetric uberzeugt wird." (On Certaintyi92)
See also Verm.Bern.(C&V) p.509 where Wittgenstein compares the mathematician's admiration of a
theorem to that of a crystal.
24
Wittgenstein does not use the metaphor of the crystal consistently, however: whereas most of the
time he seems to admire the crystal in the Romantic tradition as something to aim for (and something he
presumably aimed for himself in the Tractatus), he also sees the danger of this approach to philosophy: An
order as pure as a crystal is a prescription, even a prejudice, of the world, and too pure and icy to yield valuable
results (PI. 107).
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4. The Mixing of White
Possibly the most sensitive issue arising from Goethe's Farbenlehre is whether light is
simple, as Goethe claims, or whether it consists of coloured rays. Related to this is the
question whether the colour white can be mixed from other colours. This question is
more clearly understood nowadays as philosophers and scientists have become aware
of the distinction between additive and subtractive colour mixing. In this section I shall
first look at the defence of white as necessarily unmixed, and then show in what sense
we nevertheless can speak of mixing two or more colours to yield white.
4.1. Defence of white as unmixed: Goethe and Wittgenstein
Visually, white does not appear to consist of other colours, in the way in which orange,
for instance, appears to consist of red and yellow. But that in itself does not prove that
there could not be a white mixed of other colours - for objects too may appear to be
made of one piece of material ("aus einem GuB") but reveal several parts at closer
examination. As we shall see, the argument about the mixing of white hinges on
whether the object of such close examination is the same as that of first appearance.
Thus it is undoubtably true that so-called "white" light can consist of an infinite number
of combinations of light of various wavelengths. And it is also true that the spectrum
correlates each of these wavelengths with a particular colour. But it does not follow that
"wavelength X" and "colour Y" are the same in every respect. So if we assume that
Newton's theory is correct in some contexts (namely those where wavelengths are
treated as identical to colours), then the defence of white as unmixed must take place in
a different context where this is not the case, such as the conceptual context of everyday
language. In this latter context, Goethe and Wittgenstein argue convincingly that white
cannot be mixed of other colours. They thus prove wrong Newton's claim that white
consist of seven (or however many) colours, not that white cannot be produced by
mixing lights of various wavelengths. Their argument runs as follows:25
25
Wittgenstein R.C.I,72; 131,126; Goethe Fl.556-9
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1. White is by definition the lightest colour.
2. Any colour other than white contains some dark quality
(skieron).
3. The mixture of colours is the addition of their qualities.
4. Hence, any mixture containing a colour with dark qualities (ie. a mixture of colours
other than white) includes some element of darkness, and therefore is not white (see
premiss one).26
As we shall see, we can more or less keep the three premisses of this argument
without accepting the conclusion, but first I shall look at the argument as it stands. That
white is by definition the lightest colour I accept without further argument. But this
need not imply that white is simple. Wittgenstein points out a linguistic reason for the
simplicity of white (mixed colours can be described by their additives, but white
cannot: thus lilac might be said to be a whitish-reddish-blue, but white cannot be said to
be a yellowish-reddish-blue (RC.I,72; 111,126)). While Wittgenstein is right about this,
his example also applies to the primary colours red, blue and yellow, (and green) which
cannot be described as mixtures or combinations either.27 There appear to be two issues
involved here: one, that white, black and the primary colours are by definition simple,
and the other that the lightest colour cannot include dark qualities. The first claim is
true a priori, but the second claim needs further clarification of the concept of inclusion
involved (conceptual, physical, physiological etc.).
The argument whether white can be a mixed colour rests on the notions of
mixture and inclusion but also on the ontology of colour: If we take a naively realist
position then, as white is phenomenologically simple, it must really be simple. This is
Goethe's position if we leave aside his religious attitude of white as representative of
Light/Truth/God (which qua belief in one unified God demands that light and white too
are unified).
~6
See also Goethe, F1.556: "All colours mixed together retain their general characteristics as skieron,
and as they are no longer seen side by side [but mixed together] there is no sensation of totality, no harmony,
and thus grey comes into being." - "Samtliche Farben zusammengemischt behalten ihren allgemeinen
Charakter als skiera ,und da sie nicht mehr nebeneinander gesehen werden, wird keine Totalitat, keine
Harmonie empfunden, und so entsteht das Grau, das, wie die sichtbare Farbe, immer etwas dunkler als WeiB
und immer etwas heller als Schwarz erscheint."
Also, mixed colours transfer their darkness to the mixture: "Die zusammengemischten Farben tragen ihr
Dunkles in die Mischung liber." (F1.559)
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Wittgenstein's emphasis on linguistic convention does not make ontological
claims but comes to the same result: If we determine the nature of white within a
particular language game, and if this language game prescribes white to be the lightest
colour, then white qua lightest colour cannot contain darkness, since the conceptual
polarity between light and darkness (which I assume to be part of the language game)
demands that the lightest colour contain no dark. (If an empirically white object
contains dark patches, such as most white things do, we call these things "off-white", or
"cream" and thus acknowledge that they are not "pure" or "brilliant white".)
Wittgenstein's statement that experiments with the spectrum can neither assert nor
falsify that white is simple therefore follows, as experiments with the spectrum use a
different concept ofwhite in the first place (R.C.I,72; 111,126).
The only context in which it makes sense to question the simplicity of white is
one in which we assume that the reality of whiteness is something other than what it
appears to be - be it a physiological process, invisible particles, wavelengths or
whatever else is itself invisible. Before I discuss these other contexts, however, I shall
have a brief look at a Goethean phenomenological argument (though not explicitly
28
expressed by Goethe).
For Goethe white in nature cannot be a mixed colour. Just as any milky liquid
through which we see other colours will take on shades of these other colours and
therefore not be white in the same patches in which it is transparent, any mixture of
opaque colours will not be white in those parts in which it is any other colour than
white. Thus a clear crimson in a mixture with blue is no longer crimson, yellow in a
mixture with red is no longer yellow, and white in a mixture with green is no longer
white. But while many mixtures of colours may be difficult to name or to recognise for
a second time, we can always be sure that it is not white because anything that looks
even slightly dark is not white (and even completely colour-blind people can recognise
that it is not white).
27
See also ch.VHI on primary colours.
28
Goethe of course wanted to prove Newton wrong on his own territory rather than give a purely
phenomenological or conceptual analysis. As I showed in chapter HI (sect.3.3) Newton's conclusion that light
consisted of colours, so that colours could be mixed to yield white, is not the only possible conclusion to be
drawn from the facts involved in the experiment. (See also Sepper (1988, ch.3) who gives a detailed analysis of
Newton's and Goethe's experiments regarding the mixing of white.)
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I conclude that white is conceptually simple and ideal ("the lightest colour"), a
conclusion supported by the phenomenological qualities of white. This does not imply
that white cannot physically or physiologically consist of other colours.
4.2. Questioning the second premiss: "Any colour other than white contains some dark
quality".
We can supplement premiss two by adding that any colour other than black and white
contains both some dark and some light qualities. While I am on Goethe's side for most
of the argument, because light and white are phenomenologically as well as
conceptually simple, and because it is hard to understand how we could mix several
dark colours to obtain a lighter colour, this only applies to material colours (or what I
call objective colours).
Coloured lights, on the other hand, may not be as light as so called white lights
of the same strength, but they are still qua lights lighter than their surroundings. Thus a
red light (seen close by) is brighter than a piece of white paper seen at the same
distance. Accepting premiss three, that the mixing of colours is the mixing of their
qualities, it is possible to understand the mixing of coloured lights as addition of light
rather than of darkness. Should we be able to add enough coloured lights to get a bright
dazzling effect, we may get light itself or its material representative white. So, by
keeping my premisses from above and shifting the emphasis of premiss two I can argue
that in order to produce the lightest colour I just need to mix the light qualities of each
colour and leave out the dark qualities. How this can be done is first shown by
Schopenhauer (see 4.4).
4.3. Premiss three: "The mixing of colours is the addition of their qualities"
Before I discuss Schopenhauer's solution to the mixing of white I should like to discard
an obvious objection to premiss three: Wittgenstein draws attention to the fact that
black and white are special cases for the mixing of colours because they alone mix with
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all other colours as well as with each other (R.C.IU,85). When it comes to the mixing of
white they thus form a simple linear formula in which the mixture gets lighter (i.e.
closer to white) the more white is mixed in. Similarly, red mixed with blue will yield a
mixture with both reddish and bluish qualities and the more red we add the redder the
mixture will be. When we mix red with green, however, the mixture will not have both
reddish and greenish qualities. So it seems that hue - unlike darkness - is not a quality
that can be mixed in a simple process of addition. As I shall show in my next chapter
this is due to the fact that hue can best be understood by reference to a two-dimensional
representation, such as hue circle, triangle or square. In any of these, complementary
colours lie exactly opposite each other. If the addition of hue qualities is represented by
vectors, a reddish yellow will form a vector between red and yellow but more in the
direction of yellow, while a yellowish-red will lie in the same segment but closer to red.
Complementary colours will by definition pull in opposite directions and thus cancel
each other out to yield a neutral grey or white (depending on the mixing process applied
- see below).
4.4. Schopenhauer's solution
Schopenhauer devotes a whole chapter on the production of white from colours (§10)
and introduces an important distinction. Because Schopenhauer equates colour with the
activity of our eyes and brains, he distinguishes between the external causes of colour
and their effects on our eyes. Regarding the effect alone, which in true Idealist tradition
is what we start with, the possibility of the production of white is given by
Schopenhauer's theory of colour itself: as every colour is partial activity of the retina,
and only white is full activity of the retina, the white-effect can be caused by anything
that causes full activity of the retina. As each colour is a particular partition of the retina
we can attain full activity of the retina by adding its complementary colour. But while
the argument is clear and simple once the premisses are accepted, Schopenhauer is well
aware that
"Only the experiment of producing white from physical, or even from chemical,
colours can produce real conviction; but here there is a special difficulty. If we want to
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remain within these colours, then we have actually passed from the colours to their
m29
causes,...
Schopenhauer wants to remain within the effects, for
"In consequence of our theory, the production of white from two colours rests simply
and solely on a physiological ground...".30 So, "...these two colours must be fully and
actually united on the retina itself for the production of white, so that the two separated
halves of the retina's activity are stimulated simultaneously, producing its full activity,
white."31 "But this can happen only by the two external causes, each of which excites in
the eye the complementary colour of the other, acting at once simultaneously and yet
separately on one and the same spot of the retina."32
After Schopenhauer has a priori established the conditions under which white
can be produced from other colours, he can see why Goethe failed in his attempts to
produce white: Goethe and his followers mixed colour pigments and triumphantly
pointed to the dirty grey they had produced, believing to have thus refuted Newton's
theory. When colour pigments or other chemical colours are mixed, however, they add
simultaneously but not separately on the eye: thus not only their lightness values but
also their darkness values are added. The dark qualities of colour are, however, their
material causes which produce an unattractive "oyster grey" (Hegel), a "caput
mortuum" (Schopenhauer), which is the dead material once the liveliness of the
individual colours is lost.
Schopenhauer thus points to an essential distinction: Since it is the material, turbid,
skieron aspect of colour that causes the dirty grey, the production of white requires
clear colours that are as little turbid or material as possible.
29
"Eigentliche Uberzeugung kann nur das Experiment der Herstellung des WeiBen aus physischen oder gar
aus chemischen Farben bewriken. Hier ist man aber immer einer besondem Schwierigkeit unterworfen. Wenn
wir namlich uns an diese Farben halten wollen, so sind wir eigentlich von der Farbe abgegangen zu der
Ursache,..." (S&F §10, p.243; Payne, pp.41-42).
30
"Die Herstellung des WeiBen aus zwei Farben beruht unserer Theorie zufolge einzig und allein auf
physiologischem Grunde..." (ibid)
31
"Solche zwei Farben mtissen zur Herstellung des WeiBen aus ihnen ganz eigentlich wieder vereinigt
werden, und zwar auf der Retina selbst, also dadurch, daB die beiden gesonderten Halften der Tatigkeit dieser
zugleich angeregt werden, wodurch dann ihre voile Tatigkeit, das WeiBe sich herstellt." (S&F, p.243-244,
Payne, p.42)
39
"Dies kann aber nur dadurch geschehn, daB die zwei auBern Ursachen, jede von welchen im Auge die
Ergiinzungsfarbe der andem erregt, einmal zugleich und doch gesondert auf eine und dieselbe Stelle der Retina
wirken." (ibid)
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"In chemical colours, therefore, by reason of their material nature, the production of
white from a pair of colours will possibly never be demonstrated, unless some special
modifications supervene."
For the production of white we therefore need to find a way of adding the
colours alone without their material skieron aspect. This cannot be achieved by making
the colours as light as possible (a popular misunderstanding of the nature of additive
colour mixing), for if we take three coloured lights, for instance, we find that:
"Now just as each of these three skieron is visible in each of the three colours,
despite the light that is combined with it, so the whole cannot gain in brightness by
three such skiera being united together with their three rays of light... Thus it is not the
increased illumination, which is balanced by the increased shade or darkness, but the
contrast of the colours that here produces the impression of pure light, or of white."34
So what happens according to Schopenhauer is that as each external cause of
colour produces its complementary in our eyes, light colours produce dark effects so
that their mixing - in order to yield white - is unsuccessful. If we, however, take truly
complementary colours and ensure that they meet our eyes simultaneously without
being themselves mixed, then one of the colours will produce its complementary in the
eye, and the other colour the opposite complementary, so that in the end we get one
whole, full activity of the retina, which is light, or white. Schopenhauer stresses again:
"This happens only when things are so arranged that both the external, exciting causes
of the two complementary colours operate simultaneously on the same spot of the
retina, without themselves being directly blended."35
What I find fascinating about Schopenhauer's account is that he does not rest with
the standard experiments of coloured shadows on white paper produced by several
coloured light sources (or in his case light shining through various parts of prisms), but
goes on to investigate more unusual cases. It is particularly interesting in the context of
33
"Zunachst kann es nicht dadurch geschehn, daB man zwei chemische Farben zusammenmischt: denn diese
wirken alsdann zwar im Verein. aber nicht gesondert." (ibid)
34
"Wie nun jedes dieser drci skiera fur sich , des mit ihm verbundenen Lichtes ungeachtet, doch in jeder
einzelnen der drei Farben sichtbar ist, so kann dadurch, daB drei solche skiera mitsamt ihren drei Lichtern
vereinigt werden, das Gan/e nicht an Helle gewinnen... Nicht die vermehrte Erleuchtung also, die durch das
vermehrte Dunkel aufgehobcn wird, sondern der Gegensatz der Farben ist es, der hier den Eindruck des reinen
Lichts oder des WeiBen herstellt." (S&F, p.245; Payne, p.43)
35
sobald man es nur anzustellen weiB, daB die beiden aufiem erregenden Ursachen zweier
Erganzungsfarben, ohne sich selbst direkt zu vermischen, zugleich auf dieselbe Stelle der Retina wirken."
(S&F, p.248; Payne, p.45)
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this chapter that Schopenhauer even succeeds in the mixture of chemical colours,
provided that at least one of them is transparent or reflective. The examples
Schopenhauer gives are: light falling through orange glass onto a blue mirror, a gold
coin in a blue glass bowl, blue paper reflected by polished copper, a (presumably red)
rose illuminated by light falling through green curtains, and overlapping reflections of
red and green in a mirror. I tried out several of these experiments myself, and must
agree with Schopenhauer that "In all these experiments, however, the two colours must
be of equal energy and purity". Thus in many of the experiments one colour will
dominate over the other, and in my case the green light from the garden influenced the
experiments too. Additionally, our eyes are spoilt by the bright colours around us, and
some of the effects are weaker than one might expect. In principle, however,
Schopenhauer has found a reliable rule of how to produce white.
Before I conclude on the mixing of white, I should like to briefly explain the
role of reflection and transparency in Schopenhauer's experiments. As I argued above,
transparency and reflection are neutral media of light. So the success of Schopenhauer's
experiments can be explained by the standard explanation of additive colour mixture
which uses two coloured light sources. As each of the light sources can be regarded as a
white light source with a colour filter in front of it, so too can a coloured transparent or
reflected medium be regarded as a light source with a colour filter. This is further
illuminated by Schopenhauer's last example of the production of "white glass": In
Schopenhauer's times as today, glass was naturally slightly green due to its containing
iron. For the production of colourless clear ("white") glass, some reddish brown
material has to be added. Although one might say that due to their transparent nature
each of the coloured glass so to say contains a light source within itself so that they are
like one reddish brown and one green filter each with a light source behind them
shining onto the same patch of white paper, I must admit that this does not convince me
as the glass does seem to be a mixture of the two colours, so that they do not act
separately on our retina. Nevertheless I think that Schopenhauer has successfully
proven the production ofwhite from other colours to be possible.
36
"Bei alien diesen Versuchen miissen jedoch die beiden Farben von gleicher Energie und gleicher Reinheit
sein." (S&F, p.247; Payne, p.45)
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While it may seem puzzling that Schopenhauer remains in opposition to
Newton although both proved that white could be produced from other colours, this
puzzle is resolved when one remembers that for Newton the mixture is objective and
for Schopenhauer it is subjective. Thus Schopenhauer can remain true to his belief that
light is pure and indivisible, because for him all colours (including white) are effects on
our eyes/brains, and hence their mixing takes place in our heads. This means that the
nature of light itself is not affected by any mixture and nor is anything proven about the
nature of light by showing that we as human beings represent certain combinations of
coloured objects and lights as white. Schopenhauer can therefore continue to argue that




What remains is a mere clarification of concepts, for which I shall have another look at
my original premisses:
1. "White is by definition the lightest colour."
I trust this to be undeniably true.
2. "Any colour other than white contains some dark quality (skieron)."
This premiss needs to be extended: Any colour includes dark and light qualities, as well
as the hue particular to that colour. Only if we include hue, can we reach
Schopenhauer's solution involving not only lightness complementaries but also hue
complementaries.37
3. "The mixture of colours is the addition of their qualities."
This premiss can be accepted as it is. The result of the colour mixture depends on the
kind of addition used: thus two colours can be added simultaneously or successively,
and they can meet different parts or the same part of the retina. Only the simultaneous
mixture on the retina of two as such separate colours yields white, as only this kind of
addition produces complementray colours simultaneously. Other kinds of colour
mixture have a weakening effect on the saturation of the original colour in the mixture,
and thus bring out only their material participation in light and dark which, after several
additional mixtures, naturally averages into a grey.
4. "Hence any mixture containing a colour with dark qualities contains some
element of darkness and is therefore not white."
This, as we have seen does not follow, and I must stress once more why the conclusion
does not follow: If we distinguish between cause and effect then any quality of a cause
is not necessarily also a quality of its effect, even if we assume that it has some effect.
In this case, the relative darkness of the colour does matter, but only in so far as its
complementary colour must not only be complementary in hue but also in brightness
and lightness. Perhaps this is best illustrated by using the image of weighing scales: If
37
Schopenhauer's own theory does not require the consideration of hue, as it rests on lightness
alone. But this explanation is neither sufficient as an explanation of colour (see ch.HI, sect.2.1) nor with regard
to the mixing of white. Schopenhauer's own examples show that he would not mix blue (1/3) with greenish-
yellow (2/3), or orange (2/3) with redish-purple (1/3), but that he only considers genuine complementaries.
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there are two equal weights of, for instance, one pound on each side of the scales then
the total weight of the scales has increased by two pounds (resulting in the heavy
material effect that Goethe and Wittgenstein concentrate on). Yet the scales are in
balance, and in a sense, show no weight at all (they yield Schopenhauer's white).
The arguments about the mixing of white show that we need to be careful when
we use phrases such as "the colour contains dark elements". This phrase is misleading
unless one explains whether the kind of containment referred to is material (yielding a
grey two pounds) or is conceptual, leaving the possibility of white equilibrium or grey
mass, depending on the equivalent concept of whiteness.
A second conclusion I draw from this chapter is that the possibility of mixing
white from two as obviously non white objects as a blue glass and a gold coin, is very
much like the production of a transparent surface with three pieces of coloured card
board: In both cases, provided the conditions are carefully obeyed, an ideal can be
produced by something obviously material.
5. Opacity and Reflection, Black and Grey
5.1. Reflection
a) Ideal reflection
Reflection as the ideal opposite of transparency can be explained in the following way:
When I look at an object through a clear pane of glass I see the object right in front of
me. But if I swap the clear glass for a mirror I can no longer see the object but instead
see myself. I thus become an object of my own vision. Thus reflection changes the
object into a subject: I can see myself being looked at by myself, and the peculiarity of
looking into a mirror might stem from the fact that I cannot move the limbs of the
mirror image as well as I can move my own, so that the image in the mirror is like me
and not like me at the same time. It is I, both as subject and as object.
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As I explained in my chapter on light, Hegel uses this relation of reflection as a
special form of identity. Light is the unity of reflection-in-itself, and hence reflections
of light can also be subjects of light: when a light is reflected in a mirror it makes the
mirror into a light source itself. Hence the blinding effects a reflective surface can have:
snow and water reflect the sun so strongly that people need to wear sun glasses, and our
own car mirrors can blind us if the car behind us has strong and ill adjusted lights. Thus
without further information it is impossible to distinguish a mirror from a true light
source.
With the exception of light (which is unity itself) unity between subject and
object cannot be achieved in reflection; but just as light propagates itself in reflection
(Enc.§276), so do images (we all know the fascinating effect of infinite reflections in
two or more mirrors). Ideally at least, when the mirror is perfectly clear, this
propagation does not effect the quality of the colours but only spatial relations and in
particular the sizes of images.38
b) Emprirical Reflection
Empirically, reflection is a matter of degree. Thus there are the clear reflections of
polished mirrors, the weaker reflections of non-polished or even blind mirrors, metals
and at last non-reflective matt surfaces. One might argue that there are states of
glossiness or shininess between perfect reflection and non-reflection, yet similarly to
the case of translucency as a state between transparency and opacity, I do not find these
concepts very helpful. We do of course use them in our language, but it is the ideal
concepts that carry the weight. If you had to explain the word "glossy" to a foreigner,
you would probably say that something glossy was something slightly reflective. (Note
how glossy paint often seems to have a shiny transparent layer on the surface). The
other way round, however, you would hardly use the word "glossy" to explain
reflection, but might instead give spatial explanations.
38
Note also that many magicians use mirrors for spatial illusions.
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c) Perceptual and Physical Reflection
As in the case of transparency, reflection too can be perceived without there being a
physically reflective object. A physically reflective object can be defined (albeit it in a
rather circular fashion) as an object that by its surface structure reflects most of the light
incident upon it in a directional reflection (as opposed to the diffuse reflection of white
objects). The chemical-physical surface structure is however not sufficient to enable us
to see reflections. More important is the viewing angle at which we look at the surface.
This is most obvious in the case of windows and other transparent media which are
only reflective at certain angles. This is so because in directional reflection the viewing
angle is the same as the reflection angle. Thus the reflective surface may be reflective to
another viewer (who might even see my reflection in the glass as I desperately try to
catch it myself), but not to myself and vice versa.
The second condition for a surface to be reflective is that some light must shine
on it. This is not just for the obvious reason that we would not see it in utter darkness
but because reflection as such requires light. We might go as far as to say that it
produces light by reflection. Thus especially on a dark surface we will see the light
reflections such as my gold rimmed spectacles and my blond hair easily, while my wine
jumper looks rather dull.
As in the case of transparency, physical reflection is not a necessary condition
for the seeing of reflection. Not only are there perfectly non-reflective (dull) patches of
paint that represent reflections in paintings but even a black and white drawing can give
the illusion of a reflection. This is so because reflection like transparency is essentially
a spatial concept. That reflectance is primarily a spatial concept can also be seen in the
difference between correct and incorrect representations of reflections in paintings.
Artists can use our knowledge of the rules of reflection to deliberately show us a




1. The reflection of light points to the location of the lightsource:
2. Mirror reflections
a) Mirror reflections need not be perfect to be convincing:
-71
b) But representations ofmirror reflections must include at least part of the original object
of reflection to avoid confusion with a window. Here we again see that reflectance and
transparency are opposites: in the drawing of the girl above we can see her as either




In contrast to transparency and reflection there is no such thing as ideal opacity.
Opacity is a very earthy and dull thing, very much like clay. It carries none of the clarity
and beauty of reflection or transparency and it seems more like a foundation than like
something to aspire to. As I said above, opacity is essentially a surface concept. While
there can be opaque clouds and wafts of smoke or fog these are transparent when
looked at (or rather, looked through) close by. Like transparency, opacity can take on
any colour, but unlike transparency this will not make the opaque medium any less
opaque. Opacity is thus the third and probably most common form of neutrality, both in
the sense of occurring most frequently, and in the sense of "base".
Boringly therefore, opacity is everything that the others are not: it introduces
earthly turbidity into divine clarity by being a physical property of objects which we
cannot clearly see through and which are not (necessarily) reflective. Thus it is
whatever is left once transparency and reflection are removed: non-polished glass for
instance is neither reflective nor transparent but opaque. Opacity is in this sense the
material that is left over when we look at the examples I gave of dull opaque surfaces
which looked brightly reflective or subtly transparent in certain conditions. Opacity is
also very much like the oyster grey left over once colours have lost their lightness in a
mixture.
As the material basis for everything visible, the only way opacity can gain
beauty is by being beautifully coloured or representing something beautifully coloured.
In fact there is no non-coloured surface, of course, but the point is that just like a
transparent space, an opaque surface can take on any colour. Depending on the intrinsic
lightness of the colour applied to it any opaque surface will become lighter or darker
than it was before, a process most frequently observed when an object is being painted.
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5.3. Black and Grey
a) The Polarity between black and white
Black as the opposite to white represents darkness. It too is ideal in the sense that we
will never see the ideal, the deepest black. Where white reflects light, black is said to
"swallow" light. This points to an important phenomenological difference between the
two colours: while whiteness is more like a surface, blackness appears as depth. This
phenomenon is most obviously observed when looking at fog at night. Fog at night
appears as the deepest blackness, so thick that you seem to be able to hold some of it in
your hand (think of all the marvellous descriptions in Dickens's novels), but as soon as
you shine a light at it, it is suddenly very close, and more like a wall than like volume.
b) Grey between Black and White
Grey plays the sad role between black and white that opacity plays between
transparency and reflection: All empirical whites and blacks are more or less grey, just
as all empirical transparencies and reflections have some degree of opacity. Also, of
any two shades of grey, given the right conditions of contrast, one may look clearly
white, the other clearly black. A relatively light grey looks black on television, for
instance. When one looks at a switched-off television set its screen is light grey. But
because the television picture consists of lights the representation of black in films is
mere absence of light: the same areas that looked grey when the set was switched off
appear the darkest black when it is switched on. On the other hand, a shade of grey can
also look white when seen in the context of lots of darker greys (see illustrations next
page).
39
Whichever sample of black one looks at it will always look bluish, greyish or brownish beside
another shade of black.
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Black, White and Grey
1. The monochrome scale
2. If you cover this page with the exception of the left square below you will see a white
square on a black square; similarly the right example looks like a black square on a white
square.
194
3. This effect which surrounding lightness has on the lightness seen can also be
demonstrated by showing two equal grey squares once on a white and once on a black
square, or two unequal grey shades on the same backgrounds which then look the same
shade of grey. (Again, please look at each of these examples separately.)
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6. Conclusion: Four Forms ofNeutrality
In this chapter I hope to have shown that transparency and reflection are ideally neutral,
while opacity and the grey shades are empirically neutral. Let me just summarise these
relations once more:
Transparency and reflectance are ideal opposites. Their empirical
representations such as crystals and mirrors always carry a degree of turbidity. As
strongest turbidity is opacity, opacity is the empirical opposite of both transparency and
of reflectance.
White and black are also ideal opposites, which are approximated by white and
black colour pigments. Empirically there is an infinite number of grey shades between
black and white. That there is no empirically perfect black, white or grey can be seen in
the fact that direct comparisons between shades of black, grey and white respectively,
make some of them look bluish and others yellowish (reddish and greenish tints occur
more seldom).
All of these concepts are neutral in the sense that they can take on any colour:
there are coloured transparent media, colour reflections and opaque colours which can
be painted on white, grey and black foundations. By definition, colours darken white
and lighten up black, but they can do either to grey depending on the relative lightness
of the grey shade.
If we conceive of light as a perfect unit we might say that
1. Ideally,
- it travels unchanged through a transparent medium;
- it is reflected unchanged in a reflective medium;
- it is brought to a halt by an opaque surface.




- both transparent and reflective media are at least slightly turbid/opaque, so that some
of
the light is stopped on its way (the resulting less perfect states are "translucent" or
"glossy").
- white and black are the material representations of light and darkness; were they
perfectly pure they would not change the quality but only the quantity of light
reflected
from or transmitted through black or white substances.
- as there are neither pure transparency and reflectance, nor pure black, grey or white,
everything that we see is more or less coloured.
Hence, empirically every medium changes not only the quantity and direction but also
the
quality (colour) of light.
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VIII
PRIMARY COLOURS AND COLOUR SPACES
In his exhibition catalogue IdeeFarbe Narciso Silvestrini lists 72 colour systems
ranging from various Ancient Greek and medieval European systems via Forsius'
colour sphere (1611) to Silvestrini's own "CMN-system" (1986). The last twelve
systems are "metasystems" which range from astrology and anthroposophy to several
world religions.
In this chapter I shall describe the development of different colour systems which
can all claim to represent the relations of colours to each other and which, despite their
disparities, seldom contradict one another. In order to do this I shall first explain the
different uses of the term "primary colour". As we shall see most systems rest on three
or four relatively obvious primary colours, but some systems of five or more colours
include among their primaries colours such as "metal" or "sandalwood".1
Irrespective of their notion of primary colour, all of these systems are essentially
based on geometrical relations. Unlike Schopenhauer's arithmetic analysis of colour,
they thus rely on two or more dimensions. That we indeed require three criteria (hue,
lightness and brightness) for the identity of each colour, and that these can best be
represented in two- or three-dimensional models, will, I hope, become self-evident by
the end of this chapter. For once we have understood the various notions of "primary
colour" we shall see why black and white add an extra dimension to each system. I
mean this quite literally, as the black-white axis makes a circle into a sphere, a cone or
a cylinder, a triangle into a pyramid, and so on. From the number of primary colours
and the shape of the colour space we shall be able to deduce the function of each colour
space, or rather, the application of the representation to practical matters. As we shall
see there is a fundamental difference between ideal (or prescriptive) and functional (or
descriptive) colour spaces.
1
Linked to the understanding of all these sytems is the linguistic problem of how we can know which colour
is denoted by which colour term. I shall return to this problem in chapter IX.
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Circle I: The Artists' Circle
The "artists' circle" is the colour system most frequently used by artists and other followers
of Goethe. Albers, Itten and Steiner use this circle, and Jtten bases his colour triangle on
the relations in this circle (see ch.X, sect.2). Its essential features are the three primary
colours red, yellow and blue in equal distance from each other and with their
complementaries (green, purple and orange) at the opposite sides of the circle.
Circle II: The Logical Circle
The "logical colour circle" shows the logical relations between our (Western European)
colour concepts. In contrast to the first colour circle we have four primaries (red, yellow,
blue and green) which are equidistant to each other. Goethe actually used both circles
interchangeably, but it is Wittgenstein who defends the four primary colours most
strongly.
Circle III: The Physical Circle
Strictly speaking this is the circle for additive colour mixture, while circle I illustrates
subtractive colour mixture. The colours in this representation are far from perfect; they
should consist of the following opponent pairs: red and cyan, blue and yellow, green and




There are two essentially different uses of the term "primary colour", a confusion of
which often leads to misunderstandings or even gross mistakes. So called "generative"
primary colours are the smallest number of colours needed to mix all other colours,
while "fundamental" primary colours appear as fundamentally simple and in necessary
relations with other colours. Philosophically speaking, fundamental primary colours are
the colours referred to in atemporal propositions about internal colour relations,
whereas generative primary colours are used in temporal propositions about external
relations. It is therefore impossible to map or reduce one kind of proposition to the
other (see also Westphal (1987), p.93).
1.1. Generative Primary Colours
Generative primary colours are the minimum of colours needed to produce all other
colours. There are two different mixing processes and hence two sets of generative
primary colours.
a) Additive Mixture
In additive colour mixtures the eye receives every colour separately but simultaneously
so that it receives the sum of all light waves emitted or reflected from each colour.
Unless we require an exceptional degree of precision, we can use Schopenhauer's
instructions for additive colour mixture: Under circumstances in which we see two or
more colours simultaneously, which physically remain separated from each other (such
as when two coloured lights are shone onto the same spot of a white screen), any two
equally strong complementary colours can be used to produce white; an uneven
mixture of them will produce most other colours; and three colours in varying
proportions additively mix to yield every single colour (even though the dark colours,
in particular brown, are best mixed by subtractive colour mixture - see below).
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The ideal three primary colours for additive mixture are those three colours to
which the three kinds of photosensitive chemicals in our eyes react. This is one short
wave, one medium wave and one long wave colour (often simplified as blue, green and
red). Yet the colour matches resulting from their mixtures vary slightly from one person
to the other, so that slightly different colours are primary in different people, and colour
deficient people only require two colours for each match (they thus lose some degree of
precision). One could take these individual divergences as evidence for a subjectivist
account of colour, but James Clerck Maxwell found that for everyone any two colours
are sufficient to mix most other colours (some fine nuances excluded), and that any
three colours can be mixed to produce any other colour at all (provided that none of the
three can be produced by a mixture of the other two). Given some relatively simple
wavelenghts measurements we can therefore use Maxwell's formula to produce any
colour we like, so that there is an objective way of producing all colours; the only
subjective aspect to additive colour mixture is the way individuals match the mixtures
with other colour samples, and as I argued in ch.n,3.3. the matching of colours rests on
the assumption of objective criteria of sameness.
Because in additive colour mixtures the colours have to appear simultaneously but
unmixed, pointillism is a form of additive colour mixture. This means that a yellow dot
beside a blue dot will not look green (as often thought) but will appear a very light grey.
Wherever a white foundation is visible it too will mix additively, and the general
mixing of the light rather than the dark colour properties explains why pointillist
paintings are generally quite bright even though they are made up of relatively dull
dots. The darkest parts of the pictures usually show less difference in colours than the
brighter parts do, and they are often almost uniformly painted compared to the highly
varied dots in the brighter areas.
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b) Subtractive Colour Mixture
The standard example of subtractive colour mixture is the mixing of colour pigments.
Instead of pointillist paintings we can now think of the many portraits and landscape
paintings in which the brightest areas are often pure primary colours or mixtures with
white or yellow; all other mixtures in these paintings are usually rather dark. (Think
especially of paintings by Rembrandt and Caravaggio who both use primary colours for
bright highlights in otherwise dark paintings).
The colours are mixed from substances which have already absorbed the light,
so that each colour which is added to another colour or colour-mixture of more or less
equal lightness will darken it. Only the addition of a substantially lighter colour such as
yellow or white will lighten the mixture as a whole. Thus a mixture of equal
proportions of yellow and blue will yield a deep pine green, and only if we use
considerably more yellow than blue in the mixture will we get a light green.
Most artists still use yellow, red and blue as generative primary colours for the
mixing of pigments, but in colour prints red and blue have been replaced by "magenta"
and "cyan". Cyan and yellow mix to green, yellow and magenta to red, and magenta
and cyan to blue. We thus find that the standard primary colours of additive colour
mixture are the complementary colours of subtractive colour mixture.
c) The Combination of Additive and Subtractive Colour Mixture
The two sets of ideal2 generative primaries for additive and subtractive mixture as each
other's complementaries have been represented in one cubic colour space by William
Benson in 1868.' Both kinds of mixture define pairs of complementaries as those
colours which yield achromatic white (and grey respectively) when mixed in equal
proportions. This is an important conceptual difference from the fundamental primary
2 These are the ideal primary colours because they appear as simple colours (see fundamental primaries
below). As Maxwell has shown, any combination of colours can be used provided they are not complementary
to each other.
3
Although Benson's cube is almost too perfect to be neglected, it is also too complex to be included in this
thesis.
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colours whose complementary pairs are defined as those colours which simply cannot
be mixed at all (we would not know what it meant to mix them).
Besides the ideal relation between additive and subtractive colour mixture we
find the real combination of both in our everyday surroundings. Any surface which is
not uniformly coloured partakes of additive colour mixture. Television pictures are the
most common example of additive colour mixture (the dark parts of a film are non-
lights), but the overall colour of natural substances such as wood, grass, hair, flowers,
etc., also derives from additive colour mixture (they all look darker when looked at
very close). Painted and dyed surfaces, on the other hand, as well as surfaces seen in
coloured light or through transparencies in non-adaptive circumstances are forms of
subtractive colour mixture.




The two sets of examples on this page are made up of the same colour pigments as each
other, but the pictures on the left generally appeal" to be darker than the ones on the right.
Subtractive Mixture Additive Mixture
——r
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1.2. Fundamental Primary Colours
Fundamental primary colours can be defined as those colours which are perceptually pure
(even if they are physically mixed, which most colours are). Fundamental primaries thus
include a strong subjective aspect which can best be illustrated by a comparison of the
opinions of Paul Klee, who thinks that the idea of four primary colours "hurts",4 and
Wittgenstein, who thinks that green as an intermediary (rather than primary) between blue
and yellow seems wrong, "even apart from any experience",5
In either case the fundamental primary is treated as a turning point within the
colour spectrum, whereas secondary or intermediate colours are on a kind of path between
the primary colours. If we thus look at the line
we find that yellow and red stick out as perceptually pure colours in an equally graded line.
This is even more apparent when we look at the spectrum itself. We find it relatively easy
to "remember" where pure red and blue are situated, but if someone pointed to a shade of
light-green and asked us to find it again, we would have more difficulties.6
Geometrically, four primary colours form the more perfect colour space as we get
the neat opposition of two colour pairs; but the three primaries of Klee's colour space
demand each other and contribute to colour harmonies and disharmonies in an equally
perfect manner which is important for the visual ails (see ch.X). As Wittgenstein points
out, these are two different language games (RC.I,6). On the one hand green does appear
more of a turning point than purple or orange are. But if I compare the first two colour




RC.111,26; also indirectly in 1,9.
6
See also Wittgenstein: "I may have impressed a certain grey-green upon my memeory so that I can
always correctly identify it without a sample. Pure red (blue, etc.) however, I can, so to say, always
reconstruct. It is simply a red, that tends neither to one side nor the other, and I recognize it without a
sample, as e.g. I do a right angle, by contrast with an arbitrary acute or obtuse angle." - "Ich mag mir ein
bestimmtes Grau-Griin so einpragen, daB ich es ohne Muster immer richtig wiedererkcnnc. Das reine Rot
(Blau etc.) aber kann ich mir sozusagen immer wieder konstruicrcn. Es ist cben ein Rot, welches weder auf
die eine noch auf die andre Scite neigt, und ich erkennc es ohnc ein Muster, ebenso lcicht wie z.B. den
rcchtcn Winkel im Gegcnsatz zu einem beliebigen spitzen odcr stumpfen." (RC III, 133)
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compare the first two colour circles at the beginning of this chapter, I find that the circle
with the three primaries looks more convincing than the one with four primaries whose
green side looks unproportionally stretched compared to the red side.
The best solution seems to be to distinguish between the functions of the two
circles: Wittgenstein's circle with the four primary colours is better at illustrating our
colour concepts in which green is treated as a primary colour just as much as blue, red
and yellow are. Aesthetically, however, the effect of red, blue and yellow is one of
perfect complementation, in which added green disturbs rather than completes.7 (Please
have a look at the four possible combinations of three primary colours on the next page
for confirmation.)
7
Do you remember the Regal cigarettes advertising posters (around 1990/91) which showed pictures of any
number of objects none of which was blue or a mixture of blue, so that our eyes demanded the blue of the
cigarette pack for aesthetically satisfactory completion? Green is not a primary colour in this sense.
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Three Primaries
Looking at these circles, each of which consists of three of the four colours red, yellow,
blue and green, one sees immediately which one is the most complete. I judge circle (b) to
be the most complete and pleasing to the eye, while (a) is the least complete.
C
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1.3. Number of Primary Colours
Out of 70 of Silvestrini's systems which name their primary colours, 28 are based on
three primary colours, 21 on four, six on five and five on six, seven on seven and three
on larger numbers (36, 48 and 2-4-8 respectively). These statistics alone are, however,
fairly ambiguous: The first problem we encounter is that black and white are included
in some of the numbers but excluded (though presumably implied) in others. A second
problem is that we do not always know which colour precisely is denoted by each
colour term, nor in what sense the term "primary colour" applies.
It is most likely that the older systems do not use additive colour mixture;
subtractively generative primaries and fundamental primaries, however, have often
been confused, especially as many of the older colour terms refer to the natural sources
of the pigments rather than to the resulting colours. Nevertheless I tried, on the basis of
the already simplified data by Silvestrini, to count the individual primary colours used:
60 systems include the colour red, 58 blue, 51 yellow and 48 green. Next come black
(ten) and white (nine), where explicitly stated. Cyan, orange and violet or purple (where
given besides red) are each included four times, magenta three times, and metal/shine
three times (once as metal/shine in general, once as silver and once as gold). One
system includes peach, one sandalwood, and four do not name their primary colours.
As the most frequent combinations of primary colours are red and blue with
either yellow or green or both, we may assume that these four colours are generally
agreed on as primary in one sense or another, a conclusion which is supported by
empirical evidence (Berlin and Kay, 1969). But we do not always know the criterion by
which they are chosen, especially where they form parts of larger groups of primary
colours.
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2. Geometry of the Colour Space
Silvestrini's systems range from linear to multidimensional representations. Although
three-dimensional systems are usually taken to be the best way of representing colour
relations, linear and two-dimensional representations have their own advantages.
Especially when a colour space is used to illustrate basic necessary relations, linear and
two-dimensional representations can be grasped much more quickly than the complex
multidimensional diagrams. Also, three or more dimensional systems can never be
looked at completely at the same time, so that even a three-dimensional model can
never show all the colour relations it intends to show (because one cannot see the
surface and the interior of a three dimensional body at the same time).
Depending on the number of primary colours chosen, the representation will be
based on a triangle or a square (with the circle leaving room for either three, four or
more primaries). Historically we can observe a movement to more and more complex
shapes and dimensions: The early systems are often linear (4 systems) or arced (2) or
can be assumed to be linear because they are defined by their affinity to the musical
scale (2). Next come the circles (15) and their three-dimensional counterparts (9 cones,
4 cylinders, 3 spheres), followed by eight triangles (and three pyramids) and a single
cube. More complex shapes are the Munsell tree, a rhomboeder, an abstract "diagram"
and four unnameable "space bodies".
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2.1. The line from black to white
All linear accounts stretch from black to white and try to arrange the other colours
between them. As we have already seen from Goethe we can easily call yellow the
lightest colour and place it next to white, and then place blue beside black as the
darkest colour; but we then have to decide between red and green as intermediate
colours. To use both and place red beside green "looks wrong" unless one places a
neutral (that is, neither red nor green, colour between them - see illustrations 1 and 2,
next page).8
The first solution to this problem is to split the line into two arcs, one of which
includes red and the other green (see illustration 3, next page). These arcs can easily be
transformed into a circle. But in this case one would have to double yellow and blue
which might seem odd (see following page).
8 Of the accounts which Silvestrini names none actually includes all four primary colours, so that the problem
was avoided in the actual systems, but that does not mean that people did not worry about the problem of
placing red and green within a linear representation of colour relations. During the middle ages green was
apparently favoured over red. (Gage, 1995)
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Problems with Linear Representations of Colour:
How to Place Red and Green
1. First solution: Leave out either red or green.
a) black-blue-red-yellow-white b) black-blue-green-yellow-white
2. Second solution: Insert a grey shade between red and green.
black - blue - green - grey - red - yellow - white
3. Third solution: Form two (or more) arcs.9
blscoic
9 after Franciscus Aguilonius (1613) in Silvestrini (1995, p.17);




From Arcs to Circles
1. The geometrical transformation: Combining the black-blue and yellow-white ends of the
two lines or arcs above yields a colour circle which includes white and black as well as two
transformations via yellow and blue respectively:
2. The pure hue circle: The doubling up of yellow and blue can only be avoided at the cost
of excluding black and white (please note that this is not the case if one chooses the double
arc; see below 2.7). In order to show that the colour circle can infinitely vary in its




2.2. Pure hues as the second dimension
A good way out of this dilemma is to exclude black and white to yield a pure hue circle
(see illustration previous page). The line from black to white can then be added as a
further dimension, with black and white themselves emerging as the poles of a sphere,
the tips of a double cone or a pyramid, etc.
The pure hue circle, whether on its own or as equator around the colour sphere, can
have three, four or more primary colours. We can even have a colour circle which
represents the linear colour relations (i.e. which colour is next to which other colour)
but which excludes notions such as primary and complementary colours by excluding
any obvious counter-positions of colours.
Complementary colours, equal space for the primaries, and other geometrical
notions are more clearly represented in angular shapes, most of which are based on
triangles or squares. Here the primary colours are the comer points and are thus given
greater priority (see also Albers's conversion of Goethe's colour circle into a triangle,
ch.X sect.3). In a triangle three incompatible primaries form the comers, and their
complementary colours are at the opposite sides of the triangle. The triangle therefore
has the advantage of not only naming the primary colours but of also placing the
secondary colours, a mixture of two primary colours, opposite the third primary.
Complementary colours are thus complementary in two senses: as primary versus
secondary, and as one colour visually "demanding" the other. The triangle can
accommodate both this visual demand ("fundamental complementaries") and the
"generative complementaries" of subtractive colour mixture in one illustration.
2.3. Saturation - the third dimension
In the space between the black and white axis and the pure hue circumference different
grades of saturation obtain. A colour is saturated if it includes neither white nor black
(nor, obviously, grey). Saturation is thus part of the internal colour relations. What this
means is that unlike properties such as transparency or reflection, saturation (and also
lightness) is a property of the colours independently of the object they are colours of
215
and fairly independently of context.10 Thus I can categorically affirm that yellow is
more saturated than brown, but it would not make sense to say that a yellow object was
more saturated than a brown object (see also Westphal, 1987, p.93).
In colour spheres, the "equator" is occupied by pure hues which become less
saturated the further they get to one of the poles (black and white) or to the centre
(grey). Pyramids are similarly organised as double pyramids with black and white tips
and a grey centre, around which the pure hues form the longest triangular (or square)
circumference, (see diagram next page). What is illustrated here are the three standard
internal relations of the colour space: Lightness, hue and saturation."
2.4. Gradation
That all of these shapes are ideal and prescriptive rather than descriptive of our typical
colour experiences can be seen if we look at the transitional steps between the
individual colours: some steps are hardly noticeable while others are relatively strong
contrasts (look for instance at the contrast between yellow and yellow-green compared
to that between yellow and light orange in circle I).
This shows that although our fundamental primary colour concepts are in
agreement with our colour perception, there are subtle variations in their quantitative
relationship to intermediary colours. This problem is not a conceptual but a physical
one: we know what it means to have four equidistant primary colours with equal
transitional stages between them in one geometrical body, but this does not mean that it
is physically possible to construct this body. Things get physically muddled through the
relations of colour with their physical bearers (colour pigments) on the one hand and
their relation to perceivers on the other.
There are, however, several ways of retaining the symmetry of a system and
also insisting on equal phenomenal grades between all colours: Ostwald, for instance,
10 A fairly saturated green will look more saturated on a grey background than on a fully saturated green
background, but this context is one of degree and not as essential as in the cases of transparency and reflection
for instance.
11 See next page for two examples of three-dimensional colour spaces.
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Three-Dimensional Colour Spaces
These are two examples of three-dimensional colour spaces, one based on a square
(alternatively based on a blue-red-yellow triangle) and one based on any of the familiar







adds some half shades to his hue circle, which protrude slightly from his 24 pure hues
of the "equator". Munsell goes further and constructs his "colour tree" on the criterion
of perceptually equal steps - the shape of a tree is thus derived from "branches" of
various length meeting in the vertical grey scale "stem".
2.5. Lightness
Another criterion that can be included in a colour system is the lightness which is
intrinsic to each colour. Lightness is conceptually included in all colour systems as the
grey scale between black and white. But in order to show that yellow is lighter than
blue, and possibly also that red is lighter than green, one cannot retain a pure hue circle,
triangle or square perpendicular to the grey scale. One geometrical solution for the





The various colour spaces emphasise different aspects of colour. Their final shape
depends on the order in which the criteria for their construction are used. Although all
spaces assume an equally graded grey scale from black to white, the following
possibilities emerge for the rest of the construction (there are probably even more, but
these are the most obvious ones):
1. black-grey-white line
2. Choose main criterion:
1. fundamental primaries
2. primaries for additive colour mixture
3. primaries for subtractive colour mixture
4. no primaries, but equal phenomenal steps
3. According to criterion:
1. fit colours into line
2. add arcs to accommodate all colours
3. add further dimension







1. from round base:
a) sphere
b) cone or double cone
c) cylinder
d) irregular shape
2. from triangular base:
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a) pyramid (or double pyramid)
b) irregular shape
3. from square base:
a)cube
b) pyramid (or double pyramid)
c) irregular shape
4. Completely irregular shape
c) more dimensions
5. Choose further criteria in order of preference:
a) saturation
b) lightness
c) equal phenomenal steps
d) available colour pigments
e) other
This overview alone allows for eight kinds of lines and arcs, 16 two-dimensional
shapes and 40 three-dimensional shapes, all of which can be given further criteria in
different orders of preference, so that we arrive at well over a thousand possible
combinations, even if all options named "other" are assumed to be just one other
option.
Of these other options I would like to highlight the following two: Silvestrini
bases his own pyramid shape colour space on black, white, transparent and opaque
comers, and places all colours more or less within this pyramid.12 One other unusual
colour space is that of Albert-Vanel who treats the four primary colours like planets
whose secondary colours move like moons around them.13 Other systems may reflect
practical applications such as the RGB system for the mixing of colours on the
television screen, or several systems by producers of paints and varnish. What is
important about the variety of these colour systems is that despite their obvious
differences they are all based on the same criteria, albeit in different orders of





preference. This suggests that the qualitative colour relations within hue, saturation and
lightness are universal.
2.7. The re-establishment of the arc
Copying the arc of Franciscus Aguilonius I thought of trying out more possibilities of
the arc. I first drew a coloured version of his arc with two halves, one of which included
red and the other green (see next page). What intrigued me was the connection of each
colour with black and white respectively. As with all colour systems (I have seen) black
and white form opposite poles with grey between them. There is no other direct route
from black to white, but they are both linked to each of the primary colours. If one
follows the line from black and white to each colour one notices two things: first, that it
takes longer to get from black to yellow than it takes to get from black to blue, and
secondly, that the distance between black and blue is the same as that between white
and yellow. So what we get in this illustration is idealised lightness of each colour.14 As
each colour approaches black or white it loses saturation, so that the double arc
includes the black and white scale, the pure hues and their mixtures, saturation, and
lightness. What is visually more intriguing however, is the cross-over between blue and
yellow. This cross-over is necessary to illustrate the relative lightness of each colour.
As yellow and blue become less saturated they have equal lightness only in middle grey
so that another measure of their individual lightness is their relation to middle grey,
which blue crosses on its way towards white and yellow on its way towards black, so
that blue is shown to be darker than middle grey, and yellow lighter than middle grey.
Last but not least there are two obvious gaps in this diagram: the first is that
between the top and the bottom arc: while the two ends could be connected (see below)
their middle cannot - the geometrical gap between red and green is thus illustrated. The
second gap is the soft trapez shaped centre piece of each arc. It cannot possibly be
painted in because these are the areas in which blue and yellow cross over each other.
14 One might argue that to scientists in the early seventeenth century lightness was still more important than
hue was.
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Mv Version of the Double Arc
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This gap thus illustrates the gap between yellow and blue which cannot be reconciled in
one place (thus illustrating the truth that nothing can be blue and yellow all over at the
same time).
2.8. My own double arc
The beauty of this double arc made me want to reconcile the two sides to see what
would happen. To avoid the meeting of red with green I moved each of them into the
previously grey gap between yellow and blue, and thus I arrived at the following shape
(see previous page). A closer look at this shape reveals that it is a colour sphere turned
inside out with one hemisphere turned opposite the other. I have not seen any other
diagram like this, but I believe it to be a successful illustration of colour relations.
Like the double arc, this figure illustrates lightness. Again there is a longer path
from yellow to black and blue to white than from yellow to white and blue to black.
The two paths again cross over, but this time the neutral grey gap is filled by red and
green respectively. On the lightness scale red and green are thus right between blue and
yellow as well as in the middle between white and black,15 so that the lightness of blue
and yellow is no longer measured by their relation to middle grey but by their relation
to red and green.
The beauty of this figure lies in its dynamics - in a very Goethean way it
demonstrates the polarities and activities of colour:
1. Lightness
Black and white move towards the pure colours in an embracing way, and the
colours themselves move outwards through red and green towards their opposite






All colours are most saturated in the middle and least saturated at the edges.
This draws our attention inwards (it is difficult to look at an unsaturated patch of colour
for a while without finding the eye distracted by a saturated colour).
3. Primaries and Complementaries
The four primary colours are indicated by the four soft comers of the centre. As
in Goethe's Farbenlehre the opposition between yellow and blue is stronger than that
between red and green: Yellow and blue spread around the centre towards each other,
while red and green seem to recede from each other in difference.
I am aware that the shape itself contributes greatly to these colour dynamics, but as
colour systems are meant to illustrate colour relations this is an advantage rather than a
flaw. As I said I could improve the lightness relations by shifting the red slightly to the
right and the green slightly to the left, so that their differences in lightness would also
be illustrated (although this would mar some of the symmetry).
The advantages of this colour illustration over the colour sphere and many other
three-dimensional systems is not just that we can see all its colours at the same time
without losing the geometrical connections, but also that the least saturated colours are
15 Because, strictly speaking ,red appears to be lighter than green, I could improve this figure by shifting red
slightly to the right and green slightly to the left to yield a slighly less symmetrical figure which would.
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placed around the periphery. This means that the figure is genuinely closed. It could
accommodate transparent colours in the centre. If we imagine an increasingly
transparent gas around the colour sphere, a cross section around the equator would look
as follows (see next page). Because we would usually look at the three dimensional
sphere rather than its cross section, however, we would usually look through the
decreasingly transparent gas at opaque surfaces of the same colour as the gas. This
means that we would not in fact perceive the transparent gas at all (see ch.VII). If we
fill the same gas into the inner gap ofmy two-dimensional figure, on the other hand, we
can see it. The figure thus also becomes another illustration of the neutrality of
transparency: The periphery shows black, white and grey as colour neutral and the
centre shows that in transparency too all colour differences are lifted.
however, also illustrate the affinity between blue and green ,and red and yellow respectively.
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Transparency
1. Transparency around the periphery of a colour circle or sphere:
2. Transparency at the centre:
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3. Novel Hues and Impossible Colours
To understand what a novel hue or an impossible colour could be, we first have to
understand what counts as a colour. If, as a first premiss, we assume that our colours
are the set of all points included in our colour space we can define a novel colour as a
colour which lies outside our colour space, and an impossible colour as one which is
made impossible by the rules of our colour space. A novel hue is not necessarily an
impossible colour as it might not contravene any of the colour rules, but an impossible
colour is always a novel colour as it cannot be accommodated by our colour space. (It is
not a novel hue in the strict sense but a binary colour for reasons given below).
3.1. Novel hues
There are two possible definitions of what counts as a novel hue, and not surprisingly
these definitions depend on the ontology of colour.
a) Subjectivist novel hues
According to the subjectivist a colour is a novel hue if I or any member of my
community has never seen it or anything like it before. The novelty of the hue thus
depends strictly on my or my community's previous colour experiences.
Examples of novel hues in this sense are of individuals who have been cured of
blindness or of colour blindness as well as of those people who for whatever reason
grew up in mono- or diachrome surroundings (we can easily make up counterfactual
examples for the case of the subjectivist - aliens from purely red or blue or whatever
coloured planets, people brought up in unicoloured laboratories, people who perceive
the world only through monochrome monitors, and so on and so forth). Under
reasonably normal living conditions we might think of a family brought up in
Greenland who is brought into the rain-forest with its amazing colours. This example,
however, also shows the weakness of the subjectivist position: we would not expect
these people not to know that they were seeing colours, but merely expect them to be
surprised by the richness of the colours. This could be shown by the way they would
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define or describe the new colours. We would expect them to make up names including
their familiar colour terms, such as "luscious red-yellow" or "richer moss colour". (Just
as the Europeans named the strange creatures of the rain-forest "giant elephant shrew"
and such like.)
The main weakness in the subjectivist definition of a novel hue is that the novelty
depends entirely on contingent factors (and the degree of contingency becomes clear
when we look at the kind of counterfactuals subjectivists use to support their case).
b) Objectivist novel hues
A stronger definition of "novel hue" must rest on a stronger notion of what counts as a
colour. But we have to be very careful not to go to the other extreme: Thompson shows
that it is easy to denounce the whole concept of a novel hue as meaningless by saying
that "It is a conceptual truth that something is a colour only if it has a location within
colour space, and there is no room within the closed space for a novel hue."16
We thus need to ask what makes the novel hue a hue at all, if it cannot be placed
within our colour space. It needs to have some resemblance to at least one of our
colours and yet it must not be a mere binary hue such as reddish-blue (purple) but must
be neither reddish, nor bluish, nor yellowish nor greenish. The novelty of the hue must
be intrinsic to the hue and yet we must recognise it as a hue.
Thompson gives a detailed and excellent account of what a novel hue is. At the
same time he refutes Frank Jackson's well known argument which claims to show that
even if we had all the scientific information in the world we would not understand what
a novel hue would look like.17 Thompson or I do not doubt that we cannot have exactly
the same experience as someone who sees a novel hue, but this in itself is true of all
experiences .
Just as I can construct a picture of an object by the descriptions of another
person I can also construct a picture of the novel hue (even if I cannot see it). The
construction works as follows:
""Thompson, 1995, p.273.
17
Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia", Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982), pp. 127-136.
229
1. We assume that Fred, who claims to see two entirely different hues where we
just see red, shares our other colour concepts. He thus sees blue, yellow, green and
either red and "fred" or "fredl" and "fred2" - which is something we can find out by
comparing the use of our colour words. For now let us assume that Fred sees blue,
yellow, green and red plus an additional colour "fred".
2. Fred knows that a hue is a saturated colour and claims that the colour "fred"
behaves like the other hues in that it can be more or less saturated and lighter or darker.
But if it does behave like the other hues then it must have a resemblance connection
with at least one of our colours, a connection just like the route from blue to red: red
itself is not bluish and blue itself is not reddish and yet we have a resemblance route
between the two via bluish-red and reddish-blue.
For the sake of the argument let us assume that "fred" has a resemblance route
to both red and blue, just as red has a resemblance route to both blue and yellow. We
thus arrive at one of the two following colour spaces (I leave out the black half of the
pyramid for sake of clarity).
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3. These drawings alone show that Fred's colour space must be bigger than our colour
space which is either completely or partially contained in it.18
4. Fred's colour space probably gains an extra dimension. It is not immediately
obvious why Fred's colour space should not merely be based on the pentagon (a) rather
than our square plus another dimension (b), until we think of the colour purple. If Fred's
colour space is basically a pentagon then it cannot accommodate a saturated purple (see
a). This is of course a possibility, but I am trying to explain what someone would see
who could see all of our colours plus a "novel" hue. So a person who claims to see five
primary hues, four of which are the same as ours, either lacks one of our binary hues (in
my example, purple) or gains a further dimension in the colour space. In this case we
need to beware of a tempting error: Only because Fred's hue is on the resemblance
route to both red and blue this does not mean that his colour "fred" resembles purple.
After all, blue is a primary hue on the resemblance route from red to green but blue is
most certainly not "reddish-green".
5. Because the above diagram looks very odd, Thompson is probably also right
in claiming that Fred would not merely see one but two novel hues. The reason for this
is that our colour space is constructed through opponent pairs, and if Fred shares most
of our colour concepts he must also share our opponent structure (diagram c).
18
Thompson includes the possibility of partially shared colour spaces (see pp. 272-278). 1 only omit this
possibility in what follows because the argument itself does not change whether we have partial or total
integration of our colour space in Fred's colour space. It makes sense that a person with radically different
colour vision could have four primary hues and share neither yellow nor green with us (but only blue and red).
This colour space would then be connected to ours in the colours red and blue, an understanding of which
would insure us that this other person did indeed see colours in our sense.
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3.2. Impossible Colours
I said above that impossible colours are impossible according to the rules of our colour
space. These rules use primary colours as reference points. Thus they might prescribe
that there is always a series of binary hues between two primary hues, and that colours
at opposite ends of the colour space are complementary to each other, and the like.
Because primary colours serve as reference points for the rules, an impossible colour is
not likely to be a primary colour: the primary colours as reference points are the names
in the rules, not the objects of the rules.
Whether our colour space is based on three or four primary colours, it always
includes the notion of complementaries. As the rules apply for the spaces between the
primary colours and their complementaries, depending on the kind of primary colour
and its corresponding complementary we therefore get different kinds of impossible
colours:
1. The fundamental complementary is based on the idea that it is perceptually opposed
to its primary (see section 1.2 of this chapter) so that one cannot see what an "in
between colour" would look like. Reddish-green is the most famous of these
impossibilities, as one does not understand what to imagine when asked to think of a
reddish-green.
2. The additive primary colour is defined as the colour which yields white when mixed
with its complementary in equal proportions. An impossible colour in this context
would thus be a colour which although complementary did not yield white. This is a
genuine contradiction, and the only solution to this problem can be an empirical one:
one and the same colour may be genuinely complementary to a certain colour in one
context but not in another. This does not, however, make it a logically impossible
colour.
3. The same is true for subtractive colour mixture: the additive primary and its
complementary mixed in equal proportions yield a monochrome grey. Any colour that
does not yield this grey is not a genuine subtractive complementary. So, either a truly
impossible colour both yields and does not yield grey when mixed with its
complementary (which does not make sense), or it does so in different contexts, in
which case it is not genuinely impossible.
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Philosophers are generally interested in the first kind of impossible colour. But
before I discuss this in some more detail I would like to say that artists are of course
aware of problems regarding subtractive colour mixture. The only painting I own is
such a painting: trying to copy the colour of its background, which had escaped my
terminology completely, I found to my surprise that it contained a light grey together
with a mixture of blue and orange - two complementary colours (see colour circle I). As
most of the figures in this abstract painting are blue or contain blue, the blue content of
the background had totally escaped me. This then is the closest I can come to an
impossible colour with regard to subtractive mixing.
But let us return to the reddish-green. As with my orange-blue painting it seems
impossible to see something as red and green at the same time (after all I never see my
painting as orange and blue at the same time). Thompson refers to an experiment in
which subjects report seeing reddish-green under highly abnormal laboratory
conditions. Even if this experiment is valid (which Thompson and Hardin doubt),19 it
does not show that we can see reddish-green under normal conditions or are able to
imagine what it would be like. In agreement with Hardin, I think that if this experiment
is taken as valid for the argument, then we have to say that we can see any colour in our
colour space. This, however, would make the structure of the colour space and hence
the notion of a colour space itself redundant. As I shall argue in my next chapter, our
whole colour vocabulary would thus become inapplicable, and hence the notion of an
impossible colour meaningless.
19
Hardin, 1988, p. 126; Thompson, 1995, pp.269, 273.
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4. Functions of colour spaces
The prime function of colour spaces is the illustration of colour relations. But the
preference of some criteria over others leads to different relations and hence to
illustrations of different functions. In principle we can distinguish between three
functions: one is to idealise colour relations in order to make a theoretical
(philosophical or aesthetic) point; the second is to try and capture the phenomenal
colour space of human beings; and the third is to list in as practical an order as possible
the colour materials available. This third kind of colour space ranges from simple
charts in decorators' shops to the complex systems of Max Bense (chemistry, textiles),
Alfred Hickethier (printing), Harald Kiippers (printing) and ACC (varnish).
One should think that the "phenomenal" colour space is universal. But while it
is generally accepted that it must have three dimensions to show hue, lightness and
saturation it is unclear whether the notion of a fundamental primary colour should be
included, and if so, whether green counts as such a colour. Because of the human
opponent systems, in which red and green are the second opponent system beside
yellow and blue, green is usually treated as a primary colour. But individual people
choose slightly different shades of colour as "pure", and so any phenomenal colour
space is a generalisation on the basis of statistical evidence.
The first kind of colour space not merely generalises but idealises. To me this is
the most philosophical of all colour spaces as it tries to show the colour relations in
principle and not with regard to minor individual differences. The colour sphere with
four opposite primary colours (including my inside-out version of the sphere) is best at
illustrating our colour concepts, while triangular shapes with the three primaries red,
blue and yellow illustrate harmonies and other aesthetic aspects of colour.
I shall return to each of these in the following two chapters: The aesthetics of a
colour system based on three primary colours will be discussed in chapter X on




Despite the varying shapes of the systems and the varying numbers of primary colours
all these systems have a few things in common which I therefore conclude to be
absolutely essential and necessarily true about colour:
1. Lightness
Even if it is not always easy to group colour samples with their respective grey shade or
other hues of equal lightness,20 we do believe that there is an objective lightness value
which each colour possesses. Naturally, the context and especially other colours will
change our judgments in individual cases as far as to the degree of optical illusions, but
in any context yellow is lighter than blue and there is no doubt about it. Some colour
systems reflect this aspect of colour while others neglect it in favour of other aspects.
2. Saturation
Although it is relatively easy to judge whether a colour is saturated or not, the possible
degrees of saturation differ from colour to colour. By this I mean that if we take a grey
shade of the same lightness as the saturated colour and then count the number of steps
needed to get from one to the other, this number will differ with each colour.21 The
shortest steps lead from yellow to an almost white grey, the longest from red to middle
grey. This aspect is neglected in most colour spaces.
3. Hue order
There is one and only one way of representing all saturated colours in a circle (if we
ignore differences between clockwise and anti-clockwise orders). Even though the
space which each colour occupies might vary from one figure to the next, the colour it
is next to will not change. Because of this essential order of hues I agree with
Wittgenstein that "I want to say that there is a geometrical gap, not a physical one,
between red and green."22
But we may want to ask where this geometrical gap exists. As Westphal correctly
observes
20 This task is much easier for someone who is totally or partially colour-blind.
21
The number of steps is judged in the following way: we have three steps if two colours by themselves are
indistinguishable but a third colour is indistinguishable from the second and clearly different from the first.
(This is an interesting solution to some problems about vagueness.)
22 Zettel 345 (p.65e)
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"The fact that the most effective means of representing the order of [chemical]
elements in geometrical order does not mean that the basis of the order is a geometrical
one." (p.95)
In other words, we cannot deduce from the geometrical necessities of our colour
systems that there is a geometrical order in nature which we can somehow access and
represent in pictures (like Goethe did with regard to his Urphenomena). The objectivity
of the order of colours does not decide issues between colour realism and idealism.
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IX
COLOUR VISION, COLOUR BLINDNESS, and COLOUR LANGUAGE
In this chapter I shall argue that our colour language necessarily depends on our colour
vision. Goethe treated colour vision in his chapter on "Physiological Colours", and
Schopenhauer's On Vision and Colour established a hypothesis about colour vision
which stimulated further physiological research in the nineteenth century. The scientific
research into colour vision is still not completed and there is some fascinating work
going on at the moment which covers all aspects of colour vision, from chemistry and
neurophysiology to evolutionary theory and psychology.1
Schopenhauer's explanation of colour-blindness is a quantitative one.2 But
although there is a quantitative aspect to colour blindness it is not enough to say that the
colour blind live in the same visual world as the normal sighted do except that their
world lacks some of the colours and replaces them with grey shades, such as the
daguerrotype did in Schopenhauer's time3 and black and white films and photographs
have done since Wittgenstein's time. Instead I shall argue that the colour-blind live in a
different visual world altogether.
Wittgenstein is the only philosopher in this dissertation who writes about the
philosophical issues connected with colour blindness, although Goethe gets close to
Wittgenstein's (and my) understanding of colour blindness in his section "Pathological
1
Thompson's Colour Vision (1995) combines details of current scientific research with philosophical issues.
An older book of the same title by Hurvich (1981) gives more details, though on a more limited philosophical
scope. A useful shorter introduction can be found in Hardin's Colorfor Philosophers (1988).
Schopenhauer's short chapter "Concerning Some Injuries and an Abnormal Condition of the Eye" (S&F
§12) is a mere list of a few cases of colour blindness which he claims to explain by his theory of the division of
the retina.
3
"Thus they see only the gradations of light and dark, and consequently the world appears to them like a
black and white picture, or a copper engraving, or as a daguerrotype." (Payne, p.59) : "Sie sehn demnach nur
die Gradationen des Hellen und Dunkeln, folglich stellt ihnen die Welt sich dar wie ein getuschtes Bild oder
ein Kupferstich oder ein Daguerrotyp.." (S&F §12, p.266)
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Colours", an appendix to "Physiological Colours". Here Goethe describes talking to
colour blind people in the following way:
"If one leaves the conversation with them to chance and merely asks them about [the
colours of] surrounding objects, one will get into the greatest perplexity and fear to go
mad." 4
In the following pages I shall try to explain why it is so difficult to talk about
colour with colour-blind people. I begin with Goethe's and Wittgenstein's comments on
colour-blindness followed by a philosophical analysis of the learning of colour words.
My hypothesis is that this learning process includes the construction of our phenomenal
colour space, and that therefore the meaning of colour words includes their position in
the colour space. As colour deficient people cannot distinguish between some colours
they cannot construct the same colour space as people with "normal" colour vision can.
Without this space, however, individual colour words are as meaningless as individual
chess pieces making arbitrary moves would be.
4
"Wenn man die Unterhaltung mit ihnen dem Zufall iiberlaBt und sie bloB iiber vorliegende Gegenstande
befragt, so gerat man in die groBte Verwirrung und fiirchtet, wahnsinnig zu werden." (F1.109)
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1. Goethe and Wittgenstein on Colour Blindness
1.1. Goethe on "Pathological Colours"
Three aspects of Goethe's section "Pathological Colours" can also be found in
Wittgenstein, and I shall very briefly list them before I give a more detailed account of
Wittgenstein's arguments:
1. Goethe does not say what it is that the colour-blind see but merely notes their lack of
discrimination between colours which he himself can clearly distinguish. Goethe's only
factual statement in the whole section is that the colour-blind must have less colours
than we do (Fl.§ 110). He is cautious about whether the colour-blind see two (for them
indistinguishable) colours as the one or as the other of the two, and Goethe's proposed
solution to what colour-blind people might be seeing is careful: In order to show what
the colour blind "probably" ("wahrscheinlich") see he paints a landscape with a pink
sky and yellow-brownish tones where we usually see green - "like they appear in
autumn" (Fl.§ 113). The picture, although not wholly successful,5 is a better attempt at
trying to show the world of the colour-blind than a verbal description is because it does
not claim to understand the concepts of the colour-blind.
The point is that one could paint a picture which looked absurdly coloured to
the majority of people but perfectly normal to a colour-blind minority. This minority
would therefore not notice the difference between this picture and the same picture
painted in "normal" colours. The possibility of the absurdly painted picture does not
imply that the colour-blind see the world like "normal" observers see that absurdly
5
The picture is reproduced in volume 1,7 of the Leopoldina edition of Goethe's scientific writings. When I
showed it to my colour blind friend he did not notice anything strange about it, and a Dr.Brandis from
Kopenhagen commented that although the painted landscape is not quite like he sees it, he too did not notice
the pink sky (letter to Goethe from 11.1.1811, printed by Goethe in Hefte zur Naturwissenschaft Uberhaupt
(1817-1822, Heft 1,4) and reprinted in Leopoldina 1,8, pp.215-220).
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coloured picture; it merely shows that they do not see the difference between that
picture and ours.6
2. Goethe bases his understanding of colour-blindness on what colour blind people say
they see, and as my introductory quotation shows, he is aware that we cannot simply
translate from their language to ours, and nor can we teach them our language.
Incidentally, the letter by Dr.Brandis mentioned above also tells the amusing tale of a
colour-blind shop assistant in a fabric shop who was told to learn colour names using
coloured samples of silk.
"..and now the poor boy sat there for days and studied [the samples], hoped joyfully
to have understood the matter, and as a result of his knowledge the next customer
received pink instead of light blue." Dr.Brandis correctly observes: "If that person really
could not see any difference between pink and light blue then he could not hope to
learn it."7
3. Most importantly of all perhaps, Goethe realises that colour-blind people have their
own rules and will throughout their lives show symptoms of the underlying laws
governing their colour vision:
"Unhealthy [colour blind] phenomena indicate in like manner [as healthy ones]
organic and physical laws; for as an individual living being deviates from the rules
which formed it, it will strive towards the general life, always on the regulated path,
and throughout its whole course it will make the principles apparent from which the
world originated and by which it is held together."8
6
If it is true that John Constable was colour-blind (I am still trying to find a reliable source for this
information), it would be interesting to take his paintings as an example to see in how many ways we could
alter them without a colour-blind person noticing the difference.
7
"... und nun saB der arme Knabe tagelang und lernte, hoffte freudig, die Sache ergriindet zu haben und das
Resultat der Gelehrsamkeit war, daB der nachste Kaufer Rosenrot fur Himmelblau erhielt." (Hefte zur
Naturwissenschaft 1,4; p.217)
g
"Die krankhaften Phanomene deuten gleichfalls auf organische und physische Gesetze; denn wenn ein
besonderes lebendiges Wesen von deijenigen Regel abweicht, durch die es gebildet ist, so strebt es ins
allgemeine Leben hin, immer auf einem gesetzlichen Wege, und macht uns auf seiner ganzen Bahn jene
Maximen andschaulich, aus welchen die Welt entsprungen ist und durch welche sie zusammengehalten wird."
(F1.102)
Eastlake gives a different and unambiguous translation of the whole paragraph; he translates the clause "durch
die es gebildet ist" as "with reference to which it was constructed". It seems that Eastlake's translation assumes
a creator with set rules according to which He creates all beings, so that even deviations can be understood as
deviations from His mles rather than as completely different rules. I am not sure which is the better
interpretation. Eastlake's one explains the comprehension of colour-blindness as understanding their deviation,
while my interpretation assumes the colour blind to have their own rules.
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Thus the colour-deficient do not mistake just any colour for another colour but
regularly mistake pairs of colour for each other.
The importance of Goethe's paragraphs is that they make us realise that the colour blind
and the colour normal live in two distinct visual worlds. The differences between these
worlds become apparent in the inability of translating the concepts of one world into
the concepts of the other, even though it is assumed that each world has a set of rules
which are followed consistently by its members.
1.2. Wittgenstein and the Definition of Colour Blindness
Wittgenstein only uses one argument to convince us that we cannot speak of the colour
blind as "seeing red as green" or "seeing red as grey". His argument rests on the fact
that colour blindness is wholly discovered, defined and judged by people with normal
vision. I shall look at this argument and its implication in some detail:
First of all, the definition of colour-blindness is a negative definition: that
person is called colour-blind who cannot discriminate between all or some of the
colours which the majority of the community can discriminate between. This definition
alone includes three issues: one, that the majority of people are by definition "normal";
two, that the so-called "normal" can differentiate between more colours than the
abnormal can, which is why the latter are called colour "deficient" or "blind"; and three,
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that these terms are derogatory although "not every deviation from the norm must be a
blindness, a defect".9
a) The majority of the population have normal colour vision.
The fact that we have no special word for people who are not colour blind
implies that they are in the majority, are "normal".10 This is reflected in the way we
learn the word "to see" before we learn the expression "to be blind" (RC.in,339), as
well as in the fact that colour blindness is an area of research in psychology, which as a
profession attends to abnormalities (RC.I,16; 111,55,319).
b) Colour-blindness is lack of a specific ability.
What we mean by abnormalities are deviations from normal behaviour. Colour¬
blindness manifests itself in the abnormal use of colour terminology and is therefore
not apparent in young children and often goes unnoticed for many years. (Teachers and
parents may believe that colour blind children are simply acting stupid or obstinately
rather than look for physiological reasons for their behaviour.) To establish the
symptoms of colour blindness it is useful to imagine someone colour blind pretending
to have normal vision: That person would do nothing but copy the utterances of other
people. Thus a colour blind person might copy people saying "look, what a lovely
blue", or "isn't that a horrible shade of green" when looking at particular paintings.
Similarly someone with normal vision might copy a colourblind person by pretending
to be unsure about colours ("is this green or brown?") or by deliberately using the
wrong colour names (for instance, by saying "I really like this orange jumper" when the
jumper is lime green; see also R.C.IH, 285).
c) Colour-blindness is nothing but lack of ability.
9
"... und nicht jede Abweichung vom Normalen muB eine Blindheit, ein Defekt sein." (RC.I,9; 111,31)
10
In Europe about 8% of men and 0.45% of women are red-green deficient. All other forms of colour¬
blindness and deficiency are very rare, (dtv Brockhaus Lexikon, 1986, volume 5, p.226)
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The verbal deviation is expressed in a negative definition because the colour¬
blind do not behave differently in any other way except that they lack some
discriminatory powers (RC.III, 164, 281). To put it simply: "Here we see two colours,
he sees only one."n Dichromats or monochromats would not be called colour-deficient
or colour-blind, if they had some other ability such as excellent night vision, a
particular sensitivity to blue, or even a more extraordinary ability such as X-ray vision.
In that case human vision would be conceptually divided into night-vision and day-
vision, or blue-vision and red-vision, or X-ray-vision and surface-vision, rather than
into "normal" and "deficient" vision. But as it is, the colour-blind, although often
slightly better at discerning lightness contrasts, are defined as nothing but people who
cannot see colour as well as other people can.
If the whole concept of colour blindness is thus determined by the discriminatory
12
powers of the majority and their consensus of what better colour judgment consist in
then we should expect to have experts of colour discrimination. Just as wine tasters
have a detailed vocabulary to describe the nuances in the flavours of wines, a colour
expert should be able to name colours of which I, for instance, could only tell roughly
between which colours they were located. As far as I am aware there are no such
experts (presumably because of a lack of consumer goods which require such experts),
but we can imagine what such an expert would do. Wittgenstein's comparison to
absolute pitch (RC.III,292) is particularly interesting as it is notoriously difficult to
judge colours outside of colour context. Similarly, the recognition of a musical note
without reference to other notes is extremely difficult. Thus most people possess
relative rather than absolute knowledge of colour, even if there may be artists who are
able to identify individual colours independent of context (like exceptional musicians
who have absolute pitch).
11
"Wir sehen hier zwei Farben, jener nur eine." (RC.111,54)
12
see also PI. Part II, sect. 11. p.227e: "There is such a thing as colour-blindness and there are ways of
establishing it. There is in general complete agreement in the judgments of colours by those who have been
diagnosed normal. This characterises the concept of a judgment of colour."
"Es gibt Farbenblindheit und Mittel, sie festzustellen. In den Farbaussagen der Normalbefundenen
herrscht, im allgemeinen. voile Ubereinstimmung. Das charakterisiert den Begriff der Farbaussagen." (p.574)
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1.3. The verbal behaviour of colour-blind people
One of the reasons why psychology does not describe the behaviour of people with
normal vision is that in a sense seeing is not an activity and hence does not manifest
itself in particular behaviour (RC.I.,81). To be able to see, is a state rather than an
activity. It is the normal state of the majority of people, just as having one head and two
arms is. Colour-blindness is also a state but it becomes manifest in diverging
expressions of colour judgments. Hence we cannot observe colour-blindness itself any
more than we can observe colour-vision (RC.I,82) but we can observe judgments made
by the colour-blind.13 Just as we do not notice normal behaviour such as someone
walking along the road or riding a bicycle but do notice when they skip and jump or fall
off their bikes, we notice the strange use of colour terminology by the colour-blind.
Because the colour-blind are defined by lack of ability rather than by some
positive power, the colour-blind cannot say, "Only I know whether I am colour-blind."
(RC.I.83). This they cannot say because they cannot know themselves whether they are
colour-blind or not unless someone tells them. It is only other, "normal" people who
notice their lack of discrimination, and to the colour-blind they may at first seem to fuss
about nothing. My colour-blind friend said that when he was to mix colours in school,
and all the other children were able to do the task except for him, he thought that there
was some kind of conspiracy against him and that they were all just pretending to see
something that was not really there. Like the child in the story of the emperor's new
clothes he saw nothing where others claimed to see something. But when looking at
colour mixtures the others do see something, and there are clear criteria to determine
who is colour blind (and with respect to which colours) and who is not. Although the
physiological details are well researched, simple testcards suffice to determine colour
judgments and hence colour blindness. So, just as a completely blind person can find
out whether someone else is blind too (RC.III,334) a colour-blind person can find out
whether someone else is colour-blind. And it is interesting to note that it is the
13
The difference between the state of being or not being able to see (colour) and the observable behaviour
in the expression of judgment can be condensed into Wittgenstein's remark that
"The statement, "I see a red circle" and the statement "I see (am not blind)" are not logically of the same sort." -
"Die Aussage "Ich sehe einen roten Kreis" und die "Ich sehe (bin nicht blind)" sind logisch nicht gleichartig."
(RC.1,84; 111,283)
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judgments which in the end decide whether someone is colour blind or not. Unlike
many medical conditions, colour-blindness is thus not defined by its causes but by its
symptoms.14
1.4. Colour samples and the learning of colour words
The agreement of judgment by a majority is our only reference point for the
learning of colour words, because
"There is, after all, no commonly accepted criterion for what is a colour, unless it is one
of our colours."15
Because the colour-blind cannot see the differences between some of the colours which
the normal sighted name as "one of our colours" they cannot learn "normal" colour
concepts (RC.III,112). But the same is also true the other way round: the colour-normal
could not learn the colour concepts of the colour-blind, if the latter had their own
terminology.16 To reduce a large colour vocabulary to a more limited one is not as
simple as it may seem. For while we quantitatively reduce a three-dimensional colour
space to a two-dimensional one, the colours around us remain the same. Thus colour
normals may find some shades of orange in the same group as some shades of green
and others in the same group as red or yellow, so that the learning of a colour blind
language game will be a far more conscious and difficult process than the learning of
colour terminology in a foreign language, for instance, into which we can translate our
14
The causes can be inhererited deficiency of photosensitive chemicals, braindamage, but also chemically
induced states. These causes determine whether someone has "protanopia", "deuteranopia" or "trianopia" for
instance, or whether they have "cerebral achromasopsia". (see also Thompson pp. 144, 163)
15
"Es gibt ja kein allgemein anerkanntes Kriterium daftir, was eine Farbe sei, es sei denn, da6 es eine
unserer Farben ist." (RC.1,14;HI,42)
16
RC.I,13, 77; m, 120, 278,284
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own colour concepts - even if the new language consists of fewer terms (thus "kolni"
might mean "blue or green" but never "blue or orange").
It is not difficult for us to imagine a people of the colour-blind,17 but it is
difficult to imagine any other colour from the ones we know.18 If we really think about
it, we therefore cannot imagine what colours look like to the colour blind or what
darkness "looks like" to a blind man (P.I.424). To understand why colour-blind people
cannot use our red and green samples to learn the words "red" and "green" we could
compare their difficulty to our difficulty when being asked to recognise ultraviolet or
infrared samples. Our red and green samples look exactly the same to the colour blind,
and yet we do not know what they look like to them. Similarly, ultraviolet and infrared
samples look exactly the same to us: as absence of visible light they are black, but in
most contexts they are invisible, i.e. transparent, and hence unnoticeable additions to
colours which we do see. Thus two flowers may look exactly the same shade of blue to
us but be easily distinguishable by insects which can perceive colours throughout the
ultraviolet range.
17
(RC.I,12,13) - Oliver Sacks's book and television programme The Island of the Colour Blind (winter
1996) introduces the reader/viewer to a community in which more than half of its members are colour-blind.
Unfortunately, however, the programme shed little light on the colour vocabulary of the islanders but instead
concentrated on the sensitivity to lightness which the colour-blind islanders suffered under.
18
(RC.ni.285, 294) - see also previous chapter.
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1.5. Grey is only neutral to people with colour vision.
We often think that the colour-blind substitute the neutral colour grey for whichever
colours they confuse. Once we think about ultraviolet samples, however, we can stop
wondering about the meaningless question of whether the colour-blind see certain
colours or even the whole world "as grey". As I hope to show, the concept "grey" loses
its meaning in this context.
If we think of our colour space as three-dimensional consisting of a black-white
axis, a red-green axis, and a blue-yellow axis, the loss of one of these axes implies not
only loss of their absolutes, red and green for instance, but also loss of their spatial
relations to other colours. Orange for instance, when deprived of its place in relation to
the red-green axis merely contains yellow and something we do not know. However, a
yellowish green too, contains yellow and something we do not know (hence people
with red-green deficiency often cannot distinguish between light green and orange).
This "something we do not know" could be grey, but it could also be some other colour
which appears neutral to the colour-blind person.19
Because we do not know whether to call it grey or perhaps brown or simply
"neutral", it does not make sense to say of people who see no colours at all20 that they
see everything as grey: they cannot possibly know what the concept grey means
because they do not understand its relations to other colours. It is about as senseless to
say that colour-blind people see everything as grey as to say that all rap music sounds
like musician X to me: for it does not sound like anyone in particular at all to me, but
just sounds the same - rap. Accordingly we cannot say that a monochrome world looks
red or green or grey or purple or any other colour, because without the framework of
other colours our usual colour concepts simply do not apply.
19
This is not altered by the fact that these people also confuse pink and grey - logically at least it does not
follow that their "pink or grey" is indeed pink or grey or any other colour that we know.
20




Colour terminology has been investigated in great detail ever since Brent Berlin and
Paul Kay published their groundbreaking book Basic Color Terms: Their Universality
and Evolution (1969). Although some parts of the book have since been challenged, its
main thesis still stands. I shall briefly introduce the Berlin and Kay hypothesis, but
rather than discussing its empirical foundations I shall instead apply it first to the colour
spaces discussed in my previous chapter and then to Wittgenstein's ideas about the
learning of colour language.
2.1. The Berlin and Kay Hypothesis
By studying the colour vocabulary of some ninety languages Berlin and Kay established
eleven "basic" colour terms, which in English are black & white, red, yellow & green,
blue, brown, purple & pink & orange & grey.21 Of these colour terms they claimed that
1. Individuals learn colours in this order.22
2. Language communities develop their colour terminolgy in this order.
3. Hence "the eleven basic color categories are pan-human perceptual universals."24
In order to supply neurophysiological evidence for these "basic" colour terms
Kay and McDaniel map the colour foci (the best examples of each colour) and the
colour boundaries onto neurophysiological responses using fuzzy sets. They drew the
21
Wherever I connect two or more terms by "&" these terms belong to the same stage of evolution (be it the
evolution of a child learning colour words or of a whole community). Thus a person or community with only
three colour terms will distinguish between black/cool (including blue and dark green) and white and red
(where yellow might either be covered by the term for white or by the term for red). A person or community
with seven colour terms will distinguish between black, white, red, green, yellow, blue and brown, one with
eight colour terms will add pink, purple, orange or grey, and so on and so forth. It is important to note that
communities with few colour terms do not leave out some colours altogether but cover them by making other
terms more general. Yet their typical example of each colour term is never a binary colour. Thus one term
covering the English terms "blue" and "green" will either take a clearly blue or a clearly green colour as its
primary sample, but not a greenish blue or a bluish green.
22"
A claim apparently supported by evidence from E.Rosch (see Thompson, pp. 209-210)
23
Further evidence has been found by MacLaury (1987, 1991).
"4
Berlin and Kay, 1969, p. 109.
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conclusion that our colour terminology reflects pan-human neural response
categories.25
These findings have been challenged by linguistic counter-examples (Russian
for instance has two basic colour terms for blue: light and dark blue)26 and by doubts
regarding method of investigation and strength of conclusion. Altogether I agree with
Thompson that
"... the variations in category boundaries from culture to culture, the modest Whorfian
effects of colour language on colour perception, and the development of colour
categories that cannot be predicted by neurophysiology - suggest that the perceptual
content of human colour vision cannot be completely specified in purely internalist,
neurophysiological terms."28
25
Kay and McDaniel, "The Linguistic Significance of the Meanings of Basic Color Terms", 1978.
26
Corbett and Morgan argue that Russian despite this abnormality and its effects on other colour terms is
still compatible with the general Berlin and Kay hypothesis. ("Colour Terms in Russian: reflections of
typological constraints in a single language", 1988)
27




2.2. Basic Colour Terms and Colour Spaces
Leaving aside empirical details, the following prediction by Berlin and Kay still stands: For
any language the first four colour differentiations are:
1. Black/cool versus white/warm
2. Red
3. Yellow - Green
4. Blue
Returning to the development of our colour space (as outlined in ch.VIII) we can thus
represent this order in the development from the colour line to the three-dimensional
colour space: We begin with a line from light/white/warm to dark/black/cool. The second
dimension is given when red enters as a strong individual colour. We might thus arrive at
the following arc:
black - blue - green - yellow - white
The next stage is a further differentiation within the top line either towards yellow-green or







Once blue is established as a separate colour, the colour circle is complete: 29
This may or may not introduce the black-white polarity as a separate dimension; but
once brown is introduced saturation becomes a distinguishing feature (brown =
yellow/red & black, pink = red & white, grey = black & white) and thus a third
dimension is introduced. Our colour space is complete.
2.3. Learning Basic Colour Terms
For now let us assume that we try to teach children with "normal" colour vision. As I
explained in my section on colour samples (chapter IV, section 2) the learning of colour
words requires two stages: First the child has to learn to apply colour samples to other
things of the same colour. This includes the important step of abstracting the colour
from other qualities of the sample (shape, texture, etc.) so that the child not only sorts
all items of exactly the same sort (red for instance) into one collection but also includes
different shapes and textures in the colour (red) collection. We say that a child "knows"
the colour term "red" when it sorts all and only red things into the same collection.
However, our colour concepts are not six independent terms,30 such as "dog",
"house", "tree", "cup", "bus" and "pencil" are, but they are necessarily linked to each
29
Compare "From arc to circle", ch.VII, sect.2.1.
30
Black, white, red, green, blue and yellow - I choose these six for no other reason than for the sake of
simplicity.
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other. Unlike the concept "dog", for instance, which includes the feature "is a mammal"
the concept "red" not merely includes the feature "is a colour" but also places red in the
colour space. If this is correct then any conceptual analysis of what it means to "place a
colour in our colour space" will be circular - much in the same way in which "placing
the number 3 between the numbers 2 and 4" cannot be further analysed without
circularity.31 Thus the logic of colour terms is of a much stronger sort than the
relationship between different breeds of dogs or species ofmammal.
The second step in the learning of colour terms is the understanding of these
internal relations. This is usually done by encouraging children to mix colours or to
order them into rows and circles. We thus advance from the rather passive ability of
identifying individual colours to the more active one of understanding colour relations.
Wittgenstein emphasises this difference by using the example of chess: someone who
does not know how to play chess but who recognises a chess board or two people
playing chess has a different understanding of the word "chess" than someone who
IT
actually plays chess has. The two people will use the word "chess" in different ways.
As the analogy with chess is also useful for the understanding of what it is that colour-
deficient people cannot learn about colour I shall elaborate on it:
31
For just as one needs to know the numbers 1-4 to learn the meaning of the number 3, one needs to know
other colours to learn the concept of the colour red.
32~
See R.C. 1,75; HI, 119,320 - this corresponds to the difference between someone merely able to count to
three and someone who is able to multiply and divide by three, to know how three angles form a triangle, to
know squares and squareroots of three, etc.
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2.4. Colour Terms and Chess Pieces
The first thing that any chess player has to learn is to identify the individual chess
pieces. Thus pawns, bishops, rooks or castles,33 knights, the king and the queen each
have to be correctly identified. And just as anyone with a colour-deficiency will identify
most colours correctly but confuse others, someone "chess-deficient" might identify
most chess pieces correctly but confuse king and queen, or bishop and pawn.
The second step, corresponding to the application of general colour samples
(ch.IV, sect.2.3) is the identification of chess pieces on other chess boards, where the
queen might be seated on a throne and the knight be mounted on a horse. Again the
"chess-deficient" person might succeed with some pieces and not with others. Perhaps
king and queen would be easier to distinguish from each other in a different set, but
now rook and knight become problematic (much as some shades of green may be
confused with blue and others with red or orange).
Both of these steps belong into the category of passive knowledge. Active
understanding begins once we learn how each chess piece moves and how to
checkmate the opponent. This corresponds to the learning of the colour circle including
the notions of mixed and unmixed colours, and of colours being situated between other
colours. While these concepts are easily spatially (hence quantitatively) definable their
meaning can only be truly grasped once the basic colour terms are understood to imply
these relations. Thus children might not at first know that red is a primary and orange a
secondary colour, but they will learn and understand this once they have successfully
mixed orange out of red and yellow but have failed to mix red out of other colours.
After much colour mixing they will see that red is a pure colour while orange is mixed.
Similarly, a chess player after much practice will see where the pieces can move to
without being taken by the opponent and will no longer consider obviously foolish
positions; just as a child will no longer consider mixing complementary colours such as
red and green.
33
Differences in terminology are not usually a conceptual problem. Thus chess players may have to learn
new terms if they move abroad, but that should no more affect their game than the fact that a cup is called
"Tasse" in German will affect the taste of the coffee in it.
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The grandmasters of colour are the artists. They no more reflect on the mixing
and harmonic qualities of individual colours than a grandmaster of chess reflects on
single movements. Instead they both see the whole picture (be it the whole painting or
the whole chess board) and notice the slightest imbalance and how to use it to their
advantage or how to avoid further disadvantage caused by movements of individual
colours or pieces.
Given this analogy we can now see that a colour-deficient person can no more
become an art-teacher than someone who cannot tell a pawn from a bishop can become
a chess instructor.34 Just as the chess-deficient community could however invent a new
game of "chess*" in which pawn and bishop were no longer distinct but made the same
moves, so colour-deficient people can paint quite wonderful pictures. But just as the
pawn-cum-bishop is neither a true pawn nor a tme bishop (even if it was defined thus)
because the individual chess pieces only play the role they play in the complete set of
chess pieces, so too the colour terms used by the colour-deficient community would
have a different use from our colour terms even if some of them coincided with ours.
2.5. Conclusion
The ability to see all the colours of our colour space as distinct from and related to each
other is an essential premiss for the learning of our colour terminology, which like other
language games consists not merely of names but also of rules. Names and rules are
intrinsically related because the meaning of individual terms is inseparable from their
correct use. And just as chess pieces can only be used correctly if both the rules are
known and the chess pieces correctly identified, so too colour terms can only be used
correctly if both their relations are known and the individual colours recognised.
34
"I cannot teach someone a game which I cannot team myself. Someone colour blind cannot teach the
normal use of colour words to someone with normal vision. Is this true? He cannot demonstrate the game, the
use."
"Ich kann niemand ein Spiel lehren, daB ich selbst nicht erlemen kann. Ein Farbenblinder kann den
Normalsehenden nicht den normalen Gebrauch der Farbworter lehren. 1st das wahr? Er kann ihm das Spiel,
den Gebrauch nicht vorfiihren. (RCEI, 284)
254
This analogy also shows that the occurrence of colour blindness is not an
argument for the subjectivity of colour: It is only because the pawn is different in shape
from the bishop and because red is different from green that the difference between
"normal" and "deficient" can be established. Colour vision and colour language are thus
linked in the following way: Any colour space requires corner concepts in relation to
which all other colours are determined. For the identification of a "dark bluish-green",
for instance, we need to distinguish black (dark), blue and green from each other as
well as from their contraries (white/light, yellow/orange and red). Someone who cannot
distinguish one of the colours from some other colour will necessarily locate "dark
bluish-green" in a different colour space.
So, although colour relations can in principle be expressed quantitatively (as in
a paint shop where we mix 40% blue, 50% green and 10% black) they nevertheless rely
on the recognition of a few irreducible colour qualities (red, green, blue, yellow, white
and black). Anyone who cannot see one or more of these colours therefore necessarily
fails to grasp all colour relations of hue, possibly saturation, and in a completely blind
person even lightness. In logical terms one might say that the fundamental primaries are
like axioms, and lightness, brightness, saturation, additive and subtractive colour
mixture, corresponding complementaries etc. are logical functions which can be
performed on these axioms. Because the physical and phenomenal properties of
individual colour pigments and lights differ from each other and may shift according to
context, these functions may be applied quantitatively and in varying order to different
axioms thus yielding different arguments/ colour spaces/ language games.
Communication between these (between artists and scientists for instance) is only
possible if the axioms are agreed on. But it is the axioms which the colour blind cannot
grasp because they simply cannot see them. And this is why it is so difficult to discuss
colour and colour relations with the colour-blind.
35
I compare the colours to axioms rather than to constants in order to show that each of them already
contains certain relations; ie. that each colour term consists of both semantic and syntactic qualities. It does not
follow from this simile that the colour terms could be conceptually analysed to yield these relations. One might




It remains a puzzle that a small two-dimensional surface with coloured patches can
represent a vast landscape or a well known face. The possibility of painting seems to
rest on the assumption that the real and the painted scene or object have something in
common which we recognise in both. In this chapter I do not discuss what it is that
painting and reality have in common.1 Instead I wish to introduce four aspects of
painting which can be found in the following quotation from Goethe's Farbenlehre.
"Since colour occupies so important a place in the series of elementary
phenomena, filling as it does the limited circle assigned to it with fullest variety, we
shall not be surprised to find that its effects are at all times decided and significant, and
that they are immediately associated with the emotions of the mind. We shall not be
surprised to find that these appearances presented singly, are specific, in combination
they may produce an harmonious, characteristic, often even an inharmonious effect on
the eye, by means of which they act on the mind; producing this impression in their
most general elementary character, without relation to the nature of form of the object
on whose surface they are apparent. Hence, colour considered as an element of art, may
be made subservient to the highest aesthetical ends."2
1
Whatever the painting and the real scene or object have in common could be something internal to us (so
that two external stimuli cause the same internal representation - be it visual as in sense-data theories or more
abstract as in language-of-thought theories; Schopenhauer uses this explanation in WWVII, §36); but it is just
as plausible that there is something external to us which the two have in common (such as a common
distribution of colours), or that it is a combination of both (as in relational theories). Hence the fact that
painting and the painted must have something in common does not in itself decide any issues in the philosophy
of perception.
2
"Da die Farbe in der Reihe der uranfanglichen Naturerscheinungen einen so hohen Platz behauptet, indem
sie den ihr angewiesenen einfachen Kreis mit entschiedener Mannigfaltigkeit ausfiillt, so werden wir uns nicht
wundern, wenn wir erfahren, daB sie auf den Sinn des Auges, dem sie vorziiglich zugeeignet ist, und durch
dessen Vermittelung auf das Gemiit in ihren allgemeinsten elementaren Erscheinungen ohne Bezug auf die
Beschaffenheit oder Form eines Materials, an dessen Oberflache wir sie gewahr werden, einzeln eine
spezifische, in Zusammenstellung eine teils harmonische, teils charakteristische, oft auch unharmonische,
immer aber eine entschiedene und bedeutende Wirkung hervorbringe, die sich unmittelbar an das Sittliche
anschlieBt. Deshalb denn die Farbe, als ein Element der Kunst betrachtet, zu den hochsten asthetischen
Zwecken mitwirkend genutzt werden kann."
Zur Farbenlehre, §758, trsl. Eastlake.
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This passage raises the following four issues:
1. The representational aspect of painting: Technically, the possibility of
painting is due to the "fullest variety" of colour within a limited circle, and to the
internal link of colour with other aspects of nature. Thus the manifold polarities of the
colour space which I described in chapter VTH can be used to represent the manifold
polarities in nature as a whole, from simple geometrical properties, such as shape and
distance, to the representation of light and people.
2. The expressive nature of colour: Spiritual and emotional feelings can be
expressed through colour because the effects of colour are "immediately associated
with the emotions of the mind". While there has been some argument as to which
colours arouse which emotions there are a few strong effects which we are as unable to
escape as illusions such as the Miiller-Lyer diagram. The expressive qualities of colour
are aimed at the subject, and among other things they explain how abstract painting can
affect us emotionally.
3. Colour harmony: The specific effects of individual colours can be combined
with effects of other colours to form harmonies or disharmonies. Colour harmony
transcends the purely physical effects of individual colours and is the aspect of painting
most closely related to music.
4. The spiritual in art: The effects of individual colours and colour
combinations are independent of the objects the colours are colours of. This not only
explains the possibility of abstract art but also explains multilayered and possibly
conflicting layers of meaning in one painting: form or object may tend towards one
interpretation4 while the colour tends towards another. So the overall composition in
3
The basic links are given in Goethe's table in the section "Internal relations" (Fl.§696): On the active (plus)
side there are: yellow, effect, light, lightness, force, warmth, proximity, repelling, relation to acids (Gelb,
Wirkung, Licht. Hell. Kraft. Warme, Nahe, AbstoBen, Verwandtschaft mit Sauren); and on the passive (minus)
side: blue, loss, shade, darkness, weakness, coldness, distance, attraction, relation to alkalines (Blau,
Beraubung, Schatten. Dunkel. Schwache, Kalte, Feme, Anziehen, Verwandtschaft mit Alkalien). Hegel and
Schelling use the links between colour and other aspects of nature to make sense of colour within their systems
as complete explanations of nature; in Schopenhauer's philosophy colour is one way of the Will objectifying
itself and hence a partial expression of nature (see ch.V, sect.5). Indeed we use colours as signifters of other
aspects of nature: redness for instance, can be meteorologically significant, can tell us whether fruit are ripe,
and can above all disclose human emotions. In painting colour can therefore be used to represent, symbolise or
point to qualities which arc themselves invisible.
4
I use the terms "meaning" and "interpretation" on the one hand and "emotion" on the other because I
believe that both immediate and intellectual effects are combined in painting, albeit to a different degree in
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painting needs to take the above three points into account and combine them with
effects from geometrical elements and overall content to achieve communication of
subjectivity and/or spirituality.
At the end of this chapter it should be clear how painting can transcend the
material of canvas and paint and become the expression of something non-material. I
take this to be a strong argument for the irreducibility of all qualitative aspects of
colour.
different paintings. In how far these effects are learnt and in how far they are universal is an empirical matter
which I wish to leave open.
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1. Painting as Representation
"[Painting] uses as material for its content and its formation visibility as such, in as far
as it [visibility] simultaneously particularises itself, i.e. determines itself in colour."5
The technical possibility of painting rests on the characteristics of colour alone, as
colour is the one essential material used in painting.6 I shall first briefly look at what
distinguishes painting from other visual arts and then discuss two aspects of
representational painting in greater detail, namely its representation of three-
dimensionality and light.
More than any other art form painting depends on light and visibility. Painting
is "visibility set in itself as subjectified and ideal" ,7 Several art forms rely on visibility
(the "visual arts"): Painting, sculpture and architecture all require external light sources
as well as observers with reasonably good eyesight (they cannot be appreciated as much
(if at all) in the dark or by blind people), but painting is unique in that it also requires an
internal light source to light up the scene within the painting.8 This making visible
("Sichtbarmachen") of the scene in a painting takes three stages, the first two of which
painting has in common with other two-dimensional art forms such as drawing and
print, but the third ofwhich is particular to painting alone.9
First, there is the line or outline, which distinguishes figure from background.10
The silhouettes of the 18th and 19th century are one example of how outlines alone can
5
"[Die Malerei] gebraucht zum Material fur ihren Inhalt und dessen Gestaltung die Sichtbarkeit als solche,
insofern sich diese zugleich partikularisiert, d.h. sich zur Farbe fortbestimmt." (Aesth., Einteilung, 3a;
voll,p.l20; my italics)
6
Note that the German word "Farbe" means both "colour" and "paint".
7
"in sich subjektivierte und ideell gesetzte Sichtbarkeit (ibid.)
g
Photography and film also require both external and internal lightsources, but Hegel was obviously not
aware of these art forms. Although it might be interesting to include a section on colour film and colour
photography I shall exclude these media for the sake of brevity.
9
The division into drawing, chiaroscuro ("Hell-Dunkel") and coloured painting is common to Goethe
(Fl."Asthetische Wirkung", §§ 848-910), Hegel (Aesth., Part m, 3, lb & 2b), and Schelling (PhK §87, 1/5
pp.519-542).
10
In Hegelian terms this is light-in-itself as "the general making visible of objectivity" simultaneously
manifesting the surface (objective matter) and itself (subjective ideality) on the surface. The particularisation of
this light-dark opposition is the visible borderline between light and dark such as in outlines. Particularisation
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represent single figures, ie. pick out the particular from the general. Other examples are
cave drawings, stickmen, woodcuts and lithography, hieroglyphs and all modem forms
of writing. In all of these the colour of the line is irrelevant as long as it differs
sufficiently from the background to be clearly discernible. Thus figure and background
can change or exchange colour without change of meaning, for the meaning of the
outline (as the example of writing shows) is purely referential.11
The second stage in the development of painting is not to strictly separate light
12
from darkness but to let them inter-play " in the art form, which Goethe and Hegel call
"light-dark" ("Hell-Dunkel") and art historians call "chiaroscuro". It allows for softer
modelling than line drawings or prints do, and hence for more naturalistic
representation, but it still essentially distinguishes figure from background merely
through differences in lightness, so that the particular colours (hues) of figure and
background remain insignificant.
In the third stage, which finally distinguishes painting from drawing and other
monochrome art forms, light and dark no longer co-exist side by side. When their inter¬
play becomes truly internal, genuine unity is achieved in colour:
"For the light, as we have seen, refers to its other, the dark. In this relation both
principles, however, do not remain independent, but set themselves as unity, as the
within-each-other of light and dark. The in itself made turbid, darkened light, which yet
penetrates and lights up the dark is the principle of colour as the true material for
painting."13
is an important notion for Hegel's understanding of the Romantic art forms. To him, classical art forms and
especially Greek sculpture demonstrate absolute beauty in abstract bodies, while the Romantic art forms and
especially painting show the inner spirit of humanity in the features of one particular person, (see also below
sect.4).
1'
There are two exceptions: symbolic use of colour and colour as means of disambiguation - see section
1.2.
12
"Ineinanderspielen" - (Hegel, Aesth., Part3,111,1,1 b) Das sinnliche Material der Malerei, beta, double
gamma, vol.131, p.33).
13
"Das Licht namlich, wie wir bereits sahen, bezieht sich auf das ihm Andere, das Dunkle. In diesem
Verhaltnis bleiben jedoch beide Prinzipien nicht etwa selbststiindig, sondern setzen sich als Einheit, als
Ineinander von Licht und Dunkel. Das in dieser Weise in sich selbst getriibte, verdunkelte Licht, das aber
ebenso das Dunkle durchdringt und durchleuchtet, gibt das Prinzip fur die Farbe als eigentliches Material der
Malerei. (ibid.)
260
In the following two subsections I shall look at colour as material for
representation. The definition of colour as "within-each-other of light and dark" is
useful but not necessary for the understanding of the representation of light in painting.
Subsection 1.2. shows how a different quality of colour can be used to enhance or
undermine three-dimensional effects.
1.1. Light in Painting
In order to understand the representation of light in painting we have to distinguish
between the painting as a physical object of our perception and the painting as a
represented world. Each of these can be further divided (Walter Schone, for instance,
uses altogether six categories).14 I shall concentrate on the represented world, or
"picture world" as I shall call it. As I wrote in chapter VI, we see illumination and light
sources only in the form of light pictures. The same is true for any scene within a
painting. Thus we only see the illumination of the picture world by inference from the
objects in the scene. A brightly coloured scene, for instance, in which we can clearly
discern all of its objects is a scene well illuminated. It is important to note that this
painted illumination depends entirely on circumstances within the picture world: a
picture room gets dark if its light is extinguished, and a sunny landscape no longer
looks bright after nightfall or on a rainy day. External illumination, such as the lights in
a gallery have no influence on this picture light.
Internal light sources may but need not be depicted within the picture. Again,
the same rules apply as in our usual surroundings: the light source itself can only be
14
Schone's categories are the following:
1. Intrinsic Light ("Eigenlicht"): the lightness intrinsic to each colour.
2. Illumination ("Beleuchtungslicht"): the illumination represented in the picture.
3. Sending Light ("Sendelicht"): light transmitted ("sent") from the picture to the viewer.
4. Pointing Light ("Zeigelicht"): points to figures within the painting.
5. Painting Light ("Bildlicht"): A rather strange concept by which Schone seems to mean the overall light in a
painting.
6. Standpoint light ("Standortlicht"): the lighting condition under which a painting is seen. Viewing conditions
quite obviously influence the effect of paintings but I shall not discuss them any further since they are a
practical matter for curators of galleries, rather than a philosophical issue.
(Walter Schone, Uber das Licht in derMalerei, 1979).
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seen if it is relatively dark (a hermit's candle, the moon, a setting sun). Bright light
sources, such as the midday sun, can only be inferred by bright illumination, i.e. by the
objects being depicted in bright colours. We cannot paint bright light sources because
there simply is no colour to depict them: once all the brightly illuminated objects with
their reflective surfaces are painted in the brightest colours, there are no colours left to
depict an even brighter light source.
Painting the light source in the picture world is as little necessary for the
depiction of illumination as seeing a real light source is necessary for judging
illumination in the real world. Light sources and illumination can, however, be painted
if they are relatively dark and thus appear as light-pictures. Typical examples are not
just the candle, the moon or the sunset mentioned above, but also light-beams. As all
light-pictures have to be represented using the brightest colours in the painting, they
will invariably draw our attention to them. They thus become artistic pointers to the
most important part(s) of the painting (Schone aptly calls them "pointing lights"). The
most obvious examples of pointing lights in Western Art are light rays around a holy
figure. When there is no such figure, but we see light rays streaming from the clouds,
these can by extension refer to God Himself.
The only means of representing light sources, illumination and higher ideals in
painting is the distribution of colour on the canvas.15 We use the intrinsic light of
colour pigments in order to represent light. Each colour has its own intrinsic lightness
value (see ch.VIII), which can, however, vary depending on the colour context it is seen
in (a light blue, for instance, will look dark beside a bright pink but light beside dark
blue), so that it is the overall lightness of a painting which determines how bright its
highlights are to be. Many artists therefore begin with a white or a black foundation,
adding lighter or darker colours respectively to achieve the correct gradations of
lightness. Leaving diverging artistic techniques aside, the representation of light is
necessarily achieved by the lightest points in the painting which hence draw our
"In painting on the other hand, the in itself dark matter has within itself its [own] inner, ideal, the light; it
is in itself lit and the light for the very same reason darkened. But this unity and the forming in one of light and
dark is colour." - "In der Malerei dagegen hat die in sich selbst dunkle Materie in sich selbst ihr Inneres,
Ideelles, das Licht; sie ist in sich selbst durchleuchtet und das Licht ebendeswegen in sich selbst verdunkelt.
Die Einheit aber und Ineinsbildung des Lichts und Dunkels ist die Farbe." (Hegel, Aesth., Part3, Einteilung,
vol.B, p.260)
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attention to them - especially if the overall illumination in the painting is quite weak.
(Think of the Dutch masters, for instance, where a cheek or nose reflecting some light
source (which is not itself represented) captures our immediate attention.)
The painting as physical object hence transmits its message to the viewer in
areas of lightness which point to its central theme or character; this may only much
later be recognised or grasped intellectually. Intrinsic lightness of colour is thus
sufficient as material for the communication of messages, although like all other forms
of raw material it requires to be worked into shape by the artist.
1.2. Dimensionality
The representation of a three-dimensional world on a two-dimensional canvas is the
second outstanding aspect of painting compared to sculpture or architecture.16
Arnheim17 argues that, strictly speaking, we hardly ever see anything in two
dimensions: we usually at least distinguish between figure and background. This claim
is supported by figures such as the maltese cross which is not seen as eight segments in
a circle but as a cross over a circle.
The Necker cube is a well known example of how we see something three-
dimensionally which really just consists of eight lines on a page. Without going into
further details I therefore assume that it is not only possible but relatively easy to
represent three-dimensions on a two dimensional page. In this section I shall
concentrate on the effect of colour on our three-dimensional vision.18
16
Again, the same applies to film and photography, albeit by passive captivation rather than active
construction.
17
Rudolf Amheim, Kunst und Sehen, 1978, pp.215-295.
18
Painting requires the correct perspective (alpha) and form (beta), but (gamma) "its true (eigentlich) task is
the colouring, so that in the truly painterly [picture] distance and form (Gestalt) only gain their true depiction in
differences of colour." - "Denn ihre eigentliche Aufgabe ist die Farbung, so daB in dem wahrhaft Malerischen
Entfernung und Gestalt nur durch Farbenunterschiede ihre eigentliche Darstellunggewinnen und darin
aufgehen." (Hegel, Aesth, Part3,111,1,2 b)B - vol.1,p.68).
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Rubin's Vase or Two Heads
On a middle grey background the white figures are slightly predominant over the black
figures, an effect which increases the darker the background; on a lighter background,
however, the black figures are seen more easily; also, some people see the vase rather than
the heads in any combination of colours. Altogether the effect is weak but consistent.
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In the introduction to this chapter I said that in simple drawings of an outline or
a figure on a background the colours chosen are irrelevant to the interpretation of the
picture. I now wish to qualify this statement: Although the particular colours chosen do
not change the figure seen, they may influence the way we interpret it. Furthermore,
colour can be used to disambiguate pictures. In the drawing of an "A", for instance, we
can either see the letter on the page or we may see it as a letter cut out of a black piece
of paper laid over the page.
A
In ambiguous pictures, where our interpretation of which part is figure and which part
is background actually makes us see different objects (such as Rubin's vase or two
heads - see previous page), that part is usually seen as figure which is surrounded ("A"),
which is smaller (such as a comer of a picture), which is simpler (such as the figure of a
man rather than a complex figure surrounding it), or which is in the lower half of the
picture:
19
Colours too make a difference. First of all, the more striking colour will more easily be
seen as figure than as background. Thus a bright red will be seen as figure over a dull
grey background, and not vice versa. Also, the warmth of the colour matters. Goethe
attributes yellow-orange to proximity and blue to distance. A combination of these two
colours therefore favours the yellow-orange figure on a blue background over a blue
figure on a yellow-orange background.20
More complex spatial relations are represented using the geometrical art of perspective.
That this has to be learnt can be seen in the beginnings of painting - both children and




See next page for illustrations - some of the results are not quite as clear as one might expect, but I think
that over all the result is convincing enough.
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Crosses on Circles
To show which colours are usually seen as figure rather than as background I have
chosen a neutral background (regarding lightness) and a neutral figure (i.e. one in
which either colour will yield the same figure albeit with slight shift towards the right
Receding and Approaching Colours
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of the Renaissance). Arnheim makes the interesting observation that it is only
anthropocentric Western artists who use the "central perspective". Chinese and
Japanese paintings are traditionally "isometric": they show the objects in relation to
themselves and to other objects rather than in relation to an individual viewpoint.
21
Western Perspective Isometric Perspective
Because both colour and perspective have irresistable visual effects they can be
used either to emphasise or to undermine each other. The first effect is called
"Luftperspektive" ("air perspective") and discussed by Goethe, Hegel and Schelling.22
It essentially consists in giving far away objects a bluish colour. Goethe correctly
observes that distant hills and mountains indeed have a bluish tint. In the strongly
coloured sketches on the next page you can see a somehow carricatured but
nevertheless working effect of perspective together with colour. In the first picture, we
see a street with blue hills in the distance. In the second picture, however, these hills do
not just look like red hills, but the appearance is that of a firestorm approaching the
village. The difference is not merely that of hills retreating versus fire approaching, but
also one of relative distance to the street.
The relation between colour and representation is of course more complex than
this. In addition to general effects of contrast and distance, there are aesthetic and
emotional effects as treated in the next section, as well as psychological effects of
association, which may vary in different sociological groups or even from person to
21
Amheim, 1978, pp.278. 287.
Goethe: Fl.§§867-870. 872 Hegel: Aesth.Part3,m,l,2b,r,BB - vol.1, pp.77-8. Schelling: PhK 1/5,pp.532,
545.
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person. What I tried to show in this section, is that the intrinsic qualities of lightness
and hue particular to each colour can be used for the representation of light, figures and
perspective.
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2. Colours affecting our Gemiit: Expression through Colour
I shall now look at the effects individual colours have on us independently of their
representative roles. While colours share with grey the property of being a unity of light
and dark,23 only colours are a specific unity of light and dark:24 they may have the same
lightness as each other and as some grey shade but they are still differentiated within
themselves (they form an extra dimension in the colour space). The primary colours in
particular are "the colour differentiations necessary to and lying in the essence of colour
itself'25.
Each colour has its own particular effects. These may be modified if mixed with
light or dark (white or black) or with another colour but will still be detectable in the
mixture. However, different artists have associated different qualities with individual
colours.26 Different Bauhaus artists, for instance, were of different convictions as to
which colours were associated with which geometrical forms.27 Different colours have
9R
also been associated with male and female principles, and all colours have had
varying symbolical and allegorical uses.
Yet there are a few qualities which everyone agrees on, and these are largely
9Q
given in Goethe's Farbenlehre. Goethe argues that the aesthetic characteristics of
23
Hegel, Aesth., Part3,m,l,2b T,aa - vol.DI, pp.70-72.
24
See Hegel in a passage on the concept (Begriff) of "blue" - (Aesth., Parti,1,1,1 - vol.1, p. 147).
25
"die im Wesen der Farbe selbst liegenden notwendigen Farbenunterschiede" (Hegel, Aesth.,
Parti,I,2,B,lc- vol.1, p. 187).
26
Gage, Colour and Culture, 1995.
27
Kandinsky, Klee and Itten thought that the triangle was linked to yellow, the square to red and the circle
to blue; Schlemmer and Hoeltzel on the other hand, thought that the circle was red and the square blue. (Gage,
pp.261-2; also Kandinsky, Punkt und Linie zur Flache, p.80)
28
Runge, 1810: blue-violet female, and yellow-orange male (Gage,p.l90);
F.Marc, 1910: yellow female, blue male (Gage, p.207);
Mondrian, 1914: red female, green male (Gage, p.248);
Kandinsky, 1920's: blue female, yellow male (Gage, p.293, note 113).
29




individual colours are related to their roles in physical phenomena. Yellow, for
instance, is naturally close to light and therefore shares with light the predominantly
active effect of a lively, if not intruding, closeness to the observer. Blue on the other
hand shares with darkness the receding and hence enticing mystical characteristics - it
appears to be far away and therefore makes us long for it. Red is the most energetic
augmentation of both and can thus be positively majestic but also overpowering,
whereas green - the balance between yellow and blue - is calming, if not boring.
These effects can of course be combined. Goethe divides all colour
combinations into characteristic and non-characteristic ones. He uses these terms in two
different ways, which are further elaborated by Albers and Arnheim respectively. The
first sense of "characteristic combination" refers to a general tendency of the colours
•5 1
used to either the active or the passive side. An emphasis on the active side (yellow,
red and reddish-purple) leads to a "mighty" ("machtig") effect, while a predominant use
of colours on the passive side (blue, green and bluish-purple) achieves a "gentle" or
"soft" ("sanft") effect. Josef Albers32captures the first two of Goethe's combinations
under the headings "mighty" and "melancholic", but also adds "lucid", "serious" and
"serene" combinations (see next page).
Hegel largely agrees with Goethe's characterisations (Aesth., Part3,in,l,2c (vol.in, pp.73-75). Schelling and
Schopenhauer do not give details about the use of particular colours. Wittgenstein appears to disagree with the
association of colours with particular effects, because effects are always context dependent (see also sect.3.3)
30
See also Schelling: "Goethe's new views of his Lehre are founded equally on the effects of colour in
nature and in art; one can see in them the innermost harmony between nature and art..."
"Goethe's neue Ansichten dieser Lehre sind ebenso auf die Natur- als auf die Kunstwirkungen der






Albers transforms Goethe's colour
circle into a triangle to
illustrate the following
relations:
Albers associates the following characteristics with these colours:13
33
Josef Albers, Interaction ofColor, 1975, p.67.
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Colour combinations which belong not just to one side of the colour circle can be
characteristic or non-characteristic in the second sense. Goethe argues that a relatively
long distance between two colours leads to characteristic combinations, while colours
which are relatively close to each other combine in non-characteristic combinations.34
Arnheim offers a more detailed analysis of colour combinations and their effects on
us.35 The idea is that most colour mixtures consist of a dominant and a subordinate
primary colour (red, blue and yellow), as can be seen in expressions like "reddish blue"
versus "bluish red". (For the sake of simplicity I shall leave aside mixtures with black
and white).
The following six colour plates illustrate the effects of various colour
combinations depending on their dominant and subordinate elements. The rules
according to which colour combinations are pleasing (attract each other) or non-
pleasing (repel each other) are perhaps not as simple as one might expect, but they are
consistent and the examples are convincing.
34
According to Goethe, characteristic combinations are: yellow & blue, yellow & red ("Purpur"), blue and
red ("Purpur"), and orange and purple ("Blaurot"), which mix subtractively to yield green, orange, purple
("Blaurot") and red ("Purpur") - (Fl. §§816-825). Please note that Goethe's use of colour terms denoting red
shades is inconsistent throughout the Farbenlehre, so that my translation is a sensible application of Goethe's




1. Common Subordinate: Attraction
When two colours contain a small
amount of the same primary colour




In this and the following examples I use capital letters for the dominant element in the mixture. Please
note that the examples on this and the following pages are best viewed individually.
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2. Structural opposition with common
element: Repulsion
Each pair has a colour in common,
which is however, dominant in

















3. Common Dominant: Repulsion
When two colours contain large
amounts of the same colour, they
emphasise the difference between





red RET IF, &
yellow-BLUE
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4. Structural Inversion: Attraction:
A combination of two colours with
the same components but reversed










5. Pure primary and primary dominant:
Repulsion
The asymmetry between a pure
primary colour and a mixture with
that primary colour is repellent






6. Combination of pure primary
and subordinate primary:
Strong repulsion
Both the asymmetry between primary
and mixed colour and the structural
opposition already encountered above
(2) cause strong repulsion.
YELLOW & yellow-RED
YELLOW & yellow-BLUE
RED & red-BT .1 IF.
RED & red-YELLOW
BLUE & blue-YELLOW
BLUE & blue RED
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In paintings these effects can be used for three different purposes: For representational
purposes mutually repelling colours can enhance contrasts between figures or between
figure and background, while mutually attractive colours ensure that differently
coloured parts of the same figure (such as pieces of clothing) still appear unified.
Secondly and independently, these colour combinations impress themselves onto the
perceiver as inescapably pleasant (attracting) or unpleasant (repelling), and can thus be
used to characterise "good" or "bad" characters in a picture. Finally, the mutual
attraction of some colours can be used to guide the perceiver across the canvas, thus
facilitating an effortless grasping of the connections within the painting.
Colour effects like these seem to belong to the realm of natural rather than
artistic beauty, as they act on us independently of our reason and understanding. In art
the characteristics of individual colours can thus be used to express characteristics of
people or objects or to communicate moods.37 The strongest immediate effects are
caused by primary colours (mixed colours are more likely to reveal conventions and
fashions as their effects are less immediate), and Hegel even compares the effect of a
pure blue to religious and moral feelings:
"Nevertheless the pure blue is nothing simple, but a specific relation of the
within-each-other of light and dark. Religious sensations, the sense for justice [...]
appear simple in the same way, and yet everything religious, every case of justice
contains a variety of specific determinations whose unity is given by this simple
sensation."38
Kandinsky39 relates the effects of colour directly to spiritual meaning. To the
effect of proximity or distance he adds concentric and excentric movement. That
yellow and white appear to spread outwards while blue and black appear to move
inwards can be confirmed by looking at equally sized circles of these four colours: The
37
Social conventions and symbolical use may intellectually interfere with or even override these effects.
38
"Dessenungeachtet ist auch das reine Blau nichts Einfaches, sondern ein bestimmtes Verhaltnis des
Ineinander von Hell und Dunkel. Religiose Empfindungen, das Gefiihl des Rechtes...erscheinen als ebenso
einfach, und doch enthalt alles Religiose, jedes Rechtsverhaltnis eine Mannigfaltigkeit von besonderen
Bestimmungen, deren Einheit diese einfache Empfindung gibt." (Aesth. Part3, HI, 2, 2b, beta - vol.HI, p. 178).
See also Part 1, n, B, 2 (vol.1, p. 188): "At this stage the abstract purity of matter in gestalt, colour, tone, etc.
becomes the essential thing." - "In dieser Beziehung wird die abstrakte Reinheit des Stoffes in Gestalt, Farbe,
Ton, usf. auf dieser Stufe das Wesentliche."
as well as Aesth. Part 1, m, B, 3, lb.
39 ••
Uber das Geistige in der Kunst, 1952.
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yellow and the white circles appear to be bigger (spreading outwards) than the blue and
the black circles (see next page). Because excentric movements resist our vision,
Kandinsky associates white with eternal resistance and yet possibility (birth);
concentric movements on the other hand draw us into their centre, and black is hence
associated with absolute lack of resistance and hence no possibility (death).40
Kandinsky's thoughts show how difficult it is to draw a clear line between
purely physical (i.e. mechanical and irresistable) effects on our psychology, and social,
personal or spiritual connections. For anyone but an eliminative materialist colour
enters the realm of subjectivity as we begin to feel drawn to a colour or are repelled by
it. For despite their immediacy, colour effects such as these appear to be different from
the effects of magnetism, gravity and other physical forces. While a materialist might
argue that colours are essentially of the same kind as these forces (albeit more
complex), dualists and idealists argue that colours affect our emotions because of the
partaking of colour in subjectivity: For Hegel and Schelling colour shares the absolute
subjectivity of light, while for Goethe and Schopenhauer colour is essentially subjective
through the activity of the retina (which Hegel and Schelling replace by a more general
concept of subjectivity of the perceiver). According to the Empedokles principle of like
causing alike, it is thus the subjective side of colour which causes subjective reactions,
while its objective features (its material basis) cause objective changes (such as in the
size of the pupil or in brain states).
Whatever its precise nature, the immediate effects of colour can be used by
artists to express feelings and emotions. In section 4 of this chapter I shall show how
the twofold effect of colour simultaneously representing an external world and affecting
observers emotionally can be used to transcend both of these components. An
alternative kind of transcendence, however, is already achieved in colour harmony.
40
As further details would lead too far astray I include an overview of Kandinsky's pairs of oppositions in
the appendix.
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Colour as affecting our judgment of size
The white and yellow circles look bigger than the blue and black ones do.
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3. Colour Composition: Harmony and Disharmony
"For harmony is a relation of qualitative differences, namely of a totality of such
differences as is founded on the nature of the matter itself."41
To create beauty, the effect of a single colour is not sufficient. As I have just shown,
single colours act like natural phenomena (what Goethe, Hegel, Schelling and
Schopenhauer call "das Naturschone" - "natural beauty"): we are unable to escape their
effects. Painting should not attempt to reproduce forces of nature but use them in order
to produce something new.42 This the artist achieves in colour composition.
Colour composition can aim at achieving harmony or disharmony. The first of
these is a balance of the colour effects just described, and the second an off-setting of
this balance. Harmony and disharmony are subjective in the sense that they depend on
human observers,43 but they are not dependent on individual observers and their
feelings about individual colours (otherwise they could not be communicated to the
many observers in art galleries).
In his book Interaction of Color, Josef Albers claims that colour is the most
relative medium in art. According to Albers, there are three kinds of things that colour
is relative to: the perceiver, other colours, and shape and content. In this section I shall
discuss the first two of these, as they both contribute to colour harmony in a painting.
The relation to shape and content I shall return to in section 4.
41
"Die Harmonic namlich ist ein Verhalten qualitativer Unterschiede, und zwar einer Totalitat solcher
Unterschiede, wie sic im Wesen der Sache selbst ihren Grund findet." (Hegel, Aesth. Parti, 2, Be - vol.1,
p. 187)
42
On the inadequacy of human attempts at imitating nature and natural forces see for instance, Hegel
(Aesth. "Das Verhaltnis des Ideals zur Natur" : Parti, HI, A2; vol.1, pp.212-229); Goethe "Einfache
Nachahmung der Natur. Manier. Stil" (HA12, pp.30-34) and "Einleitung in die Propylaen" (HA12, pp.38-55);
Schelling, PhK 1/5 §87. pp.546-7); and Kandinsky, Uberdas Geistige in der Kunst, p.56.
43
Colour blind people see different colours as harmonising with each other than normally sighted people
do.
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3.1. Colour as relative to the perceiver: the demand for subjective totality
Besides the obvious fact that colour-blind and colour normal people have different
colour experiences and that these might vary slightly even among colour normal
people, colour is relative to the perceiver in a more essential sense: As the eye strives to
supplement the colour it sees with its own complementary, any picture which contains
only or predominantly one colour makes our eyes produce the complementary of this
colour in a space close to this colour (close in space but also in time). If there is a
neutral (white, black or grey) surface close to the colour seen we will see this surface
coloured as the complementary of the colour originally observed ("simultaneous
contrast"). And if there is no such neutral space (if for instance, we are in a room
entirely painted in one colour) we will see its complementary as soon as we leave the
impression of that colour, either by closing our eyes or by leaving the room
("successive contrast" or "after-image").
Most paintings, of course, do not consist of just one colour. Our eyes thus over-
impose complementary colours on any colour next to the colour which causes a strong
effect. To counteract this effect Goethe demands colour totality in a painting:
"We before stated that the eye could be in some degree pathologically affected by being
long confined to a single colour; that, again, definite moral impressions were thus
produced, at one time lively and aspiring, at another susceptible and anxious - now
exalted to grand associations, now reduced to ordinary ones. We now observe that the
demand for completeness, which is inherent in the organ, frees us from this restraint;
the eye relieves itself by producing the opposite of the single colour forced upon it, and
thus attains the entire impression which is so satisfactory to it."44
"If again, the entire scale is presented to the eye externally, the impression is
gladdening, since the result of its own operation is presented to it in reality."45
As totality of colour can free our eyes from the irresistable effects of strong colours and
our own physically necessary counteractions, totality is the beginning of the spiritual in
art, because it allows for freedom from physical causality. Surprisingly, only
44
"Wurden wir vorher bei dem Beschauen einzelner Farben gewissermaBen pathologisch affiziert, indem
wir, zu einzelnen Empfindungen fortgerissen, uns bald lebhaft und strebend, bald weich und sehnend, bald
zum Edlen emporgehoben, bald zum Gemeinen herabgezogen fuhlten, so fiihrt uns das Bediirfnis nach
Totalitat, welches unserm Organ eingeboren ist, aus dieser Beschriinkung heraus; es setzt sich selbst in
Freiheit, indem es den Gegensatz des ihm aufgedrungenen Einzelnen und somit eine befriedigende Ganzheit
hervorbringt." (Fl.§ 812, see also rest of this section, Fl.§§ 808-815).
45
"Wird nun die Farbentotalitat von auBen dem Auge als Objekt gebracht, so ist sie ihm erfreulich, weil ihm
die Summe seiner eigenen Tatigkeit als Realitat entgegenkommt." (FL. § 808)
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Simultaneous Contrast
The grey square in the middle of the red square appears to have a strong greenish tint - an
effect, by the way, which colour-blind people do not see.
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Schopenhauer makes a similar point. As I wrote in chapter V, Schopenhauer sees the
purpose of art in the facilitation of the grasping of Platonic Ideas. Platonic Ideas are,
however, only accessible when we are free from the forces of the Will. Because the
beauty of colour harmony frees us from the natural (physical) forces of individual
colours (i.e. from their effect on our will), it lets us enter a state of pure representation
and hence allows us to attain truly objective knowledge (Erkenntnis). Although a mere
tool and hence not a Platonic Idea itself, colour harmony is therefore a prerequisite for
good art, which like all art forms should strive to communicate Platonic Ideas:
"This subordinate kind of beauty, which is added [to painting] helps the state of pure
knowledge, and in painting is the same as diction, metre and rhyme are in poetry: for
both are not the essential but the first and immediate effect."46
Hegel demands colour totality because to him colour is by nature structured
totality ("eine durch die Natur der Sache gegliederte Totalitat") 47 If colours do not
appear in their totality (objectively), our corresponding subjective "sense of totality"
("Sinn der Totalitat") misses something. Thus the eye does not rest in reconciliation
with the external world unless it is presented with totality48 Reconciliation is an
essential concept for Hegel as for him painting is an essentially Christian art form.49 It
is the reconciliation of the subjective (God/ spirit) with the objective (human/ matter),
first achieved in the human death and heavenly resurrection of Jesus Christ, which is
repeated in painting when the subjective (human observer) is reconciled with the
46
"Diese ihr [der Malerei] beigegebene, untergeordnete Art der Schonheit befordert den Zustand des reinen
Erkennens und ist in der Malerei das, was in der Poesie die Diktion, das Metrum und der Reim ist: beide
namlich sind nicht das Wesentliche, aber das zuerst und unmittelbarWirkende." (WWVII, §36, pp.541-2)
47
Hegel, Aesth. Part3, ffl, 1, 2b, T, 66 (vol.m, p.75).
48
"Furthermore, the colours must be combined in such a way that both their artistic opposition and the
reconciliation and dissolving of the same and thereby peace and reconciliation for the eye come into being...it
is partly the kind of combination, partly the degree of intensity of each colour which cause such force of
opposition and peace of mediation." -
"Weiter aber die mtissen die Farben so zusammengestellt werden, da6 sowohl ihr malerischer Gegensatz
alsauch die Vermittlung und Auflosung desselben und dadurch eine Ruhe und Versohnung furs Auge zustande
kommt...teils die Art der Zusammenstellung, teils der Grad der Intensitat jeder Farbe bewirkt eine solche Kraft
des Gegensatzes und Ruhe der Vermittlung." (ibid.)
49
Schopenhauer too believes that painting is a Christian form of art but does so for different reasons
(WWV II §36, p.538). He uses the concept of reconciliation when he writes about music, which like Hegel he
praises as an art form superior to painting. If we transfer Schopenhauer's concept of reconciliation to painting
we arrive at a balance between symmetry (rhythm) and colour (tone). Hegel, on the other hand, seeks
reconciliation within colour.
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objective (matter of the painting) in the aesthetic experience. The opposition between
subject and object as well as that between one colour and another can be "aufgehoben"
("preserved and uplifted into new and higher unity") by avoiding strong contrasts,
oppositions and "wild" mixtures of colours,50 but also by avoiding a mere dissolving of
oppositions into a "cloudy-weak-sad" ("triib")51 mixture52. Most importantly Hegel
demands the totality of differences (rather than just some of them) which is achieved in
the balance of primary colours, for "Such a totality in its unity ("Einklang") is the
53
essentially harmonic."
Schelling's argument for totality of colour in painting is based on pre-
established harmony between internal and external systems of necessity which are
based on identity and difference:54
"The eye demands in everything, which is to be presented to it as pleasing, the harmony
of colours according to the same necessity and the same laws to which it [the harmony]
is produced in external appearances. The greatest pleasure of the eye is to be taken out
of the weary identity and then through totality to be brought to complete balance in a
state of highest difference. Therefore the eye in general demands totality of colour in
every painting."55
50
Aesth., Parti, n,B,lc and 2.
51
See appendix for meanings of "triib".
52
Aesth., Parti, H, B, 2 and Parti, HI, B, 3, lb
53
"Naher gehort sodann zur Harmonie eine Totalitat von Unterschieden, welche der Natur der Sache nach
einem bestimmten Kreise angehoren; wie die Farbe zum Beispiel einen bestimmten Umfang von Farben als die
sogenannten Kardinalfarben hat, welche aus dem Grundbegriff der Farbe iiberhaupt sich herleiten und keine
zufalligen Vermischungen sind. Eine solche Totalitat in ihrem Einklange macht das Harmonische aus."
(Aesth., Parti, HI, B, HI, la - vol.1, p.324)
54
see also F.Steinkamp, "Difference and Indifference", 1991.
Colour is a prime example of the relation between identity and difference: As the phenomenon of simultaneous
contrast shows, each colour contains the capacity to point beyond itself to its opposite and is thus in a state
between being itself and being its own negation. In colour totality the negation (complementary) of individual
colours leads back to the same colour totality and hence lets the eye rest.
55
"Das Auge fordert in allem, was ihm als wohlgefallig dargeboten werden soli, die Harmonie der Farben
nach derselben Notwendigkeit und denselben Gesetzen, nach welchen sie in der ausseren Erscheinung
produziert wird. Die hochste Lust des Auges ist, indem es aus der ermudeten Identitat gesetzt wird, in der
hochsten Differenz doch wieder durch die Totalitat in ein vollkommenes Gleichgewicht gesetzt zu werden.
Deswegen fordert das Auge im Allgemeinen in jedem Gemalde Totalitat der Farben." (PhK,I/5, p.516).
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3.2. Colours as relative to other colours: objective harmony
Independently of observers, colour spaces can illustrate how totality can be determined
quantitatively. Schopenhauer's fractions allow calculation of one kind of totality, while
other colour spaces demand others. Generally speaking, a colour space with three
primary colours will demand different proportions from a colour space with four
primary colours (which contains relatively more green or yellow). Additionally,
harmony of lightness and saturation can also be established. While it is easy to calculate
average values from colour spaces in order to perfect colour totality, there is an infinite
number of ways in which the same colour space will yield quantitatively balanced
results. Goethe and Hegel offer the same three ways in which totality can be achieved
quantitatively:56
First, all colours can be given in their strongest (most saturated) form in equal
proportions. This kind of harmony is difficult to achieve, as each colour at its strongest
has powerful effects which can barely be balanced. Thus only great masters of painting
ever achieve strong totality of colours. Poussin's Holy Family on the Steps is a good
example of consciously achieved colour totality, but generally speaking it is the
twentieth century artists who balance primary colours or even make them the object of
their painting (e.g. Bauhaus and de Stijl artists).
Secondly, weaker artists will avoid the difficulty of balancing strong colour
effects and instead choose weaker, i.e. less saturated, colours. Paintings in weak pastel
colours belong into this category, some of which are purely decorative (think of the way
Monet's waterlilies have been used for fabrics, teacups and other ornate objects, and
also of the pastel prints which decorate so many public buildings). In Goethean terms,
these are "weak" paintings, but because of their use of predominantly light rather than
dark colours they remain on the active side and hence have a pleasing happy effect. On
the passive (unhappy) side we get the generally brownish and greenish colours in much
landscape painting. In both cases,
56
Goethe, Ft. §§880-95; also as quoted in Hegel (vol.HI, p.77);
Hegel (Aesth. Part3, HI, 2b, f, 66 - vol.HI, pp.75-77).
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"The harmonious contrasts are often found to be very happily felt in such pictures, but
without spirit ("Mut" - "courage"), owing to a dread of the motley ("Bunten" -
"colourful")." 57
According to Goethe, Hegel and Schelling, though perhaps surprisingly, the
third and richest form of colour harmony is achieved in the painting of human flesh:
"For this is an ideal within-each-other of all main colours. Through the transparent
yellow of the skin shines the red of the arteries, the blue of the veins, and in addition to
the light and dark and other various shinings and reflections there are grey, brownish,
even greenish tones, which at first seem highly unnatural and can yet be correct and
with true effect. And at the same time this Shining-within-each-other is totally
glossless, i.e. no shining of something other appears in it, but it is soulful and alive
from the inside."58
"The highest marriage of light with matter, so that the essence becomes all
matter and all light, takes place in the production of the flesh. The flesh is the true
chaos of all colours and therefore not similar to any of them but the least dissolvable
and most beautiful of all mixtures. Yet this altogether unique kind of colour is in
addition not immobile, like the other kinds of colour, but is lively and mobile."59
57
"Man findet in solchen Gemalden oft die harmonischen Gegenstellungen recht gliicklich, aber ohne Mut,
weil man sich vor dem Bunten furchtet." Fl. §895.
58
"Diese aber ist ein ideelles Ineinander aller Hauptfarben. Durch das durchsichtige Gelb der Haut scheint
das Rot der Arterien, das Blau der Venen, und zu dem Hell und Dunkel und dem sonstigen mannigfaltigen
Scheinen und Reflexen kommen noch graue, briiunliche, selbst griinliche Tone hinzu, die uns beim ersten
Anblick hochst unnatiirlich diinken und doch ihre Richtigkeit und wahrhaften Effekt haben konnen. Dabei ist
dieses Ineinanderscheinen ganz glanzlos, d.h. es zeigt kein Scheinen von anderem an ihm, sondern ist von
innen her beseelt und belebt.." (Hegel, Aesth., ibid, pp.78-9); see also Goethe, Fl.§§877-878.
59
"Die hochste Vermahlung des Lichtes mit dem Stoffe, so dass das Wesen ganz Stoff und ganz Licht wird,
geschieht in der Produktion des Fleisches. Das Fleisch ist das wahre Chaos aller Farben und deshalb keiner
besondem ahnlich, sondern die unauflbslichste und schonste Mischung aller. Aber auch diese ganz einzige Art
der Farbe ist noch iiberdies nicht unbeweglich, wie die anderen Arten der Farbe, sondern lebendig und
beweglich." (Schelling, PhK,I/5, p.540).
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3.3. Painting and Music
Goethe believed that colour and music were "like two rivers from the same source"
whose phenomena could therefore be derived from the same higher principle.60 The
comparison between painting and music, colour circles and musical scales deserves a
thesis of its own, but I shall only very briefly look at the similarities and differences
between the two, and shall ignore their most obvious difference completely, namely
that painting is a spatial and music a temporal art.61 Similarities between the two art
forms are already apparent in the terminology which both art forms share: tone,
harmony, composition, and timbre (in German called "Klangfarbe" - "sound-colour").
I shall begin with the notion of "tone". Each musical tone, as opposed to a mere
sound, has a clearly defined place in the musical notation. A musical tone is therefore
more like a primary colour than just any "tone of colour", with half-tones taking the
place equivalent to secondary colours. Much like colour spaces musical notations may
differ culturally (have different numbers of central tones - numbers of primary colours),
but we are yet able to distinguish clear tones from messy sounds. In ancient Greece
there were two schools of musical tones: the Pythagoreans with their five tone
system,63 and the Aristoteleans with their seven tone systems.64 The development of
Fl.§§747-750: "Verhaltnis zur Tonlehre" - "Relation to harmony"; like the English word "tone" the
German "Ton" can refer both to a tone of colour and a tone in music, a connection much exploited by
synaesthetic artists.
61
Even if a symphony contains some spatial elements and a painting is usually "read" from left to right over
a certain period of time, they are still essentially temporal and spatial respectively (see also Arnheim, p.375).
"
Strangely, this is contested by Rousseau, who argues that sounds cannot be identified individually in the
way that colours can. ("Essay on the Origin of Languages", 1764, in Gage, p.236). In the same essay Rousseau
also stresses that the band of the visible spectrum is narrower than the frequencies of audible sound, a fact
which accounts for the difficulties of associating colours with individual sounds (see below).
63
The five tone system was transferred to colour by Scarmilionius (De Coloribus, 1601) and several others
in comparisons between colour relations and musical fifths (see Gage, pp. 153-4); Arcimboldo developed the
idea for a "gravicembalo" with a double octave for the grey shades and five hues in the 1580's (ibid.); one
might also count the association of colour with vowels into this category, (Gage,p.209).
64
In the Republic Plato associates seven rings of the solar system with seven colours (of rather obscure
description) combined with notes of constant pitch, which together make up a single scale (book X, "Myth of
ER", 616e)
As the seven tone system corresponds to the musical octave, Newton used Descartes' diagram of
seven tone musical harmony to illustrate his colour relations. Newton thought a musical division of the
spectrum suitable "not merely because it agrees with the phenomena very well, but also perhaps because it
involves something about the harmonies of colours [...] perhaps analogous to the concordances of sounds"
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twelve tone music in a sense combined the two systems and led to a number of
synaesthetic compositions at the beginning of this century.65
The assignment of colours with particular tones is, however, problematic. The
first difficulty with any such assignment is that colour forms a closed space, while
musical tones form a line. Any octave higher or lower than the one first established,
therefore has to repeat the colour sequence of the first, or use new colours, both of
which seem counterintuitive options. Instead of assigning colours to quantifiable pitch,
nineteenth century artists therefore begin to look at timbre ("Klangfarbe"), which offers
several qualitative ways of associating colour with sound, such as association of
colours with instruments, moods, keys, etc.
In the "Historical Part" of his Farbenlehre Goethe critically reviews
J.L.Hoffmann's work (1786), which offers detailed parallels between colour and music.
Among other things, Hoffmann associates blue shades with string instruments, green
with the human voice, and the yellow and red shades with wind instruments.65 Many
Romantics associated (light) blue with flutes (see Gage, p.298, note 89), and the
association of dark blue with the cello was especially stressed by Kandinsky (Uber das
Geistige in der Kunst, p.93), who seems to have had genuine synaesthetic experiences:
"It sometimes seemed to me as if the brush, as it tore pieces with inexorable will from
this living being that is colour, conjured up in the process a musical sound. Sometimes I
could hear the hiss of the colours as they mingled."
While I believe that much of synaesthesia is subjective in the strong personal sense, an
ear-piercingly high and loud tone indeed seems to be similar in effect to a dazzling
(Cambridge Lecture. 1669). In an unpublished draft for his Opticks Newton even suggests harmonious
combinations of particular colours (such as orange and indigo forming fifths). "But this harmony and discord
of colours is not so notable as that of sounds because in two concordant sounds there is no mixture of
discordant ones, in two concordant colours there is a great mixture, each colour being composed of many
others." - A statement which Goethe and his followers (including myself) naturally object to. - (both quoted in
Gage, p.232)
65
Schonberg's Die gtiickliche Hand, for instance, is to be accompanied by colour (Gage, p.244); Itten
divides his twelve part colour circle (see ch.VKI) into seven "rational" and five "emotional" tones (Gage,
p.242).
66
Like Goethe, I think that Hoffmann's list in all its detail is contrived, but I shall include it in the appendix.
For Goethe's summary see HA 14 (pp.244-248).
67
Kandinsky, Reminiscences, 1914, quoted in Gage, p.208.
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light, while a sonorous bass has much in common with soft dark colours (as painted in
Graubner's "colour-spaces" ("Farbkorper") for instance), and would not be associated
with a bright yellow.68 Yet one should beware of assigning particular colours to
particular musical entities. D.D.Jameson's colour notation for popular tunes on his
coloured piano keyboard used Goethe's active and passive colours for major and minor
key respectively (Gage, p.235), but as Wittgenstein correctly remarks:
"One and the same theme has a different character in minor key than in major, but it is
totally wrong to speak of a character of the minor key in general. (In Schubert the major
key often sounds sadder than the minor key.) And so it is, I believe, pointless and
without use for the understanding of painting to speak of the characters of single
colours...."69
But even if I have to conclude that precise assignments of single colours to
particular musical entities, be they pitch, mood, instrument, key or anything else,
appears to be both subjective and context dependent, this does not mean that the
comparison between colour and music is fruitless. If we assume that at least some
musical tones have strong and inescapable physical and psychological effects on us
(even if these do not correspond precisely to the effects of individual colours), the role
of harmony in music can be taken to be the same as it is in painting: to balance and thus
to transcend purely physical effects. The nineteenth century notion of "tuning" the
palette describes well, how colour balance might be a prerequisite of harmony, just as
the tuning of an instrument is a prerequisite for producing harmonious sounds. 0
• 71
As in painting, we find weak and strong forms of harmony in music. "Easy
listening" and the kind of classical music played in hotels or restaurants (often
simplified versions of stronger harmonies) belong to the weak category. As Goethe
writes about painting, they are pleasing but lack courage. To the "unhappy" harmonious
68
Yet some earlier systems apparently associated dark colours with high pitch (Gage, p.230).
69
"Ein und dasselbe Thema hat in Moll einen anderen Charkter als in Dur, aber von einem Charakter des
Moll im allgemeinen zu sprechen, ist ganz falsch. (Bei Schubert klingt das Dur oft trauriger als das Moll.) Und
so ist es, glaube ich, miiBig und ohne Nutzen fur das Verstandnis der Malerei von den Charakteren der
einzelnen Farben zu reden." (Verm.Bem. (C&V), p.570).
70
See also Gage, p. 185.
71
Although there is no direct parallel to the painting of human flesh in music, one might also say that the
piece as a whole expresses human spirit (see also Schopenhauer below).
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paintings in dark colours, there might correspond the moody pieces so much adored by
teenagers and drunk and lonely adults.
A stronger form of harmony is achieved in the symphonies of the great
composers. Much like good paintings, good symphonies live from a totality of
differences: while each note seems to demand the note that follows it by inner necessity
and thus guides us through the symphony in themes and melodies,72 there are also
strong counterpoints pulling us into different directions. And just as colours shine most
in relatively dark paintings, so too a melody can seem overwhelmingly pure and
beautiful in an otherwise "dark" symphony. (Think for instance of the effect of the
chorus in Beethoven's ninth symphony, or of some of the songs used in Mahler's
symphonies.) That the importance of totality is the same in music and in painting can
be observed when we compare the effects of popular extracts, as heard in
advertisements or seen on gallery souvenirs, to the same extracts within their complete
contexts.
Composition in both art forms is partly based on quantitative measures as learnt
in art and music classes. These, however, have changed over the centuries. Also, there
is an infinite number of ways in which the parts can be combined to yield quantitative
totality, and yet only very few of these combinations are good pieces of art. Music
pieces of the three major schools of musical composition, Baroque counterpoint,
strictly "Classical" and Romantic music, and modem twelve tone music, have all been
accompanied by colour compositions.
In the 1720's the French Jesuit Louis-Bertrand Castel began work on an "ocular
harpsichord",73 but it was not until the first decade of this century that the Baroque
counterpoint was applied to painting. Especially Morgan Russell (Creavit Deus
Hominem/ Synchromy no.3: Color Counterpoint, 1914), Theo van Doesburg, who in
1923 described his rectangular forms as the "thorough bass of painting" (Gage, p.241),
and Paul Klee (Ad Parnassum, 1932) all admired Bach, and the latter is reported to
have said:
72
Arnheim interestingly compares the effect of hearing the same tone rising and falling although it is of
course a sequence of individual tones, to the perception of a dot as moving, although it is in fact a serious of
dots being lit one after the other. (Arnheim p.392)
73
See Gage, p.233 for details.
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"Music already saw and solved the question of abstraction in the eighteenth century, but
this was muddled again by the programme music of the nineteenth. Painting is only
now taking it on board."74
But at the same time Piet Mondrian saw Jazz and other modem forms of music as the
equivalent of his paintings,75 and Kandinsky proclaimed that the solid foundation of the
thorough-bass had to be discarded in the twentieth century, as harmony was no longer
7f\
suitable for modem times.
Despite these parallels between painting and music, the German idealists
generally rate music as a higher, more spiritual art form than painting, because music is
less bound to matter. Schopenhauer even denies any relation between music and
painting: To him music is an immediate expression of the Will while painting like all
other art forms is essentially representational and hence aims at freedom from the will.
"[Music is] such an immediate objectivation and picture of the whole Will, just like the
world itself, and the [Platonic] Ideas whose manifold appearance is the world of the
individual objects. Music is therefore not at all like the other art forms an image of the
Ideas; but it is an image of the Will itself, whose objectivity can also be found in the
Ideas: this is why the effect of music is so very much more powerful than that of the
77
other art forms: for they merely talk of shadows while it [music] speaks of essence."
Thus, according to Schopenhauer, music can give us immediate access to the
Will just as the other arts give us access to the Platonic Ideas (and via these Ideas
mediate access to the Will).78 Although Schopenhauer strongly contrasts the visual arts,
74
Lecture at Dessau 1927/8 (Gage, p.242; see also Gage illustrations no.189 & 193).
75
In 1927 Mondrian published the essay "Jazz and Neo-Plastic" (Gage, p.242), and he also painted the
Victory Boogie-Woogie and several Foxtrott compositions; Gene Davis compared his own work to the playing
of jazz: "I seldom think about colour....I never really plan my colour more than five stripes ahead and often
change my mind before I reach the third stripe. I like to think that I am somewhat like a jazz musician who
does not read music and plays by ear. I paint by eye..." (Gage, p.266)
76
With regret Kandinsky thus looks back to Mozart and even Beethoven as no longer appropriate (fiber das
Geistige in der Kunst).
77
"[Musik ist] eine so unmittelbare Objektivation und [ein] Abbild des ganzen Willens, wie die Welt selbst
es ist, ja wie die Ideen es sind, deren vielfache Erscheinung die Welt der einzelnen Dinge ausmacht. Die Musik
ist also keineswegs gleich den anderen Kiinsten das Abbild der Ideen; sondem Abbild des Willens selbst,
dessen Objektitat auch die Ideen sind: deshalb eben ist die Wirkung der Musik so sehr viel machtiger als die
der anderen Kiinste: denn diese reden nur von Schatten, sie aber vom Wesen." (WWVI, §52, p.359)
78
Schopenhauer goes as far as claiming that the intervals of the musical scale are parallel to the steps in the
objectivation of Will in nature, i.e. the various species in nature. He further compares any deviation from the
arithmetic correctness of the musical intervals due to temperature or other changes in circumstances to
deviations in nature from perfect specimen of a species. (WWVI, §52)
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which allow access to Platonic Ideas, against music, which allows access to the Will
itself, the fact that he fails to capture colour relations purely quantitatively in his own
theory of colour (see ch.n, sect.2.1) may show another close affinity between colour
and music: The numbers representing each colour are either correct in relation to their
darkness or to each other, but never to both at the same time. Similarly, the various
tones in a symphony can never result in a mathematically harmonic system, because the
numbers by which the tones can be represented have irresolvable irrationalities: if the
tones are "correct" in relation to the fundamental tone (bass) they are not so to each
other - so that a mathematically correct piece of music cannot even be thought of or put
into practice.
Aristoteleans might agree with Schopenhauer: in Problems79 Aristotle claims
that colours as opposed to music have no moral power, and later Aristides writes that
music has a direct effect on body and soul, whereas painting conveys only a "tiny
fragment" of life.80 We must remember that Schopenhauer, and probably also Aristotle
and Aristides, write about colours as tools for representation rather than as aesthetic
ends in themselves. As I hope to have shown in the previous section, colours do have
strong effects on us (on body and soul). G.Field, for instance, writes: "...it is evident
colors have a science as distinct from any association with figure or forms ... as that of
music is from the figurative language of poetry."81
If Field is right, and I think he is, then it is perhaps surprising that
"mankind has until now [1913] always tried to satisfy its need for the highest spiritual
exultation only in music. Only tones have been able to grip us and transport us to the
highest realms. ... Yet color is just as capable of music of providing us with the highest
exstacies and delights."82
Schopenhauer compares music in general to a universal language which
similarly to geometrical figures and numbers can be understood a priori but is not
79
Problems, XIX, 27, 29 (Gage, p.227)
OA
On Music, Gage, p.227.
81
Aesthetics, or the Analogy of the Sensible Sciences Indictaed, with an Appendix on Light and Colors,
1820 (Gage, p.235)
82"
Morgan Russell (1913), in Gage, p.241.
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abstract. But if a symphony can picture the whole world in its own language, I see no
reason why colour should not be able to achieve the same thing, provided we do not
think of colours as stable patches but as complex and interrelated forms. Concentrating
on different colour relations within one painting will lead to different views and hence
ways of understanding the same picture. If the painting is a true masterpiece it can
encompass the totality of all colour relations and hence in the form of colour
encompass the whole world, much like a master symphony can encompass the whole
83world in music.
83
This assumes that the internal relations of colour are forms of more general relations, which can be found
in all aspects of life. The inclusion of external relations of colour with other properties, widen the range in
which colour compositions might affect us even further. The possibility of colour therapy, for instance,
undermines Schopenhauer's argument, for only if colour can be an immediate force of the Will can it have
such fundamental (non-intellectual) effects on us.
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4. The Spiritual in Art
The last three sections established that painting can represent light and three-
dimensional objects, that individual colours have irresistable effects on us, and that
these effects can be strengthened, softened or balanced in colour harmonies, so that
effects of individual colours can be transcended (in Hegelian terms they are thus
"aufgehoben"). In this section I wish to explain how the representational and expressive
qualities of colour can be used to communicate subjectivity and possibly even
spirituality.
In order to do so I shall briefly look at representational and abstract painting
(both conceptual and non-conceptual). For the effect of colour in painting is twofold
(intrinsic and representational). Kandinsky aptly calls this difference one between
"inner" and "outer" beauty in painting,84 a difference which can best be illustrated by
the difference between representational and non-representational art, although abstract
art too can have external beauty and all good representational paintings also have
internal beauty.
In representational art we cannot but praise a picture as beautiful in conjunction
with its represented subject matter. Thus we say, "what a beautiful portrait of a
woman", or even, "oh, what a beautiful landscape". The representational painting
seems to capture the beauty of a person, landscape or object, and it is thus at least
partially beautiful in virtue of what it represents, i.e. something external to the picture,
which the painter has captured or enhanced by good composition, colour etc.85 Abstract
art, on the other hand, is beautiful in virtue of its inner properties alone (form and
colour), as it does not represent anything external to itself. (If it does refer to something
external to itself, as conceptual art does, it is not beautiful in virtue of this other).
Abstract art is thus beautiful in virtue of what it is, whereas representational art is
mostly beautiful in virtue of capturing the beauty of what it represents.
84
I am aware that the notion of beauty is in itself problematic, but let us for now assume that we know what
we mean when we say that a person or an object is beautiful.
8:1 Please note that the reverse is not true: the most beautiful person, landscape or object will not
make a beautiful painting unless the latter is well painted (composed).
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4.1. Representational Painting
The fact that it is possible to create three-dimensional effects by the use of colour alone
is a great advantage in painting: not only does the actual presence of a three-
dimensional object thereby become superfluous, but the colour which takes its place
is itself a much higher principle:
"Painting by no means lacks the third dimension but discards it intentionally to replace
the merely spatially real by the higher and richer principle of colour."87
According to Hegel, the partial replacing of space by colour makes the art work
richer because it allows us to replace material objectivity by ideal subjectivity. As we
have seen, what distinguishes painting from all other art forms is its sensual material,
colour, which facilitates the internalisation of the subjectivity of light in matter. As
"subjectivated and set-as-ideal visibility"88 painting transfers material objects into a
subjective and ideal setting. It does so quite literally by creating a two-dimensional
ideal (in the sense of not real but to be imagined) setting in which there are ideal laws
of vision, namely the laws of light and colour, which alone determine what we see. (We
are not able to walk around the painting to look at what lies behind the tree; nor are we
able to illuminate a dark part of the picture by shining a light into it.)
It is through the internalisation of external, material features in colour pigments
that painting can externalise internal features. Thus it is the subjective aspects of colour
that enable the artist to express subjectivity and hence the colour magic of painting
("malerischer Farbenzauber"), which
"through the delicacy and variety of its nuances is also capable of making visible the
whole richness of particular characteristics and the whole externalising (lit."stepping-
86
"The figure (Gestaln is produced by light and shadow and thus becomes superfluous for itself as real
figure (Gestalt)." - "Die Gestalt wird durch Licht und Schatten gemacht und ist fur sich als reale Gestalt
tiberfliissig."
(Hegel, Aesth., Part3, ID.I.Ib) B) BB) - vol.ID, p.33)
87
"die Malerei enlbehrt die dritte Dimension nicht etwa, sondern verwirft sie absichtlich, um das bloB
raumlich Reale durch das hohere und reichere Prinzip der Farbe zu ersetzen." (Hegel, Aesthetics, Part3, ID, 1,
lb, double gamma).
88
"in sich subjektivierte und ideell gesetzte Sichtbarkeit" (Hegel, Aesth., Part3, Einteilung)
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out") of spirit as internality as well as the full summary of the soul (Gemiit) in itself
through the soul-view of the eye (Seelenblick des Auges)."89
Perhaps the spirituality of representational painting can be summarised in this
one expression - "Seelenblick des Auges" - for it captures the three ways in which
painting makes visible soul/spirit/subjectivity:
First of all, painting is the only one of the visual arts that represents eyes.90
Even sculptures with painted eyes do not appear to look at us, while in (good) paintings
people do look. They may look at something or someone in the picture or at the
observer of the painting (think of the most famous of mysterious looks, the Mona Lisa).
Secondly, the eyes painted carry more expression than anything else in the
picture. Thus a painted body may look as if it was in pain but can be redeemed by the
look in the eyes. Also, a healthy and good looking body can be made meaningless by a
tortured look in the eyes. The expression of someone's eyes, be they real or painted, can
haunt us even if we have forgotten other features. (This is presumably so, because the
eyes are the most expressive feature of our bodies.) The fact that painting cannot only
duplicate such expression (like film and photography can), but can in fact create such
expressions remains a mystery which any reduction to the physical properties of paint
and canvas fails to explain.
Thirdly, the soul becomes visible not only through the look of the figure in the
painting but also through that of the person looking at the painting. Here lies the
importance of the subjective aspect of colour vision for painting. In the contemplation
of a painting we have a true "Scheinen und Widerscheinen": the shining of colours on
the canvas is reflected physically through the complementary action of our eyes, and the
shining of the spirit in the painting becomes a reflection of the shining of our own spirit
when the two meet in the "Seelenblick des Auges".
If we accept the premiss that the representation of eyes allows for the
expression and communication of feelings and even spirituality, we can also accept the
explanation by Hegel and Schelling that this is possible because colour as the material
89
"durch die Feinheit und Vielfaltigkeit seiner Nuancen auch die ganze Fiille besonderer Charkterztige und
das ganze Heraustreten des Geistes als Innerlichkeit sowie die voile Zusammenfassung des Gemiits in sich
durch den Seelenblick des Auges sichtbar zu machen befahigt ist." (Hegel, Aesth., Part3, n, Introduction)
90
Nowadays film and photography can also capture the "Seelenblick des Auges" - think of the black and
white photographs of Greta Garbo, for instance.
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of painting contains light which is essentially subjectivity and spirituality. But even if
one does not want to embrace their philosophy, the possibility of the communication of
feelings and hence of subjectivity in painting is a good argument against the reduction
of colour to exclusively objective quantities.
4.2. Conceptual Art
Conceptual art essentially refers to something other than itself. Josef Kosuth in his
essay "Art after Philosophy"91 argues that "In this period of man, after philosophy and
religion, art may possibly be one endeavour that fulfils what another age might have
called "man's spiritual needs". Or, another way of putting it might be that art deals
analogously with the state of things "beyond physics" where philosophy had to make
assertions." (p.24)
Kosuth claims that this is possible because "objects are irrelevant to the
condition of art" (p.26). By this he means, I believe, that the piece of (conceptual) art as
92
object is irrelevant once one has grasped its idea. If this is the case, then the material
of colour is irrelevant to conceptual art (Kosuth's own works, as far as I am aware, are
almost exclusively black and white). In a sense, conceptual art is therefore a step back
to the pure line or outline, which I discussed at the beginning of this chapter.
Conceptual pieces of art concerning colour could be a red canvas with the title "red", or
a yellow and blue canvas with the title "Goethe's Polarity". Once we have grasped the
ideas of these pieces (of art?) we can discard the material objects themselves (which is
also why I can adequately describe them and need not include illustrations, which is not
the case with other pieces of art). German idealists would have probably criticised
conceptual art in the same way in which they criticised allegorical art forms: because
9'
Kosuth, Art after Philosophy andAfter, pp. 13-33.
92 Kosuth also refers to his art as "Art as Idea as Idea" (ibid.p.20).
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allegorical pictures can only be understood by reference to something external to them,
they themselves are of little or no value (they can easily be copied).
Therefore the colours in conceptual art are reducible, albeit not to their physical
properties (which are irrelevant) but to their conceptual references.
4.3. Abstract Expressionism
By abstract expressionism I mean all paintings which are non-representational but still
carry meaning within themselves. Unlike conceptual art, their titles are usually of no or
little importance ("No Title") because they do not refer to something external to
themselves. Thus I take Kandinsky's "compositions" as prime examples of this art
form.
"For people who are not used to it this inner beauty [of abstract art] naturally
appears as ugly, as man generally tends towards the outer and does not want to
recognise inner necessity."93 But
"External beauty is an element that forms the spiritual atmosphere. Besides the positive
side, however, (as the beautiful = the good) it suffers the same lack as the talent which
isn't used exhaustively - (talent in the sense of the gospel)."94
Because colour in abstract expressionism neither represents something other
than itself within the picture (as in representational art) nor refers to ideas outside the
picture (as conceptual art does), colour becomes its only means of expression. In
abstract painting only colour contrasts constitute form, and only the composition of
colour and form constitutes meaning. While I am not sure exactly how abstract painting
can express feelings (a matter for psychological research) I know that it can do so. The
93
"Dem nicht daran Gewohnten erscheint natiirlich dieses innere Schone haBlich, da der Mensch im
allgemeinen zum AuBeren neigt und nicht gerne die innere Notwendigkeit erkennt."
(Kandinsky, Uber das Geistige in der Kunst, p.48.)
94
"AuBere Schonheit ist ein die geistige Atmosphare bildendes Element. Es hat aber auBer der positiven
Seite (da Schones = Gutes ist) den Mangel des nicht erschopfend ausgentitzten Talentes - (Talent im Sinne des
Evangeliums)." (Uber das Geistige in der Kunst, p.26, my translation).
See also Schelling: For Schelling colour qua indifference is living capacity (Vermogen) which has to be used
to point beyond itself and thus transcends the purely external beauty of sculpture (cp. F.Steinkamp, 1991,
p. 186).
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fact that we can be fascinated by completely abstract paintings, can look at them for
many hours and may have strong wishes to return to them after years, may be due to
any the following: either the painting itself has intrinsic objective values, or it reflects
our own subjective values, or the effect is a combination of both.
I shall begin with the first case. The intrinsic objective value of an abstract
painting can only lie in its composition, i.e. in the quality and distribution of colours.
As I showed in my last section, the strong effects of individual colours can be
transcended in colour harmony. What Kandinsky calls "inner necessity" may thus be
the inner necessity of the composition. Just as a false note in a piece of music is
immediately detectable and makes us aware of the necessity with which the notes in the
piece follow each other, so colour changes in a painting are also immediately noticeable
as "disturbing" or "wrong". (Hence the strong effects of genuinely "ugly" abstract
paintings, where the colours have been intentionally composed in disharmony.) So,
although the colours in abstract paintings are not placed by the necessity of truthful
representation, they are yet only "correct" in particular places on the canvas. In this
sense, abstract painting is like a geometrical figure or an algorithm as opposed to an
accountancy sheet: It is true only in virtue of its own axioms (while the accounts are
truthful in virtue of circumstances external to themselves). And qua axioms the
conditions of abstract painting, namely the relations of colours to form and to each
other, are irreducible.
The second aspect of abstract painting is its reflection of subjective states of
mind. Not only do different people see different "things" in abstract paintings, but the
same person can also see different things at different times. Thus the same coloured
shapes can sometimes seem to dance with one another and at other times fight each
other; they may thus evoke or reflect positive or negative feelings in the perceiver.
Again I cannot say how exactly this process works (again a matter for psychologists)
but I can say that the possibility of abstract painting arousing emotions and thoughts (be
they initiated or reflected by the painting) is a clear argument against the reducibility of
colour to objective entities which do not arouse such emotions or thoughts.
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5. Conclusion
The roles that colours play in painting are a clear indicator of the irreducible qualitative
aspects of colour. Colours can arouse emotions thus causing subjective feelings, which
(arguably) can only stem from subjective aspects within colour.95 Colour harmony can
transcend the purely physical side of this effect for emotion-free (purely spiritual)
aesthetic contemplation. The grasping of pure beauty (and perhaps even truth) through
aesthetic insight is very difficult to explain unless one allows for irreducible qualitative
aspects of colour, which can, for instance, explain how a slight change in colour can
turn an exquisitely beautiful painting into a common or even ugly one. Finally, colours
can convey meaning, be it by reference to people, events, or ideas, or intrinsically by
presenting us with truths about themselves,96 about the artist or even about ourselves.
None of these aspects of colour can be captured in or explained by a reductionist
account of colour.
This depends on one's philosophical position. Anyone who believes that emotions are
themselves reducible to (objective) physical states, will simply assume that these states are caused by
the relevant physical qualities in colour.
96




My conclusion is twofold. On the one hand I wish to argue that colours exist
independently of human observers. This ontological claim is, however, qualified by the
epistemological claim that the nature of colour is determined by the human conceptual
framework. The first part of my claim is of the same kind as the claim that the sun
exists independently of observers. Colours like the sun have existed before there were
human beings on earth and (all else being equal) they will exist should human life cease
to exist. My second claim, that colours qua colours are determined by human observers,
is an epistemological claim about what we can discover about the nature of colour.
Any discovery is limited by the object of discovery on the one hand (colours
will not be discovered to breed in Madagascar), and by the method of investigation on
the other. While methods may become more and more sophisticated with time, any
object of investigation may still only be known in as far as our conceptual framework
can accommodate it. To some extent, however, frameworks change because of new
discoveries. Thus the concept "earth" changed considerably when it was proven that the
earth was not flat. That the concept "earth" could still be used at all must have been due
to the fact that on the surface nothing had changed. Thus the concepts up and down,
flat and spherical, east and west, etc. still applied. Similarly, we structure the coloured
world into light and dark, saturated and nonsaturated, reddish, bluish, greenish and
yellowish colours. Different causal explanations of how or why we structure colour in
this way do not affect these colour concepts. Invisible wavelengths, for instance, which
physically correlate to (at least a subclass of) what we call colours, are not colours
because we cannot judge whether they are light or dark, saturated or unsaturated, and so
on (see also chapters VIII and IX).
This leads to the question whether discoveries about wavelengths will be
discoveries about colours. I deny that this is the case. The wavelength theory is a mere
model. It might be objected that just as it is a matter offact that the earth is round and
revolves around the sun and it is simply false to claim the opposite, it might be also a
fact that light of the wavelength 640nm is red and simply false to deny this.
Furthermore, the correlation of wavelengths with colours might be taken to be a
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valuable insight into the nature of colour. But for whom? Perhaps it is because I do not
have a good head for figures that I still have to look up which wavelengths correlate to
which colours. For me at least, this correlation is completely arbitrary, and if red was
correlated with 460 or even 280 nm I should hardly notice the difference. When it
comes to the order of colours in the colour circle on the other hand, I have no difficulty
whatsoever in remembering which colour is next to which other colour. And this is not
due to the fact that I have now studied colour for a few years but rather that I can
always reconstruct the circle.1 Even if physicists may find it easy to remember that the
wavelength 640nm is correlated with red because they have a genuine understanding of
the nature of electromagnetic radiation, there still seems to be an essential difference
between connecting the seen with the seen (red with blue via purple, for instance) and
the seen with the unseen (red with 640nm, for instance). I am interested in the former,
while scientists are interested in the latter. My conclusion will therefore centre around
the necessary relations of the seen with the seen, i.e. necessary internal relations.
Whether these relations are ultimately determined by unseen physical qualities of the
coloured objects, the perceivers, or both, I cannot decide on, although my conclusion
favours explanations which involve both perceivers and objects. (One wonders what it
means to say that the necessity of the colour relations itself might be grounded in both
object and perceiver.)
Two sets of arguments lead to my conclusion. These are completely
independent of each other, one resting on common sense and the other on metaphysical
premisses. Unless one wants to exclude metaphysics categorically, there is no need to
choose between the two arguments, as they both lead to the same result, albeit on
different levels: Both combine ontological independence of colour with conceptual
dependence on human observers, and both resist the reduction of colour to entirely
subjective entities (such as sensations) or objective entities (physical or chemical
entities, or complex causal relations between these entities).
1 This is related to Wittgenstein's point that we have no difficulties in remembering pure (primary)
colours as we can always "construct" them (R.C.m,7,133).
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1. The Common Sense Argument
1.1. Colours exist independently of perceivers: Colour Constancy
It is very difficult if not impossible to explain colour constancy unless colours exist
independently of perceivers. If colours were ontologically dependent on individual
perceivers, there would be no colours when no-one was perceiving them. This would
lead to the absurd conclusion that colours would disappear each time someone
perceiving them blinked. One would also wonder what made the same colour re-appear
each time we looked at the same object. We are not normally surprised to find that most
objects have relatively stable colours over long periods of time; on the contrary, we
notice when colours change (fading pictures and clothes, renovated paintings, etc.).
Furthermore, we can recognise regions and paintings from descriptions given centuries
ago and we can tell if colours have changed since those descriptions were first given.
So, the idea that colours depend on individual perceivers is counterintuitive.
Even if colour does not depend on individual perceivers, someone arguing for
ontological perceiver-dependence of colour might say that colour requires the
possibility of being perceived. Thus the orchid in the rainforest is red because if David
Attenborough went to the rainforest he would see a red orchid. This account allows for
colours remaining the same over long periods of time and while individual perceivers
blink, as there might always be someone who could see the colour if he was there.
Yet this account does not solve the logical problem of colour constancy; To say
that a certain blue dye does not fade for twenty years is not the same as to say that if
someone was looking at it twenty years later he would see the same colour as he saw
twenty years earlier. For if we turn the sentence around we arrive at the following
statement: "If something looks the same to me as it looked twenty years ago then its
colour has not changed." This, however, is not necessarily true for I might have had an
accident resulting in colour-blindness.
One way of avoiding this problem, is to include a ceteris paribus clause in the
argument, such as "provided my vision has not changed". But this means that we
require a criterion for what counts as change of vision; and change of vision can only
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be defined with reference to a stable (i.e. viewer independent) world (see also chapter
IX). Furthermore, the possibility of colours changing entails the possibility of colour
constancy, whether both concepts are defined with reference to perceivers or not. But
colour change and colour constancy require a criterion for colour identity over time.
This criterion cannot be the perceptual experience of individuals, for if I insisted that a
colour had remained the same for the last twenty years, while someone else insisted that
it had changed, we could only settle our dispute by some objective criterion, such as a
photograph of the original colour for instance (on the condition that the photograph
captured the colour perfectly at the time and had not faded itself). Another objective
criterion might be the reflectance of the colour measured at the time under laboratory
conditions, a measurement which could be repeated after twenty years.
In a dispute about colours, someone arguing for perceiver-dependence of colour
has to take the judgment of a colour expert to be the decisive criterion, where the
colour expert would not be allowed to use any means of identifying the colour other
than looking at it. Yet the notion of a colour expert only makes sense if we believe that
colours exist objectively (in the sense of being perceiver-independent): We call a
person an expert if that person can identify what we know by independent means to be
of a certain quality; otherwise the notion of an expert does not make sense (we do not
call someone in great pain an expert of his pain, because he is the only person who can
feel this pain).
Thus colour exists independently of perceivers because perceivers use colours
themselves as criteria for colour judgments. Also, scientific measurements of spectral
reflectance, energy flux and other physical properties of colour only make sense if there
are colours the properties of which can be measured.
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1.2. But the nature of colour is bound to human thought
The argument from colour constancy establishes the existence of colour independently
of observers, but it does not establish what colours are. It allows for physical and
chemical reduction of colour to other entities, as well as for more unusual explanations
of colour, such as colours being the "deeds and sufferings of light". I now wish to argue
that the nature of individual colours can only be understood with reference to human
thought.
The first difficulty for anyone denying that the nature of colour depends on
human thought, is to explain the cultural differences between colour concepts. That
emotional and aesthetic aspects of colour are at least partially culturally determined can
be seen in cultural differences of colour symbolism and colour fashion. Other aspects of
colour are universal, such as the receding nature of blue (see chapter X). I therefore
distinguish between aspects of colour which are purely subjective and hence differ from
culture to culture or from individual to individual, and those which are universal but
nevertheless anthropocentric.
a) External, cultural influences on colour concepts
That the nature of colour can be determined by our conceptual frameworks becomes
apparent when we look at what counts as a colour. White, black and grey count as
colours in some contexts (such as flags, clothes, wallpaper, cars, etc.) but not in others
(photographs, film, painting). Also, football colours, orange and green in Northern
Ireland, and the colour of the human skin, are all relevant in some circumstances but
are ignored in others. The use of these colour concepts thus depends on contexts which
are external to and independent of the colour concepts themselves. Thus it is entirely
contingent which colours are relevant in which contexts. Even if most conventions for
the use of particular colours can be historically justified, they still depend on issues
external to the colour space. A purely objective account of colour will have difficulties
These conceptual frameworks are the same as what Wittgenstein calls "language games"; I prefer the term
"conceptual framework" as it seems less specific to just one philosopher.
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in explaining these colour concepts (and will probably dismiss them as "folk
concepts").3
b) Necessary Internal Relations
The necessary colour relations which form the framework of our colour concepts are
not affected by changes of context. As I demonstrated in chapter VIII, most colour
spaces show the same colour relations even if they set different priorities (which again
are based on factors external to colour)4 These internal relations are necessary (see
chapter VIH), and I shall now say why they are irreducible.
First of all, the necessary status as such is irreducible. Although I like to believe
that there are necessary relations in nature which philosophers and scientists can
discover, I reluctantly accept the stronger arguments by Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer,
Wittgenstein (Tractatus) and many other philosophers that necessity itself depends on
the logical structure of human thought. This leads to the question of how to explain the
logical structure of human thought. For as with Hardin's subjectivism we might be able
to explain structures of thought with reference to the physical make-up of the brain
which in turn could be explained with reference to general physical laws. But as this is
only possible by using the faculty of human thought, I believe this question to be
ultimately unanswerable: We can only grasp laws of nature with our human faculties,
and hence all laws of nature conform to the structures of human thought, i.e. can be
expressed in terms of human concepts. I am fully aware that this is not a satisfactory
answer regarding the status of necessity of colour relations. But a full answer could
only be given after a thorough investigation into the nature of necessity as such, and
this in turn goes beyond the scope of this thesis. All I can say is that colour relations are
Please note that Goethe, Schelling, and especially Hegel are able to explain these concepts because their
accounts are not purely objective. Hegel's account is particularly successful because of Hegel's emphasis on
history. On the other hand, all three accounts are at least partially outmoded, which shows how much their own
ideas are culturally determined.
4
Thus it is not the nature of colour itself that makes the pharmacist use a different colour space from the
decorator and the artist a different one from the physiologist, but the purpose for which each of these people
uses colour.
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just as necessary as other internal relations are (geometrical relations for instance). It
remains deeply puzzling why exactly the statements "yellow is darker than blue" or "red
is closer to green than it is to yellow" are necessarily false, but it is clear that our colour
relations would not be colour relations if they were any different from what they are
(see chapters Vm and EX).
Statements such as "blue is darker than yellow" are a priori true and even
analytical in a broad sense: The statement "blue is darker than yellow" is a priori true
because it is "true without reference to experience, except in so far as experience is
necessary for the understanding of its terms".5 This means on the one hand, that it is
true for any material which is yellow or blue (all else being equal - a very whitish-blue
would of course be lighter than a very dark yellow or brown), but on the other hand it
also means that it is not necessarily true for someone colour-blind, as someone colour¬
blind does not have the experience necessary for understanding of the concepts in this
statement (see chapter IX). Hence colours are not Kantian innate a priori concepts, but
are a priori in the broader sense given above.
In how far statements about the internal relations of colours are analytic
depends on how broadly we understand the notion of analyticity. That blue is darker
than yellow is true in virtue of the meaning of the words "blue", "yellow" and "darker
than", but one would hardly be able to formulate a number of definitions for these three
terms, from which the statement "blue is darker than yellow" could be logically
deduced. "Darker than yellow" cannot be understood as a predicate of blue because
otherwise we would require a whole list of similar predicates for each colour and this is
not the way our colour concepts are organised. The difficulty of assigning synthetic or
analytic characteristics to colour statements derives from the essentially three-
dimensionality of our colour space, which requires a two-dimensional shape as basis (a
5
A.Flew, Dictionary ofPhilososophy, London, 1979, p. 16.
0
Blue, for instance, would have the predicates "darker than yellow", "darker than red", "about the same
darkness but slightly darker than green", "darker than all mixtures of the above colours", ..., also "closer to
green than to red or yellow", "closer to red than to yellow", and so on. If we add white, black and grey to this
list as well as all mixed colours we will arrive at a very extensive list indeed. What this list really does,
however, is to give a description of the form often found in riddles ("If X sits next to Y and Y is opposite Z
and..."). Like the riddle it describes spatial relations of a situation which can much more easily be represented
by a drawing. Similarly, all our colour relations can be represented in a colour space.
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hue circle, triangle, square or other two-dimensional shape). Analyticity in the narrow
(Fregean) sense, however, is an essentially linear (arithmetic) concept which requires
meanings to be contained in words, in the way that small numbers are contained in
bigger numbers.
In conclusion, colours cannot be purely objective in the sense of being reducible to
quantifiable objective entities such as wavelengths or particles for the following two
reasons: First, our individual backgrounds make us use different colour concepts in
different situations, and this in itself is difficult to explain by a purely objective
account. More importantly, however, colour relations are irreducible to causal relations
between quantifiable objective entities, because they are internal relations and hence
their necessity is determined by human thought. Thus the fact that red and green are
fundamental complementaries, for instance, cannot be explained by reference to
chemical reactions in our eyes/brains because in an important sense the fact that red and
green are complementaries is primary to the fact that certain chemicals may cause us to
see red or green but never both at the same time. Thus in a different world the physical
causes could be different ones, but in all possible worlds red and green will be
complementary colours (provided there are to be colours at all in that world - for there
could be a monochrome or even non-coloured world such as the ones inhabited by
colour-blind and blind people.
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2. A metaphysical account:
2.1. The Objective Existence of Colour:
How the existence of colour can be deduced purely by reference to light and darkness,
which themselves are assumed to exist independently of observers.
Premisses
1. Everything is either ideal or real in the following sense:
ideal = eternal, non-changing, non-perceivable - can only be grasped by thought;
real = becoming (i.e. not eternal, changing), perceivable - can be grasped empirically
with our senses (and the aid of scientific instruments).
2. The ideal is essentially identical with itself and hence exists independently of other
things. The real is essentially different from other real things and hence exists in
relation to other things.7
3. Anschauung (contemplation/intuition) can unite the ideal and the real by "seeing" the
ideal in the real (see also ch.V).
Application to colour:
1. Light is ideal8 - it is invisible and can only be grasped by thought. Darkness is the
ideal (conceptual) opposite of light - it too is invisible. Turbidity is real - it is visible
and by its visibility is opposed to both light and darkness, in the sense in which the real
is opposed to the ideal: light and darkness appear in the real world (materialised in the
medium of turbidity) as the colours white and black (see chapter VII).
71 am aware thai everything is identical with itself, but the point about ideal things is that they are identical
with themselves and nothing else, whereas real things are identical with themselves but also in causal relations
to other things so that real things can be extensively defined by other real things, while ideal things must be
self explanatory.
g
The light here referred to is what I called "light-in-itself (ch.VI).
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2. The object of visibility9 is always turbid (i.e. not perfectly transparent) and coloured
(because everything non-transparent is coloured).10 So, turbidity and colour necessarily
co-exist, even though conceptually they are different from each other.
We see the opaque parts of turbidity (as the transparent parts are by definition
invisible). Colour is thus the total of the opaque parts of turbidity and hence a boundary
between us and whatever lies behind these opaque parts (this is most obvious in the
case of perfect opacity: surfaces).
Colour thus forms the visible boundary between light and darkness. With regard
to opaque objects we are always on the light side of them and do not see what lies
behind the surface of the object, so that colour forms a very obvious boundary between
us and the invisible. (We are naturally "enlightened" about the surfaces of objects but
"left in the dark" regarding their qualities beneath the surface.) Coloured transparencies
on the other hand, can be held against the light or against objects (i.e. darkness). If held
against the light they occlude parts of the light (weaken a white light source), held
against objects they occlude parts of the objects (make us not be sure about the colour
of the object, and even occlude very light transparent objects altogether). Although
coloured transparencies do not appear as boundaries themselves (provided their edges
coincide either with their background or with our visual field) their colours merge with
the coloured boundaries of the objects seen through them, so that again we see
boundaries and not the coloured transparency between us and the surface1'(see also
chapter VII). Boundaries are real not ideal, because ideality is identity with itself and,
by definition, boundaries establish differences.
9 Although I am trying to give an account of colours independent from observers I use the notion of
visibility as an essential aspect of reality. I am aware that the concept of visibility itself requires perceivers, but
do not think that this stands in the way of the argument, because the distinction I am making is the classical
one between the world of appearance (what I call "real" is thus the empirically real) and the world of true and
eternal things (what I call the "ideal world", which in Platonic terminology is of course the only real world).
So, as the whole of empirical reality requires human observers I can argue that colour like everything else
requires human observers but does not depend more on perceivers than other things in the empirically real
world.
10
I take this to be obviously the case.
''
Someone might object that we see the red light in a room with a red light bulb. I believe that this is only
true, if the air in the room is not perfectly clear (if it is smoky or steamy), in which case we get the impression
of an ever so thin red fog, which we notice as being in the way between us and the objects in the room.
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3. Anschauung (intuition/contemplation) can unite the ideal and the real by "seeing" the
ideal in the real.
The process of Anschauung is a seeing of a perfect form of something which
itself is merely real and hence imperfect. Colour as the boundary between light and
darkness is an especially good example of how the ideal can be seen in the real: In the
empirical world, boundaries inform us about the shape and possibly the quality of
whatever lies either side of them. (Thus the colour of a shining red tomato tells us both
about the quality of the fruit and about the lighting conditions it is seen in). But colour
is not merely a useful indicator in the empirical world, but also one of the most suitable
media for an Anschauung of the ideal, because colour contains the ideal (light) within
itself. Artists, for instance, can express ideals (such as beauty, truth, religion) using real,
material, colours.
The necessary internal relations between colours form a second kind of ideal
which can be grasped in painting. As an argument for colour objectivity, Anschauung is
the possibility of transcending the world of appearances by means of colour, which
hence must be at least partially independent of observers, as nothing wholly subjective
could lead us out of subjectivity towards pure (ideal) objectivity.
To conclude, this metaphysical account claims that the ideal opposition of light and
darkness manifests itself in real turbidity which is relatively dark or light and relatively
transparent or opaque and always coloured. Turbidity may thus be called the real
substance of colour. As every colour is necessarily turbid and everything turbid
necessarily coloured, and as furthermore turbidity is independent of observers as it only
depends on light and darkness (matter) for its existence, it follows that colour exists
independently of observers and is real and objective.
But because colour and turbidity are co-extensive, this "metaphysical argument"
by itself offers no reason why colour should not be reduced to turbidity - which itself is
visible and more or less dense matter. This account by itself is therefore a materialist
account of colour, unless one makes it part of a wider framework or proves that in itself
it is insufficient.
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2.2. Limitations of the metaphysical account.
As Goethe, Hegel and Schelling demonstrate, the metaphysical account can be
extended to explain individual colours and colour relations. But it generally fails to do
so satisfactorily because it either relies on personal intuitions or on holistic systems too
vast to serve as useful accounts for someone merely interested in colour.
In Goethe, Hegel and Schelling the metaphysical account continues more or
less in the following way:12 Turbidity is a visible medium of light and darkness, both in
the sense that it makes light and darkness visible and in that it is the medium of
visibility as such, which requires the opposition of light and darkness but is always
darker than light and lighter than darkness. Individual colours depend on the density
and extension of the medium (a broad medium appears denser than a narrow medium
of the same material) and on the spatial relation of the medium to light, darkness and
perceiver, for the same medium may be blue on one side and yellow on the other.
Individual colours are explained in the following way: White and black are the
pure visible representatives of light and darkness (see chapter VII). Blue appears on the
dark side of the medium and yellow on its light side. Thus the dark side of a dense
medium such as fog will appear blue (as the light from the other side hardly travels
through the fog) and blue will also appear on the light side of a thin medium, such as
glass, over a dark background. Yellow appears on the light side of a thick medium such
as fog, because the darkness can hardly be seen through the fog; and yellow appears on
the dark side of a thin medium held before the light, such as glass.
This account assumes a linear relationship between dark and light (visible as
black and white), which yields blue and yellow. As the turbid medium or the light
intensities change the two ends meet in the middle. Goethe's theory that red comes into
being when the forces are increased, and green as equilibrium when they are weakened,
is not supported by any strong evidence and, although beautifully expressed in his own
writings, may be disregarded as absurd. As I hope to have shown in chapter VIII, our
colour space is three-dimensional and can thus not be deduced from a bipolar line.
12~
For the purpose of the argument I shall neglect differences between the three accounts.
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One way out of this problem is to add another external dimension such as
temperature. This makes it difficult to argue for pure ideality of light and dark,
however, as light is then no longer identical with itself but stands in a causal relation
with temperature. It may yet be possible to give a consistent metaphysical account of
colour, but that requires a system as vast as Hegel's.13 For once we include other
polarities such as hot and cold we will find it hard to explain colour without explaining
everything. I therefore conclude that there could be a complete system which explains
both the existence of colour and the characteristics particular to individual colours.
Both Hegel's system as given in his Encyclopedia and the whole of modern science
could be two such complete systems. This may seem to be a strange coincidence, but
really it follows from the fact that Hegel and modem scientists both believe that there
are necessary truths in nature which we can discover. Like Goethe, I myself want to
believe that this is indeed the case. Like Goethe I even have strong emotional and
aesthetic reasons for hoping that there are necessities in nature which we can grasp. But
like Goethe I am also convinced that a good and clear account of colour relations can
be given independently of the status of its necessities. So while I find metaphysical
accounts such as those of Hegel and Schelling far more interesting than the common
sense one of Wittgenstein for instance, they prove to be less useful as a means of
explaining colour because of their vast interconnections and metaphysical baggage.
Similarly, scientific accounts require a vast knowledge of scientific backgrounds to
offer genuine insights into the nature of colour (because, as I argued above, the mere
fact that red is correlated with the wavelength 640nm for instance, means very little on
its own).
Goethe's Farbenlehre lies somewhere between all of these accounts. Tom
between idealism and realism, between poetic feelings and joy in empirical discoveries,
Goethe avoided the philosophical decision for one philosophical system. Although I
hope to have made at least some of the philosophical implications clearer than he has, I
can see that this thesis might be criticised for the same reason. Yet I do find merit in the
fact that we may learn something to be true without having to interpret this fact in only
13
Please note that modern scientific accounts of colour rely on just as vast a system as Hegel's account does,
often including the greater part of late twentieth century theory in physics, chemistry and physiology.
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one way. It could well be a strong advantage for philosophy if more subject matters
were investigated by themselves before they are presented to the scrutiny of
philosophers and scientists for explanations and justifications.
3. Colour as Unity of Subject and Object
Within this thesis I hope to have shown that because colour relations are necessary they
are irreducible to invisible particles obeying physical laws. For I believe that, firstly,
physical laws ultimately depend on the same logical (subjective) necessity our colour
relations are part of and hence have no greater explanatory value. This rests on the
uncomfortable supposition that physical laws are not objective necessary truths which
we can discover. As I said above, I am not quite happy with this answer myself, but for
now find the arguments in its favour more convincing than those of its opponents.
Secondly, I believe that colours are better explained by looking at colours and their
relations than by theorising about invisible entities. This philosophical attitude can
partly be explained by my scepticism about the informative value of physical
explanations and partly by the fact that we require basic colour concepts to know what
it is that we want to explain or reduce. Logically, basic colour relations as represented
in a colour space are thus primary to physical explanations or reductions.
For the sake of the argument, however, let us assume that we have found a
complete account of colour vision which reduces all colour relations and all processes
involved in colour vision to underlying physical causes (much like Locke envisaged it).
Suppose also that this account can indeed explain our colour relations. Such a complete
causal account must involve both external colour (physical input) and perceiver
(physiological processes). As a complete account it could in principle be implemented
on a computer and it would pass a colour Turing test. Let us further assume that the
computer could perform complex representational tasks, such as taking the effect of
blue as a distant colour into account. As a computer is in principle able to decode even
as complex images as paintings it could well pass the Turing test in an art college.
What it will always lack, however, is the understanding of the effect of paintings (even
if it could predict the effect certain paintings might have on human beings in different
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frames of mind), because a computer lacks what Goethe calls the "physiological
colours".
The subjective and active production of colour in our eyes is contrary to the
whole being of a computer, as computers are by definition objects and hence neither
subjective nor active but merely functional.14 The activity of the eye however is the
subjective completion of the colour circle and our means of judging colour harmony
and disharmony, even to the extent of strong moral and aesthetic effects. Leaving aside
their differences regarding the nature of subject and object, Goethe, Hegel and
Schelling agree on colour being a form of unity between subject and object: For Goethe
the subjective activity of the eye reflects the objective activity of the sun within us.
Hegel treats colours as synthesis of subjective (ideal) light and objective (real) matter,
and Schelling similarly as their indifference. All three thinkers explain the role of in
painting as a means of transcending the material of paint and canvas with reference to
this intrinsic duality in colour itself.
Colour can neither be explained by subjective idealism nor by eliminative
materialism, as both of these theories deny one essential aspect of colour: the subjective
idealist cannot explain colour constancy and the eliminative materialist cannot explain
the necessity of colour relations or the aesthetic effects of painting. Furthermore, the
subjective aspects of colour cannot possibly be reduced to objective entities nor the
objective properties to subjective ones, as subjectivity and objectivity are themselves
necessarily irreconcilable.15
While I have not produced a theory of colour myself, I hope to have clarified
why the nature of colour itself facilitates a great variety of colour theories. There is
certainly more to colour than meets the eye: colour is as much within us as it is external
to us. The possibility of painting transcending the material of paint and canvas is the
more beautiful argument for my thesis, but the necessity of colour relations which are
formulated with reference to public colour samples already shows that colours must be
some kind of unity of subject and object.
If a computer was not completely object it could not be used in reductivist arguments.
15
See also S.Priest, "Newton and Hegel: Can Science explain the Scientist?", in Petry, 1993, pp.115-123.
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1. Notes on Some German Words
Anschauung: In philosophical contexts, the word "Anschauung" is usually translated
as "intuition". "Anschauung" has the connotation of personal experience, and the
adjective "anschaulich" denotes characteristics of reports or explanations such as
"clear", "vivid", "graphic", i.e. as if you had seen it yourself. The concept of
"Anschauung" is hence often closer to the process of contemplation of objects than the
more internal process of intuition. This is also illustrated ("made anschaulich") by the
etymological connection with the English word "show".
Betrachtung: "Betrachtung" is often also translated as "contemplation". It is generally
a more organized kind of contemplation, and can also mean "examination". The word
"observation" is probably the best translation.
Erkennen, Erkenntnis: "Erkenntnis" is usually translated as "knowledge", which is
fine considering that the German word for epistemology, the theory of knowledge, is
"Erkenntnistheorie". Scientific "Erkenntnisse", however, are "scientific discoveries or
findings" which stem from the act of "erkennen" - to perceive, make out, recognize,
identify, acknowledge. Julian Young prefers the translation "cognition" which is also
used in standard translations of Kant's works. In the connection with colour "eine Farbe
erkennen" is best translated as "to identify or recognize a colour". The Scottish word
"ken" clearly shows the connection of "Erkenntnis" to both "can" (konnen) and "know/
be acquainted with" (kennen). The German word "Kunst" (art) is also related.
Erscheinung, Erscheinen: While the translation of "Erscheinung" as "appearance" is
usually adequate, one should beware of contrasting it with "reality". Although
"Erscheinung" can mean "apparition" or "vision", the primary German connotation of
"Erscheinung" is not only the outer appearance of someone or something, but also its
connection with (rather than contrast to) reality. Thus "in Erscheinung treten" is "to
become manifest", and "Erscheinungsform" is "manifestation". In relation to Goethe in
particular, it is interesting to note that "Erscheinung" can often be translated as
"phenomenon" (with reference to events: "a common phenomenon" - "eine haufige
Erscheinung") or "symptom" (as in symptoms of illness); these translations again show
the relation of "Erscheinung" to reality, with "Erscheinung" being the outer
mainfestation of reality. Altogether "appearing" might therefore be a slightly better
translation than "appearance", if it was not for the German grammatical equivalent of
"Erscheinen".
Farbenlehre: The word "Lehre" can be translated as apprenticeship, doctrine, theory,
lesson, teachings. Goethe's Farbenlehre contains aspects of all of these, but especially
of an apprenticeship. The three volume work describes the work of Goethe rising from
apprentice to master (it is his "Meisterstiick") and at the same time it teaches us and
asks us to do a similar (but not the same) apprenticeship. The translation "Theory of
Colour" is unsuitable because Goethe insists that it would be wrong to have a theory of
colour as long as the word "theory" has the connotation of "system" or "doctrine".
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Gemiit: Best translated as "heart and soul", the "Gemtit" comprises both spiritual and
emotional feelings, and has hence come to refer to the nature or disposition of a person
as a whole. When Goethe or the German Idealists speak of a piece of art that "riihrt" or
"regt das Gemiit" they mean something that reaches our innermost being, both
spiritually and emotionally. One might say that the "Gemtit" is the sum of our
subjective states.
Steigerung: "Steigerung" is both increase and intensification. I shall use the translation
"intensification" to stress the qualitative aspect of it.
Stufenfolge: literally a series of steps; also stages of development. I shall translate
"Stufenfolge" as "hierarchy" to emphasise the qualitative aspect of getting higher as you
climb steps. This may not be a good translation but I cannot think of a better one.
Triibe, triib: The adjective "triib" is contrasted mainly with "clear" (murky water,
cloudy liquid, muddy puddles, dirty glass and dull eyes can all be described as "triib")
and with "light" (dim light, dull weather, grey or overcast skies, dull or dingy colours).
It can thus be used figuratively as "gloomy" (mood, voice) or "dreary" (time). In its
literal sense "Triibe" describes the degrees of opposition to light and clarity. Thus it
may describe any state between perfect light and total darkness ("totale Triibe"), as well
as any state between perfect transparency and total opacity (again "totale Triibe").
Vorstellung: the verb "vorstellen" literally means "to stand something forward", ie. "to
put forward", hence "to introduce" and also "to represent". The reflexive form "sich
etwas vorstellen" means "to put something before one's mind" - "to imagine". There is
an obvious philosophical connection to the theory of representation, but in connection
with Schopenhauer I find the words "to present" and "presentation" more suitable than
"to represent" or "representation". The word "re-presentation" might suggest a process
in which we perceive the world as it is and then re-present it. Schopenhauer's "Welt als
Vorstellung", however, is always presented to us through our senses and our brains, so
that perception and representation are one and the same thing. "Vorstellung" can also
mean "presentation" in the sense of "performance". Thus "die Welt als Vorstellung" is
not the real world as it is in itself but only a performance for human comprehension.
Wesen: Wesen can be translated as "essence", "nature", "being" or "character". "Being"
and "essence" sound too abstract in English and have too many non-Goethean
philosophical connotations to be used. The word "character" captures the notion of the
"Wesen" of people well but sounds strange when used in connection with plants or
stones. So despite the possibility of confusion with outer nature ("mother nature"), I
shall use the translation "nature". After all Goethe wants to show how the inner nature
of a being is one with outer nature. To avoid confusion I shall however add the German
word wherever necessary ("nature (Wesen)").
Wirklichkeit: There are two translations for the words connected with this concept:
1.wirken, die Wirkung: to act, have an effect on; the
effect.
2.wirklich, Wirklichkeit: actual, real; reality.
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How the two are connected is best shown by Schopenhauer:
"To be [sein] is generally synonymous with to act [wirken]; accordingly, in German,
everything that is, is very strikingly and with unconscious profundity called actual
(wirklich), that is, acting (wirkend)." 1
1 "Sein ist uberhaupt mit Wirken gleichzusetzen: daher auch im Deutschen und mit unbewuBtem Tiefsinn
alles, was ist, wirklich, d.i. wirkend genannt wird. [US&F, §l,p.21]
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2. Kandinsky's Polarities
In tjber das Geistige in der Kunst Kandinsky establishes two pairs of colour
oppositions, the first one of which shows inner character as effect on the soul
("innerlichen Charakter als seelische Wirkung"), whereas the second one is "of physical
character, as in complementary colours" ("physikalischen Charakters, als
Komplementarfarben"). Together the two oppositions form a circle or ring between two
poles, which Kandinsky sees as "the life of simple colours between birth and death"
("das Leben der einfachen Farben zwischen Geburt und Tod").
(The Roman numbers denote the pairs of oppositions; from Kandinsky, Uber das
Geistige in der Kunst, 1951, p.105)
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First Pair of Oppositions (I and II)





























2nd excentric & concentric
(as yellow and blue, but in rigid form)
Kandinsky, Uber das Geistige in der Kunst, p.89.
322
Second Pair of Oppositions (in and IV)
(of physical character, as complementary colours)3
IE RED GREEN III. Opposition
1 movement the spiritually erased 1st opposition.
movement in itself | | = mobility in potentiality
= immobility
*5teol
Ex- and concentric movements lack completely.
In optical mixture = grey
as in mechanical [mix] of white and black = grey
IV ORANGE PURPLE IV. Opposition
bom from the 1st opposition from
1. active element of yellow in red = orange








3. Johann Leonhard Hoffmann
Hoffmann gives detailed parallels between colour and music in his Versuch einer
Geschichte der malerischen Harmonie iiberhaupt und der Farbenharmonie
insbesondere, mit Erlauterungen aus der Tonkunst und vielen praktischen
Anmerkungen (Halle, 1786; in HAM (1989, p.246). I agree with Goethe's criticism of
the way in which the natural appearances of colour and musical tone are arbitrarily
categorised into parallels unsuitable to their nature, but like him recommends the list,







Pure colours (Ganze Farben)









Heavenly colours (Himmlische Farben)
Earthly (brown) colours
(Irdische (braune) Farben)
Dominant tone (Herrschender Ton)






















Full tones (Ganze Tone)









High tones (Hohe Tone)
Bass (Kontratone)
Solo voice (Solostimme)
First and second voice
(Prime und Sekundstimme)
Violoncello (Violoncell)
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